Eastwood Construction Partners, LLC v. Bryant, Jr. et al

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
GREENSBORO DIVISION
In re: 	)
)
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr., 	)
Sharon Renea Bryant, 	) 	Chapter 7
) 	Case No. 25-10147
)
Debtors. 	)
______________________________________ )
Eastwood Construction Partners, 	)
LLC dba Eastwood Homes, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Adv. No. 25-02009
)
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr., 	)
Sharon Renea Bryant, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
______________________________________ )
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr., 	)
Sharon Renea Bryant, 	)
)
Third-party Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Adv. No. 25-02009
)
Clark Stewart, Allen Nason, 	)
James C. Adams, II, Clint Mores, 	)
Jamey Lowdermilk, & Katarina K. Wong, 	)
)
Third-party Defendants. 	)
______________________________________)
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 14th day of January, 2026.
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ORDER ON DOCUMENT TITLED “DEFENDANTS’ CLARIFICATION REGARDING
CONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL”
This adversary proceeding is before the Court on the document
titled 	“Defendants’ 	Clarification 	Regarding 	Conditional
Withdrawal” 	filed 	by 	James 	Lawrence 	Bryant, 	Jr. 	and 	Sharon 	Renea
Bryant (“Defendants”) on January 13, 2026. 	ECF No. 79. 	Defendants
are proceeding pro se.1 	For the reasons stated herein, the Court
construes Defendants’ filing, ECF No. 77, as (1) a motion for leave
to 	amend 	Defendants’ 	amended 	answer 	to 	voluntarily 	dismiss
Defendants’ 	counterclaims 	and 	to 	add 	a 	counterclaim 	for
declaratory 	relief 	that 	the 	Confession 	of 	Judgment 	does 	not
constitute 	a 	“debt” 	that 	is 	subject 	to 	being 	excepted 	from
discharge; 	and 	(2) 	a 	voluntary 	dismissal 	of 	the 	third-party
complaint. 	The 	Court 	will 	grant 	Defendants’ 	motion 	for 	leave 	to
amend 	Defendants’ 	amended 	answer 	to 	voluntarily 	dismiss
Defendants’ 	counterclaims 	and 	will 	deny 	as 	futile 	Defendants’
motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend 	to 	add 	a 	counterclaim 	for 	declaratory
relief that the Confession of Judgment does not constitute a “debt”
that 	is 	subject 	to 	being 	excepted 	from 	discharge. 	Finally, 	the
Court 	determines 	that 	Defendants 	amended 	answer 	has 	been 	amended
to voluntarily dismiss all counterclaims asserted therein without
prejudice 	and 	that 	ECF 	No. 	77 	shall 	constitute 	a 	notice 	of
1 The Court must construe filings by pro se litigants liberally. 	See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
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voluntary 	dismissal 	of 	Defendants’ 	third-party 	complaint 	without
prejudice.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendants filed a voluntary petition under chapter 7 of title
11 	on 	March 	13, 	2025. 	Case 	No. 	25-10147, 	ECF 	No. 	1. 	Plaintiff
commenced 	this 	adversary 	proceeding 	on 	June 	5, 	2025. 	ECF 	No. 	1.
On June 9, 2025, Plaintiff timely filed an amended complaint as of
right 	under 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	15(a)(1)(B).2 	ECF 	No. 	3. 	Plaintiff
seeks 	a 	declaration 	of 	exception 	to 	discharge 	for 	a 	debt 	owed 	to
Plaintiff by Defendants under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 	Id. ¶ 47.
On 	August 	29, 	2025, 	Defendants 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	the 	amended
complaint 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	on 	which 	relief 	can 	be
granted, among other things. 	ECF Nos. 16 & 28. 	The Court held a
hearing 	on 	Defendants’ 	motion 	and 	subsequently 	entered 	an 	order
and opinion denying Defendants’ motion. 	ECF No. 36. 	On November
19, 2025, Defendants filed a motion asking this Court to reconsider
and 	vacate 	its 	order 	and 	opinion 	denying 	Defendants’ 	motion 	to
dismiss, 	arguing 	that 	the 	Confession 	of 	Judgment 	entered 	in 	the
North Carolina General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division,
was ineffective due to the voluntary dismissal filed by Plaintiff
in 	that 	case 	at 	the 	direction 	of 	the 	North 	Carolina 	state 	court.
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 7, 12, 14, 15, and 41 are made applicable to this adversary
proceeding 	by 	Fed. 	R. 	Bankr. 	P. 	7007, 	7012(b), 	7014, 	7015, 	and 	7041,
respectively.
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ECF 	No. 	37. 	The 	Court 	considered 	the 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	and 	the
procedural 	posture 	and 	rulings 	of 	the 	state 	court, 	none 	of 	which
is 	disputed 	by 	Defendants, 	determined 	that 	the 	Confession 	of
Judgment 	remained 	effective, 	and 	denied 	the 	motion 	to 	reconsider
on November 21, 2025. 	ECF No. 41.
On December 1, 2025, Defendants filed an answer to the amended
complaint. 	ECF 	No. 	45. 	Thereafter, 	on 	December 	4, 	2025,
Defendants filed a document titled “Counterclaims of Defendants,”
ECF No. 47, which the Court liberally construed as an amendment as
of 	right 	to 	Defendants’ 	answer 	to 	the 	amended 	complaint 	to 	add
counterclaims 	under 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	15(a)(1)(A) 	and 	as 	a 	third-
party 	complaint 	against 	the 	additional 	named 	entities 	under 	Fed.
R. Civ. P. 14. 	ECF No. 54. 	In the amended answer and third-party
complaint, 	Defendants 	assert 	15 	counterclaims 	and 	third-party
claims 	against 	six 	additional 	entities, 	including 	individuals.
See ECF No. 47.
On 	January 	9, 	2026, 	Defendants 	filed 	a 	document 	titled
“Defendants 	Amended 	Answer 	to 	Amended 	Complaint 	and 	Amended
Counterclaim”. 	ECF No. 77. 	The Court entered an order construing
this 	document 	as 	(1) 	a 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend 	Defendants’
amended 	answer 	to 	voluntarily 	dismiss 	Defendants’ 	counterclaims;
(2) a voluntary dismissal of the third-party complaint; and (3) a
motion 	to 	reconsider 	the 	Court’s 	prior 	order 	and 	opinion 	denying
Defendants’ motion to dismiss as well as the Court’s order denying
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Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	reconsider 	the 	order 	and 	opinion 	denying
Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss. 	ECF 	No. 	78. 	The 	Court 	allowed
Defendants seven days from entry of the order to file a statement
explaining if the Court had misinterpreted the filing. 	Id.
On January 13, 2025, Defendants filed the document currently
before the Court. 	ECF No. 79. 	Defendants state that the previous
document 	was 	intended 	to 	withdraw 	all 	previously 	asserted 	third-
party 	claims 	and 	counterclaims 	and 	assert 	one 	additional
counterclaim 	for 	a 	declaratory 	judgment 	that 	Plaintiff 	does 	not
hold a cognizable debt that may be excepted from discharge. 	Id.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) provides that a party
may 	amend 	its 	pleading 	once 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	course. 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ.
P. 15(a)(1). 	A party may amend a pleading for a second time only
with 	the 	opposing 	party’s 	written 	consent 	or 	the 	court’s 	leave.
Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	15(a)(2). 	“The 	court 	should 	freely 	give 	leave
when justice so requires” but a court may deny leave to amend when
the 	proposed 	amendment 	would 	be 	futile. 	Id.; 	see 	also 	Katyle 	v.
Penn 	Nat. 	Gaming, 	Inc., 	637 	F.3d 	462, 	471 	(4th 	Cir. 	2011)
(“[f]utility is apparent if the proposed [amendment] fails to state
a claim under the applicable rules and accompanying standards”).
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A plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss a complaint (including a
third-party complaint)3 by filing a notice of dismissal before the
opposing 	party 	serves 	an 	answer 	or 	a 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment
or 	by 	filing 	a 	stipulation 	of 	dismissal 	that 	is 	signed 	by 	all
parties 	that 	have 	appeared. 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	41(a)(1)(A).4 	A
notice of voluntary dismissal filed before an adverse party serves
an 	answer 	or 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	“is 	effective 	at 	the
moment the notice is filed with the clerk and no judicial approval
is required.” 	Marex Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel,
2 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 1993).
Defendants’ 	have 	previously 	amended 	their 	answer 	once 	as 	a
matter of course, therefore the Court will construe the filing as
a 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend 	the 	amended 	answer 	to 	remove 	the
previously 	asserted 	counterclaims 	and 	to 	add 	a 	counterclaim 	for
declaratory 	relief 	that 	the 	Confession 	of 	Judgment 	does 	not
constitute 	a 	“debt” 	that 	is 	subject 	to 	being 	excepted 	from
discharge. 	Finally, 	because 	no 	party 	has 	filed 	an 	answer 	to 	or
motion for summary judgment on Defendants’ third-party complaint,5
3 A third-party complaint is a pleading. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a).
4 This dismissal is without prejudice unless the notice states otherwise or the
party has previously dismissed any federal or state court action based on or
including the same claim. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). 	In the latter event,
the notice operates as an adjudication on the merits and the dismissal is with
prejudice. 	Id.
5 Plaintiff and proposed third-party defendants moved for sanctions under Rule
9011, to strike the third-party complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(4), or to
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the Court will construe Defendants’ filing as a notice of voluntary
dismissal of the third-party complaint without prejudice.
The 	Court 	will 	grant 	Defendants’ 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend
the 	amended 	answer 	as 	to 	removal 	of 	the 	counterclaims 	and 	deny
Defendants’ 	motion 	as 	to 	the 	additional 	counterclaim 	for
declaratory relief.6 	The Court previously has determined that the
Confession 	of 	Judgment 	constitutes 	a 	debt 	and 	that 	the 	amended
complaint 	plausibly 	states 	a 	claim 	that 	the 	judgment 	should 	be
excepted 	from 	Defendants’ 	discharge 	under 	§ 	523(a)(6). 	ECF 	No.
36. 	The 	Court 	likewise 	denied 	Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	reconsider
this 	decision 	on 	the 	basis 	that 	the 	Confession 	of 	Judgment 	was
ineffective 	due 	to 	the 	dismissal 	of 	all 	remaining 	claims 	in 	the
state 	court 	action. 	ECF 	No. 	41. 	The 	Court 	also 	gave 	Defendants
notice 	of 	the 	meritless 	nature 	of 	their 	proposed 	counterclaim 	in
the 	order 	construing 	Defendants’ 	counterclaim 	as 	a 	motion 	to
reconsider the Court’s prior order and opinion denying Defendants’
motion to dismiss as well as the Court’s order denying Defendants’
motion 	to 	reconsider 	the 	order 	and 	opinion 	denying 	Defendants’
motion 	to 	dismiss. 	ECF 	No. 	78. 	The 	Court 	gave 	Defendants 	an
dismiss the third-party complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), but did not
answer or move for summary judgment. 	See ECF No. 72.
6 Bankruptcy courts have the discretion to decide an issue without holding an
evidentiary hearing where the record is sufficient to permit the court to reach
a decision. 	In re Graft, 489 B.R. 65, 72 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2013) (noting that
bankruptcy 	courts 	have 	broad 	discretion 	in 	determining 	whether 	a 	hearing 	is
necessary, and that “‘a hearing—much less an evidentiary hearing—is not required
in every instance’”) (quoting In re I Don't Tr., 143 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1998)).
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opportunity 	to 	respond 	to 	the 	Court’s 	interpretation 	of 	their
filing, and Defendants did in fact respond. 	ECF No. 79.7
Defendants’ 	counterclaim 	for 	declaratory 	relief 	that 	the
Confession of Judgment does not constitute a “debt” that is subject
to being excepted from discharge fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted and is therefore futile.8 	Section 523(a)(6)
excepts from discharge debts for “willful and malicious injury by
the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.”
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 	A judgment constitutes a claim. 	11 U.S.C.
7 Defendants contend that this counterclaim is not intended to challenge the
Court’s prior decisions. 	ECF No. 79, at 1. 	In its opinion and order denying
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court specifically stated that “the existence
of the debt is not a claim that can be re-adjudicated by this Court,” ECF No.
36, 	at 	17, 	and 	reemphasized 	that 	ruling 	in 	its 	denial 	of 	the 	motion 	to
reconsider. 	ECF No. 41. 	Defendants’ argument attempts to distinguish between
contesting the existence of the debt and contesting whether the debt constitutes
a 	debt. 	This 	argument 	is 	meritless 	in 	light 	of 	the 	prior 	rulings, 	and
Defendants’ counterclaim necessarily seeks reconsideration of the Court’s prior
decisions.
The 	Court 	notes 	that 	Defendants 	state 	that 	they 	are 	making 	the 	proposed
counterclaim “conditionally” such that, if the Court determines that they are
reasserting claims previously ruled on, they will withdraw it. 	ECF No. 79, at
1-2. 	Parties, 	even 	those 	proceeding 	pro 	se, 	cannot 	“conditionally” 	assert
frivolous claims that cause other parties to incur costs in defense, agreeing
to dismiss them only if the Court determines that they are meritless. 	Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 9011 (by filing a document, unrepresented parties certify that the
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law,
after reasonable inquiry under the circumstances). 	Defendants ultimately bear
the responsibility of asserting futile and meritless claims in this Court. 	The
Court cannot act as counsel. 	Defendants in effect, are “throwing everything
against the wall to see what sticks,” while having no idea of the merit of the
claims 	made 	and 	are 	purporting 	to 	apologize 	for 	continuing 	to 	do 	it. 	Such
actions will not insulate them from the consequences and costs caused to other
parties 	by 	asserting 	meritless 	claims—especially 	those 	on 	which 	the 	Court
already has ruled.
8 To state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a claim “must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
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§ 101(5)(A) (“‘claim’ means—right to payment, whether or not such
right 	is 	reduced 	to 	judgment 	. 	. 	.”). 	The 	term 	“debt” 	is
coextensive 	and 	simply 	means 	liability 	on 	a 	claim. 	11 	U.S.C. 	§
101(12); 	see 	In 	re 	Cybermech, 	Inc., 	13 	F.3d 	818, 	822 	(4th 	Cir.
1994) 	(quoting 	legislative 	history 	that 	the 	terms 	claim 	and 	debt
are coextensive, and finding that “when a claim exists, so does a
debt”) (quotations omitted).
Defendants 	do 	not 	dispute 	the 	existence 	or 	authenticity 	of
the 	Confession 	of 	Judgment 	from 	which 	the 	liability 	at 	issue
arises. 	ECF No. 3-3; see also ECF No. 77, at 2. 	Plaintiff’s right
to 	payment 	under 	this 	judgment 	constitutes 	a 	claim 	under 	§
101(5)(A) 	and 	Defendants’ 	liability 	under 	this 	judgment
constitutes 	a 	debt 	under 	§ 	101(12). 	Therefore, 	Defendants’
counterclaim is futile, and the Court will deny Defendants’ motion
to 	amend 	the 	amended 	answer 	to 	the 	extent 	that 	it 	seeks 	to 	add 	a
counterclaim for declaratory relief.
NOW, 	THEREFORE, 	IT 	IS 	HEREBY 	ORDERED, 	ADJUDGED, 	and 	DECREED
as follows:
1. 	Defendants’ 	filing, 	ECF 	No. 	77, 	shall 	be 	construed 	as
(1) 	a 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend 	Defendants’ 	amended 	answer 	to
voluntarily 	dismiss 	Defendants’ 	counterclaims 	and 	to 	add 	a
counterclaim 	for 	declaratory 	relief 	that 	the 	Confession 	of
Judgment 	does 	not 	constitute 	a 	“debt” 	that 	is 	subject 	to 	being
excepted 	from 	discharge; 	and 	(2) 	a 	voluntary 	dismissal 	of 	the
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third-party complaint.
2. 	Defendants’ 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend 	Defendants’
amended answer to voluntarily dismiss Defendants’ counterclaims is
granted.
3. 	Defendants’ 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend 	to 	add 	a
counterclaim 	for 	declaratory 	relief 	that 	the 	Confession 	of
Judgment 	does 	not 	constitute 	a 	“debt” 	that 	is 	subject 	to 	being
excepted from discharge is denied as futile.
4. 	Defendants 	have 	amended 	their 	amended 	answer 	to
voluntarily 	dismiss 	all 	counterclaims 	asserted 	therein 	without
prejudice.
5. 	ECF 	No. 	77 	shall 	constitute 	a 	notice 	of 	voluntary
dismissal of Defendants’ third-party complaint without prejudice.
[END OF DOCUMENT]
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Parties to be Served
25-02009
John Paul Hughes Cournoyer
U.S. Bankruptcy Administrator 	Via CM/ECF
Jamey M. Lowdermilk
Katarina Kyung Oak Wong
Counsel for Plaintiff/Third Party Defendants 	Via CM/ECF
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr.
5629 Siler Str
Trinity, NC 27370
Sharon Renea Bryant
5629 Siler Str
Trinity, NC 27370
Allen Nason
2857 Westport Road
Charlotte, NC 28208
James Adams, II
Brooks Pierce McLendon Humphrey Leonard
230 n. Elm St., Ste 2000
Renaissance Plaza
Greensboro, NC 27401
Clint Morse
Brooks Pierce McLendon Humphry & Leonard
230 N. Elm St, Ste. 2000,
Renaissance Plaza
Greensboro, NC 27401
Clark Stewart
2857 Westport Road
Charlotte, NC 28208
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