USA v. Martin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Kenneth Martin’s Motion to Suppress
Evidence (ECF No. 41) and Motion to Dismiss Indictment (ECF No. 42). All pretrial matters were
referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The
undersigned recommends the motion be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 1, 2024, a grand jury indicted Mr. Martin on one count of felon in possession of a
firearm. Mr. Martin filed the pending Motion to Suppress Evidence arguing the Court should
suppress any evidence, including a firearm and statements, obtained as the result of a warrantless
search of Mr. Martin’s cross body bag conducted without his consent. Mr. Martin’s Motion to
Dismiss Indictment on Second Amendment Grounds alleges that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is
unconstitutional and violates the Second Amendment.
On June 25, 2025, the parties appeared for an evidentiary hearing. The Government offered
testimony of St. Louis County Police Department Officer Nathan Phillips. The defense did not
offer any witnesses, but defense counsel elicited testimony from the Government’s witnesses on
cross-examination. The parties filed post-hearing briefs. These matters were fully briefed and
submitted on October 14, 2025. The matter is now ready for resolution.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNETH MARTIN,
Defendant.
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Case No. 4:24-CR-205 MTS/RHH
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The undersigned has carefully considered the evidence offered and admitted at the
evidentiary hearing, including the credibility of the Government's witness. The undersigned has
also considered the arguments of the parties both at the hearing and in their written submissions.
(ECF Nos. 41, 42, 47, 48, 53, 56, 66.) Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, the oral
arguments made on the record, and the written submissions of the parties, the undersigned makes
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
On Friday evening, November 10, 2023, St. Louis County Police Officer Nathan Phillips
(“Officer Phillips”) assigned to the Bureau of Transit Police. Officer Phillips was conducting
surveillance on the MetroLink property located near Interstate 70 and Hanley Road. Officer
Phillips was located on the second floor of the parking garage and utilized spotting binoculars to
observe the bus terminals and train platforms. Officer Phillips’ partner was Officer Downen.
Officer Phillips observed a subject, later identified as Mr. Martin, sitting south of the number 98
bus stall. Officer Phillips could see Mr. Martin drinking from a Grey Goose Vodka bottle and
could hear music playing from his mobile phone. Officer Phillips also observed Mr. Martinn
wearing a cross-body bag that appeared to contain a heavy object. Officer Phillips wore a body
camera that recorded both his surveillance and his contact with Mr. Martin. The Government
moved to admit the video from Officer Phillips body Camera into evidence as Government Exhibit
1. Officer Downen drove the patrol vehicle to the bus lanes and Officer Phillips walked to the bus
platform to contact Mr. Martin. Upon reaching the bus platform, Officer Phillips observed Mr.
Martin smoking a cigarette. Officer Phillips informed Mr. Martin that smoking or drinking alcohol
was not allowed on MetroLink property. Mr. Martin apologized and extinguished his cigarette on
the bench. Officer Phillips asked for and received Mr. Martin’s identification. Officer Phillips
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informed Mr. Martin that he was going to run his information to see if he had active warrants.
Officer Phillips stated that based on his observation of Mr. Martin smoking and drinking alcohol,
he had the choice of writing a warning, issuing a summons, or placing Mr. Martin under arrest.
The record check indicated that Mr. Martin had an active warrant for his arrest, was on probation,
and had a physically violent caution code attached. Officer Phillips informed Mr. Martin of the
warrant and told him that he would contact the issuing agency to verify the warrant and see if they
wanted him taken into custody. Officer Phillips informed Mr. Martin that he needed to go to the
patrol car to verify this information. Before leaving his partner alone while he went to the patrol
car, he asked Mr. Martin if he had any weapons on his person. Mr. Martin did not answer the
question and kept asking could he go home. At this point Officer Phillips decided to pat down Mr.
Martin for weapons. Mr. Martin attempted to secure the cross-body bag close to his body. Officer
Phillips removed the cross-body bag from Mr. Martin and immediately observed a knife in an
unzipped compartment in plain view. Officer Phillips also could feel an object that was consistent
with the weight and feel of a firearm within the cross-body bag. Officer Phillips testified that,
based on his training and experience, individuals frequently keep firearms in cross body bags,
individuals who possess firearms evade questions pertaining to firearms, and the weight and feel
of the bag was consistent with that of a firearm. Officer Phillips searched the cross-body bag and
located two handguns in the main compartment. Officer Phillips made the decision to arrest Mr.
Martin after he observed the knife in plain view.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In his motion and post-hearing brief, Mr. Martin argues the Court should suppress evidence
of the firearm and his statements because the warrantless search of Mr. Martin’s cross-body bag
person does not comply with the Fourth Amendment. He asserts Officer Phillips was no longer in
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danger from a weapon in the cross-body bag after it was removed from Mr. Martin’s person and
he was in handcuffs.
A. Probable Cause Existed to Arrest Mr. Martin
“A warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if is supported by probable
cause. United States v. Finely, 56 F4th 1159, 1165 (8th Cir 2023). “Probable cause exists ‘when
the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest [is] sufficient to lead a reasonable person
to believe that the defendant has committed or is committing and offense.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted). The existence of probable cause is determined from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable officer, not the defendant. Id.
In this case, it is clear that Officer Phillips had probable cause to arrest Mr. Martin. In fact,
Mr. Martin does not argue that probable cause did not exist to support his arrest. Officer Phillips
observed Mr. Martin on MetroLink property drinking alcohol, smoking a cigarette, and playing
loud music from his mobile phone via a speaker worn around his neck. Officer Phillips also found
that Mr. Martin had an active warrant for his arrest. Accepting Officer Phillips’ testimony as true,
he did not intend to arrest Mr. Martin at the time of the search of the cross-body bag. Therefore,
the law requires a separate justification to support a pat-down search for weapons.
B. Pat-Down Search Pursuant to Terry
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable searches and seizures” by
the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV. For a search to be reasonable, the Government generally
must obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before “physically intruding on constitutionally
protected areas” or otherwise searching areas or items in which an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-10 (2013). “In the absence of a warrant,
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a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley
v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014) (internal citation omitted).
Although probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Martin, Officer Phillips’ encounter with Mr.
Martin was also permissible under Terry v. Ohio. Police officers may briefly detain an individual
for an investigative purpose when they have a reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity may be
afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); see also United States v. Roberts, 787 F.3d 1204,
1209 (8th Cir. 2015). “The concept of reasonable suspicion is not ‘readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’” United States v. Quinn, 812 F.3d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). “Reasonable suspicion must be supported
by more than a ‘mere hunch,’ but ‘the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level
required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying the preponderance of the
evidence standard.’” Roberts, 787 F.3d at 1209 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
274 (2002)). A reviewing court considers the totality of the circumstances. See id.
In assessing the reasonableness of the suspicion, officers may “draw on their own
experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273
(internal quotations and citation omitted). The Court may also consider “[s]ituational factors
including the time of day or night and the location of the suspect parties [which] may support the
reasonableness of an officer's decision to conduct a stop.” Roberts, 787 F.3d at 1209 (internal
quotations and citations omitted); see also United States v. Preston, 685 F.3d 685, 690 (8th Cir.
2012) (nighttime traffic stops are inherently dangerous). Although reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity does not, without more, automatically entitle an officer to frisk a subject, see
United States v. Slater, 979 F.3d 626, 629 (8th Cir. 2020), where the police have reasonable
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suspicion to believe that a subject is armed and “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger,” they may frisk
that subject as part of the Terry stop. United States v. Reddick, 910 F.3d 358, 362 (8th Cir. 2018)
(citation omitted); see also United States v. Pope, 910 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 2018) (“[I]t remains
reasonable to allow an officer to frisk someone whom the officer has lawfully stopped and whom
the officer reasonably believes is armed.”). “A pat-down is permissible if a reasonably prudent
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in
danger.” United States v. Gaffney, 789 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2015). “Certainly it would be
unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their
duties.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 23. An officer conducting an investigation at close range may protect
himself by conducting a limited protective search for concealed weapons “to allow the officer to
pursue his investigation without fear of violence.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
Mr. Martin challenges the constitutionality of Officer Phillips’ pat-down search. Officer
Phillips had reasonable suspicion Mr. Martin may be armed. After a few initial questions, Mr.
Martin began correctly and appropriately responding to Officer Phillips’ questions. He apologized
for smoking and drinking. He even told Officer Phillips that he was on probation. There was
nothing about the encounter initially that would create reasonable suspicion that Mr. Martin may
be armed or pose a danger to the officers.
During the time between Officer Phillips’ initial encounter with Mr. Martin and the pat-
down search, the officer learned he had an active warrant and confirmed that he was on probation.
Upon learning Mr. Martin had an active warrant for his arrest, Officer Phillips informed Mr. Martin
that he needed to contact the agency issuing the warrant to confirm if they want him arrested.
Officer Phillips informed Mr. Martin that he needed to go to his vehicle to verify the information.
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He stated that before leaving his partner alone, he needed to ask if Mr. Martin possessed any
weapons. Mr. Martin evaded the question multiple times. He also clutched the cross-body bag to
secure it to his body. These actions by Mr. Martin and articulated by Officer Phillips gave rise to
reasonable suspicion to support a pat-down search pursuant to Terry.
Officer Phillips testified that based on his training and experience individuals frequently
carry firearms in cross-body bags and he had hopes that he could search Mr. Martin’s bag. In his
brief, Mr. Martin infers that he desired to conduct a pat-down search because he personally hoped
to find him in possession of a firearm. The Court does not find Mr. Martin’s argument convincing,
nor would the officer’s personal hopes be relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis. “As we
made clear in Whren, ‘the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated
by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the
action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.’ … Subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
Officer Phillips’ subjective intentions were not demonstrated to be contrary to his testimony, nor
are they relevant to the probable cause or reasonable suspicion analysis.
Mr. Martin argues that Officer Phillips had removed the cross-body bag and placed him in
handcuffs prior to searching the bag. Because the cross-body bag was in exclusive possession and
control of law enforcement the search was not subject to the search incident to arrest exception to
the warrant requirement. Mr. Martin relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Chadwick for this proposition. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). Mr. Martin’s
reliance on Chadwick is misplaced.
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In Chadwick, federal agents conducted surveillance on defendants as they retrieved a
footlocker and suitcases after departing a train. Id. at 3. Unbeknownst to defendants, a drug dog
alerted the agents to the presence of narcotics. Id. at 4. Agents arrested defendants as they loaded
the luggage into their vehicle. Id. Defendants and their vehicle were transported to a federal
building. Agents searched the footlocker at the federal building approximately an hour and a half
after defendants’ arrest. Id. Agents did not obtain defendants’ consent to search, nor did they obtain
a search warrant. Id. Agents had no reason to believe that the footlocker contained explosive or
that defendants would be able to access it. Id. The Court held that:
[W]arrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot
be justified as incident to that arrest either if the “search is remote in time or place from the
arrest,” Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. [364, 367 (1964)], or no exigency exists. Once
law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately
associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer
any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy
evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15.
Here, the search of Mr. Martin’s cross-body bag occurred within seconds of Officer Phillips
seeing a knife in plain view in an open pocket of the bag. Mr. Martin was in arms reach of Officer
Phillips at the time of the search. Whether an officer has exclusive control of a seized item does
not necessarily determine whether the item remains in the area from which the arrestee might gain
possession of a weapon. United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). The Eighth Circuit has rejected the notion that
an officer’s exclusive control of an item necessarily removes the item from the arrestee’s area of
immediate control. Id. (citing United States Morales, 923 F.2d 621, 626-27 (8th Cir. 1991))
(rejecting the defendant's argument that the search of his bags, performed while the defendant was
held spread-eagled against a wall three feet away by another officer, was improper because the
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police had gained “exclusive control” over the bags, explaining that “under this fallacious theory
no search or seizure incident to a lawful custodial arrest would ever be valid; by seizing an article
even on the arrestee's person, an officer may be said to have reduced that article to his ‘exclusive
control’” (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461–62 n. 5 (1981))); United States v.
Mefford, 658 F.2d 588, 591-93 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding the search of the defendant's paper bag
as a search incident to arrest because the bag remained in the area within the defendant's immediate
control even though the arresting officer held the bag during the search); see also United States v.
Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that the defendant was “unlikely to be able to
make a successful lunge for the entertainment center” while he was “[h]andcuffed, lying face down
on the floor, and surrounded by the police,” but nonetheless holding that the search of the
entertainment center incident to arrest was valid because “the police did not know how strong he
was, and he seemed desperate”); United States v. Horne, 4 F.3d 579, 586–87 (8th Cir.
1993) (upholding a search of furniture that occurred after the defendant and the only other person
in the room had been handcuffed, because the arresting officer “could reasonably have believed
that weapons were within reach of the hand-cuffed detainees”). The search of Mr. Martin’s cross-
body bag was proper for reasons stated above.
Lastly, once Officer Phillips made the decision to arrest Mr. Martin upon observing the
knife in plain view, Mr. Martin would have been subject to a search of his person and his property
at the police station for jail. The routine practice of jails within this district is to perform an
inventory search of a defendant’s property before placing them in a jail cell. The purpose of an
inventory search is to protect the owner’s property while it remains in police custody and to protect
the police from claims over lost or stolen property. U.S. v. Smith, 715 F.3d 1110, 1117 (8th Cir.
2013). An inventory search must be reasonable and cannot be a ruse to discover incriminating
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evidence. Id. Even when law enforcement fails to conduct a search according to standardized
procedures, this does not require suppression of evidence discovered as a result of the search. Id.
Officer Phillips testified that after an arrest, a suspect is taken to the police station, and
their property is inventoried. The Court knows of no situation within this district where a suspect
is not subject to a search and their property not inventoried during the normal booking procedure
prior to placement in a jail cell or holding tank. Mr. Martin was lawfully arrested. It is inevitable
that the firearms would have been discovered during the inventory search of the normal booking
process.
For the reasons stated above, the motion to suppress should be denied.
C. Motion to Dismiss Indictment
In his motion to dismiss, Mr. Martin argues that the Felon in Possession of a Firearm
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. Mr. Martin states that the lifetime ban on
possessing a firearm violates the Second Amendment because the Second Amendment protects
the decision to possess a firearm, and he is part of “the people” that the Amendment is meant to
protect. Mr. Martin acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by the Eighth Circuit’s decision
in United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1126 (8th Cir. 2024). He submits that Jackson was
wrongly decided and filed his motion to preserve the issue for further litigation regarding the
constitutionality of the statute.
In June 2024, the Supreme Court provided additional guidance on how to apply the Bruen
framework to a federal firearms regulation. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). After
Rahimi, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded a number of cases back to the circuit courts for
further consideration. These cases included United States v. Jackson, an Eighth Circuit case in
which the appellate court had held that case-by-case litigation of the constitutionality of §
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922(g)(1) was not necessary. In its new opinion pursuant to the Supreme Court’s order of remand,
the Eighth Circuit again affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on the
constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 2024).
The Eighth Circuit found that neither Bruen nor Rahimi casts doubt on “longstanding prohibitions
on the possession of firearms be felons.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Eighth
Circuit concluded that given the Supreme Court's assurances on this issue and the history that
supports them, “there is no need for felony-by-felony litigation regarding the constitutionality of §
922(g)(1).” Id.
Here, Mr. Martin’s arguments are similar to those made in Jackson. Mr. Martin has
multiple prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. He is subject to a lifetime ban from
possessing firearms pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). As the Court is bound by Eighth Circuit
precedent, Mr. Martin’s arguments are foreclosed and will be denied. See United States v. Carter,
No. 4:23CR351 MTS/JSD (E.D. Mo. May 12, 2025) (citing United States v. Williams, 131 F.4th
652, 655 (8th Cir. 2025) (pretrial motion to dismiss based on argument that § 922(g)(1) violates
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is barred by controlling Eighth Circuit precedent).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendant Kenneth Martin’s Motion to
Suppress Evidence (ECF No. 41) and Motion to Dismiss Indictment on Second Amendment
Grounds (ECF No. 42) be DENIED.
The parties are advised that they have 14 days in which to file written objections to this
Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to timely file objections
may result in a waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357
(8th Cir. 1990).
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A trial date will be set by further order of the Court.
Dated this 17th day of November, 2025.
RODNEY H. HOLMES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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