Davis v. City of St. Louis, Missouri et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
WENDELL DAVIS, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 4:22-CV-902-ZMB
)
CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 	)
and OFFICER AMON FIGGS, in his 	)
individual capacity, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORADUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Wendell Davis’s second motion to amend his Complaint. Doc.
101. The Court previously dismissed all of Davis’s claims against Defendant City of St. Louis and
also denied his motion for leave to amend the Monell claim against the City due to the futility of
the proposed amendment. Doc. 49. Davis now renews his request to amend the Complaint due to
the release of an audit report from the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD)
regarding its Force Investigation Unit (FIU). Specifically, the most recent proposed amendments1
would add the City back to this case and reassert the Monell claim, buttressed with information
from the FIU Audit and other sources. While these new allegations hardly paint a flattering picture
of the FIU, they also do not change the Court’s prior conclusion regarding the futility of a revised
complaint. As a result, the Court must again deny Davis’s motion to amend.
1 At a status hearing, Davis’s counsel agreed that Counts 4 and 5 were not intentionally included in the proposed pleading,
as they were properly dismissed. Doc. 132 at 21–22. Accordingly, the Court deems these amendments abandoned and
will not address them further.
Case: 4:22-cv-00902-ZMB Doc. #: 140 Filed: 01/05/26 Page: 1 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
BACKGROUND
I. 	Factual Background
The Court accepts as true the following well-pled facts. On August 31, 2017, Defendant
Amon Figgs was on patrol in St. Louis, Missouri, when he noticed a parked vehicle with a license
plate number similar to one on his “hot sheet” of stolen cars. Doc. 1 ¶ 8. Upon closer inspection,
Figgs determined that the plate did not match his list or, for that matter, any other vehicle that had
been reported stolen. Id. ¶ 9. Nevertheless, he decided to investigate further. Id. ¶ 10. Before approaching
the vehicle, Figgs and other SLMPD officers set up “spike teams” in various locations. Id. ¶ 11.
Figgs then proceeded to surveil the vehicle as Davis entered the passenger seat. Id. ¶ 12. After the
vehicle began to drive away, officers deployed spike strips to flatten its tires. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. When
vehicle came to a stop, Davis got out, and Figgs pursued him on foot. Id. ¶ 13. Figgs eventually
caught up with Davis and shot him in the back without warning and despite being equipped with
a Taser. Id. ¶ 14–17; see also Docs. 26 ¶ 4, 26-1 ¶ 15 (correcting the number of times Davis was
shot). As a result of the shooting, Davis remains paralyzed from the waist down. Doc. 1 ¶ 19.
II. 	Procedural Background
Davis filed this case in August 2022. Id. His original complaint contained a claim of
municipal liability against the City. Id. ¶¶ 35–46. In November 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss
the Monell and other claims against the City. Doc. 8. Five months later, Davis filed a motion to
amend his complaint, including proposed amendments to the Monell claim. Doc. 26. The Court
subsequently granted the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and denied in relevant part Davis’s
Motion to Amend due to its futility. Doc. 49.
Case: 4:22-cv-00902-ZMB Doc. #: 140 Filed: 01/05/26 Page: 2 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
Davis now “seeks to amend in order to re-plead [the Monell claim] with more information
regarding the systemic failures of the FIU.” Doc. 102 at 6. The FIU was created in 2014 to
investigate the criminal aspects of police shootings, and the SLMPD audited the Unit in 2017 to
assess the efficacy of its work. Doc. 102-1 ¶¶ 40, 55. The report highlighted various policy violations
and investigative shortcomings. Id. ¶¶ 38–53. At various points in this case, Davis attempted to obtain
the FIU Audit in discovery. See Doc. 102 at 2–4 (describing efforts to uncover the report). A redacted
version of report was then released in September 2024 in another case. Ball-Bey v. Chandler, No.
4:18-CV-1364-SPM, Doc. 449-1 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 26, 2024). Although the deadline for amending
pleadings had long since passed, Doc. 85, Davis quickly filed a renewed motion to amend citing
the information revealed in the FIU Audit. Doc. 101. The proposed amended complaint contains more
than 30 new allegations from three sources: (1) the FIU Audit, (2) previously available information,
and (3) details from “recently released” text messages. See Doc. 102-1. The City once again opposes
the motion, arguing that the amendments remain futile and that it would be prejudiced at this late
stage of the case. Doc. 109. Following Davis’s reply, Doc. 121, the motion is ripe for resolution.
LEGAL STANDARD
After the time for amendment “as a matter of course,” a plaintiff may modify its complaint
“only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” F ED. R. C IV. P. (15)(a)(2).
Rule 15 generally requires courts to “freely give leave to amend when justice so requires.” Id.
“But parties do not have an absolute right to amend their pleadings, even under this liberal standard.”
Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, 532 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Indeed, various
reasons justify a district court’s denial of leave to amend, including “undue delay, bad faith, or
dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of the amendment.” Id. (citation omitted).
Case: 4:22-cv-00902-ZMB Doc. #: 140 Filed: 01/05/26 Page: 3 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
“When a party seeks to amend after court-imposed deadlines for doing so,” it must also
satisfy the “stricter standards” of Rule 16, which requires a “showing of good cause.” Midwest
Med. Sols. v. Exactech U.S., 95 F.4th 604, 607 (8th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted); see also FED. R.
C IV. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s
consent.”). The application of the “good-cause standard is not optional.” Cheeks v. Belmar, ---
F.4th ---, 2025 WL 3560674, at *4 (8th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). “The primary measure of
good cause is the movant’s diligence in attempting to meet the order's requirements.” Sherman,
532 F.3d at 716. “Only after the movant shows good cause may the court consider whether
amendment is proper under Rule 15(a).” Cheeks, 2025 WL 3560674, at *3.
A moving party may fail to show “good cause when there has been no change in the law,
no newly discovered facts, or any other changed circumstance after the scheduling deadline for
amended pleadings.” Sherman, 532 F.3d at 718 (quotation omitted); see also Ellingsworth v.
Vermeer Mfg. Co., 949 F.3d 1097, 1100 (8th Cir. 2020); Spates v. Lombardi, 2024 WL 3549101,
at *2 (8th Cir. 2024). Similarly, courts have denied leave to amend where allegedly new facts were,
in fact, available to the party prior to the amendment deadline. See, e.g., IBEW Loc. 98 Pension
Fund v. Best Buy Co., 326 F.R.D. 513, 524 (D. Minn. 2018). And “futility is always a basis to deny
leave to file an amended complaint.” A.H. v. St. Louis Cnty., 891 F.3d 721, 730 (8th Cir. 2018).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Rule 16 Good-Cause Analysis
As a threshold matter, this Court must examine whether Davis has demonstrated sufficient
diligence in pursuing his proposed allegations to justify the filing of an amended complaint more
than a year after the applicable deadline. See Doc. 23; Cheeks, 2025 WL 3560674, at *3. There is
little doubt that Davis’s exhaustive efforts to obtain the FIU Audit and the speed with which he
filed a second motion to amend after the report’s release constitute good cause for that new
information. Doc. 102 at 1–4. However, he has not shown the same diligence with respect to the
other new facts, as this information was either publicly available or reasonably discoverable well
before the pleading-amendment deadline.
Case: 4:22-cv-00902-ZMB Doc. #: 140 Filed: 01/05/26 Page: 4 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
A majority of the new allegations contain information that was previously available in the
public sphere. These facts include the 2009 deposition of Michael Sack, the disciplinary hearing
of Steven Burle, public statements made by the FIU in 2014, the 2021 report from the Arch City
Defenders, police policies and general orders, and general information about previous police
shootings.2 Doc. 102-1 ¶¶ 39–43, 53. Indeed, Davis does not even attempt to suggest he had good
cause for adding these publicly available facts, apparently recognizing his lack of diligence. Doc. 102
at 5; see Int’l Techs. Mktg. v. Verint Sys., 850 F. App’x 38, 43 (2d Cir. 2021) (affirming denial of
motion to amend based on information that was publicly available before the amendment deadline);
Morgan Art Found. v. McKenzie, 2021 WL 863264, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2021) (“[M]aterial
that is already in the public domain . . . [b]y definition . . . cannot justify a late motion to amend.”)
(collecting cases).
Davis likewise has not shown diligence with respect to the text messages cited in his
proposed amendments. Doc. 102-1 ¶ 50; Davidson v. MTD Prods. Co., 2025 WL 289477, at *4
(11th Cir. Jan. 24, 2025) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend based on lack
of diligence) (citing Millennium Partners v. Colmar Storage, 494 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007)).
There is no indication that he specifically requested or was denied access to these messages (or
their content) prior to the FIU Audit’s public release, and some basic Google queries suggest that
they became public well before the amendment deadline. In any event, given that Davis bears the
burden of establishing good cause, see Sherman, 532 F.3d at 716, his failure to even address
diligence as to this information is dispositive.
2 The Court recognizes that the FIU Audit adds a few minor details about the shootings, but the vast majority of facts
appear to be public information that was available before the report’s release. See Ball-Bey, No. 4:18-CV-1364-SPM,
Doc. 449-1 at 31, 37; Doc. 102-1 ¶¶ 63, 65. Nor does Davis even attempt to meet his burden of explaining otherwise.
Case: 4:22-cv-00902-ZMB Doc. #: 140 Filed: 01/05/26 Page: 5 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
In sum, Davis has demonstrated “good cause” under Rule 16 to amend his complaint to
include allegations directly related to the FIU Audit. But he has not shown the same diligence in
uncovering information previously known to the public, including the “recently released” text
messages. As such, the Court will consider only the FIU Audit in its analysis under Rule 15(a).3
II. 	Rule 15(a) Futility and Prejudice Analysis
Once the Court has determined that good cause exists for an amendment, it must analyze
the proposed complaint under Rule 15(a). See id. at 716 (citation omitted); Mahnken v. Wright
Med. Tech., No. 4:18-CV-2095-SRC, 2020 WL 255809, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 17, 2020) (“If a party
has been diligent in meeting the scheduling order’s deadlines, the Court should then decide if the
amendment is proper under Rule 15(a).”). This analysis includes considering whether the
amendment would be futile or if there would be “unfair prejudice to the non-moving party.”
Mahnken, 2020 WL 255809, at *1. Both hurdles preclude amendment here.
a. 	Futility
Davis seeks “to replead his Monell claim against the City,” Doc. 101 ¶ 6; Doc. 102-1 ¶¶ 37–
69, while the City opposes the proposed amendment primarily on the grounds of futility, Doc. 109.
“An amendment is futile if the amended claim ‘could not withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule
3 The parties have not cited—and the Court could not locate—any authority directly addressing the proper analysis
where a party establishes good cause for some proposed amendments while failing to show diligence with respect to
others. But courts have suggested that, at most, only new facts and related allegations should be evaluated under Rule 15.
See, e.g., Farsura v. QC Terme US Corp., 342 F.R.D. 373, 376–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (granting leave to amend in part
while rejecting attempt to use genuinely new facts to shoehorn previously known and publicly available information),
vacated on reconsideration to deny motion to amend, 2023 WL 2919553 (Mar. 14, 2023); Ruvalcaba v. Ocwen Loan
Servicing, 2018 WL 295973 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2018) (finding no good cause where only 2 of 30 new allegations were
based on information from after the amendment deadline); cf. Carbajal v. Dorn, 2010 WL 487433, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2010)
(striking new allegations that exceeded the scope of previously authorized amendments for failure to show good cause).
Moreover, this Court is convinced that entertaining non-diligent proposed amendments would undermine the rationale
for requiring the good-cause showing in the first place—namely, respect for court-ordered deadlines and efficient case
management. See Cheeks, 2025 WL 3560674, at *4 (“Applying Rule 15(a) without first requiring good cause under
Rule 16(b) would effectively read the good-cause requirement out of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). That
said, even were the Court to consider all of Davis’s new allegations in its futility analysis, he still would fail to establish
an unconstitutional custom or failure to train, supervise, or discipline for similar reasons.
Case: 4:22-cv-00902-ZMB Doc. #: 140 Filed: 01/05/26 Page: 6 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
12(b)(6).’” Hillesheim v. Myron’s Cards & Gifts, 897 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Silva
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 711, 719 (8th Cir. 2014)). Thus, the Court must examine the
proposed complaint to see if Davis’s new allegations would allow him to survive a motion to
dismiss. See Doc. 49 at 2 (setting out the relevant legal standard).
Given that Davis seeks to renew his Monell claim against the City, the Court must again
assess municipal liability under section 1983. The Court previously detailed the types of Monell
claims and relevant standards, see Doc. 49 at 3–4, but it bears repeating that “[t]he Supreme Court
has set a high bar” for establishing such liability “and demands careful analysis . . . to avoid any risk
that liability could be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior.” Soltesz v. Rushmore Plaza
Civic Ctr., 847 F.3d 941, 947 (8th Cir. 2017). Davis does not meaningfully allege an official policy
or a failure to train,4 so an unofficial custom and a failure to supervise or discipline are the only
types of Monell claims before the Court. See Watkins v. City of St. Louis, 102 F.4th 947, 953 (8th
Cir. 2024). Davis’s proposed amendments fall short of establishing either of these claims.
1. 	Unconstitutional-Custom
To establish an unconstitutional unofficial custom, Davis must show: “(1) the existence of
a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by [government]
employees; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by . . . policymaking
officials after notice . . . of that misconduct; and (3) an injury by acts pursuant to the government
entity’s custom.” Edwards v. City of Florissant, 58 F.4th 372, 376 (8th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).
Further, this custom must be “the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Watkins, 102
4 While Davis has styled the Monell claim in his proposed amended complaint as a broad “Failure to Train, Supervise,
and Discipline,” the specifics of Davis’s proposed amendments primarily revolve around supervisory failures, along
with potentially intentional failures to investigate police shootings, Doc. 102 at 3, with only conclusory allegations
regarding the failure to train officers, Doc. 101 at 3; Doc. 102-1 ¶¶ 71–74. Thus, Davis has at most alleged a failure
to supervise or discipline, and the Court will consider only these non-conclusory allegations. Doc. 102 at 9, 12.
Case: 4:22-cv-00902-ZMB Doc. #: 140 Filed: 01/05/26 Page: 7 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
F.4th at 953 (quotation and alterations omitted). In other words, there must be “a direct causal link
between the municipal policy or custom and the Plaintiff’s constitutional deprivation.” Jackson v.
City of Maplewood, No. 4:24-CV-1207-NCC, 2025 WL 2299393, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 7, 2025)
(quoting Danielson v. Huether, 355 F. Supp. 3d 849, 872 (D.S.D. 2018)).
Davis’s proposed amendments include allegations about: (1) the FIU Audit, (2) the
SLMPD’s purportedly similar shootings of fleeing suspects, and (3) “recently released” text
messages.5 Doc. 102-1 ¶¶ 38–69. Davis asserts that these facts help prove that, at the time of his
shooting, the SLMPD “employed a custom of turning a blind eye to its officers’ rampant use of
excessive force.” Doc. 121 at 6. Even taken in the light most favorable to Davis, these facts would
not change the Court’s previous conclusion that the Monell claim cannot survive a motion to
dismiss.
Critically, Davis again fails to plead facts sufficient to meet the second element: “deliberate
indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity’s policymaking
officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct.” See Jackson, 2025 WL 2299393, at *7
(emphasis added). While the proposed complaint is replete with allegations of wrongful conduct,
it fails to assert that SLMPD policymaking officials were on notice of this misconduct. Significant
5 As discussed above, the Court will consider only the facts directly drawn from the FIU Audit in its futility analysis,
as Davis has not demonstrated good cause for his delay in including the other allegations. However, even if Davis had
good cause for pleading the other information at this late stage, his proposed complaint still falls short of establishing
a custom. Specifically, Davis points to seven shootings and one tasing to suggest that, even before the audit,
policymakers would have had “constructive” notice of the issue. See Burbridge v. City of St. Louis, 430 F. Supp. 3d
595, 619–20 (E.D. Mo. 2019) (“Multiple incidents of misconduct may establish the existence of a custom if some
evidence indicates that the incidents occurred over a course of time sufficiently long enough to permit notice of, and
then deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of, the conduct by policymaking officials.”). But seven shootings
over the course of six years is insufficient to show a custom. See Naes v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:19-CV-2132-SEP,
2021 WL 6049815, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 21, 2021) (finding eight incidents over nine years insufficient); see also
Burbridge, 430 F. Supp. 3d at 620–21 (concluding that “two or three” instances of unconstitutional conduct a year
apart do not establish a custom). As the Court previously noted, even ten incidents over the course of several years
would be insufficient to establish a custom “in a police department that serves over 300,000 residents.” Doc. 49 at 10–11.
For similar reasons, the text messages do not demonstrate a sufficiently widespread pattern that can be imputed to the
City. Thus, Davis has again failed to plead an unconstitutional-custom claim.
Case: 4:22-cv-00902-ZMB Doc. #: 140 Filed: 01/05/26 Page: 8 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
in this regard is the timing of events. The FIU Audit is dated May 17, 2018, Doc. 102 at 1, but
Davis’s injury occurred months earlier, in August 2017. Doc. 1 ¶ 8. Thus, even if the FIU Audit
were sufficient to show an unconstitutional custom, there is no indication that policymakers were
on notice of the problems identified in the report until almost a year after Davis’s injury. This
failure to show notice is fatal to a Monell custom claim. See Edwards, 58 F.4th at 378.
2. 	Failure to Supervise or Discipline
Pleading a failure to supervise or discipline under section 1983 here requires facts sufficient
to show that: (1) the City’s supervisory or disciplinary practices were inadequate; (2) the City was
deliberately indifferent to the rights of others in adopting those practices and its failures were the
result of deliberate and conscious choices; and (3) the City’s alleged deficiencies caused Davis’s
constitutional deprivation. See Ulrich v. Pope Cnty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2013).
“Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault,” absent a “pattern of similar constitutional
violations,” a plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the need for more supervision or discipline
was “so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that
the policymakers of the [SLMPD] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to
the need.” Doe v. Fort Zumwalt R-II Sch. Dist., 920 F.3d 1184, 1189 (8th Cir. 2019) (quotations
omitted). Under Eighth Circuit precedent, a failure to train, supervise, or discipline is the most
difficult Monell claim to make because, “[i]n virtually every instance where a person has
[allegedly] had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will
be able to point to something the city ‘could have done’ to prevent the unfortunate incident.”
Mendoza v. United States Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 849 F.3d 408, 420 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
While the FIU Audit paints a picture that is by no means flattering, Davis has not
sufficiently pled that the City was deliberately indifferent to the issues highlighted in the audit. As
Case: 4:22-cv-00902-ZMB Doc. #: 140 Filed: 01/05/26 Page: 9 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
an initial matter, as the City notes, the audit itself was the product of the SLMPD attempting to
remedy these very problems once a new head of the FIU became aware of them in 2018. Doc. 109
at 8. But even considering the allegations regarding the FIU Audit in the light most favorable to
Davis, they lack the specificity required to establish a failure to supervise or discipline. Davis’s
proposed amendments allege several failures on the part of the FIU, including investigatory errors,
issues caused by FIU officers working secondary jobs, limited command oversight, officers
approving their own reports, and delays in beginning investigations. However, Davis does not
establish that the issues with the FIU were so obvious and so likely to violate an individual’s
constitutional rights that liability should be imputed to the City—much less that any relevant
policymakers were effectively on notice of these issues in August 2017.
Accordingly, the Court must again deny Davis’s motion to amend on futility grounds, as it
is unlikely that his proposed complaint would survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
b. 	Prejudice
The prejudice from allowing an amendment at this stage of litigation provides an independent
basis for denying the motion to amend. Davis suggests that the City’s repeated delay in releasing
the FIU Audit precludes a finding of prejudice. Doc. 102 at 10–11. He also asserts that the facts
underlying his claim were “known or available to all parties” and that the amendments would not
“radically alter the scope and nature” of this litigation. Id. But the record belies these claims.
The Eighth Circuit has noted that “[a]ny prejudice to the nonmovant must be weighed
against the prejudice to the moving party by not allowing the amendment.” Bell v. Allstate Life
Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 452, 454 (8th Cir. 1998). Further, “when late tendered amendments involve new
theories of recovery and impose additional discovery requirements, courts are less likely to find
Case: 4:22-cv-00902-ZMB Doc. #: 140 Filed: 01/05/26 Page: 10 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
an abuse of discretion due to the prejudice involved.” Id.; see also Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs.,
512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008) (same).
Here, any hardship to Davis would be minimal given the futility of the amendment, and
the prejudice to Defendants is obvious. The Court dismissed the claim against the City more than
two years ago. Since that time, discovery has been completed, and the parties have fully briefed a
motion for summary judgment, as well as dueling Daubert motions. Docs. 92, 94, 96. Contrary to
Davis’s claim that the proposed amendments would not radically alter the scope of this litigation,
renewing the Monell claim against the City would require reopening of discovery, additional
expert reports, and renewed motions for summary judgment—significantly delaying the ultimate
resolution of this case. Thus, the prejudice to both the City and Figgs of permitting a belated
amendment strongly outweighs the harm to Davis, bolstering the rationale for denying his motion.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s second [101] Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint.
So ordered this 5th day of January 2026.
ZACHARY M. BLUESTONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case: 4:22-cv-00902-ZMB Doc. #: 140 Filed: 01/05/26 Page: 11 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>