SHARP v. BISIGNANO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SYLVIA S., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:25CV1074
)
FRANK J. BISIGNANO, )
Commissioner of Social )
Security, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Sylvia S., brought this action pursuant to the
Social Security Act (the “Act”) to obtain judicial review of the
final decision of Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security
(the “Commissioner”), denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (Docket Entry 1.) The Commissioner
has filed the certified administrative record (Docket Entry 4
(cited herein as “Tr. __”)), and both parties have submitted
dispositive briefs in accordance with Rule 5 of the Supplemental
Rules for Social Security Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Docket
Entry 7 (Plaintiff’s Brief); Docket Entry 9 (Commissioner’s Brief);
Docket Entry 10 (Plaintiff’s Reply)). For the reasons that follow,
the Court should enter judgment for the Commissioner.
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff applied for DIB (Tr. 229-44), alleging a disability
onset date of May 23, 2017 (see Tr. 229, 231, 238, 240). Upon
denial of that application initially (Tr. 90-100, 118-22) and on
reconsideration (Tr. 101-13, 132-35), Plaintiff requested a hearing
de novo before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) (see Tr. 136-
37). Plaintiff, her attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”)
attended the hearing. (Tr. 38-69.) The ALJ subsequently ruled
that Plaintiff did not qualify as disabled under the Act. (Tr. 14-
37.) The Appeals Council thereafter denied Plaintiff’s request for
review (Tr. 1-6, 226-28), thereby making the ALJ’s ruling the
Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review.
In rendering that decision, the ALJ made the following
findings later adopted by the Commissioner:
1. [Plaintiff] last met the insured status requirements
of the . . . Act on December 31, 2019.
2. [Plaintiff] did not engage in substantial gainful
activity during the period from her alleged onset date of
May 23, 2017, through her date last insured of December
31, 2019.
. . .
3. Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff] had the
following severe impairments: relapsing-remitting
multiple sclerosis, attention deficit-hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD), and learning disorder.
. . .
4. Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff] did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met
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or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
. . .
5. . . . [T]hrough the date last insured, [Plaintiff]
had the residual functional capacity to perform light
work . . . except [she] could stand and/or walk 6 hours
of an 8-hour workday and sit 6 hours of an 8-hour
workday; could lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally
and 10 pounds frequently; could frequently grip, grasp,
handle, finger, and feel with the bilateral upper
extremities; could frequently climb ramps/stairs; could
occasionally climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds; could
frequently balance and stoop; could occasionally kneel,
crouch, and crawl; could never perform work in high,
exposed places, in proximity to moving mechanical parts,
and driving or operating machines or equipment; could
perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks at a non-
production assembly line rate; could have occasional
interaction with coworkers and supervisors but never
interact with the general public; could work in a low
stress work environment with no more than occasional use
of judgment and decision making capabilities; and could
adapt to occasional changes in workplace settings and
routines.
. . .
6. [Plaintiff] had no past relevant work during the
period from her alleged onset date of May 23, 2017,
through her date last insured of December 31, 2019.
. . .
10. Through the date last insured, considering
[Plaintiff]’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there were jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the national economy
that [she] could have performed.
. . .
11. [Plaintiff] was not under a disability, as defined
in the . . . Act, at any time from May 23, 2017, the
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alleged onset date, through December 31, 2019, the date
last insured.
(Tr. 19-33 (bold font and internal parenthetical citations
omitted).)
II. DISCUSSION
Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits.” Hines v.
Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, “the scope
of . . . review of [such a] decision . . . is extremely limited.”
Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff has
not established entitlement to relief under the extremely limited
review standard.
A. Standard of Review
“[C]ourts are not to try [a Social Security] case de novo.”
Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a
reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ
[underlying the denial of benefits] if they are supported by
substantial evidence and were reached through application of the
correct legal standard.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 561 (internal brackets
and quotation marks omitted).
“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). “It consists of
4
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more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less
than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th
Cir. 2001) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “If
there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the
case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence.” Hunter,
993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the [C]ourt should not
undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility
determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ, as
adopted by the Commissioner].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal
brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where conflicting evidence
allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is
disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the
[Commissioner] (or the ALJ).” Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The issue before [the Court], therefore, is not whether
[the claimant] is disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding that [the
claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and
was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.”
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
When confronting that issue, the Court must take note that
“[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving
a disability,” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981),
and that, in this context, “disability” means the “‘inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
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medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months,’” id.
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).1 “To regularize the
adjudicative process, the Social Security Administration [(‘SSA’)]
has . . . promulgated . . . detailed regulations incorporating
longstanding medical-vocational evaluation policies that take into
account a claimant’s age, education, and work experience in
addition to [the claimant’s] medical condition.” Id. “These
regulations establish a ‘sequential evaluation process’ to
determine whether a claimant is disabled.” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
This sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) has up to five
steps: “The claimant (1) must not be engaged in ‘substantial
gainful activity,’ i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a
‘severe’ impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the ‘listings’ of
specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent
that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity
[(‘RFC’)] to (4) perform [the claimant’s] past work or (5) any
other work.” Albright v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174
1 The Act “comprises two disability benefits programs. [DIB] provides
benefits to disabled persons who have contributed to the program while
employed. The Supplemental Security Income Program . . . provides benefits to
indigent disabled persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations . . .
for determining disability governing these two programs are, in all aspects
relevant here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1 (internal
citations omitted).
6
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F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999).2 A finding adverse to the
claimant at any of several points in the SEP forecloses an award
and ends the inquiry. For example, “[t]he first step determines
whether the claimant is engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’
If the claimant is working, benefits are denied. The second step
determines if the claimant is ‘severely’ disabled. If not,
benefits are denied.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th
Cir. 1990).
On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at
each of the first three steps, “the claimant is disabled.” Mastro,
270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and
two, but falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment
is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment,
the ALJ must assess the claimant’s [RFC].” Id. at 179.3 Step four
then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on that RFC, the
claimant can “perform past relevant work”; if so, the claimant
2 “Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the
claimant. If the claimant reaches step five, the burden shifts to the
[government] . . . .” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted).
3 “RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the
claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562 (noting that administrative
regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-
related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and
continuing basis . . . [which] means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an
equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted)). The
RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses
the claimant’s “ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy
work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin
impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only
after [the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and
any related symptoms (e.g., pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.
7
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does not qualify as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the
claimant establishes an inability to return to prior work, the
analysis proceeds to the fifth step, whereupon the ALJ must decide
“whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering
both [the RFC] and [the claimant’s] vocational capabilities (age,
education, and past work experience) to adjust to a new job.”
Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the government cannot
carry its “evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant]
remains able to work other jobs available in the community,” the
claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.4
B. Assignments of Error
Plaintiff argues that the Court should overturn the ALJ’s
finding of no disability on these grounds:
1) “[s]ubstantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s
evaluation of [the initial-level state agency psychological
consultant’s] opinion in formulating the RFC’s determination of
[Plaintiff]’s mental work-related limitations because the ALJ did
not explain why a limitation to short instructions was excluded
4 A claimant thus can qualify as disabled via two paths through the SEP.
The first path requires resolution of the questions at steps one, two, and three
in the claimant’s favor, whereas, on the second path, the claimant must prevail
at steps one, two, four, and five. Some short-hand judicial characterizations
of the SEP appear to gloss over the fact that an adverse finding against a
claimant on step three does not terminate the analysis. See, e.g., Hunter, 993
F.2d at 35 (“If the ALJ finds that a claimant has not satisfied any step of the
process, review does not proceed to the next step.”).
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from the RFC determination” (Docket Entry 7 at 7 (bold font and
block formatting omitted); see also Docket Entry 10 at 2-8); and
2) “[s]ubstantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s omission
of a reaching limitation from the RFC determination because the
evidence of record confirmed that [Plaintiff] had difficulty
reaching due to poor balance and coordination issues” (Docket Entry
7 at 12 (bold font and block formatting omitted); see also Docket
Entry 10 at 8-11).
Defendant contends otherwise and seeks affirmance of the ALJ’s
decision. (Docket Entry 9 at 3-14.)
1. Short Instructions
Plaintiff’s first assignment of error maintains that
“[s]ubstantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s evaluation of
[the initial-level state agency psychological consultant’s] opinion
in formulating the RFC’s determination of [Plaintiff]’s mental
work-related limitations because the ALJ did not explain why a
limitation to short instructions was excluded from the RFC
determination.” (Docket Entry 7 at 7 (bold font and block
formatting omitted); see also Docket Entry 10 at 2-8.) More
specifically, Plaintiff notes that, although the initial-level
consultant “opined that [Plaintiff] could ‘understand and remember
short simple instructions but may have difficulty with detailed
instructions’” (Docket Entry 7 at 7 (quoting Tr. 97) (emphasis
added)), and the reconsideration-level consultant “opined that
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[Plaintiff] could ‘understand, remember, and follow simple
instructions’” (id. (quoting Tr. 110) (emphasis added)), “[t]he ALJ
found th[o]se opinions ‘persuasive’” (id. at 8 (quoting Tr. 29)),
“incorrectly stated that [the consultants’] opinions were generally
the same[, ] did not discount th[e initial-level consultant’s
opinion that Plaintiff might have difficulty with detailed
instructions, and] . . . did not explain why the RFC determination
did not contain a limitation to short instructions” (id. (citing
Tr. 29)). Plaintiff additionally contends that “[t]he ALJ’s
failure to properly evaluate [the initial-level consultant]’s
opinion was prejudicial because[,] . . . [u]nder Thomas [v.
Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2019)], a limitation to
short instructions would have required [VE] testimony to address
the apparent conflict between th[at] limitation and the [R]easoning
[Development L]evel of two [(‘RDL 2’)] required by the three
occupations [cited by the VE and adopted by the ALJ at step five of
the SEP].” (Id. at 10 (citing Tr. 32, 61-63); see also id. at 6
(quoting Thomas, 916 F.3d at 314, for proposition that “[RDL 2]
requires an individual to ‘carry out detailed but uninvolved
instructions[,]’” and that “a claimant . . . limited ‘to short,
simple instructions, may not be able to carry out detailed but
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uninvolved instructions’”).)5 For the reasons that follow,
Plaintiff’s assertions miss the mark.
For benefits applications filed on or after March 27, 2017
(such as Plaintiff’s (see Tr. 229-44)), the SSA has enacted
substantial revisions to the regulations governing the evaluation
of opinion evidence, see Revisions to Rules Regarding the
Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, 2017 WL
168819 (Jan. 18, 2017). Under the new regulations, ALJs need not
assign an evidentiary weight to medical opinions or accord special
deference to treating source opinions. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(a) (providing that ALJs “will not defer or give any
specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any
medical opinion(s) . . ., including those from [a claimant’s]
medical sources”). Instead, an ALJ must determine and “articulate
in [the] . . . decision how persuasive [he or she] find[s] all of
the medical opinions . . . in [a claimant’s] case record.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b) (emphasis added). Moreover, when a medical
source provides more than one opinion, the ALJ can evaluate the
5 A job’s RDL reflects the degree of analytical ability required by the
job, with the levels arranged in ascending order of complexity from level 1 to
level 6. See generally Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), App’x C
(“Components of the Definition Trailer”), § III (“General Educational
Development”), 1991 WL 688702 (G.P.O. 4th ed. rev. 1991). A job with RDL 1
entails the abilities to “[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out simple
one- or two-step instructions . . . [and d]eal with standardized situations with
occasional or no variables in or from these situations encountered on the job.”
Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, a position rated at RDL 2 requires a worker
to “[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved
written or oral instructions . . . [and d]eal with problems involving a few
concrete variables in or from standardized situations.” Id. (emphasis added).
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persuasiveness of such opinions “together in a single analysis,”
and need not articulate how he or she considered those opinions
“individually.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(1).
In evaluating the persuasiveness of an opinion, the SSA deems
supportability and consistency “the most important factors,” and,
thus, the ALJ must address those two factors in evaluating the
persuasiveness of an opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).6 The
ALJ must discuss the three other persuasiveness factors — the
nature and extent of the medical source’s relationship with the
claimant and area of specialization, as well as the catch-all
“other factors that tend to support or contradict” the opinion, 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(3)-(5) — only when the ALJ finds two or more
opinions about the same issue “[e]qually persuasive” in terms of
supportability and consistency, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(3).
At the initial level of review, the state agency psychological
consultant found that Plaintiff’s mental impairments qualified as
severe and caused “[m]oderate” limitations in her abilities to
“[u]nderstand, remember, or apply information,” “[i]nteract with
others,” “[c]oncentrate, persist, or maintain pace,” and “[a]dapt
or manage [her]self[.]” (Tr. 94 (emphasis added).) As a result of
6 “Supportability” means “[t]he extent to which a medical source’s opinion
is supported by relevant objective medical evidence and the source’s supporting
explanation.” Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853; see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(c)(1). “Consistency” denotes “the extent to which the opinion is
consistent with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources
in the claim.” Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853; see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(c)(2).
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those limitations, the consultant formulated a mental RFC in which
she found Plaintiff had “[m]oderate[] limit[ation]” in her ability
to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions, and
opined that Plaintiff could “understand and remember short simple
instructions but may have difficulty with detailed instructions”
(Tr. 97 (emphasis added)), as well as that Plaintiff remained
“capable of [simple, routine, repetitive tasks (‘SRRTs’)]” (Tr. 98
(emphasis added)). Upon reconsideration, another consultant
similarly concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairments caused
“[m]oderate” limitations in her abilities to “[u]nderstand,
remember, or apply information,” “[i]nteract with others,”
“[c]oncentrate, persist, or maintain pace,” and “[a]dapt or manage
[her]self” (Tr. 105 (emphasis added)) and also found, like the
initial-level consultant (see Tr. 97), that Plaintiff had
“[m]oderate[] limit[ation]” in her ability to understand, remember,
and carry out detailed instructions (Tr. 110 (emphasis added)).
That consultant, unlike the initial-level consultant, opined that
Plaintiff could “understand, remember, and follow simple
instructions” (Tr. 110 (emphasis added)), as well as “accept simple
instructions from a supervisor” (Tr. 111 (emphasis added)), and
ultimately concluded that Plaintiff remained capable of
“perform[ing SRRTs] at a non-production pace, in a position with
reduced social demands and no frequent changes in assigned tasks or
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routines” (Tr. 106 (emphasis added); see also Tr. 111 (finding
Plaintiff “[c]apable of SRRTs” (emphasis added))).
The ALJ provided the following analysis of the persuasiveness
of the state agency psychological consultants’ opinions:
The [ALJ] has considered the prior [state agency]
psychological consultant’s findings through the date last
insured at the initial level . . . . [The initial-level
consultant] found [Plaintiff] had moderate limitations in
all “B” criteria. [That consultant] assessed that
[Plaintiff] was able to understand and remember short
instructions but may have difficulty with detailed
instructions; sustain attention and concentration for
short periods, but may have difficulty maintaining
concentration for extended periods of time; may have
difficulty with social interaction but is able to
interact with others in a setting that does not require
intensive interpersonal demands; and may have problems
with adapting to routine change as [Plaintiff] has
problems with handling stress.
At the reconsideration level, the [ALJ] considered the
mental limitations offered by [the reconsideration-level
state agency psychological consultant] . . . . [That
consultant] found the same moderate limitations in all
“B” criteria but provided a more detailed mental
[RFC]. [That consultant] assessed that [Plaintiff] was
able to understand, remember, and follow simple
instructions; has some deficits in sustained
concentration and pace but appears capable of sustaining
sufficient attention to complete [SRRTs] for a 2-hour
period at a non-production pace and complete a normal
workweek; may have some social interaction limitations
but can accept simple instructions from a supervisor and
maintain adequate relationships with coworkers in a work
setting with minimal social interaction and only casual
public contact; and will have some difficulty adapting to
changes in the workplace but should be able to adapt to
changes associated with the performance of simple routine
tasks and function adequately in a stable work assignment
in a position that is not highly production oriented or
socially demanding.
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The [ALJ] finds [the consultants’] assessments to be
generally the same. They are persuasive for
[Plaintiff]’s performing [SRRTs] at a non-production
assembly line rate; having occasional interaction with
coworkers and supervisors; working in a low stress work
environment with no more than occasional use of judgment
and decision making capabilities; and adapting to
occasional changes in workplace settings and routines.
However, the [ALJ] found [Plaintiff]’s testimony
supported limiting her to never interacting with the
general public. [The consultants’] assessments were
internally consistent at the time of their reviews of the
limited medical evidence and generally supported by the
findings of the consultative physical [sic] examiner,
[J.] Craig Hunt, Psy.D. . . . .
(Tr. 29 (emphasis added) (internal parenthetical citations
omitted).) Plaintiff’s arguments challenging that analysis by the
ALJ fail for the following three reasons.
First, as a threshold matter, the ALJ did not err in finding
the state agency psychological consultants’ opinions “generally the
same.” (Tr. 29 (emphasis added).) As discussed above, the
consultants found the same moderate limitations in the four areas
of mental functioning at steps two and three of the SEP (compare
Tr. 94, with Tr. 105), the same moderate limitation in
understanding, remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions
in the mental RFC (compare Tr. 97, with Tr. 110), and the same
ultimate conclusion that Plaintiff remained capable of SRRTs
(compare Tr. 98, with Tr. 106, 111). As the ALJ expressly
acknowledged, the opinions differed in that the reconsideration-
level consultant “provided a more detailed mental [RFC].” (Tr.
29.) Moreover, the ALJ’s mental RFC accounted for the
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reconsideration-consultant’s “more detailed mental [RFC]” (id.) by
containing restrictions to “a non-production assembly line rate[,]”
“occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors[,]” no
“interact[ion] with the general public[,]” “a low stress work
environment with no more than occasional use of judgment and
decision making capabilities[,]” and “occasional changes in
workplace settings and routines.” (Tr. 26.)
Second, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the initial-level
consultant neither limited Plaintiff to short instructions nor
found her unable to handle detailed instructions. Regarding short
instructions, the consultant stated only that Plaintiff “[wa]s able
to understand and remember short and simple instructions” (Tr. 97),
but did not opine that her mental impairments limited her to work
involving no more than short instructions (see id.). Consistent
with that interpretation, the initial-level consultant ultimately
concluded that Plaintiff could perform SRRTs (see Tr. 98), which
denotes a broader range of unskilled work than short, simple
instructions, see Lawrence v. Saul, 941 F.3d 140, 143 (4th Cir.
2019) (holding that no apparent conflict existed between RFC
containing restriction to SRRTs and jobs rated at RDL 2); Thomas,
916 F.3d at 313-14 (finding apparent conflict between RFC limiting
the plaintiff to short, simple instructions and RDL 2 jobs).
Correspondingly, the initial-level consultant’s statement that
Plaintiff “may have difficulty with detailed instructions” (Tr. 97
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(emphasis added)) did not equate to an opinion that Plaintiff
lacked the ability to handle such instructions, Turberville v.
Colvin, No. 1:11CV262, 2014 WL 1671582, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 23,
2014) (unpublished) (“[The consultative psychological examiner]’s
observation that [the p]laintiff would have ‘difficulty’ tolerating
stress in the workplace does not equate to an opinion that [the
p]laintiff reasonably could not do so.”), recommendation adopted,
slip op. (M.D.N.C. May 15, 2014) (Eagles, J.); Watkins v. Astrue,
No. 1:09CV741, 2011 WL 2791267, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Jul. 14, 2011)
(unpublished) (Sharp, M.J.) (noting that doctor’s opinion that
claimant would have “some difficulty” attending school did not
equate to inability), recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C.
Sept. 26, 2011) (Eagles, J.). Moreover, by prefacing the opinion
with the equivocal word “may” (Tr. 97), the consultant did not even
provide a definitive opinion that Plaintiff would have difficulty
with handling detailed instructions (see id.).
Additionally, that interpretation of the consultant’s “may
have difficulty” (Tr. 97) language harmonizes with the consultant’s
finding of “[m]oderate” (as opposed to “marked” or “extreme”)
limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to understand, remember, or apply
information (Tr. 94) and “[m]oderate limit[ation]” in her ability
to handle detailed instructions (Tr. 97). The regulations define
a “moderate” limitation as meaning mental “functioning in that area
independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis
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is fair,” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 12.00F.2.c.
(emphasis added), and not that the individual possesses no useful
ability to function in that area.
Third, because (as explained above) the ALJ did not err by
omitting from the RFC a limitation to short instructions, and
because Plaintiff’s RFC restricting her to SRRTs (see Tr. 26) does
not conflict with the three RDL 2 jobs cited by the VE (see Tr. 62-
63 (citing Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), No. 222.687-
022 (“Routing Clerk”), 1991 WL 672133 (G.P.O. 4th ed. rev. 1991),
DOT, No. 208.685-010 (“Collator Operator”), 1991 WL 671753, and
DOT, No. 222.587-038 (“Router”), 1991 WL 672123)) and adopted by
the ALJ at step five of the SEP (see Tr. 31-32), see Lawrence, 941
F.3d at 143, no apparent conflict existed that the ALJ failed to
identify and resolve.7
Put simply, Plaintiff’s first issue on review fails as a
matter of law.
7 As the undersigned has recommended a finding that the ALJ did not err in
omitting a limitation to short instructions from the RFC, and binding precedent
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit holds that no
apparent conflict existed between Plaintiff’s RFC limiting her to SRRTs (see Tr.
26) and the RDL 2 jobs adopted by the ALJ at step five (see Tr. 31-32), see
Lawrence, 941 F.3d at 143, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s argument that
Social Security Ruling 24-3p, Titles II and XVI: Use of Occupational Information
and Vocational Specialist and Vocational Expert Evidence in Disability
Determinations and Decisions, 2024 WL 5256890 (Dec. 6, 2024), did not “overrule
[the] binding judicial precedent [in Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 210 (4th
Cir. 2015)]” (Docket Entry 7 at 11), which “found that the duty to address
apparent conflicts was independently required by the . . . Act and the ALJ’s duty
to develop the record” (id. at 10-11).
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2. Reaching Limitation
In Plaintiff’s second and final issue on review, she contends
that “[s]ubstantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s omission of
a reaching limitation from the RFC determination because the
evidence of record confirmed that [Plaintiff] had difficulty
reaching due to poor balance and coordination issues.” (Docket
Entry 7 at 12 (bold font and block formatting omitted); see also
Docket Entry 10 at 8-11.) More specifically, Plaintiff faults the
ALJ for “not properly evaluat[ing consultative medical examiner]
Dr. [Diana] Marchese’s opinion on reaching limitations due to poor
balance” (Docket Entry 7 at 14 (citing Tr. 28) (referencing Tr.
379)), because the ALJ 1) “did not explain why the timing of Dr.
Marchese’s examination [approximately eight months after Plaintiff
stated that her multiple sclerosis symptoms began] undermined [Dr.
Marchese’s] opinion” (id. (citing Tr. 28)), and 2) “rejected [the]
reaching limitation due to the phrasing of the opinion” (id.
(citing Tr. 28)) without “clarif[ying any] ambiguity” by
“‘engag[ing] in a simple § 404.1520b(b)(2) inquiry’” (id. at 15
(quoting Oakes v. Kijakazi, 70 F.4th 207, 214 (4th Cir. 2023))).
In addition, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s failure to “properly
acknowledge and consider [Plaintiff]’s ability to reach based on
abnormal cerebellar testing” (id.; see also id. at 15-16
(summarizing evidence reflecting Plaintiff’s impaired coordination
(citing Tr. 58, 60, 375, 379, 407, 409, 413, 418, 421, 426, 433))),
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or “provide any reasoning or explanation of why th[o]se
abnormalities did not support a reaching limitation” (id. at 16
(citing Tr. 26-31)). In Plaintiff’s view, “[t]he consideration of
a reaching limitation due to poor balance and coordination issues
is not an academic exercise because the occupations relied on by
the ALJ require frequent reaching.” (Id. (citing Tr. 32, 62-63)
(referencing DOT, No. 222.687-022 (“Routing Clerk”), 1991 WL
672133, DOT, No. 208.685-010 (“Collator Operator”), 1991 WL 671753,
and DOT, No. 222.587-038 (“Router”), 1991 WL 672123).) As the
discussion below makes clear, Plaintiff’s contentions fall short.
Dr. Marchese conducted a consultative physical examination of
Plaintiff on December 2, 2017 (see Tr. 371-81), at which Dr.
Marchese noted that Plaintiff “primar[il]y complain[ed] of
[multiple sclerosis]” causing “cognitive [symptoms], fatigue, [and]
trouble walking, writing, standing[, and] sitting for extended
periods[,]” with “symptoms first beg[inning] in April 2017” (Tr.
371). Dr. Marchese documented “grossly intact” cranial nerves (Tr.
375), “[r]educed finger to nose coordination and heel to shin
bilaterally” (id.), a “[w]ide based gait with externally rotated
feet” (id.), 5/5 strength except 4+/5 leg extension bilaterally
(see id.), “diminished [sensation] across both palms” (Tr. 376),
and intact deep tendon reflexes (see id.). Dr. Marchese further
recorded that Plaintiff could “lift, carry and handle light
objects[,]” “rise from a sitting position without assistance[,]”
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“walk on heels and toes[,]” and “stand on one foot bilaterally with
concentration[,]” but had “difficult[y]” with tandem walking.
(Id.) Dr. Marchese additionally found full range of motion in all
of Plaintiff’s joints (see Tr. 377-78), that Plaintiff could
“pinch, grasp and manipulate small and large objects without
difficulty” (Tr. 378), that she could “complete her paperwork with
her own pen” with “legible” handwriting (Tr. 379), and that she
could “reach overhead” (id.). As a result of those findings, Dr.
Marchese concluded that Plaintiff “would likely have difficulty
with activities that require stooping, squatting or handling heavy
objects that require a strong base[,]” and would have “[m]oderate”
limitation in carrying and “[m]ild” limitation in reaching due to
“[p]oor balance[.]” (Id.)
The ALJ discussed Dr. Marchese’s findings (see Tr. 28), and
then provided the following analysis of the persuasiveness of her
opinions:
The [ALJ] finds Dr. Marchese’s opinion minimally
persuasive, as the examination occurred roughly eight
months after [Plaintiff] stated the multiple sclerosis
symptoms began. In addition, Dr. Marchese did not
provide specific functional limitations; rather, she used
an undefined “likely.” Dr. Marchese did indicate that
[Plaintiff]’s reaching was mildly limited and carrying
was moderately limited due to poor balance, but she did
not describe what kind of reaching (e.g. overhead) or a
weight range. However, the findings are informative for
providing a baseline of [Plaintiff]’s alleged physical
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impairments from her alleged onset date through the date
last insured.
(Id. (emphasis added) (internal parenthetical citation omitted).)
As the ALJ found Dr. Marchese’s opinions “minimally persuasive”
overall (id.), and her mild reaching limitation in particular not
adequately described (see id.), the ALJ labored under no obligated
to adopt Dr. Marchese’s mild reaching limitation. Plaintiff,
however, attacks both of those bases for discounting Dr. Marchese’s
opinions (see Docket Entry 7 at 14-15) but, ultimately, has not
shown that the ALJ reversibly erred.
Plaintiff first challenges the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr.
Marchese’s opinions as “minimally persuasive” because her
“examination occurred roughly eight months after [Plaintiff] stated
the multiple sclerosis symptoms began” (Tr. 28), pointing out that
“[t]he ALJ did not explain why the timing of Dr. Marchese’s
examination undermined her opinion” (Docket Entry 7 at 14).
Plaintiff’s argument in that regard has merit, as the ALJ did not
explain why the passage of eight months between the reported start
of Plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis symptoms and the examination
diminished the persuasiveness of Dr. Marchese’s opinions. (See Tr.
28.) Further compounding that lack of explanation, the ALJ later
“f[ound] Dr. Hunt’s opinions persuasive, as the examination
occurred roughly seven months after [Plaintiff] stated the multiple
sclerosis symptoms began during Dr. Marchese’s examination (April
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2017).” (Tr. 30 (emphasis added).) The ALJ’s decision entirely
lacks an explication of why the eight-month gap in time undermined
Dr. Marchese’s opinions while the seven-month gap in time bolstered
Dr. Hunt’s opinions. (See Tr. 28-30.) However, as explained in
more detail below, that error by the ALJ remains harmless under the
facts of this case. See Calhoun v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., ___
F.4th ___, ___, 2026 WL 2602326, at *4 (4th Cir. 2026) (“[W]e will
set aside the [Commissioner’s] decision for error only where the
error is harmful. An error is harmless when the court can
confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, fully crediting the
relevant evidence, could have reached a different result.”); see
generally Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989)
(observing that “[n]o principle of administrative law or common
sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion
unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a
different result”).
Plaintiff additionally faults the ALJ for “reject[ing Dr.
Marchese’s] reaching limitation due to the phrasing of the
opinion[,]” contending that, “[e]ven if Dr. Marchese’s opinion used
ambiguous language, . . . it does not give the ALJ the ability
outright to reject [the] reaching limitation[.]” (Docket Entry 7
at 14.) According to Plaintiff, “the Fourth Circuit has held, ‘[]
when an administratively ordered consultative examiner’s opinion
contains what ought to be an easily clarified ambiguity on a key
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issue, it logically follows that an ALJ must engage in a simple
§ 404.1520b(b)(2) inquiry.’” (Id. at 14-15 (quoting Oakes, 70
F.4th at 214) (emphasis supplied by Plaintiff).)
Under the governing regulations, when the ALJ finds “evidence
in [a] case record [] insufficient or inconsistent,” the ALJ “may
need to take [] additional actions,” including that the ALJ can
“determine whether [a claimant qualifies as] disabled based on the
evidence [the ALJ] ha[s],” or “may recontact [a claimant’s]
treating source.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b (emphasis added). Here,
the ALJ did not find Dr. Marchese’s report (or her reaching opinion
in particular) “insufficient” or “inconsistent” (see Tr. 28) and,
even if the ALJ had done so, the regulations vested the ALJ with
substantial discretion regarding the steps to take to remedy the
insufficiency or inconsistency, and did not compel the ALJ to
recontact Dr. Marchese, see Billie C. v. O’Malley, No. 2:23CV4245,
2024 WL 2819734, at *18 (D.S.C. May 14, 2024) (unpublished) (“[A]n
ALJ is only expected to seek additional evidence or clarification
if the ALJ cannot reach a conclusion about whether the claimant is
disabled based upon the evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520b . . . . [T]he ALJ was not required to further develop
the record after rejecting the portion of [the state agency
psychological consultants’] opinion concerning [the p]laintiff’s
potential absences as vague. Under [the ALJ’s] appropriate
discretion, [he] relied on the extensive evidence available in the
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record — including [the p]laintiff’s own statements regarding her
functional limitations, the objective medical evidence, [her]
activities of daily living, and the opinion evidence — to render a
disability determination . . . .”), recommendation adopted sub nom.
Carey v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2024 WL 2817955 (D.S.C.
May 31, 2024) (unpublished); Hughes v. Kijakazi, No. 5:21CV05, 2022
WL 3714627, at *11-12 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2022) (unpublished) (“The
ALJ was not required to recontact [the] consultative
examiner [whose opinions the ALJ had found vague] . . . to obtain
additional information with respect to his opinion.”); Cullen v.
Kijakazi, No. 6:20CV4061, 2022 WL 92616, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 10,
2022) (unpublished) (“The applicable regulations now allow ALJs
substantial discretion in deciding whether to recontact a treating
physician for additional or clarifying information. [The
p]laintiff has cited no authority under the applicable
regulation . . . requiring an ALJ to recontact a medical source for
clarification of an opinion.” (emphasis added)); Rogers v. Saul,
No. 4:19CV896, 2020 WL 4209064, at *10 (D.S.C. June 30, 2020)
(unpublished) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ
erred by finding consultative examiner’s opinions “overly vague,”
but then not recontacting the consultative examiner “for an
explanation,” because 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b contains no such
requirement), recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 4207649 (D.S.C. July
22, 2020) (unpublished).
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Moreover, Oakes does not provide a basis for remand. In that
case, the Fourth Circuit noted that, “[d]espite [the plaintiff’s]
years-long struggle with [back and leg pain], [his] medical record
is exceedingly sparse . . . [and t]he totality of record medical
evidence relating to his condition includes two emergency room
visits and one administratively ordered consultative
examination[.]” Oakes, 70 F.4th at 210–11 (emphasis added). In
the context of that “exceedingly sparse” record, see id. at 210,
the court held that, “[t]o the extent that [the consultative
examiner]’s justification for his ambulatory-device recommendation
was ambiguous, the medical record is incomplete and the ALJ should
have “take[n] additional actions” to seek clarification,” id. at
213 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(b)).
Here, in contrast, the ALJ had a complete record consisting
of Plaintiff’s testimony (see Tr. 44-59) and statements on
Disability Reports (see Tr. 266-72, 294-301, 305-19), a Third Party
Function Report completed by Plaintiff’s cousin (see Tr. 321-30),
opinions from two state agency medical consultants and two state
agency psychological consultants (see Tr. 91-100, 102-13), Dr.
Hunt’s consultative psychological examination which included a
battery of psychological tests (see Tr. 361-68), a comprehensive
neuropsychological evaluation conducted in 2007 after Plaintiff’s
multiple sclerosis diagnosis (see Tr. 493-514), Dr. Marchese’s
consultative medical examination (see Tr. 371-81), and a complete
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record (see Tr. 41-42) of Plaintiff’s treatment prior to, during,
and after the relevant period in this case (see Tr. 382-492).
Under such circumstances, Oakes does not compel remand for the ALJ
to take further action with respect to Dr. Marchese’s reaching
opinion under Section 404.1520b(b)(2). See Coley v. Bisignano, No.
5:25CV589, 2026 WL 2628855, at *7-8 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 2026)
(unpublished) (rejecting the plaintiff’s “argu[ment that] the ALJ
could have easily ‘fixed’ the vagueness problem by seeking
clarification of [the consultative medical examiner]’s opinion[,]”
and “distinguish[ing] the [] case from Oakes, because [] there was
a history of treatment with neurology and orthopedics that
documented [the plaintiff]’s impairments and limitations”),
recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 2628296 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 4, 2026)
(unpublished); Jasper Y. v. Bisignano, No. 8:25CV1370, 2025 WL
4067036, at *7-9 (D.S.C. Dec. 30, 2025) (unpublished) (finding no
merit to the plaintiff’s contention that ALJ’s statement that
consultative medical examiner’s opinion regarding standing and
walking limitations did “not appear to be attributable to [the
examiner]” but, rather, based on the plaintiff’s subjective reports
amounted to “uncertainty regarding [the examiner]’s opinions” and
“obligated [the ALJ] to seek clarification” under Oakes, because
“the record . . . [wa]s not ‘extremely sparse,’ as was the record
in Oakes[,]” and “there was additional evidence in the record which
the ALJ could and did evaluate to reach a decision”),
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recommendation adopted sub nom. Youngblood v. Bisignano, 2026 WL
165170 (D.S.C. Jan. 20, 2026) (unpublished).
Furthermore, assuming, arguendo, that the ALJ erred in his
evaluation of Dr. Marchese’s opinions, any such error remains
harmless under the circumstances of this case. See Calhoun, ___
F.4th at ___, 2026 WL 2602326, at *4 (“[W]e will set aside the
[Commissioner’s] decision for error only where the error is
harmful. An error is harmless when the court can confidently
conclude that no reasonable ALJ, fully crediting the relevant
evidence, could have reached a different result.”); see generally
Fisher, 869 F.2d at 1057 (observing that “[n]o principle of
administrative law or common sense requires us to remand a case in
quest of a perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe that
the remand might lead to a different result”). Even if the ALJ had
fully credited Dr. Marchese’s opinion that Plaintiff’s physical
impairments resulted in a mild limitation in reaching (see Tr.
379), Plaintiff fails to explain how adopting a mild reaching
limitation would have compelled the ALJ to restrict Plaintiff to
less than frequent reaching in the RFC (see Docket Entry 7 at 12-
17; see also Docket Entry 10 at 8-11).
Indeed, courts have held that frequent limitations in the RFC
adequately account for even moderate limitations in functional
areas. See Rosalyn R. P. v. Bisignano, No. 1:25CV725, 2026 WL
1864019, at *6 (M.D.N.C. June 29, 2026) (unpublished) (holding that
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the plaintiff “fail[ed] to explain why the ALJ’s RFC, which limited
[the p]laintiff to frequent, but not constant, operation of hand
controls, pushing, pulling, and reaching, did not sufficiently
account for a ‘moderate’ limitation in those activities” (emphasis
added) (internal parenthetical citation omitted)); Angela P. v.
Bisignano, No. 24CV827, 2025 WL 3706652, at *20 (D.D.C. Dec. 22,
2025) (unpublished) (“‘[F]requently’ is defined by SSA regulations
to mean ‘occurring from one-third to two-thirds of the time.’ And
restricting a claimant to exposure to the condition only one- to
two-thirds of the time is an appreciable limitation — a reduction
in exposure of 33% to 66% compared to a non-limited individual —
which is sufficient to account for a ‘fair’ [i.e., moderate,]
limitation.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Jennifer Lee W.
v. Berryhill, No. 5:18CV64, 2019 WL 1243759, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar.
18, 2019) (unpublished) (“[A] moderate limitation is not
inconsistent with a finding that an individual can engage in
frequent, but not constant activity.” (emphasis added)); Wake v.
Astrue, No. 2:11CV35, 2012 WL 6851168, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 4,
2012) (unpublished) (“[The p]laintiff has provided no legal
authority or any legal argument as to why [a physician]’s finding
that [the p]laintiff’s ability to grip . . . and to finely
manipulate objects on the left was moderately to severely
impaired . . . is inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC that [the
p]laintiff was limited to frequent handling and fingering with the
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left hand.” (emphasis added)), recommendation adopted, 2013 WL
145764 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 14, 2013) (unpublished). As all the jobs in
question require frequent reaching, see DOT, No. 222.687-022
(“Routing Clerk”), 1991 WL 672133, DOT, No. 208.685-010 (“Collator
Operator”), 1991 WL 671753, and DOT, No. 222.587-038 (“Router”),
1991 WL 672123, Plaintiff has not shown that any error committed by
the ALJ in analyzing the persuasiveness of Dr. Marchese’s mild
reaching opinion prejudiced Plaintiff.
Plaintiff further asserts that “the ALJ did not properly
acknowledge and consider [Plaintiff]’s ability to reach based on
abnormal cerebellar testing.” (Docket Entry 7 at 15.) In support
of that assertion, Plaintiff points out that “[t]he finger-to-nose
test (i.e., where the individual reaches for a medical provider’s
finger with an outstretched arm and then touches their own nose
with that arm) is used to evaluate cerebellar damage and dysmetria”
(id. (citing https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/symptoms/25232-
dysmetria)), as well as that “[a]n individual with dysmetria ‘can’t
accurately judge the distance between [her]self and the things
[she’s] trying to reach or walk toward,’ and . . . ‘may have
difficulty controlling their movements and may undershoot or
overshoot their target’” (id. (quoting https://my.clevelandclinic.
org/health/symptoms/25232-dysmetria)). According to Plaintiff, her
“finger-to-nose tests consistently documented cerebellar
abnormalities” (id. (citing Tr. 375, 379, 407, 409, 413, 418, 421,
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426, 433)), which Plaintiff deems “consistent with [her attorney]’s
argument [at the hearing before the ALJ] about how th[at] evidence
related to [Plaintiff]’s work-related abilities” (id. (citing Tr.
58, 60)). Plaintiff further notes that “the ALJ did not
acknowledge or mention [Plaintiff’s finger-to-nose] tests at
Guilford Neurological Associates” (id. at 15-16 (citing Tr. 28,
407, 409, 413, 418, 421, 426, 433)), and “did not provide any
reasoning or explanation of why th[o]se abnormalities did not
support a reaching limitation” (id. (citing Tr. 26-31)).
Although the ALJ did note Plaintiff’s “reduced finger-to-nose
coordination and heel–to-shin bilaterally” documented by Dr.
Marchese (see Tr. 28 (referencing Tr. 37)), Plaintiff correctly
points out that the ALJ did not expressly discuss Plaintiff’s
finger-to-nose tests with Plaintiff’s treating neurologist, Dr.
Richard A. Sater at Guilford Neurological Associates (see Tr. 20-
31). However, “‘there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ
specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision.’”
Reid v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir.
2014) (quoting Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir.
2005). Moreover, despite Dr. Sater’s consistent findings of
reduced finger-to-nose testing (see Tr. 407, 409, 413, 418, 421,
426, 433), he offered no opinion that Plaintiff’s multiple
sclerosis limited her ability to reach (see Tr. 398-436, 460-87).
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Significantly, Plaintiff did not testify that her multiple
sclerosis caused reaching limitations; rather, she stated that it
caused difficulties with her processing speed (see Tr. 48, 54),
balance (see Tr. 51), ability to kneel (see id.), memory (see Tr.
52), ability to hold and pick up items (see Tr. 59), ability to
shuffle papers (see Tr. 64), and ability to type (see Tr. 65).
Notably, she also testified that she inadequately performed her
prior job stocking candy at a grocery store, not because she could
not perform the reaching involved in stocking candy, but “because
[her] knees d[id]n’t like to do that.” (Tr. 45 (emphasis added).)
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff alleged balance issues, the
ALJ (A) found Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the
record” (Tr. 27 (emphasis added)), a finding unchallenged by
Plaintiff (see Docket Entries 7, 10), and (B) limited Plaintiff to
a maximum of 20 pounds of lifting and carrying, frequent (as
opposed to constant) balancing and stooping, and no “work in high,
exposed places, in proximity to moving mechanical parts, and
driving or operating machines or equipment” (Tr. 26 (bold font
omitted)) to account for Plaintiff’s issues with balance (see Tr.
30).
Lastly, to the extent that Plaintiff contends that “[her
attorney]’s argument [at the hearing before the ALJ] about how th[e
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finger-to-nose] evidence related to [Plaintiff]’s work-related
abilities” supported a reaching limitation (Docket Entry 7 at 15
(citing Tr. 58, 60)), such a contention misses the mark.
Plaintiff’s attorney argued that Plaintiff’s “ability to walk [wa]s
the major thing” as well as “carry items while trying to walk[.]”
(Tr. 58 (emphasis added).) He then elaborated as follows:
[Plaintiff] has to really, really concentrate to maintain
her ability to squat down. And that could be detrimental
to her performing a light job, especially any kind of job
like a cashier. Sometimes they send you off. You’re not
just standing there all day. They send you off to do
zoning or whatnot. And being able to put things on stock
could be a major issue for her. Even like the
picker/packer, the ability to walk as long as she would
have to walk and put things, pick things off of areas
would be very difficult for her. And then the occasional
of climbing things that would be needed for a light job,
and just carrying 20 pounds at a time, occasionally,
would be very difficulty for her to achieve with the
medical evidence in the file.
(Id. (emphasis added); see also Tr. 60 (“But when you go down
through the file with the Guilford Neurology, they talk about the
reduced finger to nose with [sic] which would be your coordination.
And then they talk about just the gait, which is wide gait, which
would limit [Plaintiff’s] ability to actually walk for long
distances, especially if something is on the ground with a wide
gait. It’d be easier for her to trip, to fall, just to be able to
coordinate with a wide gait, especially for [an] eight hour day, 40
hour workweek.” (emphasis added)).) When read in context,
counsel’s argument clearly focused on Plaintiff’s alleged inability
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to handle the walking, carrying, climbing, and squatting involved
in jobs like cashier and picker/packer, and counsel made no
argument that Plaintiff could not tolerate reaching. (See id.)
In sum, Plaintiff’s second and final assignment of error fails
to demonstrate grounds for remand.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not established an error warranting remand.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision
finding no disability be affirmed, and that this action be
dismissed with prejudice.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
October 16, 2026
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