Shipman v. Wells Fargo Advisors et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
DENNIS SHIPMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
WELLS FARGO ADVISORS and CHUBB
LTD.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 4:26-cv-00159-SRC
Memorandum and Order
Dennis Shipman, a self-represented litigant, sues Wells Fargo Advisors and Chubb
Limited for conversion, breach of bailment, and financial exploitation under state law in
connection with Defendants’ alleged retention of $2,078.22 in fee-credit balances. In his
Verified Complaint, Shipman also attempts to invoke federal securities law. Shipman separately
filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. He also moves for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction against Defendants, seeking the immediate return of his funds.
Finally, Shipman attempts to move for summary judgment against Defendants and asks the Court
for a status conference. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over Shipman’s claims, it dismisses
his complaint and denies his pending motions as moot.
I. 	Background
Shipman is an American citizen who is “currently residing in Kigali, Rwanda.” Doc. 3 at
1 (The Court cites to page numbers as assigned by CM/ECF.). He asserts that, in mid-January
2026, Wells Fargo Advisors “issued secure confirmations that [his] account held a balance of
$2,078.22, which was secure and available for remittance.” Id. at 2. Despite this, and despite
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Shipman’s “full compliance with all security protocols, including the submission of passport
identification and an Affidavit of Indigency,” Defendants refused to release the funds to him. Id.
He sues Wells Fargo Advisors and Chubb Limited for conversion, breach of bailment, and
financial exploitation, id., ostensibly under Missouri law, id.; see doc. 3-2 at 1. He also invokes
federal securities law—namely, 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa and SEC Rule 15c3-3. See doc. 3-2. For
relief, Shipman seeks $2,078.22 in special damages and $5 million in punitive damages. Id.; see
doc. 3 at 2.
Separately, Shipman filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, stating that
(1) he has zero dollars in liquid assets, (2) he received $1,700 per month in government benefits
over the past year, (3) his monthly expenses total $1,630 per month, and (4) he has one
dependent. Doc. 4 at 1. Shipman also moves for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction against Defendants. Doc. 5. He asserts that he faces “imminent physical
dissolution . . . due to a $0.00 liquid balance caused by Defendants’ conversion.” Id. And he
seeks an order “compelling Defendants to immediately remit $2,078.22.” Id. Further, despite
the Defendants’ not yet being served in this case, Shipman seeks summary judgment against
them. See doc. 6 at 4; docs. 13, 14, 15. (Notably, the summary-judgment request does not
comply with Local Rule 4.01 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b).). Finally, Shipman moves
for a status conference. Doc. 17. Before the Court can address the merits of Shipman’s filings,
the Court must first assess whether it has jurisdiction over Shipman’s claims.
II. 	Standard
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v.
Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 26 (2025) (citation omitted). As such, they may only hear and decide
those cases the subject matter of which is specified under federal law. See id. Among these are
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federal-question cases (i.e., those cases “arising under” federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331) and
diversity cases (i.e., those cases between “citizens of different states” whose dispute involves a
sum greater than $75,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332). Royal Canin, 604 U.S. at 26. If the Court
determines at any time that it lacks jurisdiction on these grounds, “the court must dismiss the
action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
III. 	Discussion
A. 	Federal-question jurisdiction
Shipman first asserts that the Court has federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 because he brings his claims under 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa and SEC Rule 15c3-3. See doc.
3-2; see also doc. 6 at 2. But importantly, this statute (known as the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970), SEC Rule 15c3-3 (17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3), and the section of the
statute under which the SEC Rule was promulgated (15 U.S.C. § 78o) do not supply Shipman
with a private right of action. See, e.g., Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 424
(1975) (“Unlike the Securities Exchange Act, the [Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970]
contains no standards of conduct that a private action could help to enforce, and it contains no
general grant of jurisdiction to the district courts.”); Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1320 n.1
(9th Cir. 1984) (noting that “[n]o private right of action exists under [section 15(c) of the
Exchange Act]”); Harris v. TD Ameritrade, Inc., 805 F.3d 664, 666 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[SEC Rule
15c3-3] . . . does not create a private right of action. And neither the section of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 under which this rule was promulgated . . . nor any other part of the Act
creates a private cause of action . . . .”); Harris v. TD Ameritrade, Inc., 837 F. App’x 841, 843
(2d Cir. 2021) (“[A]uthorities have uniformly held that SEC Rule 15c3-3 . . . does not create a
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private right of action.”). Thus, the Court lacks federal-question jurisdiction over Shipman’s
claims.
B. 	Diversity jurisdiction
Shipman next asserts that the Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
because “the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold” and “the parties are
citizens of different states/nations.” Doc. 3 at 1; see also doc. 3-2. The Court disagrees.
1. 	Diversity of citizenship
As relevant here, to establish diversity of citizenship, Shipman must allege that the
controversy is between (1) “citizens of different States” or (2) “citizens of a State and citizens or
subjects of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(2).
a. 	Citizens of a state
The Court first examines whether Shipman is a “citizen of a State” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(1). “In order to be a citizen of a State within the meaning of the diversity statute, a
natural person must both be a citizen of the United States and be domiciled within the State.”
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989) (emphasis in original). Here,
Shipman alleges that he is an American citizen who is “currently residing in Kigali, Rwanda.”
Doc. 3 at 1; see also doc. 3-2. To “reside” means to “have one’s permanent home in a particular
place.” Reece v. Bank of New York Mellon, 760 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in
original). The Eighth Circuit has thus held that an allegation of where a party resides is
“unambiguous” and “sufficiently pleads [the party’s] citizenship” for diversity purposes. Id. at
778 n.6. Shipman’s allegation that he is “residing in” Rwanda therefore means he is domiciled
in Rwanda for diversity purposes. See Wagstaff & Cartmell, LLP v. Lewis, 40 F.4th 830, 839
(8th Cir. 2022) (noting that, for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, “‘domicile’ and
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‘citizenship’ are synonymous terms” (citation omitted)). Thus, Shipman is not a “citizen of a
State within the meaning of the diversity statute”—rather, he is “stateless.” Newman-Green, 490
U.S. at 828.
b. 	Citizen or subject of a foreign state
Next, the Court analyzes whether Shipman is a “citizen[] or subject[] of a foreign state”
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). The Supreme Court has held that, because of their United States
citizenship, American citizens living abroad are not citizens or subjects of a foreign state for
purposes of section 1332(a)(2). See Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 828–29. Thus, because
Shipman alleges that he is a United States citizen, see doc. 3-2 at 1; doc. 3 at 1, he is not a citizen
or subject of a foreign state under section 1332(a)(2), see Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 828–29.
In sum, “American citizens who are domiciled abroad do not satisfy any of the
enumerated categories required for a federal court’s exercise of diversity jurisdiction.” Freidrich
v. Davis, 767 F.3d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 828–29). The
Court therefore lacks diversity jurisdiction over Shipman’s claims.
2. 	Amount in controversy
But even if Shipman’s “stateless” status did not preclude diversity jurisdiction, his
allegations regarding the amount in controversy would. Recall that, under section 1332, the
amount in controversy must “exceed[] the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Typically, a complaint need only “allege the jurisdictional amount
in good faith.” Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vein Ctrs. For Excellence, Inc., 912 F.3d 1076, 1080
(8th Cir. 2019). But, “[w]here it is a ‘legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the
jurisdictional amount,’ jurisdiction is not proper.” Mensah v. Owners Ins. Co., 951 F.3d 941,
943 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289
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(1938)). “The legal certainty standard is met where the ‘legal impossibility of recovery [is] so
certain as virtually to negative the plaintiff’s good faith in asserting the claim.’” Peterson v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 867 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Schubert v. Auto Owners Ins.
Co., 649 F.3d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 2011)). Additionally, punitive damages “are included in the
amount in controversy,” but “the existence of the required amount must be supported by
competent proof.” OnePoint Sols., LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 348 (8th Cir. 2007).
Here, Shipman seeks only $2,078.22 in actual damages, yet he requests punitive damages
of $5 million. See doc. 3-2 at 1. He provides no “competent proof” supporting his claim for
punitive damages. Nor does it appear that state or federal law would support his claim for
punitive damages. Indeed, both the Missouri Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause typically limit punitive damages to a single-digit ratio. See All Star Awards & Ad
Specialties, Inc. v. HALO Branded Sols., Inc., 642 S.W.3d 281, 295–96 (Mo. 2022) (en banc);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (“Our jurisprudence and
the principles it has now established demonstrate . . . that, in practice, few awards exceeding a
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will
satisfy due process.”).
Shipman’s more recent filings further belie his claim that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. Indeed, in his memorandum in support of summary judgment, Shipman states
that he seeks only $20,782.20 in punitive damages. Doc. 13 at 4. And in his “Notice of
Expiration of Settlement Efforts and Notice of Ripeness for Summary Judgment,” Shipman
states that he seeks total damages of $37,009.64. Doc. 15 at 7.
Thus, the Court finds that a “legal certainty” exists that Shipman’s claims are for less
than $75,000. See Mensah, 951 F.3d at 943; Peterson, 867 F.3d at 995. Shipman therefore does
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not satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, so the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over
Shipman’s claims.
Having found that the Court has no basis for jurisdiction, the Court dismisses Shipman’s
complaint without prejudice. Doc. 3. The Court denies as moot Shipman’s motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, doc. 4, and his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction, doc. 5. And, to the extent Shipman seeks summary judgment against
Defendants, the Court denies that request as moot. See doc. 6 at 4; docs. 13, 14, 15. Finally, the
Court denies as moot Shipman’s motion for a status conference. Doc. 17.
IV. 	Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Shipman’s [3] Verified Complaint without prejudice.
The Court denies as moot Shipman’s [4] motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and his
[5] Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. And, to the extent
Shipman seeks summary judgment against Defendants, the Court denies his [6] [13] [14] [15]
request as moot. Finally, the Court denies as moot Shipman’s [17] motion for a status
conference. A separate Order of Dismissal accompanies this Memorandum and Order.
So ordered this 13th day of February 2026.
STEPHEN R. CLARK
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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