HOLMAN v. WIGGS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
QUENTON D. HOLMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:23cv618
)
A.T. WIGGS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge for a recommendation on “Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment” (Docket Entry 33) (the “Motion”). Because a
genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court should deny the
Motion.
BACKGROUND
Following his arrest on August 27, 2021, Quenton D. Holman
(the “Plaintiff”) sued, as relevant here, North Carolina Alcohol
Law Enforcement Division (“ALE”) Special Agents Todd Wiggs (“S.A.
Wiggs”) and Kaleb Kluttz (“S.A. Kluttz”) (collectively, the
“Defendants”) for excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as
well as battery under North Carolina law. (See generally Docket	1
Entry 2 (the “Complaint”).)
1 “Section 1983 authorizes a plaintiff to sue for an alleged
deprivation of a federal constitutional right by an official acting
under color of state law.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154,
171 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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I. Procedural History
Defendants “mov[ed] to dismiss [the] Complaint” (Docket Entry
16 at 1), arguing that qualified immunity and public official	2
immunity shield them from Plaintiff’s claims (see Docket Entry 17	3
at 7-16). The Court (per United States District Judge William L.
Osteen, Jr.) denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss because, “[a]t
th[at] stage of the proceedings, qualified immunity and public
official immunity afford[ed] Defendants no relief from Plaintiff’s
excessive force and battery claims” (Docket Entry 27 at 20). (See
Docket Entry 29 at 2 (adopting Docket Entry 27).)
Again contending that they “are entitled to . . . qualified
immunity . . . and [p]ublic [o]fficial [i]mmunity” (Docket Entry 34
at 1), Defendants “move for summary judgment” (Docket Entry 33 at
1). Additionally, Defendants maintain that “no genuine issues of
material fact [ ] support Plaintiff’s claims” (id.) because
“Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that [ ] Defendants used
excessive force to arrest him, and the undisputed facts show that
[Defendants’] actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment”
2 Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s
pagination.
3 “North Carolina courts refer to this form of immunity as
‘public officer immunity’ and ‘public official immunity,’
interchangeably, though the trend seems to indicate that ‘public
official immunity’ is more common now.” Hines v. Johnson, No.
1:19cv515, 2020 WL 1516397, at *16 n.8 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2020).
2
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(Docket Entry 34 at 1). Plaintiff opposes the Motion. (See Docket
Entry 34 at 1). Plaintiff opposes the Motion. (See Docket Entry
37 at 3.)
II. Factual Record
As relevant to the Motion, Plaintiff avers:
[Defendants] were on duty when they encountered me
on August 27, 2021, at the Trinity Park Family Fare
[convenience store] in Durham, NC. When I was
approached, I was struck repeatedly by . . .
Defendants[], then the Duke University officer
approached. . . . Defendants . . . struck me repeatedly
in the ribs while I was in handcuffs. I went to the
ground and then was repeatedly struck in the torso and
ribs by [S.A.] Kluttz and [S.A.] Wiggs. I was handcuffed
and laying on the ground. The Unidentified Duke
University Police officer held me to the ground by
placing his hands on my neck. [S.A.] Kluttz pulled me to
my knees. . . . [S.A.] Wiggs delivered a forearm blow to
my neck. . . . [S.A.] Kluttz kneed me several times to
the ribs. The Duke University Police Officer that [sic]
was assisting in holding me down while [Defendants]
battered me[] then withdrew when I stopped moving. The
Duke University Officer stood and watched as [S.A.]
Kluttz kneed me in the ribs repeatedly.
(Docket Entry 24 at ¶¶ 11-12, 14-20 (paragraph numbers and breaks
omitted).) Consistent with these averments, Plaintiff previously
stated under penalty of perjury in conjunction with the Complaint:
[I] suffered repeated blows to the torso while in
handcuffs, as [I] was lying on the ground, restrained by
a total of three law enforcement officers. The only
crime [I] was believed to have committed was possession
of marijuana initially. . . . At the time of the
[alleged] use of excessive force, [I] posed absolutely
zero threat to officers or bystanders. [I] was unarmed,
restrained, and incapacitated by a forearm blow to the
brachial nerve.
(Docket Entry 3 at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).)
3
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Conversely, S.A. Wiggs avers:
On Friday, August 27, 2021, I was . . . working in
my capacity as a Special Agent participating in
enforcement operations in and around Durham, NC. On this
evening, I was working with [S.A.] Kluttz.
At approximately 11:15 p.m., I observed an
individual, later identified as [Plaintiff], . . .
retrieve a plastic bag . . . contain[ing] a substance
consistent in appearance with marijuana. . . .
Because I believed I observed violations of NC law
pertaining to drug possession, I drove my vehicle to
[Plaintiff’s] location[,] approached [him, and]
immediately identified myself as an ALE Agent
. . . . [Plaintiff] began reaching in his bag for items
that were out of my view. Fearing for my safety, I
grabbed his arms in an attempt to detain him. [S.A.]
Kluttz arrived and assisted me as I secured [Plaintiff]
with handcuffs. . . .
At one point [during a probable cause search of
Plaintiff], his keys fell to the ground, and as I bent
over to retrieve them, [Plaintiff] began to flee by
running while still handcuffed. After approximately 50
yards, [Plaintiff] lost his shoes, his balance, and
subsequently fell to the ground. At this time, [S.A.]
Kluttz was at [Plaintiff’s] side. [Plaintiff]
immediately began kicking wildly at [S.A.] Kluttz,
actively resisting arrest, and then attempt[ed] to stand
up and continue his escape.
When I approached and observed this assaultive
behavior, I delivered a single forearm strike to
[Plaintiff’s] brachial nerve on the right side of his
neck to gain compliance. He immediately stopped
resisting, and no other strikes or force was used by
[S.A.] Kluttz or me.
(Docket Entry 34 at 18-20 (paragraph numbers omitted).)
S.A. Kluttz similarly avers:
On Friday, August 27, 2021, . . . I was working with
[S.A.] Wiggs. . . . While [I was] preparing [a] citation
for [another] patron, [S.A.] Wiggs informed me . . .
[that Plaintiff] was holding a baggie of marijuana in his
4
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hand. As I was finishing up with my patron, I observed
[S.A.] Wiggs pull across the street to deal with
[Plaintiff]. I finished up with my patron and went over
to [S.A.] Wiggs who had [Plaintiff] pushed up against the
back of the truck with his hands behind his back. I
assisted [S.A.] Wiggs by putting [Plaintiff] in handcuffs
while [S.A.] Wiggs had control of him.
I observed [Plaintff] to be wearing a small bag[,
and] . . . I observed [S.A.] Wiggs begin a probable cause
search of [Plaintiff] . . . . As [S.A.] Wiggs was
instructing [Plaintiff] to step out of the road, a set of
keys fell out of the bag.
[S.A.] Wiggs bent down to get the keys, at which
point [Plaintiff] began to flee by running while still
handcuffed. [S.A.] Wiggs and I began chasing
[Plaintiff]. . . . After approximately 50 yards,
[Plaintiff] lost his balance and fell to the ground in
the middle of the road. I quickly grabbed [Plaintiff] by
his left arm to gain control of him, and began to give
verbal commands for [Plaintiff] to stay on the
ground. [Plaintiff] did not comply and continued to
actively resist by kicking his feet at me and trying to
stand up. [S.A.] Wiggs assisted me and helped get
[Plaintiff] under control.
An unknown Duke University Police Officer was in a
neighboring parking lot and observed the situation taking
place and jumped the fence to come and assist us.
(Id. at 24-25 (paragraph numbers omitted).)
Defendants also submitted a copy of the “[ALE] Report of
Enforcement Activity” (id. at 29) describing Plaintiff’s arrest,
which generally accords with the foregoing averments of S.A. Wiggs
(see id. at 17-22) and S.A. Kluttz (see id. at 23-26), including
that S.A. Wiggs “delivered a single right forearm strike to
[Plaintiff’s] brachial nerve on the right side of his neck” (id. at
31).
5
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DISCUSSION
I. Relevant Standards
A. Summary Judgment Standards
“The [C]ourt shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). The movant bears the burden of establishing the
absence of such dispute. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). Because the Court “tak[es] the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party,” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th
Cir. 2011) (en banc), that “party is entitled to have the
credibility of his evidence as forecast assumed, his version of all
that is in dispute accepted, and all internal conflicts in it
resolved favorably to him,” Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087
(4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted). “If, after reviewing the record as a whole, [the Court]
find[s] that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for [the
nonmoving party], then a genuine factual dispute exists and summary
judgment is improper.” Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv.
Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996).
6
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B. Excessive Force and Battery Standards
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive
force and battery claims. (See Docket Entry 34 at 1.) As the
United States Supreme Court has explained:
Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in
the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free
citizen, it is most properly characterized as one
invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which
guarantees citizens the right “to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures” of the
person.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (ellipses in
original). Accordingly, “all claims that law enforcement officers
have used excessive force — deadly or not — in the course of an
arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen
should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its
‘reasonableness’ standard[] . . . .” Id. at 395 (emphasis
omitted).
“Determining whether the force used to effect a particular
seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful
balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Thus, although “the right to make an arrest or
investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use
some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it,”
id., courts “have consistently held that officers using
7
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unnecessary, gratuitous, and disproportionate force to seize a
secured, unarmed citizen, do not act in an objectively reasonable
manner,” Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 532 (4th Cir. 2003).
Although an objective test, see Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard “is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application,” id. at 396 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Instead,
its proper application requires careful attention to the
facts and circumstances of each particular case,
including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.
Id. The Court conducts its inquiry “from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene,” id., and its determination of
“excessive[ force] turns on the information possessed by the
officer at the moment that force is employed,” Harris v. Pittman,
927 F.3d 266, 272 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As such, “force justified at the beginning of an
encounter is not justified even seconds later if the justification
for the initial force has been eliminated.” Waterman v. Batton,
393 F.3d 471, 481 (4th Cir. 2005).
In turn, North Carolina law permits “a civil action for
damages for assault and battery . . . against one who, for the
accomplishment of a legitimate purpose, such as justifiable arrest,
uses force which is excessive under the given
circumstances.” Myrick v. Cooley, 91 N.C. App. 209, 215, 371
8
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S.E.2d 492, 496 (1988). “Under the common law, a law enforcement
officer has the right, in making an arrest and securing control of
an offender, to use only such force as may be reasonably necessary
to overcome any resistance and properly discharge his duties.” Id.
Accordingly, “[h]e may not act maliciously in the wanton abuse of
his authority or use unnecessary and excessive force.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Importantly, “[t]he threshold for determining whether the
limits of privileged force have been exceeded for purposes of
liability under Section 1983 is higher than that for a normal tort
action.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]here a plaintiff
brings both a [Section] 1983 excessive force claim and a common law
claim for assault and battery, the [C]ourt’s determination of the
reasonableness of the force used with respect to the [Section] 1983
claim controls its assault and battery analysis,” 6 Am. Jur. 2d
Assault and Battery § 96 (2025) (footnote omitted), at least
insofar as constitutionally excessive force will be deemed to
constitute a battery. See Johnston v. Hefner, No. 5:24cv138, 2025
WL 2417760, at *9 (W.D.N.C. July 16, 2025) (“The Fourth Circuit has
recognized that[] ‘the jurisprudence governing Fourth Amendment
excessive force actions also controls a party’s actions for battery
and gross negligence.’” (quoting Njang v. Montgomery Cnty., 279 F.
App’x 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2008)).
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C. Immunity Standards
Defendants also assert their entitlement to qualified immunity
and public official immunity. (See Docket Entry 34 at 1.) “The
doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
evaluating qualified immunity, courts consider “(1) whether the
plaintiff has established the violation of a constitutional right,
and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of
the alleged violation.” Raub v. Campbell, 785 F.3d 876, 881 (4th
Cir. 2015).4
A right qualifies as “clearly established” if “it would be
clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202
(2001). In other words, “[t]he unlawfulness of the action must be
apparent when assessed from the perspective of an objectively
reasonable official charged with knowledge of established law[]
. . . .” Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 489 (4th Cir.
1990). “This is not to say that an official action is protected by
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has
4 The Court may address these prongs in whichever order “will
best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of [the]
case.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242.
10
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previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light
of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citation omitted).
Separately, as relevant to Plaintiff’s battery claim, under
North Carolina’s doctrine of public official immunity, “a public
official, engaged in the performance of governmental duties
involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, may not be held
personally liable for mere negligence in respect thereto.” Smith
v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 331, 222 S.E.2d 412, 430 (1976) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The rule in such cases is that an
official may not be held liable [u]nless it be alleged and proved
that his act, or failure to act, was corrupt or malicious . . ., or
that he acted outside of and beyond the scope of his duties.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, “public officers’	5
immunity . . . is unavailable to officers who violate clearly
established rights because an officer acts with malice when he does
that which a man of reasonable intelligence would know to be
5 “Malice,” in this context,
does not necessarily mean that which must proceed from a
spiteful, malignant, or revengeful disposition, but a
conduct injurious to another, though proceeding from an
ill-regulated mind not sufficiently cautious before it
occasions an injury to another. If the conduct of the
defendant was unjustifiable, and actually caused the
injury complained of by the plaintiff, . . . malice in
law would be implied from such conduct . . . .
Betts v. Jones, 208 N.C. 410, 181 S.E. 334, 335 (1935) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
11
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contrary to his duty.” Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 742 (4th
Cir. 2003) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Hines v. Johnson, No. 1:19cv515, 2020 WL 1516397, at *17
(M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2020) (explaining that “[p]ublic official
immunity . . . is not available for intentional torts”).
II. Analysis
The Court should deny Defendants’ Motion as to both of
Plaintiff’s claims. Construed in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff, as required at this stage of the proceedings and despite
Defendants’ alternate account, the evidence reflects that
Defendants suspected Plaintiff of drug possession and struck him in
the torso repeatedly and in the neck, including while Plaintiff lay
handcuffed on the ground. (See Docket Entry 3 at 2; Docket Entry
24 at ¶¶ 11-12, 14-20.) Considering, on those facts, “the severity
of the crime,” the “immediate threat [posed] to . . . officers or
others, and whether [Plaintiff] . . . actively resist[ed] arrest or
attempt[ed] to [flee],” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, Defendants
exercised excessive force when they, “unprovoked[, handcuffed and
repeatedly struck] a nonthreatening, nonresisting [Plaintiff] to
effect his arrest,” Barfield v. Kershaw Cnty Sheriff’s Office, 638
F. App’x 196, 203 (4th Cir. 2016). See Wiegang v. Long, C/A No.
2:19-1842, 2022 WL 2068951, at *11 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2022) (noting
the “substantial body of caselaw [finding excessive force] when an
officer strikes or continues to use force against a suspect who is
12
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already restrained” and collecting Fourth Circuit cases (brackets
and internal quotation marks omitted)), recommendation adopted,
2022 WL 1590994 (D.S.C. May 19, 2022); Zephrine v. Prince George’s
Cnty., No. 02-1769, 2006 WL 8438040, at *9 (D. Md. June 15, 2006)
(“[B]eating a suspect while the suspect is restrained is not
objectively reasonable.”).
Likewise, because the record creates a genuine issue of
material fact as to excessive force — a “higher [liability
standard] than that for a normal tort action [such as battery],”
Myrick, 91 N.C. App. at 215, 371 S.E.2d at 496 — a genuine issue of
material fact also exists as to Plaintiff’s battery claim. See
Morgan v. City of Charlotte, No. 3:22cv3, 2023 WL 4002524, at *15
(W.D.N.C. June 14, 2023) (observing that a plaintiff’s North
Carolina “battery claim[] . . . rises and falls with the excessive
force claim”), appeal filed, No. 23-1748 (4th Cir. July 18,
2023). Therefore, Plaintiff’s “parallel state law claim of . . .
battery is subsumed within the federal excessive force claim and
[should] go[] forward . . . .” Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174
(4th Cir. 1994).
Defendants maintain, however, that qualified public immunity
and public official immunity shield them from liability. (See
Docket Entry 34 at 1.) Yet, viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, the record reflects that Defendants repeatedly struck
Plaintiff as he lay handcuffed, violating the “Fourth Circuit[’s]
13
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. . . clearly establishe[d case law] that officers employ excessive
force when they assault a . . . physically restrained [suspect],”
Goodman v. Barber, No. 7:11cv153, 2012 WL 4928873, at *7 (E.D.N.C.
Oct. 16, 2012), aff’d, 539 F. App’x 87 (4th Cir. 2013). See also
id. at *2 (denying qualified immunity at summary judgment stage to
a defendant who “hit” and “knee[d]” a “completely subdued”
plaintiff). Based on the facts the Court must accept as true at
this juncture, multiple Fourth Circuit decisions “ma[k]e plain
enough[] . . . the excessive nature of the force used here[] . . .
and [have] found excessive force when officers continued to assault
non-dangerous, controlled suspects. That is precisely the case
here.” Lewis v. Caraballo, 98 F.4th 521, 536 (4th Cir. 2024); see
also Gill v. Mallow, No. 22-2077, 2023 WL 7487165, at *4 (D. Md.
Nov. 13, 2023) (“It has been the well-settled law for more than 20
years that gratuitously punching or violating the bodily integrity
of an arrestee violates the Fourth Amendment.”). Accordingly,
qualified immunity does not entitle Defendants to judgment as a
matter of law at this point in the proceedings.
Similarly, because public official immunity “is unavailable to
officers who violate clearly established rights,” Bailey, 349 F.3d
at 742, said doctrine provides Defendants no relief at summary
judgment. “Accepting the facts as [presented by Plaintiff] . . . ,
a man of reasonable intelligence would have known that [beating
Plaintiff as he lay handcuffed] . . . was contrary to his duty,”
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thereby “foreclos[ing] the availability of public officers’
immunity” at summary judgment. Id.; see also id. at 742 n.6
(“Because we find that the acts at issue violated rights that were
clearly established, an officer of reasonable intelligence would
have known that the officers’ actions were contrary to their duty.
This is all that is required to support a finding of malice under
state law, and it is clear that there is no public officers’
immunity where the officers act with malice.” (citation omitted)).
CONCLUSION
A genuine issue of material fact exists and, construing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, qualified
immunity and public official immunity do not shield Defendants from
liability.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion (Docket Entry 33)
be denied.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
February 4, 2026
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