Raubach v. Holt Solutions, LLC

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
In re:
Ryan Lashon Ford,
Debtor.
Case No. 24-31129
Chapter 7
Melanie D. Johnson Raubach, solely in
her capacity as Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee
for the Estate of Ryan Lashon Ford,
Plaintiff,
Holt Solutions, LLC,
Defendant,
Adv. Pro. No. 25-03032
ORDER AND OPINION TERMINATING THE DEBTOR’S CIVIL CONTEMPT,
DIRECTING THE DEBTOR TO PAY ACCRUED FINES, REDUCING SANCTIONS TO
JUDGEMENT, DENYING THE DEBTOR’S MOTIONS, PERMANENTLY DENYING
DISCHARGE, BARRING THE DEBTOR FROM FILING IN THE BASE CASE ON
MATTERS UNRELATED TO THE ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDING, DENYING THE
BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATOR’S REQUEST FOR 9011 SANCTIONS, AND
REPORTING CRIMES TO THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA U.S.
ATTORNEY AND THE MECKLENBURG COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
_____________________________
Ashley Austin Edwards
United States Bankruptcy Judge
FILED & JUDGMENT ENTERED
Christine F. Winchester
Western District of North Carolina
January 5 2026
Clerk, U.S. Bankruptcy Court
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THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the Debtor’s Response and Declaration to Order
Denying Debtor's Request to Purge Contempt, Further Sanctioning Debtor, and Denying Debtor's
Discharge [Doc. No.1 224; Adv. Proc. Doc. No. 57], filed on October 6, 2025 (the “First Contempt
Review Motion”), Motion to Vacate or Stay Civil Contempt Proceedings, for Protective Relief, and
Supporting Memorandum of Law Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020 and Due Process Principles [Do.
No. 242], filed on October 27, 2025, (the “Second Contempt Review Motion”), Motion to Vacate
Contempt Order and For Declaratory Relief that the Court Exceeded Its Article I Authority [Doc.
No. 248], filed on October 30, 2025, (the “Third Contempt Review Motion”), Motion to Vacate or
Deny Contempt and Sanctions for Lack of Evidence Basis and Violation of Federal Rules of
Evidence and Due Process [Doc. No. 252], filed on October 30, 2025 (the “Fourth Contempt
Review Motion”), Motion for Reconsideration, Protective Relief, and Stay Pending Appeal [Doc.
No. 293], filed on November 12, 2025 (the “Fifth Contempt Review Motion”), and Motion to
Reconsideration, Protective Relief, and Emergency Stay Pending Appeal [Doc. No. 295], filed on
November 12, 2025 (the “Sixth Contempt Review Motion,” and together with the First Contempt
Review Motion, the Second Contempt Review Motion, the Third Contempt Review Motion, the
Fourth Contempt Review Motion, the Fifth Contempt Review Motion, the “Contempt Review
Motions”), all relating to the Court’s Order Finding Debtor in Civil Contempt [Doc. No. 132; Adv.
Proc. Doc. No. 34], entered July 14, 2025 (the “Contempt Finding Order”), Opinion and Order
Sanctioning Debtor for Failure to Comply with Omnibus Order and Contempt Order [Doc. No.
147; Adv. Proc. Doc. No. 39], entered July 29, 2025 (the “Contempt Sanctions Order”), Order
1 “Doc. No.” refers to the docket numbers in the above captioned Chapter 7 base case (the “Chapter 7 Base
Case”), unless the phrase follows either (1) “Adv. Proc.,” where it refers to the above captioned Adversary
Proceeding stemming from the Base Case (the “Adversary Proceeding”), or (2) “Dist. Ct.,” where it refers
to the Debtor’s District Court case concerning the Debtor’s Reference Withdrawal Motion, as defined
below.
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Denying Debtor’s Request to Purge Contempt, Further Sanctioning Debtor, and Denying Debtor’s
Discharge [Doc. No. 223; Adv. Proc. Doc. No. 56], entered October 7, 2025 (the “Contempt
Further Sanctions and Discharge Order”), and Order Continuing For Final Hearing [Doc. No.
270], entered on November 4, 2025 (the “Final Contempt Order,” and together with the Contempt
Finding Order, the Contempt Sanctions Order, the Contempt Further Sanctions and Discharge
Order, the “Contempt Orders”), as well as before the Court upon the Debtor’s Motion for
Reconsideration 	of 	Order 	Denying 	Motion 	to 	Shorten 	Notice 	and 	Asserting 	Procedural
Disadvantage 	and 	Prejudice 	[Doc. 	No. 	264], 	filed 	on 	November 	3, 	2025 	(the 	“Notice
Reconsideration Motion,” and together with the Contempt Review Motions, the “Debtor’s
Outstanding Motions”), and related to the Court’s Order Denying Motion to Shorten Notice [Doc.
No. 258], entered on October 31, 2025 (the “Denying Shortened Notice Order”).
For the reasons outlined below, (1) terminates the Debtor’s civil contempt, (2) orders the
Debtor to pay the fines she has accrued under the Contempt Orders, (3) reports to the U.S. Attorney
for the Western District of North Carolina and the Mecklenburg County District Attorney various
crimes, (4) denies the Debtor’s Outstanding Motions, (5) denies the Debtor’s discharge, (6) bars
the Debtor from docketing any filings in her Chapter 7 Base Case without prior approval by the
Court, and (7) denies the request for Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 sanctions against
the Debtor.
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I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
A. Introduction
1. 	On December 23, 2024 (the “Petition Date”), the Debtor filed her pro se, Voluntary
Petition [Doc. No. 1] (the “Debtor’s Petition”), for relief under Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United
States Code. The Petition Date would begin what will probably be one of the most involved
individual Chapter 7 cases the Court will have.
B. Pre-Petition and Petition Date Facts
1. 	The Debtor’s Assets
2. 	As recently as 2023, the Debtor owned two properties: (1) a property at 3819
Yorkford Dr, Charlotte, North Carolina, 28269 (the “Yorkford Property”), and (2) a property at
6415 Nevin Glen Drive, Charlotte, North Carolina, 28269 (the “Nevin Property,” and together with
the Yorkford Property, the “Properties”).3 As of the Petition Date, the Debtor received almost
$1,800 in income from renting the Nevin Property (the “Rental Income”).4
3. 	The Debtor formed Holt Solutions, LLC, a North Carolina limited liability
company (“Holt Solutions”) on April 20, 2022 (the “Holt Solutions Creation Date”).5 Holt
2 The Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator managed to condense and organize for the Court over three
hundred docket entries, countless pleadings, nine hearings spanning eight months and almost 15 hours
combined, see infra notes 44, 55, 76, 88, 105, 124, 149, 184, 224, & 265, and organize it by into
approximately twenty pleadings. The Court greatly appreciates thus extensive and outstanding work.
3 Cf. Yorkford Property & Nevin Property Quitclaim Deeds Instrument No.s. 2023036479 & 2023036480,
attached to Seventh Status Report on Debtor’s Compliance with Orders [Doc. No. 278; Adv. Proc. Doc. No.
72] (the “Seventh Status Report”), as Exhibit A, pp. 15–21 (the “Properties Conveyances Quitclaim
Deeds”).
4 See Debtor’s June 2025 Residential Rental Contract Renewal and/or Amendment, attached to Seventh
Status Report, as Exhibit B, pp. 22–23; Debtor’s 2024 IRS Form 1040 Schedule E (Supplemental Income
and Loss), attached to Declaration of Melanie D. Johnson Raubach [Doc. No. 275], as Exhibit A, pp. 2–4
(reporting receipt of rental income totaling $1,795 monthly or $19,740 annually).
5 See Holt Solutions’ 2022 North Carolina Secretary of State Limited Liability Company Articles of
Organization, attached to Ex Parte Motion for Production of Documents Only from the Debtor and Holt
Solutions, LLC, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 [Doc. No. 92] (the “Holt Solutions Document
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Solutions’ sole registered member, organizer, and agent is the Debtor, and its mailing and principal
and registered office addresses is the same as the Yorkford Property’s address.6 which she
described in official records as a tribal property.7 The Debtor also so operates, as of the Petition
Date, Holts Consulting, another North Carolina limited liability company (“Holts Consulting”).8
A year and a day after the Holt Solutions Creation Date and around 19 months prior to the Petition
Date, the Debtor conveyed to Holt Solutions first the Yorkford Property (the “Yorkford Property
Conveyance”)9 and then the Nevin Property (the “Nevin Property Conveyance,” and together with
the Yorkford Property Conveyance, the “Conveyances”),10 on April 23, 2023 (the “Conveyances
Date”).11
4. 	On the Petition Date, the Debtor held almost $9,200 in bank accounts (the “Debtor’s
Held Funds”).12 Additionally, twenty-six bank accounts existed on the Petition Date which
belonged to the Debtor either wholly individually, jointly with her dependents, or through Holt
Solutions (the “Debtor’s Accounts”).13 The month prior to the Petition Date, the Debtor was
actively using four of the Debtor’s Accounts, which were also the four accounts which held the
most funds as of the Petition Date; from three of those four accounts the Debtor transferred funds
five times on the Petition Date itself.14
Production Motion”), as Ex. A, pp. 6–8 (the “Holt Solutions State Registration Filing”) (providing the
Debtor’s filing with the North Carolina Secretary of State the articles of organization forming Holt
Solutions, LLC, describing it as a “Tribal LLC [that] function[s] as a multi-purpose Aboriginal Tribal
Association Trust”).
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 See Debtor’s Petition, p. 2.
9 See Properties Conveyances Quitclaim Deeds, pp. 16–18.
10 See id., pp. 19–21.
11 See id.
12 See Seventh Status Report, ¶ 22.
13 See id.
14 See id., ¶ 23.
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2. 	The Tribal Entities and the Tribal Courses
5. 	The Debtor is and has been a member of the Xi-Amaru Tribe (the “Tribe”) since at
least 2022, according to the Debtor’s admission to the Court. The Tribe appears to one entity within
a larger amorphous group of related entities or individuals, including, in addition to the Tribe, the
Aboriginal Republic of North America (“ARNA”), HAWAB DFW Region 6, Shabazz Associates,
the Aboriginal Medical Association, the Aboriginal University, a ‘Minister’ Kojo Xi Shabazz, also
known as Aboriginal Don (“Minister Kojo”), and a ‘Dr.’ Amaru Nama Taga Xi-Ali, also known as
‘Dr.’ Ali Muhammad (“Dr. Ali”) (collectively and together with the Tribe, the “Tribal Entities”).
6. 	The Tribal Entities offer various educational courses (the “Tribal Courses”), some
of which are labeled ‘Jurist’ and appear to purport to teach about the law (the “Jurist Courses”).15
The Debtor has taken various courses with the Tribe (the “Debtor’s Tribal Courses”) and began,
around the Petition Date, one of the Jurist Courses (the “Debtor’s Jurist Course”), per her
submissions. Within three years prior to the Petition Date, the Debtor made nearly $4,000 in
payments to various Tribal Entities (the “Tribal Payments”).16
3. 	The Petition and the IFP Application
7. 	In the Debtor’s Petition, the Debtor made selective and false submissions, as well
as material omissions, regarding her financial matters. As to the Debtor’s assets, although the
Debtor’s Petition did disclose (1) the Debtor’s interest in the Debtor’s vehicle,17 (2) the Debtor’s
interest in Holts Consulting and the latter’s existence since April 7, 2022,18 and (3) an interest in
15 See infra ¶¶ 107–110.
16 See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
17 See Debtor’s Petition, p. 11.
18 See Debtor’s Petition, p. 2 & 58.
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the Properties with an asserted valuations for the Properties,19 the Petition omitted any reference
(1) to creditors of the Properties or the vehicle (the “Debtor’s Creditors”),20 as well as (2) to Holt
Solutions or the Debtor’s interest in Holt Solutions.21 The Petition also denied generally the
Conveyances’ occurrence.22 Lastly, the Debtor’s Petition claimed a “homestead exemption” and
various exemptions pursuant to laws concerning foreign or federally recognized Native individuals
(the “Debtor’s Tribal Exemptions”) for the Debtor’s assets generally.23
8. 	As to the Debtor’s income, the Debtor’s Petition asserted that the Debtor’s income
was around $3,000 monthly (the “Debtor’s Asserted Income”) for herself and for her three
dependents, which omitted the Rental Income.24 Furthermore, the Debtor’s Petition also explicitly
denied the Rental Income’s existence, both specifically as of the Petition Date25 and generally
within two years of the Petition Date.26 The Debtor’s Petition also denied specifically the Debtor’s
Held Funds’ existence and omitted any reference to any of the Debtor’s Accounts.27
19 See Debtor’s Petition, p. 11 (providing a valuation for the Properties as $30,000 each
20 See Debtor’s Petition, pp. 23–25.
21 See Debtor’s Petition, p. 2 & 58.
22 See Debtor’s Petition, p. 55 (the Debtor’s response “No” to whether, “[w]ithin 2 years before [she] filed
for bankruptcy, [she had] s[old], trade[d], or otherwise transfer[red] any property to anyone, other than
property transferred in the ordinary course of [her] business or financial affairs”).
23 See Debtor’s Petition, Schedule C: The Property You Claim as Exempt, pp. 21–22.
24 See Debtor’s Petition, pp. 42–43 (the Debtor’s responses regarding her income providing only three
sources of income, specifically, $800 a month in family support, just under $500 a month in government
assistance, and just under $1,900 a month pension or retirement income).
25 See Debtor’s Petition, pp. 42–43 (the Debtor’s response to Question #8a reporting “$0.00” for “[n]et
income from rental property”).
26 See Debtor’s Petition, p. 49 (the Debtor’s negative answers to Question 4, querying whether she had
received “any income from employment or from operating a business during this year or the two previous
calendar years,” and Question 5, querying whether she had “receive[d] any other income during this year
or the two previous calendar years”).
27 See Debtor’s Petition, p. 15 (the Debtor’s negative answers to both Questions #16 and 17 as to whether
the Debtor “own[s] or ha[s] any legal or equitable interest in” “cash,” described as “[m]oney you have in
your wallet, in your home, in a safe deposit box, and on hand when you filed your petition,” or “[d]eposits
of money,” described as “[c]hecking, savings, or other financial accounts; certificates of deposit; shares in
credit unions, brokerage houses, and other similar institutions”).
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9. 	Along with her Petition, the Debtor also filed the Application to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis [Doc. No. 4] (the “IFP Application”), requesting that the Court waive the Debtor’s
Chapter 7 filing fee due to the Debtor’s income being below the threshold, 150% of the poverty
line for the debtor’s household. For this calculation, the IFP Application provided similar numbers
to those provided in her Petition, also omitting the Rental Income.28 The IFP Application did
disclose one of the Debtor’s Accounts with a balance of $0.00 but affirmed that that amount
encompassed the Debtor’s Held Funds.29 The Court granted the IFP Application.30
C. January through May Facts
1. 	The January 341 Meeting, Early Filings, and the April 23 Hearing
10. 	On January 22, 2025, the Trustee held a 341 Meeting of Creditors (the “January
341 Meeting”).31 By then, the Trustee had learned of Holt Solutions and the Conveyances through
independent research, since the Debtor’s Petitions’ had omitted both matters.32 At the January 341
Meeting, the Debtor made additional similar false submissions regarding the truth of the Debtor’s
Petition (1) generally33 and as the Debtor’s Petition pertained (2) to the Debtor’s assets34 and (3)
28 See IFP Application, p. 1.
29 See IFP Application, p. 2.
30 See Order Granting Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Doc. No. 7].
31 See First Meeting of Creditors with 341(a) meeting to be held on 1/22/2025 at 10:00 AM at Zoom 341
Meeting [Doc. No. 5]; see also Transcript of 341 Meeting of Creditors on January 22, 2025, attached to
Notice of Filing of Transcript of 341 Meeting of Creditors Held on January 22, 2025 [Doc. No. 273], pp.
2–27 (the “January 341 Meeting Transcript”).
32 See January 341 Meeting Transcript, at 9:8–9:12 (the Trustee statement how she had learned through
North Carolina state records about the Debtor’s interest in Holt Solutions); id., at 11:23–12:10 (same about
the Yorkford Property Conveyance); id. 15:14–15:24 (same about the Nevin Property Conveyance).
33 See id., at 3:22–4:11 (the Trustee’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor affirms that the Debtor’s
Petition was, “[t]o the best of [her] knowledge, correct,” that there were “not, that [she was] aware of” or
“any changes [she] need[ed] to announce,” that she “list[ed] all of [her] assets,” that she “list[ed] all of [her]
debt”).
34 See id., at 4:3–4:6 (the Trustee’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor responds “[y]es” as to
whether the Debtor’s Petition had identified all her assets).
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the Conveyances,35 as well as regarding (4) the Tribal Payments.36 The Debtor also described Holt
Solutions and Holt Consulting as operating on behalf of the Tribe to which they also owed any
income received.37 She described Holt Solutions as managing the Properties for the Tribe38 and
asserted that the Tribe “controls” and is responsible for the Properties39 on account of the
Conveyances because the Tribe “owns” Holt Solutions as “tribal property” or a “tribal business.”40
11. 	The same day as the January 341 Meeting, the Trustee filed a Notice of Possible
Dividends and Request for Notice to Creditors [text-only docket entry]. On March 3, 2025, the
Debtor filed the Pro Se Reaffirmation Agreement Between Debtor and Navy Federal Limited [Doc.
No. 19] (the “Reaffirmation Agreement”). The Reaffirmation Agreement provided the Debtor’s
Asserted Income for the Debtor’s income, excluding the Rental Income.41 On March 20, 2025, the
35 See id., at 4:8–4:11 (the Trustee’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor responds “[n]o” as to
whether the Debtor had “sold or given away anything in the last four years that [the Debtor] did not include
in” the Debtor’s Petition).
36 See id., at 17:4–17:10 (the Trustee’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor responds “[n]o” as to
(1) whether the Debtor “pay[s] funds to the Tribe,” and again as to (2) whether the Debtor “ha[s] [ ] ever
made a monetary transfer to the Tribe”).
37 See id., at 19:19–20:8 (the Debtor’s response, when asked what Holt Solutions and Holt Consulting does,
describing their work as “services of charity” “through the Tribe. . . [,] services of learning more about your
Tribal identity. . . .[,] [L]earning about your lineage, of your Indigenous lineage really”).
38 See id., at 22:20–23:8 (the Debtor’s response, when asked whether Holt Solutions “ha[s] any income,”
asserting that “[i]t’s the Tribal property and Tribal business” and denying that “as a Tribal business[,] [ ] it
sell[s] any goods. . . .[,] [A]ny products. . . .[,] [Or] any services,” and, when asked whether the Tribe
“manage[s] property,” asserting “[i]t holds the property”).
39 See id., at 11:23–12:20 (the Debtor’s response, when asked about the Conveyances as to the Yorkford
Property, asserting (1) that “[t]he transfer was done over to the Tribe,” (2) that she had “owned the property
and [ ] put it over to the Tribe's name,” that she “receive[d] in exchange” “[n]othing,” and (3) that “[t]he
Tribe” “controls the property”); id., at 16:3–16:7 & 16:16–17:3 (the Debtor’s response, when asked about
the Conveyances as to the Nevin Property, asserting (1) that she did not “receive anything in exchange,”
(2) that “[t]he Tribe” “controls that property,” and (3) that “[t]he Tribe” “is responsible for paying upkeep
on that property” such as “if [ ] it needed a new roof” as well as paying its “utilities [and] taxes” with
income, that the Debtor surmised, from “other members and the Tribal business”).
40 See id., at 9:13–9:21 & 9:25–11:8 (the Debtor’s response, when asked about Holt Solutions, stating that
it was a “Tribal property” or “Tribal business . . . . [I]n which the Tribe in which I'm a part of owns,” and
description of the Tribe as “actually the Xi-Amaru Tribal Government” that is “like the Native American”).
41 See Reaffirmation Agreement, p. 1. Because the Debtor’s Asserted Income minus the Debtor’s expenses
did not provide enough surplus to pay the reaffirmed debt payments under the Reaffirmation Agreement,
see id., the Reaffirmation Agreement was deemed a presumptive hardship and set for hearing on April 7,
2025 (the “April 7 Hearing”). See Court Notice of Reaffirmation Hearing [Doc. No. 21].
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Trustee filed the Objection to Exemptions [Doc. No. 20] (the “Exemptions Objection”), objecting
to the Debtor’s Tribal Exemptions as lacking basis in law.42
12. 	Over the following month, the Debtor would move twice to end the Chapter 7 Base
Case. First, on April 3, 2025, the Debtor filed the Motion to Voluntary Dismiss Case [Doc. No. 26]
(the “Dismissal Motion”), asserting that the Chapter 7 Base Case was filed under the mistaken
impression bankruptcy was necessary to deal with her debts, but had concluded that negotiating
with her creditors outside of bankruptcy would better ensure she retains her assets.43 On April 22,
2025, the Debtor filed the Notice of Motion and Motion to Convert Chapter 7 Case to Chapter 11
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 706(a) [Doc. No. 41] (the “First Chapter 11 Conversion Motion”).
13. 	On April 23, 2025, the Court held a hearing in this case (the “April 23 Hearing”)44
on, inter alia, the Reaffirmation Agreement, Exemptions Objection, the Dismissal Motion. The
42 See Exemptions Objection, pp. 2–3 (requesting the Court denies the claimed exemptions on the grounds
that, because “North Carolina has opted out of the Federal exemptions provided,” “ ‘the State’s exemption
statute applies to resident debtors in bankruptcy’,” whereas the Asserted Exemptions were “not [under] the
North Carolina exemption statutes” (citation omitted)).
43 See generally Dismissal Motion.
44 See Transcript for Hearing/Trial held on 4/23/2025 [Doc. No. 180] (the “April 23 Hearing Transcript”);
see also Courtroom Recording on April 23, 2025, at 10:29:12 AM [Doc. No. 43] (56 minutes). Technically,
the April 23 Hearing was the third hearing in this case. However, the first hearing technically held, the April
7 Hearing, had its matters continued to the next hearing on April 21, 2025, see Courtroom Recording on
April 7, 2025, at 09:50:58 AM [Doc. No. 30] (noting the Reaffirmation Agreement had been continued for
hearing on April 21, 2025), as did in turn the next hearing to April 23 Hearing. See Courtroom Recording
on April 21, 2025, at 09:43:33 AM [Doc. No. 40] (noting both the Reaffirmation Agreement and
Exemptions Objection had been continued for hearing on April 23, 2025); see also Notice and Motion for
Request of Court Hearing and Request for Alternative Hearing Dates [Doc. No. 32]; Order Regarding
Electronic Device Motion and Hearing Date Motion [Doc. No. 37].
Originally, Debtor had set the First Chapter 11 Conversion Motion for hearing at the April 23 Hearing.
See First Chapter 11 Conversion Motion, p. 4. The same day, the Trustee filed the Response Objection of
Trustee to Notice of Hearing on Debtor's Notice of Motion and Motion to Convert Chapter 7 Case to
Chapter 11 Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 706(a) [Doc. No. 42], asserting the time period for hearing the First
Chapter 11 Conversion Motion was not long enough and that it did not warrant emergency consideration.
The Court explained to the Debtor at the top of the April 23 Hearing that the Court could not hear the First
Chapter 11 Conversion Motion because the period from when it was filed to when the Debtor sought to
have it heard (the “notice period”) contravened Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(a)(4)’s requirement of a 21-day
notice period for such motions. See April 23 Hearing Transcript, at 3:21–4:9. The Court also noted that
although the full required period generally was required, it could sometimes be reduced, but never for a
period as short the Debtor sought. See id., at 4:10–4:16 (the Court’s informing the Debtor that, “to the extent
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Debtor, the Trustee and the United States Bankruptcy Administrator for the Western District of
North Carolina (the “Bankruptcy Administrator,” and together with the Debtor and the Trustee, the
“Parties”) appeared at the April 23 Hearing. The Court first heard the Reaffirmation Agreement at
the April 23 Hearing, which the Court ultimately granted.45
14. 	During consideration of the Exemptions Objection, the Debtor clarified the
assertions she made at the January 341 Meeting regarding Holt Solutions, the Properties, and the
Properties Conveyances vis-à-vis the Tribe. Specifically, the Debtor asserted that she stilled wholly
owned the Properties,46 notwithstanding the Conveyances, because such conveyances to tribal
entities were allowed and was common practice “for asset protection” by tribal individuals.47
that something is on shortened notice, occasionally the Court will consider shortened notice,” but “[n]ever
really 24 hours' notice,” and only “[l]ike maybe [to] truncate from the 14 days or the 21 days if there's an
emergency, but that's then paired with a motion to shorten notice”).
45 See April 23 Hearing Transcript, at 5:10–9:10. During discussion of the Reaffirmation Agreement, the
Debtor appears to have avoided making a further false submission to the Court at the April 23 Hearing as
to the Debtor’s Asserted Income representing correctly the Debtor’s income. See id., at 7:06–7:21 (the
Court’s and the Debtor’s exchange:
Court: [L]ooking at what you included on the reaffirmation agreement, it looks like for this that you
might have income of $3,135 a month; is that correct?
Debtor: (No response)
Court: On that front page of the reaffirmation agreement.
Debtor: Yes.
Court: And we saw elsewhere in Schedule I that you may not be employed. I'm confused on that.
Debtor: I — I am on disability pension, yes.
Court: Okay. Understood.
Debtor: I'm retired.
Court: All right. So, you receive 3,000 monthly. Excellent. Okay. And then it looks like your expenses
are about $4,098.03 a month; is that correct?
Debtor: Yes.).
46 See id., at 16:18–16:22 (the Debtor’s clarification of her statements made at the January 341 Meeting
asserting that she was “still under control of” Holt Solutions); id., at 17:2–17:5 (same that her claimed
exemption meant that “even though once again the property is in the tribal entity, [she was] the sole owner
of it” especially since she “use[s] the property, of course, as [her] personal residence”); id., at 18:24–19:2
(same “even though [she] transferred it under the tribal entity, which is a part of the [Tribe’s] government,
it is wholly sold—owned and controlled by [herself] as the tribal member”).
47 See id., at 16:22–17:1 (the Debtor’s statement that she “kn[ew]. . . that it’s a normal practice to transfer
any assets or anything to [a person’s] tribal entity just for cultural purposes and for [them] to be under—in
good standing with any legal responsibilities that [they] also have under tribal law”); id., at 17:12–17:15
(the Debtor’s statement that that the Properties Conveyances “w[ere] done as a tribal practice that we always
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During consideration of the Dismissal Motion, the Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator
questioned the likelihood of and the Debtor’s ability to pay her creditors outside of bankruptcy.
The Debtor countered that her enrollment in the Debtor’s Tribal Courses would engender the
necessary funds to pay the Debtor’s creditors.48 The Court ultimately granted the Exemptions
Objection49 and denied the Dismissal Motion.50 The Court concluded the April 23 Hearing by
recommending that the Debtor obtain counsel for the Debtor’s bankruptcy case.51
15. 	After the April 23 Hearing and prior to the next hearing, the Debtor made various
other filings.52 Additionally, on May 1, 2025, the Trustee filed a notice to various creditors of the
Debtor who were undisclosed in the Debtor’s Petition (the “Debtor’s Undisclosed Creditors”)53 to
which objected the Debtor on May 6, 2025.54
do,”); id., 21:24–22:2 (the Debtor’s statement that the Properties Conveyances “were for asset protection
that was consistent with tribal customs and private cultural governance”)..
48 See April 23 Hearing Transcript, at 32:2–32:9. (“I know the Trustee mentioned about the deficit. Again,
during the process of this I have been afforded some opportunities to go on ahead—I've taken up some
courses or enrolled in some courses through the tribe to go on ahead and compensate and be able to pay the
creditors in full so that that could be done.”).
49 See Order Sustaining Objection of Trustee to Exemptions [Doc No. 48].
50 See Order Denying Debtor's Motion to Dismiss [Doc No. 49].
51 See April 23 Hearing Transcript, 33:20–34:15.
52 On April 25, 2025, the Debtor filed a duplicate version of the First Chapter 11 Conversion Motion. see
Motion to Convert Case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 11 [Doc 44] (the “Second Chapter 11 Conversion
Motion”). On May 6, 2025, the Debtor filed Motion for Specific Relief [Doc. No. 52] (the “Specific Relief
Motion”). On May 22, 2025, the Debtor filed the Motion and Memorandum: Ruling that Tribal Property is
not property of the Estate [Doc. No. 56] (the “First Tribal Property Motion”).
53 See Notice of Bankruptcy Filing [Doc. No. 47] (sending notice to Rocket Mortgage, the Internal Revenue
Service (the IRS), the North Carolina Department of Revenue (the NCDOR), and the Mecklenburg County
Tax Office).
54 See Response to Trustee's Notice of Bankruptcy Filing [Doc. No. 50] (disputing the Debtor’s Undisclosed
Creditors should have been notified because, (1) as to Rocket Mortgage, “the Debtor is not seeking to
discharge any mortgage debt,” (2) as to the IRS and the NCDOR, the “Debtor has no outstanding tax
liabilities or active repayment,” and (3) as to the Mecklenburg County Tax Office, it “does not hold an
unsecured or secured claim against the Debtor” and the Debtor’s “property taxes are paid in the normal
course through escrow accounts,” wherefore, “no delinquent or defaulted debt exists”).
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2. 	The May Hearing and Further Filings
16. 	On May 27, 2025, the Court held a hearing (the “May Hearing”)55 on various filings
by the Debtor. During the May Hearing, the Bankruptcy Administrator cross-examined the Debtor,
wherein the Debtor first acknowledged the Rental Income as well as another undisclosed account
of the Debtor’s Accounts where the Rental Income was deposited.56 The Debtor testified she
thought that even “if [her] name [was] on the account but it belongs to the Tribe, [she] d[id]not
need to list [ ] or disclose it.”57 When asked whether any other undisclosed accounts existed, the
Debtor admitted to having another account that was opened after the Petition Date,58 but falsely
stated only these two accounts of the Debtor’s Accounts existed.59
17. 	When asked about the Debtor’s assertion of expected income from the Debtor’s
Tribal Courses at the April 23 Hearing, the Debtor testified that she had completed courses through
the Tribe on genealogy, cosmology, and other topics.60 She testified that she began the Debtor’s
Jurist Course in February 2025, had paid the requisite fee, and was currently enrolled.61 The Debtor
could not explain how these courses would engender the income she had asserted they would.62
As to the Debtor’s Jurist Course, the Debtor described it as covering “nationality, law” and “[t]he
55 See Transcript for Hearing/Trial held on 5/27/2025 [Doc. No. 181] (the “May Hearing Transcript”); see
also Courtroom Recording on May 27, 2025, at 09:55:00 AM [Doc. No. 62] (29 seconds); Courtroom
Recording on May 27, 2025, at 10:55:47 AM [Doc. No. 63] (59 minutes); Courtroom Recording on May
27, 2025, at 11:22:02 AM [Doc. No. 64] (26 minutes); Courtroom Recording on May 27, 2025, at 11:52:15
AM [Doc. No. 65] (4 minutes); see also Exhibit(s) for Hearing on 5/27/25 [Doc. No. 58].
56 See May Hearing Transcript, at 30:20–31:23
57 See id., at 32:5–32:8; see also id., at 50:8–53:24.
58 See id., at 32:9–32:23.
59 See id., at 32:24–33:7.
60 See id., at 44:7–44:21.
61 See id., at 42:19–44:6.
62 See id., at 44:7–44:21.
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denationalization of individuals that are looking to reclaim their status”63 and denied that anything
the Debtor learned from the Debtor’s Jurist Course informed the Debtor’s Petition.64
18. 	The Debtor also testified that she had made no payments to the Tribe other than for
Debtor’s Tribal Courses and one donation of $300 the previous year.65 She further testified that
she had been involved with the Tribe since “maybe 2022.”66 Finally, the Debtor testified, not on
cross but in her own affirmative submission, that the Tribe was willing to provide additional funds
to help her repay her debts outside of a Chapter 7 case.67
19. 	Although the Debtor testified to the facts just canvassed, the Debtor testified that
she could not recall answers to many questions, most of which, conveniently, pertained to matters
the Debtor appears to have tried to conceal from the bankruptcy proceedings, such as those relating
to the Nevin Property, the Rental income,68 and others matters.69 This would begin a trend
63 See id., at 54:11–54:18.
64 See id., at 54:19–54:21.
65 See id., at 56:17–58:2.
66 See id., at 60:1–60:2.
67 See id., at 60:12–61:23.
68 See id., at 22:5–24:1 (the Debtor’s statement she could not remember details as to how much her monthly
mortgage payment for Nevin Property was despite paying it monthly and having done so that same month
or even confirm an estimate of it being below or about $1,000 or remember the original amount); id., at
26:5–26:8 (same as to the names of who rented the Nevin Property from her); id., at 26:15–27:3 (same as
to the entity that employed the Nevin Property’s property manager or how long property manager had
worked there or when they first met); id., at 30:1–30:4 (same as to how much the mortgage for Nevin
Property had been refinanced to or even “[b]allpark” it); id., at 30:24–31:18, 33:8–33:15 & 50:22–50:24
(same as to the name of the bank where an account belonging to Holt Solutions was held and where the
Nevin Property mortgage payments were made from, when she opened the account, how much was held in
it, or if any deposits to it had been made); id., at 36:5–36:12 (same as to the full extent of maintenance done
to the Nevin Property in the last year); id., at 39:16–40:2 (same as to whether the Rental Income had been
paid that month).
69 See id., at 34:21–34:25 (same as to who prepared her 2023 tax returns); id., at 43:8–43:9 & 44:3–44:4
(same as to how much she had paid for Tribal Courses); id., at 56:14–56:16 (same as to whether the Trustee
had asked her about the Conveyances at the January 341 Meeting); id., at 59:24–60:7 (same as to when she
had purchased her vehicle and whether or not it had occurred before or after she joined the Tribe).
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throughout the May and subsequent hearing of the Debtor not recalling matters apparently when
doing so was convenient for the Debtor.70
20. 	Due to this testimony, the Court orally directed the Debtor to provide the Trustee
and Bankruptcy Administrator with certain “information” needed, including any information as to
any undisclosed bank accounts (the “May Accounts Directive”), tax returns (the “May Tax Returns
Directive”), leases (the “May Leases Directive”), and “any of the course information” (the “May
Course Documents Directive,” and together with the May Bank Directive, the May Tax Returns
Directive, and the May Leases Directive, the “May Oral Directives”).71 The Court explained to the
Debtor that the Trustee’s role in the bankruptcy case obliged her to seek and review such
information.72
21. 	Following the May Hearing and prior the next hearing, the Parties made various
further filings. On May 28, 2025, the Trustee initiated the Adversary Proceeding, asserting, inter
alia, that the Conveyances were fraudulent and that the Properties should be brought back into the
bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the Debtor’s creditors.73 The next day, the Debtor filed an
Answer to Complaint [Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 6], wherefore the Court entered the Court Memo to
Individual re: Attorney Representation [Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 7] (the “Court Representation Memo”),
informing the Debtor that she could not represent Holt Solutions and would need to obtain counsel
to litigate the Adversary Proceeding. The Debtor also made further filings seeking to end her
70 See infra notes 91–92 and accompanying text (the June 23 Hearing); note 109 and accompanying text
(the July 7 Hearing); notes 126 & 131 and accompanying text (the July 21 Hearing); notes 152, 156–159,
& 174 and accompanying text (the September Hearing); notes 192–194, 198, 200 and accompanying text
(the October Hearing); notes
71 See id., at 64:11–64:21.
72 See id., at 64:21–66:11.
73 See Adversary case 25-03032. Complaint 13 by Melanie D. Johnson Raubach, Chapter 7 Trustee against
Holt Solutions, LLC [Doc. No. 66]; see also Adversary case 25-03032. Complaint 13 by Melanie D. Johnson
Raubach, Chapter 7 Trustee against Holt Solutions, LLC [Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 1].
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Chapter 7 Base Case or effectuate a resolution obtaining the treatment she had sought through the
Debtor’s Tribal Exemptions.74 On June 9, 2025, the Debtor filed the Amended Schedule J, Cover
Sheet [Doc. No. 78] (the “First Amended Schedule”). The First Amended Schedule again provided
as the Debtor’s income the Debtor’s Asserted Income which omitted the Rental Income.75
D. June Facts
1. 	The June 9 Hearing and Further Filings
22. 	On June 9, 2025, the Court held a hearing (the “June 9 Hearing”)76 on one of the
Debtor’s pleadings regarding the Debtor’s tribal assertions. The Debtor again argued that the
Properties were unrecoverable due to their tribal status from the Conveyances and that such
conveyances are standard tribal practice.77 After rebuttal as to the merits of these arguments by the
74 See Motion to Convert Case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 [Doc. No. 68] (the “Chapter 13 Conversion
Motion”); Motion to Refer Matter to Mediation Pursuant to LBR 9019-2 [Doc. No. 69] (the “Mediation
Motion”); Motion and Memorandum: Ruling that Tribal Property is Not Property of the Estate [Doc. No.
70] (the “Second Tribal Property Motion”); Motion to Compel Trustee to Provide Proposed Settlement
Amount for Full Repayment of Creditors and Estate Administrative Costs [Doc. No. 71] (the “Compel
Settlement Motion”); Memorandum [Doc. No. 77] (the “Memorandum”).
75 See First Amended Schedule, p. 4.
76 See Transcript for Hearing/Trial held on 6/9/2025 [Doc. No. 182] (the “June 9 Hearing Transcript”); see
also Courtroom Recording on June 9, 2025, at 10:21:08 AM [Doc. No. 82] (the “June 9 Hearing
Recording”) (39 minutes).
77 See June 9 Hearing Transcript, at 3:17–7:5 (arguing that that the Properties could not be liquidated as part
of the usual practice for a Chapter 7 debtor’s estate because the Conveyances made the Properties ‘tribal
property’ and thus unavailable for such liquidation recovery, which she again asserted this was customary
practice for tribal entities); id., at 7:7–10:11 (arguing that the Conveyances are not prohibited unless
fraudulent which they were not because they were done more than 20 months before filing and the Debtor
was not involvement at the time and given her recent efforts to pay her creditors and her transparency
regarding the Conveyances since the January 23 341 Meeting).
The Debtor also argued that the Trustee’s previous analogies of the Debtor’s Tribal Exemptions to
exemptions claimed by asserted sovereign citizens had been prejudicial to the Debtor and created bias as to
her asserted tribal status. See id., at 10:13–12:5. The Court did directly respond to this third argument by
explaining that the Trustee’s analogies did not function to say the Debtor’s asserted tribal status was the
same as sovereign citizens claimed statuses. See id., at 12:6–12:18 (“Ms. Ford, just so you know, everybody
is supposed to -- we just read the cases. And so, it's her job, as it's your job, is to convince us. So, you know,
as far as the bias, she just have to provide case law which might be illustrative, but a lot of times you provide
case law that you know might not be exactly the same but may help guide the Court's decision-making
process. So I am listening to everything you're saying, I just want you to know that sometimes just because
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Trustee78 and the Bankruptcy Administrator,79 the Bankruptcy Administrator also informed the
Court that the Debtor had done nothing to comply with the Court’s May Oral Directives and
specifically did not comply with the May Accounts Directive and the May Leases Directive when
the Bankruptcy Administrator’s offered the Debtor an opportunity to do so.80 After the Debtor
replied to the merits of the Trustee’s and the Bankruptcy Administrator’s rebuttal,81 the Court
queried the Debtor as to her compliance with the May Oral Directives, the Debtor acknowledge
she had not taken any actions to comply.82 Additionally, after discussion of the Trustee’s efforts to
notify the Debtor’s creditors, the Court explained to the Debtor that the Trustee was obligated to
send such notice and this was one reason which made the Debtor’s compliance with the May
Accounts Directive so important in order to progress the Debtor’s case.83
23. 	Later the same day as the June 9 Hearing, the Debtor filed the Motion for Protective
Order to Limit Discovery [Doc. No. 81; Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 13] (the “First Protective Motion”) in
you cite case law, just as you've cited case law, you know that's not exactly your same fact pattern, but it
might help guide the Court, and I think Ms. Raubach is just trying to do that, as well.”). The Debtor
responded that she “underst[ood] and [ ] respect[ed] what [the Court was] saying,” but that the nonetheless,
just the Trustee making the analogy created bias and was prejudicial. See id., at 12:19–14:8.
78 See id., at 14:12–15:19 (arguing that that the First Tribal Property Motion mischaracterized the Properties
as still part of the Debtor’s Estate, just unrecoverable, when in reality they were not part of the Debtor’s
estate given the Conveyances, wherefore she had brought the Adversary Proceeding).
79 See id., at 15:23–17:10 (arguing that the assertions made by the Debtor in support of the First Tribal
Property Motion replicated those made previously by the Debtor which the Court rejected when it granted
the Exemptions Objection, concurring with the Trustee as to the Conveyances’ effect, and arguing that the
Debtor was not proceeding in good faith but to keep her assets by avoiding the required rules for a Chapter
7 case).
80 See id., at 17:11–17:22.
81 See id., at 18:6–19:9 (reiterating that Tribal entity holds the deed, stating that the Debtor is not wasting
resources, insisting that the Debtor has funds to pay creditors in full and wants a settlement number, and
denying that the Debtor was hiding assets or acting in bad faith),
82 See id., at 19:10–19:18 (“No, Your Honor. And that is -- even that is under Tribal jurisdiction. All of that
is under Tribal jurisdiction, Your Honor. And I do understand that she would like it. Again, it's under Tribal
jurisdiction”).
83 See id., at 25:17–26:9 (the Court correcting the Debtor’s argument that Rocket Mortgage should not be
notified as it was not relevant to bankruptcy because Rocket Mortgage could move to foreclose given their
secured status, by pointing out the Debtor was mixing up laws and that such creditors could not so foreclose
specifically because of the bankruptcy case, but were needed to be known for the case to move along).
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both the Chapter 7 Base Case and the Adversary Proceeding. The Debtor filing the First Protective
Motion in the Adversary Proceeding without counsel contravened the Court’s Local Rule 2090-1,
the Court Representation Memo, and the Court’s explicit delineation to the Debtor of the same at
the June 9 Hearing,84 as did another motion the Debtor filed the same day in the Adversary
Proceeding.85
24. 	On June 20, 2025, the Debtor also filed the Amended Statement of Income, Schedule
J, Cover Sheet [Doc. No. 105] (the “Second Amended Schedules,” and together with the First
Amended Schedule, the “Amended Schedules”). The Second Amended Schedules repeated the
false statement from the Debtor’s Petition as to the nonexistence of the Rental Income
specifically86 and as to the Debtor’s Asserted Income, it again omitted the Rental Income as part
of the Debtor’s income.87
84 See id., at 20:10–22:3 (denying the First Tribal Property Motion because there was no justiciable
controversy yet for the Court to decide (1) because the First Tribal Property Motion made arguments as to
matters involved the Adversary Proceeding and Holt Solutions, and (2) because Holt Solutions required
counsel for it to be present before the Court pursuant to the Court’s Local Rule 2090-1 and counsel had not
yet been obtained); see also Order Denying Motion [Doc. No. 84].
85 Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding for Sovereign Immunity & Jurisdiction & Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction [Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 12]. On June 12, 2025, the Trustee filed the Motion to Strike Ryan
Ford's Filings and Trustee's Request for a Deadline for Defendant to Retain Counsel [Adv. Pro. Doc. No.
17], which the Court granted on July 10, 2025, see Order Granting Motion to Strike Ryan Ford's Filings
and Trustee's Request for a Deadline for Defendant to Retain Counsel [Adv. Pro. Doc. No. 32], directing
the Debtor to obtain counsel for Holt Solutions by August 10, 2025 (the “Obtaining Representation
Directive”).
86 See Second Amended Schedules, p. 3.
87 See Second Amended Schedules, p. 8.
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2. 	The June 23 Hearing, the Reference Withdrawal Motion, and Further Filings
25. 	On June 23, 2025, the Court held a hearing (the “June 23 Hearing”)88 on various
prior filings by the Debtor.89 During consideration of one such filing, the Bankruptcy Administrator
informed the Court that the Debtor still had not complied with some of the directives under the
May Oral Directives.90 The Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator cross-examined the Debtor
during the June 23 Hearing, wherein the Debtor again failed to recall details as to key matters,
such as her compliance to date with the May Oral Directives,91 the Nevin Property, and the Rental
Income.92
88 See Transcript for Hearing/Trial held on 6/23/2025 [Doc. No. 184] (the “June 23 Hearing Transcript”);
see also Courtroom Recording on June 23, 2025, at 10:33:28 AM [Doc. No. 112] (53 minutes); Courtroom
Recording on June 23, 2025, at 10:40:19 AM [Doc. No. 113] (1 minutes); Courtroom Recording on June
23, 2025, at 10:45:17 AM [Doc. No. 114] (4 minutes); Courtroom Recording on June 23, 2025, at 11:22:01
AM [Doc. No. 115] (10 minutes).
89 See June 23 Hearing Transcript, at 7:7–20:1 (hearing arguments on the Chapter 13 Conversion Motion);
id., at 20:7–23:10 (hearing arguments on the Mediation Motion); id., at 23:11–25:5 (not hearing arguments
on the Second Tribal Property Motion because it replicated arguments which the Debtor had made in the
First Tribal Property Motion and which the Court had rejected); id., at 25:6–31:24 (hearing arguments on
the Memorandum); id., at 31:25–36:6 (hearing arguments on the Compel Settlement Motion); id., at 36:8–
39:8 (hearing arguments on the First Protective Motion first in the Chapter 7 Base Case); id., at 39:9–43:10
(hearing arguments the First Protective Motion in the Adversary Proceeding and the Adversary Proceeding
Dismissal Motion).
90 See id., at 7:7–8:15; id., at 8:24–9:9 (the Bankruptcy Administrator statement asserting that the Chapter
13 Conversion Motion should be denied because, inter alia, the Debtor’s noncompliance to date with the
with the May Accounts Directive and the May Leases Directive made it inappropriate at that time).
91 See id., at 11:3–13:2 & 13:9–13:20 (the Bankruptcy Administrator’s and the Debtor’s exchange where
the Debtor testifies that she could not recall (1) whether she received an email from the Bankruptcy
Administrator sent on May 28, 2025, (2) whether the Bankruptcy Administrator had presented a printout of
the email to the Debtor in person prior to the June 9 Hearing, (3) whether she had received emails from the
Bankruptcy Administrator’s office providing notice of the Holt Solutions Document Production Motion, or
(4) when the Debtor had last used her email, but could recall enough to confirm that the emails had been
sent to the Debtor’s email address); id., at 16:23–19:8 (the Trustee and the Debtor’s exchange where the
Trustee reminds the Debtor about an email the Debtor had sent to the Trustee three days prior on June 23,
2025, wherein the Debtor asserts she was making efforts to comply with the documents requested by the
May Accounts Directive and the May Leases Directive, which the Debtor confirmed at the June 23 Hearing
but could not recall certain details as to those actions).
92 See id., at 14:10–16:17 (the Bankruptcy Administrator’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor
testifies that she could not recall (1) whether the July Rental Income had been paid, (2) whether
communications between her and the property manager had occurred regarding a July Rental Income
payment, (3) what the date of a Rocket Mortgage payment was, or (4) what the bank’s name where the
account in Holt Solutions’ name was located and the Rental Income was paid).
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26. 	The Court concluded the June 23 Hearing with an oral ruling93 which was reduced
to written form and entered on June 23, 2025, as the Order from Omnibus Hearing on June 23,
2025 [Doc. No. 111; Adv. Proc. Doc. No. 19] (the “June Omnibus Order,” together with the May
Oral Directives, the “May and June Orders”). The June Omnibus Order, after first denying various
filings of the Debtor’s hearing at the June 23 Hearing,94 made five directives to the Debtor,
specifically:
• 	(1) Barring the Debtor from litigating on behalf of Holt Solutions (the “June Holt
Solutions Representation Directive”);
• 	(2) Directing the Debtor to provide the Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator with any
of the Debtor’s and Holt Solutions’ bank account information (the “June Accounts
Directive,” and together with the May Account Directive, the “May and June Accounts
Directives”);
• 	(3) Directing the Debtor to provide the Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator with any
of Holt Solutions’ tax returns (the “June Tax Returns Directive,” and together with the
May Tax Returns Directive, the “May and June Tax Returns Directives”);
• 	(4) Directing the Debtor to provide the Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator with any
lease agreements for either of the Properties (the “June Leases Directive;” together with
the May Leases Directive, the “May and June Leases Directives,” which, together with
the May and June Course Documents Directives, the May and June Tax Returns
Directives, and the June Holt Solutions Representation Directive, the “May and June
non-Tribal Directives”);
• 	(5) Directing the Debtor to provide the Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator with any
documents for the Debtor’s Tribal Courses (the “June Courses Documents Directive;”
together with the May Course Documents Directive, the “May and June Courses
Documents Directives,” which, together with the May and June non-Tribal Directives,
the “May and June Directives”).95
The June Omnibus Order set a deadline of June 27, 2025, for the Debtor’s compliance,96 directed
the Trustee or the Bankruptcy Administrator to file a report on the Debtor’s compliance after this
93 See id., at 43:19–51:9.
94 See June Omnibus Order, pp 3–4, decretal ¶¶ 1–4.
95 See id., p. 4, decretal ¶ 6.
96 See id., p. 4, decretal ¶ 7.
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deadline,97 and set a status hearing for the Debtor’s compliance on July 7, 2025 (the “July 7
Hearing”).98
27. 	On June 27, 2025, the Debtor filed the Motion to Withdraw Reference [Doc. No.
121; Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 1] (the “Reference Withdrawal Motion”), which sought to withdraw her
case from this Court to the District Court. The same day, the Debtor sent a cease-and-desist letter
to the Trustee alleging that the Trustee had committed libel and defamation against the Debtor and
the Tribe. See Notice of Receipt of Correspondence from Debtor to Trustee “Official Notice to
Cease and Desist” [Doc. No. 124] (the “Cease and Desist Letter”).
28. 	On July 3, 2025, the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator filed the Joint
Report (of Bankruptcy Administrator and Trustee) of Status of Debtor's Compliance with Order
from Omnibus Hearing on June 23, 2025, and Request for Sanctions [Doc. No. 125; Adv. Proc.
Doc. No. 29] (the “First Status Report”). The First Status Report reported that the Debtor had
started to comply with the June and May Bank Accounts Directives by providing some account
statements, but also reported that this (1) did not include either some or all statements for the
accounts requested as well as (2) had revealed more of the Debtor’s Accounts of which the Trustee
and the Bankruptcy Administrator were previously unaware.99 The First Status Report also
reported that the Debtor had not taken any actions to comply with the May and June Tax Returns
Directives and the May and June Courses Documents Directives, and had not fully complied with
the May and June Leases Directives.100 Thus, the First Status Report requested that the Court
97 See id., p. 4, decretal ¶ 8.
98 See id., p. 4, decretal ¶ 9.
99 See First Status Report, pp. 2–3.
100 See id., pp. 3–4 (reporting that the Debtor had taken no actions to comply with the May and June Tax
Returns Directives and the May and June Courses Documents Directives and had provided for the May and
June Leases Directives, a 2024 amendment, but not the original copy).
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“[f]ind the Debtor in civil contempt of the [June] Omnibus Order and permit the Debtor to purge
her contempt by paying … $100.00 per day beginning on July 7, 2025, until she fully complies.”101
29. 	On July 7, 2025, the Debtor responded to the First Status Report. See Response to
Joint Report of Status of Debtor's Compliance with Omnibus Order and Objection to Request for
Sanctions [Doc. No. 127] (the “First Status Report Response”). The First Status Report Response
objected to the May and June Course Documents Directives on the grounds that her compliance
with the directives would violate copyright102 and the directives were irrelevant to her bankruptcy
case.103 However, the First Status Report Response stated, the Debtor “intends to comply with the
remaining provisions of the [June Omnibus Order] and is actively gathering the requested financial
records” and “and will produce them as soon as they are collected.”104
E. July through August Facts
1. 	The July 7 Hearing
30. 	The Court next held the July 7 Hearing105 as a status conference on the Debtor’s
compliance with the May and June Orders. As to the First Status Report Response’ assertion that
101 See id., pp. 7–8.
102 See First Status Report Response, ¶¶ 3–4 (stating that that Debtor’s Tribal Courses’ materials “are
proprietary intellectual property of the course provider and are protected by federal copyright and trademark
law,” and “[u]nder 17 U.S.C. §106, [only] a copyright owner” may “reproduce, create derivative works,
and distribute the copyrighted content,” wherefore, since “Debtor did not author or own the tribal course
content and holds no license to redistribute it,” her disclosure “would violate those exclusive rights.”
103 See id., ¶¶ 7–8 (stating that the May and June Course Documents Directives are “overbroad request[s]
beyond the scope of legitimate discovery” because they “ha[ve] no apparent relevance to Debtor's financial
affairs, assets, or estate administration,” wherefore, they are “outside the scope of a proper Rule 2004
examination”).
104 See id., ¶¶ 5–6 (stating these directives in the May and June Orders other than the May and June Course
Documents Directives “fall[ ] squarely within the scope of a Rule 2004 examination, which permits inquiry
into the debtor's property, liabilities, and financial condition” because they seek documents that “are clearly
relevant to the estate and under Debtor's control and there is no dispute about providing them”).
105 See Transcript for Hearing/Trial held on 7/7/2025 [Doc. No. 185] (the “July 7 Hearing Transcript”); see
also Courtroom Recording on July 7, 2025, at 10:08:00 AM [Doc. No. 128] (20 minutes); Courtroom
Recording on July 7, 2025, at 11:17:32 AM [Doc. No. 129] (38 minutes).
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the Debtor was trying to comply with the May and June non-Tribal Directives, the Bankruptcy
Administrator rebutted on the grounds that the Debtor’s explanation did not explain her
outstanding noncompliance with all the May and June non-Tribal Directives. The Bankruptcy
Administrator asserted that the May and June Leases Directives could be easily and quickly fully
complied with by the Debtor’s contacting the Nevin Property’s property manager.106 As to the First
Status Report Response’ copyright and relevancy objection to the May and June Courses
Documents Directives, the Bankruptcy Administrator rebutted on the grounds that the Debtor was
just arguing she did not need to comply because she did not want to comply.107 The Trustee joined
the Bankruptcy Administrator’s and highlighted that the Debtor had approximately a seven week
period since the May Oral Directives to comply at least with the May and June non-Tribal
Directives.108
31. 	The Debtor was cross examined by the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator
as to the account statement production to date, any undisclosed accounts, the Debtor’s Petition,
and the Tribe; the Debtor could not remember details.109 This testimony revealed more of the
Debtor’s Accounts.110 After the cross-examination, the Trustee reminded the Debtor that she could
106 See July 7 Hearing Transcript, at 11:8–13:16.
107 See id.
108 See id., at 13:19–14:1.
109 See id., at 21:24–33:13 (the Debtor's responses that she could not recall answers: as to (1) one Bluevine
account, specifically, (a) what one deposit to it was for and (b) why one of its statement referenced another
account owned by the Debtor at a different undisclosed bank, (c) whether Holt Solutions owned an account
at that bank (but could confirm that she personally did not own such an account); as to (2) another Bluevine
account, specifically, (a) what a transfer to it labeled as for Nevin Property was specifically or, (b) whether
it still existed or when she last accessed it, (c) when she last deposited into it (but could confirm it was in
Holt Solutions’ name); as to (3) a non-Bluevine account, specifically, (a) when the Debtor closed it, (b) why
she did closed it, and (c) what she had used it for (but could confirm she owned it); on (4) whether the
Debtor’s Petition had directed the Debtor to report all accounts she owns; on (5) whether the Debtor or Holt
Solutions owned any other further undisclosed accounts; on (6) exactly whether she or Holt Solutions
owned a Bluevine credit card (but tentatively denied them so owning one); and, as to (7) the Tribe, (a) what
its address was, (b) who a contact person was, or (c) any identifying details or any details related to the
Debtor's Tribal Courses or the Debtor's Jurist Course)
110 See id.
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easily download the overdue account statements online..111 The Bankruptcy Administrator noted
that the fact that May and June Account Directives directed the Debtor to provide statements for
all accounts she owned, not only those requested which the Debtor produced, challenged the
Debtor’s assertion she was attempting to comply with the May and June non-Tribal Directives.112
32. 	The Court concluded the July 7 Hearing with an oral ruling113 which was reduced
to written form and entered on June 23, 2025, as the Contempt Finding Order. The Contempt
Finding Order found the Debtor in civil contempt for her noncompliance with the May and the
June Orders,114 but provided that the Debtor could purge this finding by complying with the May
and June Orders by, specifically, providing the Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator with:
• 	(1) all statements for any and all of the Debtor’s or Holt Solutions’ accounts generally,
and specifically, but not limited to, certain statements for certain identified accounts
(the “July 7 Accounts Directives,” and together with the May and June Bank Account
Directives, the “May, June, and July 7 Account Directives”),
• 	(2) the lease agreements for either of the Properties (the “July 7 Leases Directives,”
together with the May and June Leases Directives, the “May, June, and July 7 Leases
Directives”), and
• 	(3) the documents for the Debtor’s Tribal Courses (the “July 7 Courses Documents
Directives;” together with the May and June Courses Documents Directives, the “May,
June, and July 7 Courses Documents Directives,” which, together with the May, June,
and July 7 Account Directives, the May, June, and July 7 Leases Directives, the “May,
June, and July 7 Orders”).115
The Contempt Finding Order set a deadline of July 17, 2025, for the Debtor’s compliance116 and
scheduled a status hearing on July 21, 2025 (the “July 21 Hearing”) for determination of
compliance and imposing sanctions if the Debtor failed to comply.117
111 See id., at 34:18–36:13.
112 See id., at 36:16–38:25.
113 See id., at 40:3–44:18.
114 See Contempt Finding Order, p. 2, decretal ¶ 1.
115 Id., pp. 2–3, decretal ¶ 2.
116 See id.
117 See id, p. 3, decretal ¶¶ 3–4.
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33. 	On July 10, 2025, the Debtor filed the Motion for Recusal of Trustee and
Bankruptcy Administrator [Doc. No. 132] (the “Original Recusal Motion”). The Original Recusal
Motion made various false allegations of fact.118 On July 11, 2025, the Trustee and the Bankruptcy
Administrator filed responses to Reference Withdrawal Motion at the District Court and119 the
Debtor replied on July 17, 2025. See Reply to Opposition [Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 17] (the “Original
Reference Withdrawal Motion Response Reply”). The Original Reference Withdrawal Motion
Response Reply contained various patent errors, such as alleging that the Trustee had sent the
Debtor threatening voicemails (the “Voicemails Allegations”)120 and utilizing masculine pronouns
interspersed with feminine pronouns, which the Debtor uses in general (the “Motion Pronoun
Discordance”), suggesting that the pleading had been duplicated from one with a male-identifying
individual.121
34. 	On July 21, 2025, prior to the July 21 Hearing, the Bankruptcy Administrator and
the Trustee filed a Joint Report of Status of Debtor’s Compliance with Order Finding Debtor in
Civil Contempt [Doc. No. 136] (the “Second Status Report”). The Second Status Report canvased
(1) that the Bankruptcy Administrator and the Trustee had found some of the Debtor’s Held
Funds,122 (2) that the Debtor had taken some actions to comply with the May, June, and July 7
118 See Original Recusal Motion, ¶ 4 (“The Trustee wants to get debtor to disclose Tribe's confidential or
proprietary property information not belonging to the Debtor's bankruptcy estate without authorization.
This information—which may include intellectual property, business secrets, or other sensitive data—was
revealed or used by the Trustee beyond the scope of her authority. The Bankruptcy Administrator was aware
of, or failing to prevent, this disclosure. By exceeding her mandate and divulging estate information she
had no authority to release, the Trustee breached her duty to safeguard estate assets and respect applicable
privacy and property rights.”).
119 See Joint Response and Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw Reference [Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 5];
Joint Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw Reference [Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 5].
120 See Original Reference Withdrawal Motion Response Reply, ¶ 21 (“The Trustee … fails to address
specific threats documented in the record (e.g. voice mails warning Debtor his liberty was at stake if he did
not comply).”).
121 See, e.g., id.
122 See Second Status Report, pp. 1–3.
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Account Directives by providing some requested statements, but not all requested statements, (3)
that her production revealed more of the Debtor’s Accounts, displaying further noncompliance of
the general part of the May, June, and July 7 Account Directives, and (4) that the Debtor had taken
no action to comply with the May, June, and July 7 Courses Documents Directives.123 The Second
Status Report did not raise any compliance issues as to the May, June, and July 7 Leases Directives,
wherefore it appears that the Debtor had fully complied with that directive prior to July 21, 2025.
2. 	The July 21 Hearing
35. 	During the July 21 Hearing,124 the Bankruptcy Administrator raised to the Court
the Voicemails Allegations.125 When the Court inquired what was the basis for the allegations, the
Debtor stated she could not recall writing it.126 The Court then directed the Debtor that she would
need to file an amended version of the Original Reference Withdrawal Motion Response Reply.127
Next, the Trustee addressed the Second Status Report,128 and the Bankruptcy Administrator
highlighted the volume of undisclosed Debtor’s Accounts.129
36. 	When the Court queried the Debtor as to the various outstanding compliance issues,
the Debtor repeated that she was trying her best to comply with the May, June, and July 7 Bank
Account Directives130 but could not recall key details when pressed by the Court on the accounts.131
123 See id., pp. 3–4.
124 See Transcript for Hearing/Trial held on 7/21/2025 [Doc. No. 183] (the “July 21 Hearing Transcript”);
see also Courtroom Recording on July 21, 2025, at 10:09:14 AM [Doc. No. 138] (21 minutes); Courtroom
Recording on July 21, 2025, at 11:31:51 AM [Doc. No. 139] (38 minutes).
125 See July 21 Hearing Transcript, at 6:17–7:15.
126 See id., at 7:16–8:7.
127 See id., at 8:8–8:11 (the Court’s statement noting that the Debtor, notwithstanding being pro se, was still
under a duty to tell the truth).
128 See id., at 9:22–14:25.
129 See id.
130 See id., at 17:6–23:1.
131 See id. (the Court’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor testifies that she could not recall (1)
details regarding a Zelle transfer to an undisclosed account, (2) details regarding Coinbase account activity,
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As to the May, June, and July 7 Courses Documents Directives, the Debtor asserted she could not
comply as it would violate copyright and claimed she was “under duress” to commit a crime.132
37. 	When the Court asked the Debtor to provide any argument regarding the mitigation
of sanctions, the Debtor admitted “mistakes” in her attempts to comply with the May, June, and
July 7 Bank Account Directives but repeated that she could not comply with the May, June, and
July 7 Courses Documents Directives because it would be illegal, citing 11 U.S.C. § 541, 15 U.S.C.
§ 114, 17 U.S.C. §§ 504 and 505, 18 U.S.C. § 241, and the Indian Arts and Crafts Act.133 The Court
then engaged in the following exchange with the Debtor:
Debtor: Through the order, Your Honor, I am being pressured and coerced into turning over
this stuff that does not belong to me. Again, it belongs to the tribe and not myself… And if
I am being threatened with sanctions and punishment for something that isn’t mine, then
obviously this causes me duress, and I am being forced to make decisions under pressure,
fear, and intimidation. So, I’m really caught in the middle of something that. Umm.
Court: Ms. Ford. Has . . . the tribe said this to you? Because we have told you that this law
you are citing is completely inapplicable. So, can you please provide a name of who you
are speaking to at the tribe that is asserting any of those arguments?
Debtor: Your Honor, I cannot say any of that, but what I can say is that this would be a-a-
against the law for me to do so.
Court: Who have you spoken to the tribe, in, during this process?
Debtor: That, I will not disclose.
Court: Has the tribe threatened you with a lawsuit?
Debtor: Your Honor, that I will not disclose.
Court: And you understood my prior ruling, is that correct?
Debtor: Which order?
Court: You understood why copyright -- why your arguments do not apply?
Debtor: No. I think they do apply.134
(3) whether she had provided statements for another account starting from June, or (4) whether she had
provided or even remembered any related documents for another transfer, among others).
132 See id.
133 See id., at 33:7–35:10. Of course, there is no section 114 in title 15 of the United States Code, which
exemplifies the Court’s concerns with the Debtor citing non-existent legal authorities and perhaps receiving
misleading legal advice from the Debtor’s Jurist Course.
134 See id., at 35:15–36:19.
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38. 	After taking the matter under advisement,135 the Court entered the Contempt
Sanctions Order six days later. The Contempt Sanctions Order, after addressing the case facts136
and law allowing the Court to sanction a party found in civil contempt,137 found:
• 	(1) that “the Debtor [had] either refused or otherwise failed to produce” what she was
directed to produce under the May, June, and July 7 Orders;
• 	(2) that “the Debtor’s assertions that she will be subject to legal action” for compliance
with the May, June, and July 7 Courses Documents Directives were “not [ ] credible”
because no evidence as to such had been provided;
• 	(3) that the May, June, and July 7 Courses Documents Directives sought documents
important for “the Court to regulate the practice of law and potential abuses in practice
against this Debtor by third parties” given the “he length and complexity of the Debtor’s
pleadings,” “the false factual information contained in some pleadings[,] and the
inapplicable or non-existent legal authorities cited therein,” which “raise questions
concerning the source of this material;”
• 	(4) that the at least $7,000 in funds the Debtor had not disclosed in her Petition
questioned the Debtor’s assertions of good faith as it may constitute perjury; and
• 	(5) that Debtor’s actions had “impeded the enforcement of the Court Orders, delayed
the progress of this case, and has disrupted the Parties’ ability to fulfill their fiduciary
duties;”138
Thus, the Contempt Sanctions Order found the Debtor again in contempt of the May Order, the
June Omnibus Order, and the Contempt Finding Order, having not complied with their directives
and acted in bad faith,139 and imposed civil contempt fine of $100 to accrue daily beginning on the
day the Contempt Sanctions Order is entered (the “Contempt Fines”).140 The Contempt Sanctions
Order also (1) directed the Debtor to provide statements for specific identified accounts (the “July
21 Accounts Directives,” together with the May, June, and July 7 Account Directives, the “May
through July 21 Account Directives”),141 (2) provided that the Debtor could purge the contempt
findings and the Contempt Fines by complying with the May Order, the June Omnibus Order, the
135 See id., at 37:11–37:12.
136 See Contempt Sanctions Order, pp. 2–9.
137 See id., pp. 9–10.
138 See id., pp. 10–12.
139 See id, p. 13, decretal ¶¶ 3–5.
140 See id, decretal ¶ 6.
141 See id, decretal ¶¶ 7–8.
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Contempt Finding Order, and Contempt Sanctions Order,142 and (3) directed the Debtor to serve
by mail a copy of the Contempt Sanctions Order to “any parties that the Debtor is aware may
contest the relief provided under this order, including the Debtor’s asserted tribe,” prior to July 31,
2025, and file a certificate of service of the same prior to August 4, 2025 (the “July 21 Mailing
Order to Tribal Entities Directive,” which, together with the May, June, and July 7 Courses
Documents Directives, the “May through July 21 Tribal Directives”).143
3. 	Further July and August Filings
39. 	On July 29, 2025, the Bankruptcy Administrator filed a motion for production to
one Tribal Entity,144 which the Court granted.145 On July 31, 2025, the Bankruptcy Administrator
filed notices of intent to subpoena further Tribal Entities at various addresses.146 These attempts
by the Bankruptcy Administrator to contact Tribal Entities appears to have been futile.
40. 	On August 4, 2025, the Debtor filed Motion for Continuance to Obtain Counsel
and Request for Clarification on Representation Options [Doc. No. 173] and the Statement of Full
Compliance with Court Orders and Request to Purge Contempt [Doc. No. 174] (the “Debtor’s
First Statement of Full Compliance”).
142 See id, decretal ¶ 9.
143 See id, decretal ¶¶ 15–16.
144 See Ex Parte Motion for Production of Documents Only from Aboriginal Republic of North America et
al. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule [Doc. No. 148].
145 See Ex Parte Order Granting Ex Parte Motion for Production of Documents Only from Aboriginal
Republic of North America et al. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 [Doc. No. 149].
146 See Notice of Intent to Serve Subpoena on ARNA (Crown Rd. address) [Doc. No. 153]; Notice of Intent
to Serve Subpoena on ARNA (Chestnut St. address) [Doc. No. 154]; Notice of Intent to Serve Subpoena on
ARNA (P.O. Box address) [Doc. No. 155]; Notice of Intent to Serve Subpoena on Xi-Amaru Tribal
Government [Doc. No. 156]; Notice of Intent to Serve Subpoena on Aboriginal University [Doc. No. 157];
Notice of Intent to Serve Subpoena on Amaru Xi-Ali D/B/A Xi Amaru Tribal Enterprises (Crown Road
address) [Doc. No. 158]; Notice of Intent to Serve Subpoena on Amaru Xi-Ali d/b/a Xi Amaru Tribal
Enterprises (Bradford Way address) [Doc. No. 159].
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41. 	On August 13, 2025, the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator filed the Joint
Response and Request for Hearing Status Report and Response and Objection (of Bankruptcy
Administrator and Trustee) to Debtor’s Statement of Full Compliance with Court Orders and
Request to Purge Contempt [Doc. No. 177; Adv. Proc. Doc. No. 46] (the “Third Status Report”).
The Third Status Report asserted that the Debtor had done nothing to comply with the May through
July 21 Tribal Directives and still had not fully complied with the May through July 21 Account
Directives because there were still missing statements and the statements produced revealed more
of the Debtor’s Accounts.147
42. 	On August 20, 2025, the Debtor filed the Reply Opposing Default Judgment in
Adversary Proceeding and Statement of Full Compliance with Court Order [Doc. No. 179] (the
“Debtor’s Second Statement of Full Compliance”). On August 29, 2025, the Debtor filed the
Debtor's Statement of Full Compliance with Updated Status Report [Doc. No. 209] (the “Debtor’s
Third Statement of Full Compliance”). The Debtor’s Second and Third Statements of Full
Compliance asserted that the Debtor did not need comply with the May through July 21 Tribal
Directives because the Debtor believed those directives as irrelevant or infringing copyright.148 On
147 See Third Status Report, 2–7.
148 See Debtor’s Second Statement of Full Compliance, ¶ 7 (“In particular, regarding the item in Contempt
Order ¶ 2(vii) (documentation of courses taken through the Debtor’s asserted tribe), the Debtor understands
– based on the Court’s and Trustee’s statements that “tribe” is not federally recognized – that such
information is not pertinent to the bankruptcy estate or required for compliance. Thus, no tribal course
documentation has been included, as the matter before the Court concerns only the Debtor’s bankruptcy
estate and the two real properties at issue.”); See id., ¶ 6 (“In compliance with the service requirements, the
Debtor served copies of the July 29 Order on all parties known to the Debtor who might contest the relief.
Specifically, on or before July 31, 2025, the Debtor provided a copy of the Order to the Chapter 7 Trustee
and to the Office of the Bankruptcy Administrator (via electronic mail, with their consent). The Debtor is
not aware of any other individual or entity that would contest the Order’s provisions. (With respect to the
Debtor’s previously asserted tribal affiliation, the Debtor notes that the Court has indicated there is no
federally recognized tribe involved in this matter. Accordingly, the Debtor did not serve any “tribal” entity,
as no such legally recognized party exists or is required to be notified in these proceedings).” (emphasis
added)); Debtor’s Third Statement of Full Compliance, ¶ 1 (“Some of the information demanded –
particularly involving tribal course materials – is outside the scope of bankruptcy and beyond the Debtor’s
legal right to produce.”).
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August 29, 2025, the Debtor also filed the Amendment [sic] Motion for Recusal of Trustee and
Bankruptcy Administrator [Doc. No. 207] (the “Amended Recusal Motion”), in which she
removed the false allegations in the Original Recusal Motion.
43. 	On September 4, 2025, the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator filed the
Joint Status Report and Response and Objection to Debtor’s Statements of Full Compliance with
Court Orders and Requests to Purge Contempt [Doc. No. 211; Adv. Proc. Doc. No. 48] (the
“Fourth Status Report”). The Fourth Status Report asserted that the Debtor had still done nothing
to comply with the May through July 21 Tribal Directives and had not fully complied with the
May through July 21 Account Directives, although the Debtor had narrowed her specific
production requirements under the May through July 21 Account Directives.
F. 	September Facts
1. 	The September Hearing and Further Filings
44. 	On September 8, 2025, the Court held a hearing (the “September Hearing”).149 By
the September Hearing, the Contempt Fines totaled $4,200 based upon the Debtor’s continued
noncompliance with the Contempt Sanctions Order. At the September Hearing, the Debtor
appeared with counsel for the Adversary Proceeding and thus had fully complied with the
Obtaining Representation Directive in the Adversary Proceeding.150 For the status hearing as to
149 See Courtroom Recording on September 8, 2025, at 11:54:01 AM [Doc. No. 214] (the “First September
Hearing Recording”) (59 minutes), Courtroom Recording on September 8, 2025, at 12:07:21 AM [Doc. No.
215] (the “Second September Hearing Recording”) (13 minutes), Courtroom Recording on September 8,
2025, at 1:39:07 PM [Doc. No. 216] (the “Third September Hearing Recording”) (1 hour), & Courtroom
Recording on September 8, 2025, 2025, at 2:08:37 PM [Doc. No. 217] (the “Fourth September Hearing
Recording”) (29 minutes); see also Exhibit List [Doc. No. 218] (the “September Hearing Exhibits”).
150 See First September Hearing Recording, at 00:43–3:21. Although this compliance did not satisfy any of
directives under the Contempt Finding and the Contempt Sanctions Orders or explicitly satisfy any of the
directives under the May and June Orders, it did effectively satisfy the June Holt Solutions Representation
Directive in the June Omnibus Order by precluding any further noncompliance of the same occurring.
However, this did not dispose of the contempt matters overall in the Adversary Proceeding, since the May
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the ongoing contempt, the Debtor first addressed May through July 21 Account Directives, which
she asserted she was trying to comply but complained that the goalposts seemed to be moving and
precluded the Debtor’s full compliance.151 When the Court directly queried the Debtor as various
details about her compliance with the May through July 21 Bank Account Directives, the Debtor
could not recall exact details or only offered tentative answers.152
45. 	The Trustee asserted that there were still many outstanding requested account
statements.153 The Bankruptcy Administrator rebutted that the moving goalposts was because of
the Debtor’s own actions, specifically, her noncompliance with the May through July 21 Accounts
Directives as it pertained to the Debtor’s Accounts generally, and her limited compliance as to only
the specifically requested accounts.154
46. 	As to the May, June, and July 7 Courses Documents Directives, the Debtor repeated
that she could not comply with those directives legally.155 When the Court then directly queried
the Debtor about discrete details about the Debtor’s Tribal Courses and the Debtor’s Jurist Course,
the Debtor testified that she could not recall any such details, although she did not deny the
through July 21 Account Directives and the May through July 21 Tribal Directives were still outstanding.
It is indisputable that the Debtor’s compliance with May through July 21 Account Directives was necessary
for the Adversary Proceeding to progress, and probably the case that her compliance with the May through
July 21 Tribal Directives was also relevant, as those matters bore highly on the Conveyances as the central
issue of the Adversary Proceeding. See id. (the Trustee’s statement canvassing the same).
151 See id., at 4:33–28:06.
152 See id. (the Debtor’s statements and Court’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor testified that
she could not recall (1) what the exact dates or periods were when certain accounts were used or closed or
whether they were closed this year or last year, (2) any details related to other accounts for the period
between February 2023 and May 2023 or for 2025, (3) whether she had previously disclosed certain
accounts, including a savings account, (4) the exact nature or timeframe of her use of another account
related to transfers, (5) the details for a transfer on February 14th, 2024 (6) the details regarding possibly
lost documents from another account, or (7) the details regarding a co-op system for another account, among
others).
153 See id., at 28:07–37:39.
154 See id., at 37:40–42:12.
155 See id., at 43:15–43:36 (the Debtor’s statement: “Again, I don't, I don't have the right to go on ahead and
um, give those. I don't have them. So, and I don't own them. So therefore, I can't give you something that I
don't.”).
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existence of such courses and her enrollment therein.156 When the Bankruptcy Administrator cross-
examined the Debtor as to similar details, the result was similarly fruitless,157 except that the
Debtor first objected to one question as violating copyright and irrelevant before being unable to
recall the answer after her objection was overruled,158 and pled the Fifth Amendment on another
question.159
47. 	During closing, the Debtor again argued she could not comply with the Course
Documents Order because they were irrelevant to bankruptcy matters and compliance would
violate copyright, but that she was complying with the Directives concerning matters she deemed
relevant to the bankruptcy case.160 The Trustee concluded by noting that sanctions did not seem to
156 See id., at 43:36–46:37 (the Court’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor testifies she could not
recall (1) what she paid for the Courses, (3) what materials she received, (3) how she took the Courses, (4)
whether she finished them in July and August, or (5) who taught the Jurist Course, and could only recall
enough to submit that the Jurist Course was “about nationality”)).
157 See id., at 53:43–59:59 (the Bankruptcy Administrator’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor
testifies that she could not recall (1) what the website for the Debtor’s Tribal Courses was, (2) exactly when
the last time she was on that website (except that it had been months), or (3) when the Debtor’s Jurist Course
finished and if it July or was it August, and could only recall enough to tentatively deny receiving a
certification from the Debtor’s Jurist Course and tentatively reaffirm being a member of the Tribe since
2022).
158 See Second September Hearing Recording, at 00:00–00:34 (the Bankruptcy Administrator’s, the
Debtor’s, and the Court’s exchange:
Bankruptcy Administrator: Do you know what state [the Tribe is] in? Is that a no?
Debtor: I object to the question.
Bankruptcy Administrator: I'd ask that you be directed to answer your honor.
Court: Please answer what's your basis for objection.
Debtor: That it has no relevancy. It has no relevancy to my bankruptcy.
Court: Objection denied.
BA: What's the state?
Debtor: I don't know.).
159 See id., at 00:35–01:58 (the Bankruptcy Administrator’s, the Debtor’s, and the Court’s exchange where
the Bankruptcy Administrator asks the Debtor who taught the Debtor’s Jurist Course and if she could recall
anything on them to which the Debtor does not respond, the Court directs the Debtor to respond, and the
Debtor states she is “going to plead the 5th because [she] do[es]n't [ ] know what else to say”).
160 See id., at 2:13 to 3:30 (the Debtor’s statement: “Yes. Again, your honor, when it concerns any of the
missing financial documents, I try to make sure that I'm producing what they're, um, the bankruptcy
administrator and the trustee are requesting when it concerns those financial matters, um, again, if it's
oversight of mine. I quickly try to um, correct that so that that is um, uh, given to them, so they have those,
and again, making sure that everything is relevant to the, um, relevant to the estate. Um, with giving them
their um, financial documents that they are requesting of me. Um, again, when it concerns the tribal
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be working to get the Debtor to comply and would defer to the Court as to further escalation.161
The Bankruptcy Administrator concluded by requesting the Course increase the Contempt Fines
and deny the Debtor’s discharge.162 Finally, the Debtor repeated her goal to pay off her creditors
and argued that the May through July 21 Tribal Directives were precluding any such progress or
resolution of the case by distracting the matters.163
48. 	The Court made an oral ruling as to the matters for the status hearing matters164 and
entered in written form on October 7, 2025, as the Contempt Further Sanctions and Discharge
Order. The Contempt Further Sanctions and Discharge Order found that the Debtor continued to
be in civil contempt (the “September Contempt Finding”) based on her noncompliance with the
June Omnibus Order and the Contempt Sanctions Order.165 Next, the Contempt Further Sanctions
and Discharge Order directed the Debtor, as a condition for her to purge September Contempt
Finding, to take various action, specifically:
• 	(1) to provide to the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator the documents for the
Debtor’s Tribal Courses (the “September Courses Documents Directives,” together
with the May, June, and July 7 Courses Documents Directives, the “May through
September Courses Documents Directives”);166
• 	(2) to “[s]erve by mail the Contempt Sanctions Order to “any parties that the Debtor is
aware may contest the relief provided under the [that order], including the Debtor’s
asserted tribe,” and file a Certificate of Service of the same (the “September Mailing
Order to Tribal Entities Directive,” together with the July 21 Mailing Order to Tribal
Entities Directive, the “July and September Mailing Order to Tribal Entities Directive,”
which, together with the May through September Courses Documents Directives, the
“May through September Tribal Directives”);167 and
documents, again, like I've stated before, um, they're not part of my bankruptcy, um, state, um, what the
court is asking me to do is to break the law, and again, for, for trademark, and, um, copyright infringement,
um, is definitely an overreach. Um, we're requesting those things that I, again, that I don't own, and I can't
produce something that I don't own.”).
161 See id., at 03:43–04:33.
162 See id., at 04:34–08:26.
163 See id., at 08:30–13:00.
164 See Third September Hearing Recording, at 00:00–09:53.
165 Contempt Further Sanctions and Discharge Order, p. 2.
166 See id, decretal ¶ 1.a.
167 See id, pp. 2–3, decretal ¶¶ 1.b–1.c.
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• 	(3) to provide specific statements for various specific accounts including those for
CashApp (the “September Accounts Directives,” together with the May through July
21 Account Directives, the “May through September Account Directives”).168
Lastly, the Contempt Further Sanctions and Discharge Order held that because of the September
Contempt Finding, (1) the Court raised the Contempt Fines’ daily accruing amount to $150
beginning on entry of the Contempt Further Sanctions and Discharge Order, and (2) the Court
denied the Debtor’s discharge, which the Court would not reconsider until the Debtor complied
with the June Omnibus Order and the Contempt Sanctions Order.169
49. 	After the Court made the oral ruling at the September Hearing, the Court heard the
Recusal Motion. The Debtor proffered opening arguments reasserting prior failed arguments170
and the Trustee rebutted.171 The Bankruptcy Administrator’s cross-examined the Debtor and
presented evidence, which the Debtor confirmed, that the Debtor removed the false allegations
from the Original Recusal Motion in the Amended Recusal Motion.172 Specifically, the Bankruptcy
Administrator addressed how the changes had not been based on the Debtor’s own volition but
were prompted by a letter that the Bankruptcy Administrator sent to the Debtor which threatened
a motion for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011(c)(1) unless,
168 See id, pp. 3–4, decretal ¶¶ 1.d.(1)–1.d.(13).
169 See id, pp. 4–5, decretal ¶¶ 2.a–2.b.
170 See Third September Hearing Recording, at 12:49–33:57 (the Debtor’s statement arguing that the
Trustee’s and the Bankruptcy Administrator’s actions in the case so far had been improper, asserting,
specifically, that (1) their actions relating to the Tribal Directives were illegal because those actions violated
copyright and were extralegal under the Trustee’s and the Bankruptcy Administrator’s duties because the
Tribal Directives involved matters outside the scope of bankruptcy, that (2) their Sovereign Citizen
Analogies displayed prejudicial debtor against the Debtor, that (3) the overall facts of the Trustee’s and the
Bankruptcy Administrator’s conduct in the case displayed that they were adverse to the Debtor’s interests,
that (4) the first three facts suggested that the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator had an improper
motive driving their actions, such as status or money, and that (5) the Debtor’s Bar Complaint had conflicted
the Trustee as to the Debtor).
171 See id., at 34:00–37:43 (succinctly arguing that a debtor’s disagreement as to how a Chapter 7 trustee
executes their lawful duty or a debtor’s manufacturing of a conflict between the debtor and a trustee did not
suffice for recusal).
172 See id., at 38:12–55:21.
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pursuant 	to 	the 	“safe 	harbor” 	provision 	under 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Bankruptcy 	Procedure
9011(c)(2)(B), the Debtor made the changes.173
50. 	The Bankruptcy Administrator asked the Debtor whether she had ever been
sanctioned by a court outside of the case before this Court, which the Debtor initially responded
by testifying that she could not recall.174 Then, the Bankruptcy Administrator presented to the
Court an order from the Mecklenburg County district court entered on December 4, 2023 which
ordered the Debtor to pay her ex-husband $8,000 in sanctions under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule
11 (the “State Court Sanctions Order”).175 The State Court Sanctions Order, the Debtor confirmed,
was ordered based on findings that the Debtor had, in a custody dispute between the Debtor and
her ex-husband, (1) “verified a pleading which contained facts and statements of law that were
insufficient to satisfy the grievances [that the Debtor] alleged,” (2) “that [the Debtor’s] allegations
as they relate to [the Debtor’s ex-husband] were not credible and were therefore, factually
insufficient,” and (3) were “filed for an improper purpose.”176
51. 	During closing, the Debtor argued that the State Court Sanctions Order did not
impugn her credibility and she repeated her opening arguments.177 The Bankruptcy Administrator
concluded by noting that (1) she was executing her duties including investigating the potential
unauthorized practice of law, and that (2) the Recusal Motion was really just a collateral attack on
173 See id.
174 See id., at 55:35–55:55.
175 See id., at 55:55–59:45.
176 See id.; September Hearing Exhibits, Exhibit BA1, pp. 31–35; see also Ford v. Ford, No. 18-CVD-21937
(KDM) (N.C. Dist. Ct. Mecklenburg Cnty. Dec. 4, 2025) (order re Defendant’s/father’s motion for Rule 11
sanctions).
177 See id., at 00:59–14:16 (the Debtor’s statements asserting that the Trustee’s and the Bankruptcy
Administrator’s actions were adverse to the Debtor, driven by bias, and extralegal).
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the Court’s orders.178 At the conclusion of the September Hearing, the Court took the Recusal
Motion under advisement, which it denied on September 29, 2025.179
2. 	Further Filings
52. 	On October 6, 2025, the Debtor filed the First Contempt Review Motion, which
reaffirmed that she had taken the Debtor’s Jurist Course.180 On October 10, 2025, the Trustee and
the Bankruptcy Administrator filed the Fifth Joint Status Report and Response and Objection to
Debtor’s Response and Declaration to Order Denying Debtor’s Request to Purge Contempt,
Further Sanctioning Debtor, and Denying Debtor’s Discharge [Doc. No. 227] (the “Fifth Status
Report”). The Fifth Status Report asserted that (1) the Debtor still had done nothing to comply
with the May through September Tribal Directives and had not fully complied with the May
through September Account Directives because some statements were still outstanding, (2) the
provided statements had revealed more of the Debtor’s Accounts, and (3) the Debtor’s production
of the CashApp Statements (the “First CashApp Statement Production”) were incomplete as it was
a summary missing specifics as to the transfers.181
53. 	On October 17, 2025, the Debtor filed the Supplemental Response Providing
Additional Information to Fifth Joint Status Report [Doc. No. 229] (the “Fifth Status Report
Response”). The Fifth Status Report Response asserted that the Debtor was trying to comply with
the May through September Account Directives and that, as it pertained to the CashApp
178 See id., at 14:30–24:55.
179 See Order and Opinion Denying Motion for Recusal [Doc. No. 221].
180 See First Contempt Review Motion, p. 8, ¶ 1.J (“The Court has at times referred to the course I took
through my asserted tribe as ‘jurisprudence’. To clarify, it is properly described as a tribal jurist course. It
is an educational and cultural course, not a degree program, law school coursework, or a credential
authorizing the practice of law. I have never represented this tribal course as a law degree, have I ever held
myself out as a licensed attorney nor practiced law.”).
181 See Fifth Status Report, pp. 3–6.
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statements, the Debtor had provided a full unredacted version of the Debtor’s CashApp accounts
on October 17, 2025 (the “Second CashApp Statement Production”).182 However, the Debtor
stated in Fifth Status Report Response that she would not comply with the May through September
Tribal Directives.183
G. October Facts
1. 	The October Hearing and the Trustee’s Letter and the Debtor’s Protective Motion
54. 	At a hearing on October 20, 2025 (the “October Hearing”),184 the Contempt Fines
totaled $9,100. After disposing of procedural matters,185 the Court turned to the status hearing on
the contempt matters. For opening arguments, as to the May through September Account
Directives, the Debtor asserted that she had finally fully complied by providing all requested
available statements in existence.186 As to the May through September Tribal Directives, the
182 See Fifth Status Report Response, ¶¶ I.1–I.3.
183 See id., ¶ I.5 (the Debtor’s statement:
The Debtor respectfully reminds the Court and the Trustee that this matter has already been fully addressed
in prior filings. As previously explained, the Debtor does not possess, own, or control the proprietary course
materials of the tribal entity. These materials are protected by copyright and trademark and remain the
lawful property of the tribe. The Debtor has no legal authority to reproduce or distribute them, and any
attempt to do so would risk copyright or trademark infringement.).
Although the Debtor asserted that she had complied specifically July and September Mailing Order to Tribal
Entities Directive, see id., ¶ I.4, this assertion was on the basis that she had sent the Contempt Finding Order
to parties related to the case, namely, the Trustee, the Bankruptcy Administrator, and the Debtor’s Creditors,
and not to any Tribal Entity. See id., p. 8.
184 See Courtroom Recording on October 20, 2025, at 10:40:53 AM [Doc. No. 233] (the “First October
Hearing Recording”) (52 minutes), Courtroom Recording on October 20, 2025, at 11:43:27 AM [Doc. No.
234] (the “Second October Hearing Recording”) (59 minutes), Courtroom Recording on October 20, 2025,
at 11:52:16 AM [Doc. No. 235] (the “Third October Hearing Recording”) (8 minutes), Courtroom
Recording on October 20, 2025, at 1:21:39 PM [Doc. No. 236] (the “Fourth October Hearing Recording”)
(1 hour), & Courtroom Recording on October 20, 2025, at 1:49:17 PM [Doc. No. 237] (the “Fifth October
Hearing Recording”) (27 minutes); see also Exhibit List [Doc. No. 232] (the “October Hearing Exhibits”).
185 See First October Hearing Recording, at 02:24–28:29 (considering the First Application for
Compensation to: Hamilton Stephens Steele + Martin, PLLC [Doc. No. 219] (the “October Fee
Application”); id., at 28:30–35:11.
186 See id., at 36:03–47:51.
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Debtor asserted that she could not comply by repeating her argument that the requested materials
were copyrighted187 and irrelevant to her bankruptcy case because she never presented herself as
a lawyer and they did not contribute to paying her creditors.188
55. 	The Trustee asserted that the Debtor had satisfied many of the account statement
requests in the May through September Account Directives by providing the Second CashApp
Statement 	Production, 	but 	that 	there 	were 	still 	a 	few 	potentially 	necessary 	outstanding
statements.189 Next, the Bankruptcy Administrator cross-examined the Debtor with a presentation
of printouts of statements from the Debtor’s accounts, which the Debtor confirmed to be accurate
and which contained transfers totaling almost $4,000 to various Tribal Entities.190 The Bankruptcy
Administrator also presented printouts of various pages from the Tribal Entities’ websites.191
56. 	When the Bankruptcy Administrator asked the Debtor about one payment made to
a Tribal Entity, the Debtor could remember virtually no details about the transfer or the Tribal
187 See id., at 47:52–48:52 (“Um, when it concerns the, uh, tribal documents, again, um, I've answered this
in previous, um, again, I don't, I don't own. I don't possess. I don't control any of these things that the, um,
uh, of the tribal entity and again, I understand that the court may have, um, uh, said this, but again, they are
copyright and trademarked and remain lawfully to the tribe. I don't have any legal authority over them, and,
um, again, that puts me at risk when it concerns copyright and trademark, um, infringement.”).
188 See id., at 48:53–50:31 (“Um, Again, I've, I've stated before, um, that these are educational and cultural
programs or really courses, but, um, the, the fact is that this is not a law school curriculum, it's not a law
degree, it's not a degree program, it's not, um, any type of, authorizing the, excuse me, the practice of law.
And nor have I presented myself as such in any capacity …. Um, is not benefiting the creditors at all. Um,
it should be considered as resolved and not raised in any, um, future reports, and I'm seeking protection
from any further sanctions when regards this issue”).
189 See Second October Hearing Recording, at 00:00–05:52.
190 See October Hearing Exhibits, Exhibit BA 1, p. 2 (the Debtor’s transfer of $650 to HAWAB on January
5, 2022); id., p. 5 (same of $550 on March 8, 2022); id., p. 6 (same of $720 to Shabazz Associates on
November 28, 2022); id., p. 8 (the Debtor’s transfer of $300 to Xi-Amaru on March 8, 2024); id., p. 11 (the
Debtor’s transfer of $55 to Aboriginal Medical Association on September 9, 2024); id., p. 13 (the Debtor’s
transfer of $360 to Xi-Amaru on October 4, 2023); id., p. 16 (the Debtor’s transfer of $515 to Xi-Amaru on
January 3, 2023); id., p. 20 (the Debtor’s transfer of $270 to Aboriginal Medical Association on September
8, 2023) id., p. 24 (the Debtor’s transfer of $360 to Aboriginal Medical Association on October 2, 2024);
id., p. 28 (the Debtor’s transfer of $150 to Aboriginal Medical Association on December 2, 2024).
191 See id., Exhibits BA 2–11.
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Entity.192 When the Bankruptcy Administrator asked the Debtor about details about the Debtor’s
Jurist Course, the Debtor could not recall most details.193 When the Bankruptcy Administrator
asked the Debtor about (1) her familiarity with certain Tribal Entities’ online materials or
individuals, (2) the source of certain arguments made by the Debtor to the North Carolina state
court and to the Court during these proceedings, (3) the origin of certain practices carried out by
the Debtor in her pleadings, and (4) the Tribe’s and the Tribal Course’s relation to Holt Consulting
and Holt Solutions, the Debtor could not recall virtually any details194 or pled the Fifth
Amendment.195 When the Bankruptcy Administrator further pressed the Debtor regarding the
Tribal Course Documents and their format, the Debtor again testified that she could not provide
192 See Second October Hearing Recording, at 07:23–13:51 (the Bankruptcy Administrator’s and the
Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor testifies that she could not recall (1) whether she was familiar with or
had heard of HAWAB or HAWAB DWF or their websites, (2) why she made the payment of $650 to
HAWAB on January 5, 2022, (3) whether her Tribe was located at Dallas Fort Worth, or (4) whether she
had taken any courses through HAWAB DWF).
193 See id., at 13:51–24:06 (the Bankruptcy Administrator’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor
testifies that she could not recall (1) where she took the Debtor's Jurist Course, (2) who provided the
Debtor's Jurist Course, (3) whether someone had threatened consequences if the Debtor provided the
Debtor's Tribal Course Documents and who it was, (4) whether someone had told her she could not provide
the Debtor's Tribal Course Documents, (5) when she started the Debtor's Jurist Course, (6) whether she
showed up to one of classes for the Debtor's Jurist Course or had taken one class this year, or (7) whether
the Debtor's Jurist Course was self-paced, online, or in person).
194 See id., at 24:07–44:51 (the Bankruptcy Administrator’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor
testifies that she could not recall (1) whether she had seen material on HAWAB's website, (2) whether she
knew who the individual was presenting in a YouTube video on HAWAB's website, Minister Kojo, (3)
whether she had taken a class with, or spoken to, or had any contact with ‘Minister’ Kojo, (4) what ARNA's
website's statement meant when it offered certification for individuals to protect themselves against adverse
legal fiction posing as government structures, (5) how long the Debtor had been signing her filings “all
rights reserved,” which the Debtor has done for virtually all pleadings to the Court, (6) when her divorce
had wrapped up, (7) what else the Debtor signed with “all rights reserved,” (8) what the phrase "fraudulent
debt" used in one of her pleadings meant, (9) whether she thought the Court was a legal fiction, (10) whether
the Debtor was taking any Tribal Courses when she created Holt Consulting, (11) whether the Debtor was
a member of the Tribe when she created Holt Consulting, (12) when the Debtor joined the Tribe, (13)
whether the Debtor’s Jurist course on “nationality” covered tribal businesses, or (14) what the source was
for the language describing Holts Solutions as a tribal entity that appeared in the organization filing the
Debtor had submitted to the North Carolina Secretary of State).
195 See id. (the Bankruptcy Administrator’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor pleads the Fifth
Amendment as to from whom and where she learned that tribal properties were tax exempt).
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them due to her nonpossession of the Tribal Course Documents.196 The result was similarly futile
when the Court stated one way the Debtor could display good faith to comply with the Tribal
Directives was to try obtain login credentials for the Debtor’s Tribal Courses.197 The Debtor’s
196 See id., at 44:52–46:59 (the Bankruptcy Administrator’s and the Debtor’s exchange:
Bankruptcy Administrator: First what I don't understand. I hope you can help me. On the one hand, I'm
hearing that you're a curious person, a lifelong learner. That you read and you, you search and you look.
And you don't really remember taking any classes, correct me if I'm wrong, that you don't really
remember taking a class on, to be a jurist, right? You may have signed up that you, you did, if you did,
you didn't do it, right? But on the other hand, you will not turn over your coursework because you'll get
in trouble. The materials don't belong to you. I don't understand the gap. If you, if you've got materials
that you can't turn over because you're going to get in trouble. Because of copyright and trademark. Did
you take the class? Did you find them at the library?
Debtor: What are you talking about? You're asking me for stuff that I don't own, that I don't have. I
mean, I don't understand, I don't, I really don't understand, and that belong to a tribe that, again, that
owns these materials.
Trustee: Where did you get it?
Debtor: So, I don't understand what you want me to do.
Trustee: Where'd you get it? Where'd it come from?
Debtor: I have no idea.
Trustee: You don't know where the stuff came from, that you're being sanctioned a $150 a day. Not to
turn over. You didn't bring it with you?
Debtor: How am I going to turn over something that I do not own?
Trustee: But you have it, don't you? You have it.
Debtor: I'm going to turn over something I do not own or, or because I, I don't have any other answer
for you.
Trustee: What is it? How many pages? Is it electronic? Is it number?
Debtor: I don't have any answers for you.
Trustee: Why?
Debtor: I don't have any answers for you. I answered. I answered you. You don't like the answer that I
gave you. So...).
197 See id., at 46:51–50:28 (the Bankruptcy Administrator’s, the Debtor’s, and the Court’s exchange:
Court: Ms. Ford, just to correct the record, you've said a lot of different things, so it's not on deaf ears.
It's more that you said you have these things that you can't turn them over, but then now you're saying,
but I don't actually...
Debtor: Your Honor, I'm not trying to be rude. I'm just saying I can't turn over what I don't own or
possess.
Court: But you do have them. That's what we're asking at this point.
Debtor: I don't have, I don't have them. That's why it's like, I don't, I don't know what you want me to
do.
Court: So, so you've taken the courses, but you don't have the materials.
Debtor: I don't have the material. I don't, I don't have them, so I don't know what else.
Court: Did you ever have them? What, what can you do about any of this? This is, I mean, again, it
doesn't, do you still have access to your courses?
Debtor: I don't have access to anything. That's why I'm, again, I don't own them. I don't have access to
them. I don't have them.
Court: And where can you, do you have a login? Do you log into the courses?
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inability to recall continued when the Debtor was asked questions about the Tribal Payments and
the Tribal Entities.198 The Debtor continued pleading the Fifth Amendment.199 The Trustee cross-
examined the Debtor about the fact that a preliminary comparison of the First and Second CashApp
Statement Productions display that the statements “do not entirely match,” and how the Debtor
Debtor: I don't even remember.).
198 See id., at 50:28–59:59, & Third October Hearing Recording, at 00:00–08:15 (the Bankruptcy
Administrator’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor testifies that she could not recall (1) why or
for what she had paid $550 to HAWAB DFW on March 8, 2022, (2) who anyone was whom someone could
contact to learn why she had made that payment, (3) whether HAWAB DFW was related to the Tribe, (4)
what the Tribe's flag was and whether it matched a flag pictured on HAWAB DFW's website, (5) whether
there was more than one ARNA, (6) why or for what the Debtor had paid $720 to Shabazz Associates on
November 28, 2022, or whether the payment was for dues or a product or service, (7) whether the Debtor
had ever heard of Shabaz Associates, (8) whether the Debtor had disputed that charge or had ever disputed
any charge to one of the Debtor's Accounts, (9) whether she had seen the 'Debt Discharge Intake Form' on
Shabazz Associates’ website, (10) whether the Debtor had sought any advice from a Tribal Entity about
debt relief other than bankruptcy); Fourth October Hearing Recording, at 03:58–38:02 (the Bankruptcy
Administrator’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor testifies that she could not recall (1) whether
individuals have to pay dues to be a member of ARNA or the Tribe, (2) whether payment of dues is every
other year, (3) when the last time was that the Debtor had paid dues to the Tribe or whether it was in 2025,
2024, or 2023, (4) who would have records of the Debtor paying dues and to whom the Debtor paid or pays
dues, (5) for what the Debtor had paid $515 to the Tribe on January 4, 2023, or any details regarding that
payment, (6) whether the Debtor had ever heard of Dr. Ali, (7) whether the Debtor had used the Debtor's
Tribally Listed Email for tribal business, (8) whether the Debtor's Tribally Listed Email was referencing
the Debtor, (9) whether the Debtor was familiar with certain ARNA terms and whether they were to whom
certain Tribal Payments had been made, (10) for what the Debtor had paid $270 to the Aboriginal Medical
Association on September 8, 2023, or when the last time was that she had bought something from them,
(11) for what the Debtor had paid $360 to the Tribe on October 4, 2023, or any details regarding that
payment, (12) for what the Debtor had paid $300 to the Tribe on March 8, 2024, or any details regarding
that payment, (13) for what the Debtor had paid $25 and $30 to the Aboriginal Medical Association on
September 16, 2024, or any details regarding that payment, (14) for what the Debtor had paid $360 to the
Aboriginal Medical Association on October 2, 2024, or any details regarding that payment, (15) whether
the Debtor had taken any Tribal Courses through the Aboriginal Medical Association, (16) for what the
Debtor had paid $150 to the Aboriginal Medical Association on December 2, 2024, or any details regarding
that payment, (17) whether the Debtor had ever visited the Aboriginal Medical Association's website or
whether the website was how she had made one of the payments to the Aboriginal Medical Association,
(18) what the Debtor received for all of the Tribal Payments, (19) whether she had completed homework
for a Jurist Course, (20) whether the Debtor had learned anything about a constitutional amendment such
as the Fourteenth, Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth, through the Tribe, (21) whether the Debtor had received any
private links for any of the Debtor's Tribal Courses or any tribal meetings, or (22) whether the Debtor had
seen or received a 'Legal Maestro Manual').
199 See Third October Hearing Recording, at 00:00–08:15 (the Bankruptcy Administrator’s and the Debtor’s
exchange where the Debtor pleads the Fifth Amendment as to whether any of the tribal statuses listed on
Shabazz Associates website described the Debtor’s tribal status); Fourth October Hearing Recording, at
03:58–38:02 (the Bankruptcy Administrator’s and the Debtor’s exchange where the Debtor pleads the Fifth
Amendment as to whether she had taken any ARNA aboriginal law firm certification classes).
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made at least one edit to the two statements adding a confidentiality statement, to which the Debtor
could not explain.200
57. 	In closing arguments, the Bankruptcy Administrator argued at to the Accounts
Directives, although the Debtor had finally submitted all requested account statements, since some
statements were redacted, the Debtor had not sufficiently complied with that directive.201 The
Bankruptcy Administrator requested the Court sanction the Debtor pursuant to Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 for continuing to assert she had complied with the prior Contempt
Orders while openly acknowledging she had not complied with certain directives.202 Next, the
Bankruptcy Administrator argued that the Contempt Fines appeared to not be working to obtain
compliance as to the May through September Tribal Directives and recommended the Court
consider incarceration of the Debtor especially given the Debtor’s unpersuasive and non-
remembering testimony which was inconsistent with the Debtor’s prior submissions to the
Court.203 Finally, the Bankruptcy Administrator requested the Court deny the Debtor any discharge
with prejudice.204 The Trustee joined the Bankruptcy Administrator’s arguments and added that
“it's abundantly clear that compliance has not occurred” and that “that the sanctions today have
not had the impact that the parties would have otherwise hoped they would have.”205 The Debtor
then closed, first asserting she had done all she could to comply with the May through September
Account Directives,206 then that she could not comply with the May through September Tribal
200 See id., at 38:01–45:09.
201 See id., at 59:23–59:59 & Fifth October Hearing Recording, 00:00–08:27.
202 See id.
203 See id.
204 See id. (the Bankruptcy Administrator’s statement that her office was required to initiate an adversary
proceeding requesting denial of discharge within a year of a debtor filing a petition, and would do so if
these matters continued past December 23, 2025)
205 See Fifth October Hearing Recording, at 08:29–10:28.
206 See id., at 10:40–18:57.
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Directives because she did not possess the Tribal Course Documents or have the authority to
provide them.207
58. 	Finally, the Court directed the Debtor to provide unredacted versions of all account
statements.208 The Court repeated that the Debtor had to comply with the September Mailing Order
Directive and clarified that serving specifically HAWAB DFW, Shabazz Associates, the Tribe,
Aboriginal Medical Associates (the “October Mailing Order Directive,” together with the July and
September Mailing Order to Tribal Entities Directive, the “July through October Mailing Order to
Tribal Entities Directive”).209 As to the Course Documents Directives, the Court suggested that the
Debtor show good faith attempts to comply by providing to the Trustee and the Bankruptcy
Administrator the Debtor’s login credentials for all Tribal Course related websites, or if the Debtor
did not remember the login credentials, by resetting the login credentials and providing reset login
credentials to the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator (the “October Login Credentials
Directive”).210 The Court then indicated to the Parties that the Court no longer thought the Debtor’s
civil contempt sanctions were coercive and that the Court would consider next pursuing other
penalties.211 Finally, the Court urged the Debtor to speak to a lawyer regarding the impending
possibility of criminal sanctions against the Debtor.212 Given the Debtor’s submissions to the
Court, the Court wanted to provide the Debtor an opportunity to show some good faith attempt at
207 See id. (“The tribal stuff, again, has nothing to do and please, please understand that I respect the court.
It's not that. Again, I can't give you what I don't have. And regardless, and in addition to the fact, again, it's
not mine. So, I don't know how I'm going to be able to do that.”)
208 See id., at 19:01–24:36
209 See id. (“[T]he requirement addresses your claim that you can't provide tribal documents for fear by suit.
This is to help you. Serving the tribe makes clear that your compliance is court ordered and beyond control.
It allows the tribe to appear and object, rather than for you to assert the rights.”)
210 See id.
211 See id.
212 See id.
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compliance,213 and the Court continued all outstanding matters for hearing November 3, 2025 (the
“November 3 Hearing”).214
2. 	The Debtor’s Further Filings, the Protective Motion, the Denial of Reference
Withdrawal, and the Denying Shortened Notice Order
59. 	On October 27, 2025, the Debtor filed the Second Contempt Review Motion and
the Motion to Limit Trustee's Examination Under Rule 2004 and for Protective Order Regarding
Post-Petition Personal Expenditures [Doc. No. 243] (the “Protective Motion”). The fact section
of the Protective Motion acknowledged payments by the Debtor to the Tribe for coursework for
the Debtor’s Courses (the “Protected Motion’s Payments”),215 and stated that “Trustee ha[d]
indicated an intent to question or investigate these transactions to determine whether the Debtor
213 See id., at 24:36–27:28 (the Debtor’s and the Court’s exchange:
Debtor: Question. If I don't have logins, if I don't have any of those. What do I do?
Court: There are many ways. You must produce everything that you took from February to May to [the
Bankruptcy Administrator] or [the Trustee] in some capacity.
Debtor: And if I don't have, if I don't have any of it, if I have none of that, then would produce any and
all documentation related to those courses.
Court: So, you don't have it, you didn't have a prior login?
Debtor: If I don't have none of that. If I've never received any of these things, then what?
Court: Produce any emails related to what you've taken, your certificates you've said you've had.
Debtor: And if I have, again, um.
Court: Ms. Ford, the issue is you've told us on the record that you've obtained certificates. You've paid
money. We need documents related to that.
Debtor: When I stated that, I was mistaken. With, with the certificate. So, I don't, again, I don't have
those. So, I was like, oh, well, I thought I did, but I don't. So, again, what, so why don't you start here?
Court: If you want to show good faith to the court. Start here. If you are saying you don't have login
and passwords, you have testified previously that you paid in advance for these courses. You, you can
show us emails showing your registration. You can show us emails related to the payments you've made
for such registration. You can show us any documents you have about how many courses you've taken.
I know you've taken a couple to completion and some not to completion. So why don't you start to show
your good faith with emails of your registration. Certainly, you must have those.).
214 See id., at 27:28–27:41.
215 Protective Motion, ¶¶ I.1–I.6 (stating that the Debtor “ha[d] engaged in ordinary personal, cultural, and
educational activities, including” making a “modest donation” and “[p]ayments of membership dues” to
the Tribe, as well the “[p]urchase of an educational coursework”).
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‘received value for services’.”216 Also on October 27, 2025, the District Court denied the Debtor’s
Reference Withdrawal Motion.217
60. 	On October 30, 2025, the Debtor filed the Third and the Fourth Contempt Review
Motions which she requested be set for hearing at the November 3 Hearing.218 Because a three-
day period contravened this Court’s Local Rule 9013 requirement for at least fourteen days for
nonmovants to review a motion before the motion is heard, the Debtor moved for the Court to
allow a shortened period because “cause” existed for allowing such under Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(c).219 This cause rested on (1) the constitutional and factual arguments
against the Contempt Order made in the Third and the Fourth Contempt Review Motions, (2) the
ongoing Fines, and (3) the possibility of imprisonment.220 The next day, on October 31, 2025, the
Trustee objected to shortened notice on the basis that one business day would not afford time
necessary for her to review the new arguments made in the Third and the Fourth Contempt Review
Motions.221 The Court denied shortened notice.222
216 Id., ¶ I.7.
217 See ORDER denying 1 Motion to Withdraw Reference; terminating as moot 15 Motion for Leave to
Supplement the Record [Doc. No. 240] (holding that (1) the matters for which the Debtor to withdraw
reference were core to bankruptcy, (2) it was efficient for those matters to remain in bankruptcy court, (3)
the Debtor’s bias and misconduct allegations against the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator were
without merit, and (4) the Debtor’s constitutional arguments were without merit).
218 See Third Contempt Review Motion, 8; and Fourth Contempt Review Motion, 7; see also Notice of
Hearing [Doc. No. 249]; Notice of Hearing [Doc. No. 250].
219 See Motion to Shorten Notice [Doc. No. 251] (the “First Shorten Notice Motion”); Motion to Shorten
Notice [Doc. No. 253] (the “Second Shorten Notice Motion,” and together with the First Shorten Notice
Motion, the “Shorten Notice Motions”).
220 See Shorten Notice Motions ¶¶ I.1–5 & ¶ II.
221 See Objection of Trustee to Debtor's Motion to Shorten Notice for Hearing on Motion to Vacate Contempt
Order and for Declaratory Relief that the Court Exceeded its Article I Authority, ¶ 2–3 [Doc. No. 256];
Objection of the Trustee to Debtor's Motion to Shorten Notice and Request Expedited Hearing on Motion
to Vacate or Deny Contempt Order and Sanctions for Lack of Evidentiary Basis and Violation of Federal
Rules of Evidence and Due Process, ¶ 2–3 [Doc. No. 257].
222 See Denying Shortened Notice Order.
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61. 	Also on October 31, 2025, the Trustee filed the Sixth Status Report on Debtor's
Compliance with Orders [Doc. No. 259] (the “Sixth Status Report”). The Sixth Status Report stated
that the Trustee had confirmed the discrepancies between Second CashApp Account Production
and the First CashApp Account Production, namely, that transfers had been missing from the first
production, many of which, “[d]isturbingly, … involve parties the Debtor has previously attempted
to shield from disclosure in this case,” i.e., Tribal Entities.223
H. November Facts
1. 	The November 3 Hearing, The Trustee’s Letter, and the Final Contempt Order
62. 	At the November 3 Hearing,224 the Court considered the Protective Motion225 and
held a status hearing on the contempt matters. By then, the Contempt Fines totaled $11,200. On
the Protective Motion, the Debtor argued that the Trustee could not investigate the Protected
Motion’s 	Payments 	as 	they 	involved 	information 	that 	was 	“protected” 	and 	irrelevant 	to
bankruptcy.226
63. 	In rebuttal, the Trustee reminded the Court that at the October Hearing, the Debtor
had insisted that she did not know the Aboriginal Medical Association and Dr. Ali.227 The Trustee
demonstrated through independent research, she had concluded that the Dr. Ali operated under the
223 Sixth Status Report ¶ 12–13. The Sixth Status Report reported that the Trustee had concluded that the
nonexistence of various accounts statements that the Debtor had been directed to provide by the September
Account Directive, thus the Debtor complied with the directive related to those accounts. See id., ¶ 14–20.
224 See Courtroom Recording on November 3, 2025, at 11:58:19 AM [Doc. No. 267] (the “First November
3 Hearing Recording”) (52 minutes) & Courtroom Recording on November 3, 2025, at 12:15:22 AM [Doc.
No. 268] (the “Second November 3 Hearing Recording”) (4 minutes); see also Exhibit List [Doc. No. 262].
225 The Protective Motion being heard at the November 3 Hearing, which the Debtor requested, see
Protective Motion, p. 5, also contravened the Court’s local rule for the allowed notice period prior to
hearing, see supra ¶ 60, but the Trustee moved on October 29, 2025, for the Court to allow a reduced period
soley for the Protective Motion, see Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Notice [Doc. No. 246], which the Court
granted. See Order Granting Motion to Shorten Notice [Doc. No. 247].
226 See First November 3 Hearing Recording, at 4:52–9:42.
227 See id., at 12:10–15:52.
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Aboriginal Medical Association’s name and was the direct recipient of more than $2,000 of the
Tribal Payments.228 Based on this conclusion, on October 23, 2025, the Trustee sent a letter to both
Aboriginal Medical Association and Dr. Ali related to those transfers made to Aboriginal Medical
Association within the preference period and inquiring whether the Debtor had received value for
the payments (the “Trustee’s Letter”).229 A trustee sending such a inquiries, i.e., to a transferee of
a debtor inquiring about the transfer’s value exchange, is part and parcel of their duties under 11
U.S. Code §§ 547–548.
64. 	The Trustee also noted she did not send a copy of the letter to the Debtor, which is
also standard practice for such inquiries. Still, four days later, the Debtor filed her Protective
Motion using the exact “value” language present in the Trustee’s Letter.230 When the Court asked
the Debtor about the timing and language tying the Protective Motion and the Trustee’s Letter, the
Debtor insisted she had not been aware of the letter and that the motion was filed in response to
the previous facts of the case.231 The Court denied the Protective Motion.232
65. 	As to the May through September Account Directives, the Trustee discussed the
discrepancies between the First and the Second CashApp Account Productions and the possibility
of spoilation by the Debtor.233 Notwithstanding that issue, the Trustee stated that the Debtor now
appeared to have fully complied with the May through September Account Directives, as she had
finally sent to the Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator all requested statements for all accounts
228 See id., at 15:52–19:11.
229 See id.
230 See id.
231 See id., at 21:21–23:13.
232 See id., at 23:17–23:39. A written order denying the Protected Motion was entered November 7, 2025.
See Order Denying Debtor's Motion to Limit Trustee's Examination Under Rule 2004 and for Protective
Order Regarding Post-Petition Personal Expenditures [Doc. No. 287].
233 See First November 3 Hearing Recording, at 24:13–29:04.; see also supra ¶ 61 (discussing of the Sixth
Status Report canvassing the same).
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identified as belonging to the Debtor on the Petition Date, which totaled twenty-five.234 As to the
May through September Courses Documents Directives, the Trustee noted how the Debtor had
taken no actions to comply.235 The Bankruptcy Administrator concurred with the Trustee’s
statements as to the Debtor’s compliance with the May through September Account Directives and
the possible spoilation, for which she quoted 18 U.S. Code § 1519 which criminalizes such
conduct.236 The Bankruptcy Administrator added that the Debtor had not fully complied with the
July through October Mailing Order to Tribal Entities Directive because the Debtor’s certificate
of service (the “Certificate of Service”) was only to one Tribal Entity, ARNA, and had used a
different address than the one the Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator had found connected to
ARNA.237 The Bankruptcy Administrator also noted that the Debtor had done nothing to comply
with the October Login Credentials Directive.238 The Bankruptcy Administrator concluded by
again recommending that the Court consider referring the Debtor for criminal contempt.239
66. 	The Debtor first insisted she had not manipulated any of the CashApp statements
and just provided the statement CashApp had sent to her and which she assumed was correct.240
She asserted that the Certificate of Service constituted compliance with July through October
Mailing Order to Tribal Entities Directive.241 Finally, the Debtor argued that she had made a good
faith effort to comply with the October Login Credentials Directive, by presenting a printout that
purportedly showed:
• 	(1) an email sent by the Debtor’s email on October 26, 2025, to HAWAB Region 6, at
hawabregion6@gmail.com, stating that the Debtor was “in a bankruptcy court
234 See First November 3 Hearing Recording, at 29:04–30:07.
235 See id., at 30:07–30:23.
236 See id., at 30:28–36:55.
237 See id.
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 See id., at 36:57–43:27.
241 See id.
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proceeding and the court has requested that [she] provide the tribal jurist course login,”
and asking if they “[c]ould provide [her] the login to give to them;”
• 	(2) a response to the email above received by the Debtor’s email on October 29, 2025,
stating that “[a]ccording [t]o our records[,] [the Debtor] never received or registered
for our organization's classes or tribal course login” and “have no login information for
us to provide;” and
• 	(3) an email identical to and sent on the same day as the email above to an entity at
amaruxiali@gmail.com (collectively, the “Debtor’s Emails”).242
When the Court asked about the Debtor’s Emails and whether the HAWAB Region 6 was the entity
from whom the Debtor took the Debtor’s Tribal Courses, the Debtor replied she could not recall
but would infer HAWAB Region 6 was not since they did not have the login credential.243 As to
the second of the Debtor’s Emails, the Debtor asserted she received no response.244
67. 	The Bankruptcy Administrator rebutted that the Certificate of Service and Debtor’s
Emails did not show attempts by the Debtor to contact Shabazz Associates, who she believed
provided the Debtor’s Tribal Courses, or Aboriginal Medical Association, wherefore she had not
complied with the July through October Mailing Order to Tribal Entities Directive or the October
Login Credentials Directive.245 The Trustee concurred with the Bankruptcy Administrator and
noted that the Protective Motion reaffirmed that the Debtor did take the Tribal Courses which
further indicated that the Debtor was willfully not complying with the May through September
Courses Documents Directives.246 The Debtor responded that “it's impossible for [her] to turn over
something that [she] do[es]n’t have,” wherefore, she was “being punished for something that [she]
cannot do.”247
242 See id. The court docketed the Debtor’s Emails at Debtors Exhibit(s) 1 and 2 [Doc. N. 261].
243 See First November 3 Hearing Recording, at 43:27–44:39.
244 See id., at 44:42–45:40.
245 See id., at 45:53–46:53.
246 See id., at 46:54–47:23.
247 See id., at 47:24–50:39.
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68. 	At the end of the hearing the Court made a final oral order248 which the Final
Contempt Order rendered in written form.249 The Final Contempt Order found that, as of the
November 3 Hearing, the Debtor had not fully complied with the Accounts Directives, the Course
Documents Directives, and the Mailing Order Directives.250 The Final Contempt Order set the
Debtor’s Outstanding Motions as well as all outstanding contempt related matters for a final
hearing on November 17, 2025 (the “November 17 Hearing”).251 The Final Contempt Order
directed the Debtor to, by the November 17 Hearing, complete four discrete actions, specifically:
• 	(1) to forward all emails she had received from CashApp to the Trustee and the
Bankruptcy 	Administrator, 	whose 	metadata 	the 	Trustee 	and 	the 	Bankruptcy
Administrator were to check (the “Forwarding CashApp Emails Directive,” which
together with the May through September Account Directives, the “non-Tribal
Directive”);252
• 	(2) to mail the Contempt Orders to (a) Shabazz Associates, (b) HAWAB DFW, (c) Xi-
Amaru Tribe, also known as ARNA, (d) the Aboriginal Medical Association, and (e)
Dr. Ali (the “November Mailing Order Directive,” and together with the July through
October Mailing Order to Tribal Entities Directive, the “Mailing Contempt Orders
Directives”);253
• 	(3) to email the same five Tribal Entities above, requesting all materials from the
Debtor’s Courses, and to forward those emails and all responses to the Trustee and the
Bankruptcy 	Administrator 	(the 	“Emailing 	Tribal 	Entities 	and 	Forwarding
Directive”);254
• 	(4) to forward to the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator any and all emails in
her email account related to the Debtor’s Courses (the “Forwarding All Tribal Emails
Directive;” which, together with the November Mailing Order Directive and the
Emailing Tribal Entities and Forwarding Directive, the “November Tribal Directives,”
which, 	together 	with 	the 	Forwarding 	CashApp 	Emails 	Directive, 	the 	“Final
Directives,” and which, together with the May through September Tribal Directives,
the “Tribal Directives”).255
248 See Second November 3 Hearing Recording, at 00:07–03:12 (the “Final Oral Order”).
249 The Final Contempt Order did so “to dispel any possibility of the Debtor’s claiming confusion.” See
Final Contempt Order, p. 2 n. 3.
250 See Final Contempt Order, p. 2.
251 See id.
252 See id.
253 See id., p. 3.
254 See id.
255 See id., p. 3–4 (stating that this “include[s], but are not limited to, account registration confirmation or
maintenance details of the same, receipts for the purchases and donations that the Debtor has averred she
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The Final Contempt Order concluded if by the November 17, 2025, the Debtor had not complied
with the Final Directives, it would consider “criminal contempt, perjury, and potentially
falsification of documents.”256
69. 	Later the same day of the November 3 Hearing, the Debtor filed the Notice
Reconsideration Motion. On November 7, 2025, the Trustee filed the Seventh Status Report, as
well as responses to Third and Fourth Contempt Review Motions,257 and the Bankruptcy
Administrator filed a response to the Fourth Contempt Review Motions.258 On November 12,
2025, the Debtor filed replies to the Trustee’s responses,259 a response to the Seventh Status
Report,260 and the Fifth and Sixth Contempt Review Motions.261 On November 14, 2025, the
made, membership documentation for which the Debtor has averred she paid dues, any course information
(including, but not limited to, the “Jurist” course) ranging from scheduling matters such as calendar
invitations and meeting links for classes or office hours, to actual course content such as syllabi, reading
lists, study materials (including links to or attachments of PDFs, slide decks, audio/video files, or zipped
archives), assignments, quiz or test notifications and grading or feedback”).
256 See id., p. 3.
257 See Objection of Trustee to Debtor's Motion to Vacate or Deny Contempt Order and Sanctions for Lack
of Evidentiary Basis and Violation of Federal Rules of Evidence and Due Process [Doc No. 276]; Objection
of Trustee to Debtor's Motion to Vacate Contempt Order and for Declaratory Relief that the Court Exceeded
its Article I Authority [Doc No. 277].
258 See Objection to Other Document [Doc. No. 279].
259 See Debtor's Reply to Trustee's Objection to Motion to Vacate Contempt Order and For Declaratory
Relief that the Court Exceeds its Article I Authority [Doc No. 290]; Debtor's Reply to Trustee's Objection
to Debtor's Motion to Vacate or Deny Contempt and Sanctions for Lack of Evidentiary Basis and Violation
of Due Process [Doc No. 291].
260 See Response to Trustee's Seventh Status Report [Doc No. 292].
261 The Debtor moved for the Court to allow a shortened notice period for the Fifth and Sixth Contempt
Review Motions in order that they be heard at the November 17 Hearing. See Motion to Shorten Notice and
Expedite Hearing on Motion with Notice of Hearing [Doc No. 294] (the “Third Shorten Notice Motion”);
Motion to Shorten Notice and Expedite Hearing on Motion with Notice of Hearing [Doc No. 296] (the
“Fourth Shorten Notice Motion”). The Debtor moved on the grounds that the Fifth and Sixth Contempt
Review Motions “involves urgent constitutional and procedural matters,” that “[d]elay [ ] would risk
irreparable harm and render appellate rights ineffective should the Order remain in force through the normal
notice period,” and that “[e]xpedited review will not prejudice the Trustee or other parties in interest, who
will receive prompt service of [these] Motion[s] and the Underlying Motion[s],” which “will preserve the
status quo and allow orderly judicial review.” See id. Although the Court first rejected the Debtor’s
arguments that requiring the required notice period would affect the Debtor’s rights to appeal and that
allowing a shortened period would not prejudice the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator, the Court
nevertheless granted shortened notice for the Fifth and Sixth Contempt Review Motions for two reasons,
namely, (1) because those motions reiterated previous arguments made by the Debtor, and (2) in order to
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Bankruptcy Administrator filed limited replies to one of Debtor’s replies to the Trustee’s responses
and to the Debtor’s response to the Seventh Status Report;262 she additionally filed responses to
the Fifth and Sixth Contempt Review Motions,263 to which the Trustee joined.264
2. 	The November 17 Hearing
70. 	At the November 17 Hearing,265 the Court heard the Debtor’s Outstanding Motions
and held a final status hearing on the Contempt Orders. First, the Debtor presented the Contempt
Review Motions.266 The Debtor invoked her Fifth Amendment rights at the beginning of the
hearing.267 The Debtor argued that the Contempt Orders violated her rights under First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment, as well Fed. R.s Bankr. P. 9018, 9023, and 9024,
because the Contempt Orders were “overboard,” sought disclosure of “expressive and social
materials,” constituted an “invasion of confidential and private matters,” and were irrelevant to
bankruptcy.268
71. 	The Bankruptcy Administrator, with joinder from the Trustee, rebutted that these
arguments (1) were not timely, (2) did not accurately represent the law, and (3) failed to provide
allow final hearing on all matters at the November 17 Hearing. See Order Granting Motion to Shorten
Notice [Doc No. 297].
262 See Limited Response Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011 to Debtor's Filing at ECF No. 290 [Doc No.
298]; Limited Response Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011 to Debtor's Filing at ECF No. 292 [Doc No.
299].
263 See Objection to Other Document [Doc No. 300]; Objection to Other Document [Doc No. 301].
264 See Trustee's Objection and Joinder to the Bankruptcy Administrator's (I) Objection to Debtor's Motion
for Reconsideration, Protective Relief, and Emergency Stay Pending Appeal and (II) Objection to Debtor's
Motion for Reconsideration, Protective Relief, and Stay Pending Appeal [Doc No. 300].
265 See Courtroom Recording on Nov. 17, 2025, at 11:58:19 AM [Doc. No. 303] (the “First November 17
Hearing Recording”) (15 minutes), Courtroom Recording on Nov. 17, 2025, at 12:15:22 AM [Doc. No. 304]
(the “Second November 17 Hearing Recording”) (59 minutes), & Courtroom Recording on Nov. 17, 2025,
at 12:15:22 AM [Doc. No. 305] (the “Third November 17 Hearing Recording”) (24 minutes).
266 See First November 17 Hearing Recording, at 04:00–10:42.
267 See id.
268 See id.
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sufficient injury justifying the relief sought of reconsideration and stay pending appeal, to which
the Trustee joined.269 The Debtor rebutted that her pro se status warranted excepting the timeliness
issue and that she had shown constitutional violations and injury warranting the Debtor’s requested
.270
72. 	The Court took the Debtor’s Outstanding Motions under advisement and turned to
the status hearing.271 The Trustee presented how the Debtor had done nothing to comply with the
November Mailing Contempt Orders Directive, the Email Tribal Entities and Forward Directive,
and the Forwarding All Tribal Emails Directive.272 The Trustee asserted that the Debtor had
complied with the Forwarding CashApp Emails Directive and that although the First CashApp
Account Production’s missing transfers were “[i]ncredibly odd,” “nothing … looked concerning
with the metadata” and it “appears to be legitimate.”273
73. 	The Debtor responded that she had indeed just sent the CashApp statements as they
were sent to her and any discrepancies were CashApp’s fault, reinvoked the Fifth Amendment, and
repeated her arguments that (1) the contempt proceedings violated the Eighth, Fourteenth and
Ninth Amendments and this Court’s Article Authority and (2) she had complied with the Contempt
Orders because she done fully complied with the non-Tribal Directives and the Tribal Directives
violated the First Amendment, were irrelevant to bankruptcy.274 The Bankruptcy Administrator
mentioned that the Debtor previously asserted being a member of a federally recognized tribe.275
269 See id., at 10:47–12:38.
270 See Second November 17 Hearing Recording, at 00:32–11:26.
271 Id., at 30:29–35:54
272 See id.
273 See id.
274 See id., at 36:59–46:03.
275 See id., at 46:13–57:32.
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74. 	The Debtor challenged that she had ever asserted to belong to a federally recognized
Tribe.276 The Court then pulled up the Debtor’s Response / Debtor's Reply to 277 Trustee's
Objection to Motion to Vacate Contempt Order and For Declaratory Relief that the Court Exceeds
its Article I Authority [Doc. No. 290] and quoted the Debtor’s passage making such assertion.277
75. 	In support of her Third and Fourth Contempt Review Motions, the Debtor repeated
her arguments that the Contempt Orders had violated copyright, involved matters irrelevant to
bankruptcy, and sought to punish the Debtor using civil contempt, as grounds for the Court having
exceeded its Article I authority, not followed evidentiary rules, and violated due process.278
76. 	As to her Notice Reconsideration Motion, the Debtor argued that the Denying
Shortened Notice Order violated due process because she was facing the threat of incarceration
and did not have the staff that the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator have.279
77. 	The Trustee rebutted that the Notice Reconsideration Motion was not timely.280 As
to the Contempt Review Motions, the Trustee asserted that they were not timely or warranting the
reconsideration relief because the Debtor could not demonstrate the threshold requirement of a
meritorious argument. Instead, the Debtor moved based on her prior arguments of copyright and
relevancy, which were “well plowed ground in this case.” 281 The Court concluded the November
17 Hearing by taking the matters under advisement.282 The Court now renders its opinion.
276 See id., at 57:39–59:59; Third November 17 Hearing Recording, at 00:00–02:00.
277 See Third November 17 Hearing Recording, at 00:00–02:00.
278 See id., at 05:03–13:09.
279 See id., at 13:57–16:12.
280 See id., at 20:07–20:42.
281 See id., at 20:42–23:27.
282 See id., at 23:30–23:49.
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II. 	DISCUSSION
A. Civil Contempt: The Contempt Findings, the Contempt Fines, the Debtor’s
Impossibility Argument, and the Debtor’s Outstanding Motions
1. 	Legal Background
78. 	Federal bankruptcy courts have the power (1) to find a party in civil contempt (the
“contemnor”) based on a contemnor’s (a) noncompliance with an order from the court (the
“underlying order”) and (b) knowledge or constructive knowledge of the underlying order and
their noncompliance, and well as the power (2) to implement various sanctions, ranging from
monetary fines to incarceration, against the contemnor in order to coerce compliance. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 70(e) (empowering federal district courts to “hold [a] disobedient party in contempt”) &
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7070 (incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70(e) to bankruptcy courts
“in an adversary proceeding”); see also Life Techs. Corp. v. Govindaraj, 931 F.3d 259, 267 (4th
Cir. 2019) (noting that federal district courts at least retain “the inherent power to order sanctions
to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and to punish bad-faith conduct intended to delay
or disrupt the course of litigation or to impede enforcement of a court order” (citation omitted));
Allen v. Pierce (In re Timmer), No. BAP AZ-04-1604-KMOS, 2005 WL 6960235, at *4 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. Sept. 29, 2005) (noting that both federal district courts and bankruptcy courts “have
inherent power to regulate practice in cases before them” and “deal with abuses in practice under
its inherent power” (citation omitted)); United States v. Ali, 874 F.3d 825, 831 (4th Cir. 2017)
(“[Civil contempt requires] (1) the existence of a valid decree of which the alleged contemnor had
actual or constructive knowledge; (2) that the decree was in the movant's ‘favor’; (3) that the
alleged contemnor by its conduct violated the terms of the decree, and had knowledge (at least
constructive knowledge) of such violations; and (4) that the movant suffered harm as a result”
(citations omitted).); Beckhart v. Newrez LLC, 31 F.4th 274, 278 (4th Cir. 2022) (civil contempt,
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unlike criminal contempt, generally does not require willfulness to violate an order ((citations
omitted))); Sugar v. Burnett, 130 F.4th 358, 377–78 (4th Cir. 2025) (same).
79. 	However, federal bankruptcy courts’ civil contempt power is also limited. Civil
contempt sanctions can only be compensatory or coercive, not punitive. See Buffington v. Balt.
Cnty., 913 F.2d 113, 133-34 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that civil contempt, unlike criminal contempt,
requires that contemnors’ sanctions “ ‘stand[ ] [ ] unless and until [they] perform[ ] the affirmative
act required by the court's order’,” (citation omitted)). Punitive sanctions may only arise from
criminal contempt, which requires “criminal proceedings, including the right to jury trial.” See
United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, Syllabus, 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
80. 	A contemnor facing coercive civil contempt sanctions may purge the civil contempt
finding and end continued sanctions by the contemnor sufficiently complying with the underlying
order. The Fourth Circuit does not necessarily require compliance to be “perfect,” and allows
“substantial” compliance to purge. See, e.g., United States v. Darwin Constr. Co., 873 F.2d 750,
754 (4th Cir. 1989); De Simone v. VSL Pharm., Inc., 36 F.4th 518, 530 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing id.,
at 754 & 755); Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers of Am., 683 F.2d 827, 832 (4th Cir.
1982). Still, substantial compliance requires the contemnor to take “all reasonable steps … to
ensure compliance” as to each part of an underlying order. See Darwin, 873 F.2d at 755–56. Thus,
substantial compliance cannot exist where (1) regardless of what steps the contemnor has taken,
any other available steps were not taken, or (2) regardless of what steps are still available, the
contemnor appears to only have taken steps as to certain parts of an underlying order. See id.
81. 	However, civil contempt may end without the contemnor fully or even substantially
complying in two ways. The first way is if civil contempt sanctions begin as coercive but become
punitive over time. When it becomes sufficiently apparent to a court that the sanctions will not
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coerce the compliance, the court must terminate the civil contempt or convert it to criminal
contempt to ensure the appropriate due process procedural requirements for criminal proceedings
occur. See Soobzokov v. CBS, Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., 642 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir.
1981) (“When it becomes obvious that sanctions are not going to compel compliance, they lose
their remedial characteristics and take on more of the nature of punishment.”); Simkin v. United
States, 715 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[A]t some point in what otherwise would be an indefinite
period of confinement[,] due process considerations oblige a court to release a contemnor from
civil contempt if the contemnor has then shown that there is no substantial likelihood that
continued confinement will accomplish its coercive purpose” (citations omitted).).
82. 	The second way to end civil contempt in the absence of compliance is “where
compliance is impossible” (the “impossibility defense”). See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S.
752, 757 (1983); see also Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, (1966). Although the initial
burden for civil contempt is on the movant, see Ali, 874 F.3d at 832, once the movant has shown
the required elements, the contemnor bears the burden of proving an impossibility defense. See id.
(citations omitted). The impossibility defense is also limited in certain ways key to this case, as
the Court discusses below.
2. 	Analysis
a. 	The Debtor’s Outstanding Civil Contempt
i. 	The Debtor’s Asserted Impossibility Defense
83. 	Throughout these proceedings, the Debtor claimed that she cannot comply with the
Tribal Directives because she deems those directives violative of copyright and irrelevant to her
bankruptcy case. The Debtor appears to have first argued this (1) in the First Status Report
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Response back in early July.283 The Debtor continued to argued this (2) directly before the Court
at the July 21 Hearing,284 in August (3)–(5) in the Debtor’s First, Second, and Third Statements of
Full Compliance,285 in September (6) directly before the Court at the September Hearing during
the status hearing286 and (7) during consideration of the Recusal Motion,287 in October (8) in the
First Contempt Review Motion,288 (9) in the Fifth Status Report Response,289 and (10) at the
October Hearing,290 and in November (11) at the November 17 Hearing.291 Such arguments,
obviously, would not suffice as grounds for the impossibility defense.
84. 	Starting at the October Hearing, the Debtor raised a purportedly different argument,
specifically, that she cannot comply with the Tribal Directives because she (1) does not have access
to any Course Documents and (2) has no ability to obtain access to any such Course Documents
to provide to the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator (the “Debtor’s New Argument”).292 If
true, the Debtor’s New Argument would most likely suffice for an impossibility defense. However,
the Court rejects the Debtor’s New Argument for five distinct reasons.
85. 	First, the Debtor’s New Argument does not really seem to be ‘new’. Rather the
Debtor’s assertion of her nonpossession or control of the Course Documents was her own
conclusion based on her perennial copyright and relevancy arguments.293 While not explicitly a
283 See supra ¶ 29.
284 See supra ¶ 37.
285 See supra ¶¶ 40 & 42.
286 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
287 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
288 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
289 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
290 See supra notes 187–188 and accompanying text.
291 See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
292 See supra note 199–200 and accompanying text. The Court notes that the Course Documents have not
been sought for public dissemination, which the Debtor has alleged, but for review by the Trustee and the
Bankruptcy Administrator.
293 See, e.g., Affidavit of Impossibility and Good Faith Compliance Introduction, ¶¶ 2.8–2.11 & ¶¶ 4.12–
4.13 [Doc. No. 244] (explaining (1) the Debtor’s noncompliance with the Course Documents Directive on
the grounds that the Debtor “d[id] not have possession, custody, or control over these materials,” and “no
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function of her asserted copyright argument, the Debtor appears to just be reasserting that legal
conclusion in an attempt to make the assertion one of fact alone.
86. 	Second, and more crucially, absent changed circumstances, a contemnor may not
raise for the first time at the contempt proceeding stage arguments as to why they cannot comply
with the underlying order. See Rylander, 460 U.S. at 757 (holding that a contemnor “may not [ ]
raise[ ] for the first time in a contempt proceeding” for noncompliance with a production order
“that [they] lacked possession or control of the records at the time the order was issued, [but] could
defend the contempt charge on the ground that [they] w[ere] then unable to comply because [they]
lacked possession or control” (citations omitted)); see also Ali, 874 F.3d at 830 (holding that
because the contemnor “did not raise her nonpossession defense at the enforcement stage” as to a
request for production of documents, she “was therefore precluded from raising that defense at the
contempt stage” as to the request). This is exactly what the Debtor attempted to do with the
Debtor’s New Argument. If some factual impossibility did exist, the Debtor was required to argue
this during the Court’s consideration of these contempt matters for the May or June Orders, or, at
the least, prior to the Contempt Finding and Contempt Sanctions Orders, not for the first time in
October.
87. 	Third, the Debtor’s New Argument is no more than a bare assertion of impossibility,
which cannot suffice under the law for impossibility defenses. Generally, impossibility based
solely on the contemnor’s assertion does not suffice, see Ali, 874 F.3d at 833 (“A bare assertion of
nonpossession 	cannot 	satisfy 	this 	burden.”), 	nor 	can 	asserting 	impossibility 	generally 	or
ability to access, retrieve, or recreate them,” having “no legal authority to” do so without copying copyright
and exposing herself to liability, and (2) the Debtor’s noncompliance with the Course Website Login
Directive on the grounds that the “login credentials requested were controlled by a third-party platform,”
the Debtor “d[id] not have the passwords or administrative access,” she “ha[d] attempted in good faith to
recover or reset the passwords but was unsuccessful, and “[t]he platform's access is now outside my
control”).
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conclusorily. See South Carolina v. United States, 907 F.3d 742, 764 (4th Cir. 2018). A successful
impossibility defense generally requires that the contemnor proffers specific and detailed facts
underpinning their assertion of impossibility, see id., and can require the contemnor to proffer
affirmative acts they took to achieve compliance not just as to some parts of order, but “ ‘all
reasonable efforts to comply’ ” with the entire order. See Ali, 874 F.3d at 833. The Debtor proffers
no details underpinning this new argument or explanations as to why she raises such argument so
late in these contempt proceedings. The Debtor proffers nothing such as, for example, the
following: (1) specific recorded attempts to obtain the Course Documents given they are linked to
a class for which she paid and thus arguably is entitled to an extent, (2) clarifications how her new
ground can be true and still comport with her previous submissions of facts that indicate at least in
a vacuum that she possesses Course Documents,294 or (3) explanations for why her previous
defense of her noncompliance fixated on alleged issues as to the Course Documents Directives
themselves warranting noncompliance if, according to the new ground, noncompliance would be
inescapable even absent those issues.
88. 	Fourth, an asserted impossibility defense cannot suffice when rebutted by the prior
conduct of the contemnor, as is the case here. Generally, the contemnor’s proffer of factual
impossibility must “convince the court that compliance . . . [is] actually impossible (rather than
merely difficult, inconvenient, or potentially impossible).” See South Carolina, 907 F.3d at 765.
Similarly, courts may reject such a proffer even if it would otherwise suffice when it is discredited
by the contemnor’s prior conduct. See Withrow v. Concannon, 942 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1991)
294 A course barring enrollees’ possession of the materials being taught seems to the Court to be at the least
counterintuitive, if not odd and concerning, and especially so when the course involves remote aspects as
the Jurist Course does.
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(“Impossibility of perfect compliance, then, may be a defense to contempt, but it does not preclude
an injunction requiring compliance . . . when a pattern of non-compliance has been shown”).
89. 	The prior facts of this case rebut the Debtor’s New Argument, not only because it
is difficult to reconcile the new argument with how the Debtor defended her noncompliance prior
to October, but also due to the Debtor’s overall general pattern of noncompliance during these
proceedings. This pattern is displayed by the Debtor’s apparent selective recall of information
queried at the Hearings,295 as well as her general unwillingness to comply with really any of the
Directives until particularly pressed as to a discrete part. The Debtor only complied once
noncompliance became specific enough to patently constitute contempt and never before her
noncompliance, while a fact, was not obvious. A contemnor’s eventual and torturously obtained
compliance with most directives, while indeed precluding further sanctions on the basis alone of
those directives, should still be able rebut later self-serving submissions discordant with those prior
facts.
90. 	Fifth, the Court simply does not believe the Debtor’s New Argument, based on (1)
the Protective Motion and (2) the Debtor’s noncompliance with the Forwarding Emails Directive.
First, the Protective Motion, due to its timing and language, makes it virtually impossible, on the
Court’s view, that the Debtor is not in contact with the Tribal Entities.
91. 	Second, the Court fashioned the Forwarding Emails Directive in a specifically
narrowly tailored way so that the Debtor could show good faith efforts to comply. This is because,
while doubtful, the Court does not completely rule out the possibility that the Debtor was enrolled
in the Debtor’s Jurist Course at some point but now no longer has access to any Course Documents
and somehow has become cut off from all Tribal Entities. However, it is inconceivable how the
295 See generally supra note 70.
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Debtor can truthfully have no such emails to forward even if she was only minimally engaged with
the Tribe as a rank-and-file paying member, which is one fact she has never repudiated. Thus, her
specific noncompliance with the Forwarding Emails Directive confirms what is evinced by the
facts before the Court: that as to the Tribal Directives, the Debtor can comply but chooses not to
comply.
ii. 	Further Sanctions Coerciveness as to the Debtor’s Compliance
92. 	Deciding whether the Debtor has complied with the Contempt Orders, which she
has not, does not end the analysis. This is because where sanctions under civil contempt have not
coerced compliance, further sanctions may stop being coercive and become punitive to the extent
a court believes it will either (1) not effectuate compliance, or (2) it can do so only do at a cost
violative of due process.296
93. 	After accruing more than $11,000 in Contempt Fines for almost half a year, the
Debtor has not budged at all with regard to the Course Documents Directives and has only possibly
budged with regard to one of the Tribal Directives, the First Mailing Directive. The Contempt
Fines have not progressed the matters underpinning the Tribal Directives. Thus, continuing
Contempt Fines now would be more punitive than coercive.
94. 	For this reason, the Court will terminate the ongoing daily contempt fines in the
Base Case and the Adversary Proceeding. However, the Court will neither (1) purge the contempt
findings given that the Debtor has not complied with the Contempt Orders and is still in contempt
nor (2) vacate the accrued fines.
296 See supra ¶ 81.
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95. 	As to the second, the Court will not vacate the accrued fines, despite the fact some
courts do,297 for two reasons. First, the Court questions whether such practice is advisable since it
seems to engender delay of compliance because it makes when compliance occurs not a concern
of a contemnor if they will eventually comply. Second, the Court’s recognition that the Contempt
Fines have become punitive is only with regard to the Tribal Directives. Indeed, this does not
appear to have been the case with the non-Tribal Directives. The Contempt Fines were requisitely
coercive as to the non-Tribal Directives until the Debtor came into compliance, which was
sometime around the November 3 Hearing. For this reason, the Court terminates the fines as of
November 3, 2025.
b. 	The Debtor’s Outstanding Motions
96. 	The Outstanding Motions all generally seek reconsideration of various Court orders
made during these proceedings, specifically six related to the Contempt Orders.298 The Court will
first consider the Notice Reconsideration Motion which seeks reconsideration of the Order
Denying Shortened Notice.299
97. 	The Notice Reconsideration Motion argues that her Shortened Notice Motions for
the Third and the Fourth Contempt Review Motions should have granted because (1) the matters
were urgent due to the Court’s criminal contempt threat,300 (2) the Debtor is pro se whereas the
297 See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corporation, v. Wayne L. Yashinsky, 170 F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 1999). But
see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Caucus Distributors), 871 F.2d 156 (1st Cir. 1989) (acknowledging
that new circumstances making what is being coerced impossible precluded fines from continuing to accrue,
but “remand[ing] for computation of the aggregate fines” assessed prior to the change in circumstances);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Arrington), 955 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
purging of civil contempt findings due to the contemnor’s eventual compliance did not affect the fines
accrued prior to compliance which were stilled owed).
298 See infra note 304.
299 See Notice Reconsideration Motion, ¶ intro & ¶ V.20–24.
300 See Notice Reconsideration Motion, ¶¶ I.2–5 & ¶ IV.16.
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Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator have a staff and resources warrants accommodation for
her,301 and (3) she had previously been able responded to a pleading in this case in a four day like
she wanted here.302
98. 	The Court denies the Notice Reconsideration Motion. The extremely short notice
period sought by the Shortened Notice Motions for the Third and the Fourth Contempt Review
Motions alone warrants the ruling and precludes reconsideration. It was further warranted since by
the time the Debtor filed the Shortened Notice Motions, she had been well aware of this rule
through her many attempts to avoid it.303
99. 	The other six Outstanding Motions make various submissions, many of which
duplicate arguments the Debtor has already raised and the Court has rejected. Together, they seek
termination and reconsideration of the Contempt Sanctions, Findings, and Orders as it relates to
the Course Documents Directives, emergency stay of the Orders, a protective order shielding the
Course Documents from discovery, an award of attorney’s fees, reconsideration of the discharge
denial, and, finally, declarations that the Court cannot punish the Debtor, that the Debtor has
complied or that her compliance is impossible, and that the Course Documents are copyrighted
and irrelevant to bankruptcy.304
100. 	Four motions seek this on the Debtor’s ground (1) that she cannot comply with the
Course Documents Directives because she does not own or possess the Course Documents, that
(2) the Course Documents are copyrighted and irrelevant to bankruptcy, and305 all six also assert
301 See Notice Reconsideration Motion, ¶¶ II.6–8 & ¶ IV.17
302 See Notice Reconsideration Motion, ¶¶ III.9–11.
303 See, e.g., supra note 44 and accompanying text.
304 See First Contempt Review Motion, ¶ 4; Second Contempt Review Motion, ¶¶ III.18–23; Third
Contempt Review Motion, ¶¶ V.20.1–6; Fourth Contempt Review Motion, ¶¶ IV.r.1–5; Fifth Contempt
Review Motion, ¶¶ IV.1–4; Sixth Contempt Review Motion, ¶¶ III.18–21.
305 See First Contempt Review Motion, ¶¶ 1.J; Second Contempt Review Motion, ¶¶ II.A.7–C.15; Third
Contempt Review Motion, ¶¶ IV.B.9–B.12 & IV.D.16–E.19; Fourth Contempt Review Motion ¶¶ III.1–4.
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(3) that the Course Documents Directives violates the Debtor’s constitutional right to due process
because her compliance is impossible.306 The Stay Motions also argue that the Contempt Orders
violate (4) the Debtor’s her right to privacy and (5) the Court’s Article I authority.307
101. 	As to the second two grounds, the Court has already rejected these arguments
multiple times. As to the first ground, the Court does not believe the Debtor.308 For the same
reasons, the Court rejects the due process grounds. As to the privacy grounds, they are not timely
and should have been raised earlier. Lastly, as to the Article I powers ground, the Court agrees with
the Debtor completely that the Court does not have the power to seek punitive sanctions. This is
exactly why, as the Court has explained multiple times to the Debtor, the Court has never
considered itself executing or initiating any criminal penalties against or imprisonment of the
Debtor. Thus, the Court denies all requested relief in the Outstanding Motions.309
B. Criminal Matters
1. 	Legal Background
a. 	Bankruptcy Courts’ Powers to Refer for Criminal Prosecution, to Seek Criminal
Contempt, and their Duty to Report Crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 3057
102. 	Notwithstanding bankruptcy courts’ substantial civil contempt powers, so long as
its sanctions remain coercive or compensatory,310 bankruptcy courts generally cannot execute,
initiate, or formally seek criminal penalties. However, bankruptcy courts have a statutorily
306 See Second Contempt Review Motion, ¶¶ II.C.13–C.14; 248, ¶¶ IV.B.9–C.15 & ¶¶ IV.E.18–E.19; Fourth
Contempt Review Motion ¶ III.4; Fifth Contempt Review Motion, ¶ II.A.5; Sixth Contempt Review
Motion, ¶ I.4.
307 See Fifth Contempt Review Motion, ¶ II.A.5; Sixth Contempt Review Motion, ¶ I.4.
308 See supra ¶ 90–91.
309 With the exception, of course, of the Debtor’s request to terminate the ongoing contempt fines, which
the Court does order, but not because the Court grants the Debtor’s request on the grounds she asserts, but
because the Court does so sua sponte on other grounds.
310 This power includes the power to imprison.
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imposed duty when they “hav[e] reasonable grounds for believing that any violation under chapter
9 of this title or other laws of the United States relating to insolvent debtors … has been committed,
or that an investigation should be had,” to “report to the appropriate United States attorney all the
facts and circumstances of the case, the names of the witnesses and the offense or offenses believed
to have been committed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3057. This language is neither permissive nor discretionary;
it is a mandatory duty of this Court from Congress.
b. 	Unauthorized Practice of Law Elements in North Carolina and Bankruptcy Courts
Procedure for Reporting it under 18 U.S.C § 3057
103. 	North Carolina law bars the practice of law by any non-licensed individual, see
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-2.1, and criminalizes the unauthorized practice of law as a Class 1
misdemeanor. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-8. North Carolina defines the “practice of law” broadly to
reach “performing any legal service for someone else,” and “include[es]. . . preparing or aiding in
the preparation of any petitions,. . . assisting by advice, counsel, or otherwise in any legal work;
and advis[ing] or giv[ing] opinion upon the legal rights of” someone else. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-
2.1. Section 84-7 empowers district attorneys to seek injunctions or criminal prosecution for
violations of § 84-2.1. North Carolina bankruptcy courts that believe the unauthorized practice of
law has occurred have a duty to report it to both the U.S. Attorney and the state district attorney
pertinent to its district due to the mixed federal and state jurisdiction of such potential crimes in
the bankruptcy context. See, e.g., In re Howerton, No. 04-12819, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2695, at *2
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. Nov. 24, 2004).
c. 	Criminal Perjury Elements and Perjury’s Effect as to Discharge in the Fourth Circuit
104. 	Making a false oath or false declaration in front of a federal court is a crime
punishable by fines and up to five years imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (criminalizing perjury
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before a federal court generally); 18 U.S.C. § 152(2)–(3) (criminalizing perjury specifically in a
bankruptcy case). Courts interpreting the latter have held such a crime has occurred when the
following elements are met: (1) the existence of a bankruptcy proceeding, (2) a statement made
therein that is (a) material and (b) false, and (3) the statement was made (a) under oath and (b)
knowingly and fraudulently. See, e.g., Metheany v. United States, 390 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 824 (1968).
d. 	Criminal Contempt Elements and an Impossibility Defense
105. 	Contempt is criminally punishable conduct pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401(3)
empowering courts “to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt
of its authority, and none other, as. . . [d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order,
rule, decree, or command.” The Fourth Circuit interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) has held it requires
three elements that approximately mirror those for civil contempt, specifically, “ ‘(1) a reasonably
specific order; (2) violation of the order; and (3) the willful intent to violate the order’.” United
States v. Mahbobeh Shariati, 694 F. App'x 893, 894-95 (4th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (per
curiam)). The Fourth Circuit has also held that criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), unlike
civil contempt, requires that the contemnor “willfully violated a decree that was clear and left no
uncertainty in the minds of those that heard it.” United States v. Westbrooks, 780 F.3d 593, 595
(4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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2. 	Analysis
a. 	The Criminal Allegations against the Tribal Entities
106. 	Sufficient evidence exists for a reasonable belief that the Tribe has or is committing
unauthorized practice of law. This conclusion is evinced through pieces of evidence displaying the
Tribe’s activities generally as well as various actions taken by the Debtor in this case.
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i. 	Evidence that the Tribal Entities Have Committed Unauthorized Practice of Law
Independent of this Case311, 312
107. 	Shabazz Associates offers a ‘Tribal Jurist Course Certification’ through Aboriginal
University taught by Minister Shabazz.313 Individuals can obtain this ‘Certification’ upon
enrollment in and completion of one of four proffered ‘semesters’ for the course.314 This course
311 The Court notes that the Bankruptcy Administrator uncovered this information through her own
independent research. The Court notes this, first, to acknowledge the Bankruptcy Administrator’s hard and
diligent work as to these matters. The Court also notes this because, although the Bankruptcy Administrator
presented this evidence at the October Hearing, she was unable admit most of it through the Debtor’s
testimony. See Exhibit List [Doc. No. 232]. Nevertheless, the Court does not think covering the evidence
here contravenes evidence rules preventing admittance there and are binding on the Court, for two reasons.
The first reason is that this evidence’s availability online suggests it qualifies for judicial notice as
the Fourth Circuit has recognized for at least some websites. See, e.g., Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 424
n.3 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Garcia, 855 F.3d 615, 621–22 (4th Cir. 2017). Additionally, it being
available specifically on Internet Archive further bolsters that judicial notice of the evidence is allowed. See
Under a Foot Plant Co. v. Exterior Design, Inc., No. 6:14-cv-01371-AA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37596,
2015 WL 1401697, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 25, 2015) (“District courts have routinely taken judicial notice of
content from The Internet Archive.”); Pinder v. 4716 Inc., 494 F. Supp. 3d 618, 625 (D. Ariz. 2020)
(“Archived websites may sometimes be afforded judicial notice.”).
Second, courts considering reporting under 18 U.S.C. § 3057 have recognized doing so does not
necessitate following all evidence rules since a court finding it must report a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 3057
is not the same as a court finding that the crime did indeed occur. See Frankoff v. Norman, No. 14-11-
00152-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 5045, at *12–15 (Tex. App. June 26, 2012) (“The Referral does not
constitute conclusive proof. . . . [A] referral [18 U.S.C. § 3057] is not evidence of a crime, but is based on
the referree's conclusion that there are grounds supporting a reasonable belief that a crime was committed.
Id. § 3057(a). As such, it may be based on information that is not admissible evidence to be investigated by
the United States Attorney. See In re Coral Petroleum, Inc., 249 B.R. 721, 725 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2000)
(noting referral to United States Attorney was for investigation of potential criminal conduct). It is not proof
of the allegations contained within it. See id.; see also In re Guttierez, 248 B.R. 287, 290 n.3 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 2000) (noting bankruptcy court may not adjudicate criminal matters relating to concealment of assets
belonging to bankruptcy estate but may refer matter for criminal investigation).”); United States v. Hubbard,
650 F.2d 293, 323 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that “[o]f course, copies of the documents can be made available
by the court to appropriate law enforcement authorities,” regardless “as to what is admissible evidence and
what is not” (citations omitted)).
312 The Court reproduces all language from sources in this section as they appear (and without any “sic”
notations), except for omissions, punctuation additions, and stem and some capitalization changes.
313 Tribal Jurist Course, SHABAZZ ASSOCIATES, https://shabazzassociates.com/tribal-jurist-course (last
visited 	Dec. 	10, 	2025) 	(permalink:
https://web.archive.org/web/20250806084125/https://shabazzassociates.com/tribal-jurist-course).
314 	Registration 	For 	Tribal 	Jurist 	Course 	– 	AU 	& 	Shabazz 	Associates, 	GOOGLE 	FORMS,
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1taRQ7TGa3IT17dG4Ac1S6IU_lYUFoz6nYsHS-OjtUYI/viewform
(last 	visited 	Dec. 	10, 	2025). 	(permalink:
https://web.archive.org/web/20251210164341/https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1taRQ7TGa3IT17dG4Ac
1S6IU_lYUFoz6nYsHS-OjtUYI/viewform?edit_requested=true).
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costs $1,000.315 Shabazz describes the course’s “[p]urpose” as “to Certify Aboriginal Jurists who
can become law professionals in our Indigenous Jurisdiction and protect Indigenous Nationals of
ARNA who are also US Nationals from adverse actions from adverse legal fictions posing as
governmental structure.”316 The topics covered in the course include:
• 	“Taxes, Debt and Currency,” which purports to teach enrollees “how to live a tax
Exempt 	for 	Life 	Operation 	(all 	Sales 	Taxes) 	via 	Indigenous 	Exemption,
Ecclesiastical Automatic Exemption, or Itemized Deduction on 1040, How to
properly engage form 56, How to Fillout Form i-9 as a Native, How to Use forms
w-8 Ben W-9 and W-4 properly, How to engage Property Tax Exemption using
Ecclesiastical 	entities 	and 	or 	Itemized 	deductions 	on 	1040’s,” 	as 	well 	as
“Understanding debt and what it actually is and what it is used for and the
impacted;”
• 	“Lawsuits and Keys to Winning,” which purports to teach enrollees “to be
comfortable going to court and working with nationals and non-nationals on cases
and the property way of dealing with issues and winning in court;”
• 	“Contract Law,” which purports to teach enrollees how “to understand how
contracts work and the impact of them on Aboriginal people” and “[h]ow to
properly engage in contract without jeopardizing the status of the aboriginal;” and
• 	“Business Operations as Tribal Jurist and Running Tribal Law Firm Successfully,”
which purports to teach enrollees how “to put[ ] it all together. . . to understand how
to organize yourself and run your law firm to serve aboriginals.”317
HAWAB ARNA describes this course as enabling enrollees to:
• 	“Assist with Tax Matters, dealing with fraudulent claims by ALL Tax Entities
making unlawful claims on Indigenous Peoples, Removing PERMANENTLY
Fraudulent Child Support Claims;”318
• 	“Removing Fraudulent Mortgage Issues and Fraudulent Debt Claims from the most
successful system of removing erroneous debt claims, the identity theft Identity
Fraud Procedure;” 319
315 Tribal Jurist Course – Shabazz Associates & AU – Winter Semester – This Is Self Paced Semester-
Donation, 	SHABAZZ ASSOCIATES, 	https://shabazzassociates.com/shop/ols/products/tribal-jurist-course-
shabazz-associates-and-au-winter-semester 	(last 	visited 	Dec. 	10, 	2025) 	(permalink:
https://web.archive.org/web/20251217071307/https://shabazzassociates.com/shop/ols/products/tribal-
jurist-course-shabazz-associates-and-au-winter-semester).
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Front Page, HAWAB DFW, ABORIGINAL REPUBLIC OF NORTH AMERICA, https://www.hawabdfw.org
(last 	visited 	Dec. 	10, 	2025) 	(permalink:
https://web.archive.org/web/20250714022258/https://www.hawabdfw.org/).
319 Id.
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• 	Assist with Lawsuit issues . . . : all types in Indigenous Jurisdiction and foreign
venues. The multiple levels of labor offered guarantee the Aboriginal Jurist will
have a service that is high demand.” 320
108. 	Shabazz Associate’s website also contains a webpage titled “Debt, Tax, Student,
OTHER DEBT Discharge Intake.” Although the Google Form for this is no longer accepting
responses,321 this webpage also provides links to purchase from Shabazz ‘Debt Donation Removal’
for $1,500322 and ‘7 Year Statute Of Limitations Donation’ for $500 which is marketed with a
picture stating “Debt Relief Just Ahead.”323
109. 	Aboriginal University, which claims to be ARNA’s first accredited educational
institute and the certifying arm for all Aboriginal Jurists,324 offers, through its ‘School of Law’,
courses on topics such as “Tribal Business Registration,” “Business & Personal Credit,” “Law
Consultation,” “Lawsuit Drafting,” “Business Credit and Personal Credit Services,” and “Land
Trust Services.”325 Level 2 of the Jurist program features ‘homework’ that quizzes enrollees on
topics 	such 	as 	“Insolvency,” 	“liability,” 	being 	a 	“debtor,” 	“Creditor[s],” 	“liquidation,”
320 Id.
321 	Debt, 	Tax, 	Student, 	OTHER 	DEBT 	Discharge 	Intake, 	SHABAZZ 	ASSOCIATES,
https://shabazzassociates.com/debt-discharge-intake 	(last 	visited 	Dec. 	10, 	2025) 	(permalink:
https://web.archive.org/web/20251217070408/https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScg64bVbL8o
ybGfbb486qumWdtB2RpRkpRmjlYFsCv6JhUUEQ/closedform).
322 	Debt 	Donation 	Removal, 	SHABAZZ 	ASSOCIATES,
https://shabazzassociates.com/shop/ols/products/bankruptcy (last visited Dec. 10, 2025) (permalink:
https://web.archive.org/web/20251217071038/https://shabazzassociates.com/shop/ols/products/bankruptc
y).
323 	7 	Year 	Statute 	of 	Limitations 	Donation, 	SHABAZZ 	ASSOCIATES,
https://shabazzassociates.com/shop/ols/products/7-year-statute-of-limitations (last visited Dec. 10, 2025)
(permalink:
https://web.archive.org/web/20251217071116/https://shabazzassociates.com/shop/ols/products/7-year-
statute-of-limitations).
324 Front Page, ABORIGINAL UNIVERSITY, https://www.aboriginaluniversity.com/ (last visited Dec. 17,
2025) (permalink: https://web.archive.org/web/20250222102643/https://www.aboriginaluniversity.com/).
325 	School 	of 	Law–Aboriginal 	Jurists, 	ABORIGINAL 	UNIVERSITY,
https://www.aboriginaluniversity.com/school-of-law-aboriginal-jurists.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2025)
(permalink: 	https://web.archive.org/web/20250513195328/https://www.aboriginaluniversity.com/school-
of-law-aboriginal-jurists.html).
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“competency,” the Supremacy Clause, “real defense,” “fraud,” “Bankruptcy,” the Bankruptcy
Clause, the UCC, differences between “chapter 13 & Chapter 7 discharge,” “arrears,” a “habeas
corpus action,” Chapter 7’s effect on child support, and remedies for child support orders.326 Level
3 of the program offers training on “International Law–Patent Trademark Copyright Training.”327
110. 	HAWAB ARNA also offers ‘Jurist Level 1 Private Coaching,” which also costs
$1,000.328 HAWAB ARNA describes this coaching as “Minister Kojo you will have access to us
on a weekly conference call which will be recorded” and requires that “you must be enrolled as a
jurist at one of the following institutions: ARNA Aboriginal Law Firm/Aboriginal University[,]
Hawab University[,] Or Any Other Creditable University within ARNA.”329
ii. 	Evidence that the Tribal Entities Have Committed Unauthorized Practice of Law
from this Case
111. 	The Debtor actions both prior to the Petition Date and within this case appear to
have been done at the advice of, for the benefit of, or in concert with the Tribal Entities. First, as
to actions done prior to the Petition Date, the Debtor was a member of the Tribe as of the Holt
Solutions Creation Date and Conveyances Date based on both independent evidence330 and the
326 Jurist Homework 2, ABORIGINAL UNIVERSITY, https://www.aboriginaluniversity.com/jurist-homework-
2.html 	(last 	visited 	Dec. 	17, 	2025) 	(permalink:
https://web.archive.org/web/20250513190135/https://www.aboriginaluniversity.com/jurist-homework-
2.html).
327 About US, ABORIGINAL UNIVERSITY, https://www.aboriginaluniversity.com/about-us.html (last visited
Dec. 	17, 	2025) 	(permalink:
https://web.archive.org/web/20250513200711/https://www.aboriginaluniversity.com/about-us.html).
328 Hawab Jurist Level 1 Private Coaching, HAWAB ARNA, ABORIGINAL REPUBLIC OF NORTH AMERICA,
https://www.hawabdfw.org/product/hawab-jurist-level-1-private-coaching/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2025)
(permalink: 	https://web.archive.org/web/20250208052222/https://www.hawabdfw.org/product/hawab-
jurist-level-1-private-coaching/).
329 See Id.
330 	See 	Arna 	Annual 	Budget 	for 	2023, 	ARNA,
https://www.arnagovernment.org/uploads/3/7/6/0/37603483/arnaannualbudget2023.pdf, p. 8 (last visited
Dec. 	16 	2025) 	(permalink:
https://web.archive.org/web/20240330042259/https://www.arnagovernment.org/uploads/3/7/6/0/3760348
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Debtor’s own testimony.331 The Debtor has also averred multiple times in this case and as late as
October, 2025, to having taken a Jurist Course.332 Lastly, the Debtor paid a total $3,930 to Tribal
Entities within three years of the Petition Date—almost $2,000 in 2022, the year of the Holt
Solutions Creation Date, nearly $1,200 in 2023, the year of the Conveyances Date, and almost
$900 in 2024, the year of the Petition Date.333 These facts reasonably suggest the Tribe’s
advancement or involvement in the creation of Holt Solutions and the Conveyances. Indeed, the
fact alone that the Debtor has paid so much to the Tribe the last few years for apparently nothing
in return, is suspect.
112. 	Moreover, further evidence ties the Tribal Entities to the creation of Holt Solutions
and the Conveyances. Prior to Petition Date, the Debtor described the creation of Holt Solutions
as relating to the Tribal Entities.334 The Debtor has similarly described the creation of Holt
Solutions and the Conveyances as relating to the Tribe throughout her various submissions during
these proceedings.335 The clear implication of these facts is that the Tribe directed or advised the
Debtor for both the creation Holt Solutions and the Conveyances, which is all the more concerning
given the deleterious effect of both on the Debtor’s financial matters, the Payments she’s made to
the Tribe, and the lack of any value in return. This above evidence is further corroborated by (1)
3/arnaannualbudget2023.pdf) (listing the Debtor, but misspelled as “Ryan Lashaun Ford,” amongst
members it appears that were in good standing as to paying dues).
331 See, e.g., supra note 66 and accompanying text.
332 See supra note 180
333 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
334 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
335 See, e.g., First Tribal Property Motion, ¶ 1 (“The Debtor is an enrolled member of the Xi-Amaru Tribal
Government (ARNA) (Aboriginal Republic of North America), a distinct tribal government. Before filing
bankruptcy, the Debtor transferred title to certain real property to a Tribal LLC operating under tribal
customs and authority affiliated with the Xi-Amaru (Aboriginal Republic of North America).”); Second
Tribal Property Motion, ¶ 1 (identical language); First Protective Motion, ¶ 2 (“Debtor is an enrolled tribal
member of the Xi-Amaru Tribal Government, and representative of Holt Solutions, LLC operates under
tribal jurisdiction, pursuant to tribal law and protocol.”).
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how the Tribal Entities offer the very courses that comprise the Debtor’s Tribal Courses,336 (2) how
the Debtor has continued to assert the Tribal Entities’ copyright justifications as why she cannot
comply with some of the directives, (3) how the Debtor has displayed confusion as to the content
of her own pleadings, and (4) how the Protective Motion displays that the Debtor’s actions in this
case have been at the Tribal Entities’ direction.
*************************
113. 	The Court believes the evidence above reasonably evinces unauthorized practice of
law which the Court is under a duty to report. While the evidence from the Tribe that is independent
of this case may be protected by the First Amendment (but, if so, only under the relaxed standard
for commercial speech), when combined with the evidence from this case, there is the appearance
that the Tribe is attempting to obtain legal outcomes in the Western District of North Carolina
Bankruptcy Court through the Debtor’s case without needing to be admitted to the Court. Thus,
the Court reports this to the U.S. Attorney for Western District of North Carolina and the
Mecklenburg County District Attorney.
114. 	The Court believes these activities warrant investigation particularly because, to the
extent individuals are paying the inordinate costs for the Tribe’s ‘services’, it would be a scam
targeting some of the most vulnerable individuals. While the Court’s jurisdiction limits it to dealing
with the Debtor and is unable to investigate the Tribe as a non-party (e.g., through issuances of
show cause orders), prosecutors are not so constrained.
336 See supra ¶¶ 107–110 (canvassing the Tribal Entities offering ‘Jurist Courses’); see also Holt Solutions
Document Production Motion (canvassing how the Tribal Entities offer cosmology and genealogy courses).
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b. 	The Criminal Allegations against the Debtor
i. 	The Criminal Contempt Allegations against the Debtor
115. 	The Debtor appears to have willfully not complied with the Contempt Orders as
they pertain to the Tribal Entities.337 Thus, pursuant to its duty under 18 U.S.C. § 3057, the Court
reports this crime of criminal contempt to the Western District of North Carolina U.S. Attorney.
ii. 	The Perjury Allegations against the Debtor
116. 	It appears that the Debtor has made numerous false submissions both to this Court,
the Trustee, and the District Court, since the Petition Date. According to the Court’s review, the
Debtor has made false submissions as to:
• 	(1) the Properties’ valuations by approximately 90%: once, affirmatively in the
Debtor’s Petition;338
• 	(2) the Debtor’s Creditors: once, by omission in the Debtor’s Petition;339
• 	(3) the Debtor’s interest in Holt Solution, two times: first, (a) by omission in the
Debtor’s Petition,340 then (b) affirmatively at the January 341 Meeting;341
• 	(4) the Conveyances, two times: affirmatively both (a) in the Debtor’s Petition342
and (b) at the January 341 Meeting;343
• 	(5) the Rental Income eleven times: by omission and affirmatively twice both (a)–
(c) in the Debtor’s Petition344 and (d)–(i) in the Amended Schedules,345 by
omission (j) in the Reaffirmation Agreement,346 and (k) by omission in the IFP
Application;347
• 	(6) the Debtor’s Accounts, countless times: in the Debtor’s Petition, in various
pleadings, and in testimony before the Court;
337 See supra ¶¶ 83–91.
338 Compare Debtor’s Petition, p. 11 (the Debtor’s valuations of $30,000 for both Properties) with Seventh
Report, Ex. C, p. 26 & 29 (providing the Mecklenburg County Office of the Tax Collector’s 2025 assessed
valuation of $378,600 for the Yorkford Property and $272,900 for the Nevin Property).
339 See supra ¶¶ 7–9.
340 See id.
341 See supra ¶ 10.
342 See supra ¶¶ 7–9.
343 See supra ¶ 10.
344 See supra ¶¶ 7–9.
345 See supra ¶¶ 21 & 24.
346 See supra ¶ 11.
347 See supra ¶¶ 7–9.
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• 	(7) the Tribal Payments, twice: (a) at the January 341 Meeting348 and (b) the May
Hearing;349 and
• 	(8) the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator’s actions, affirmatively twice: in
the Original Recusal Motion and the Original Reference Withdrawal Motion
Response Reply.350
117. 	Although there is only direct evidence as to its willfulness as to one of the above
false submissions,351 the number of false submissions and their convenience to the Debtor’s
position on the matters for which the Debtor proffered them, sufficiently evinces a strong case of
criminal perjury. Similarly, as to the Debtor’s false submissions regarding the Debtor’s Accounts,
the Debtor’s pattern of compelled, piecemeal disclosure aggravates those false submissions and
demonstrates that those omissions were not inadvertent but willful.
118. 	The Debtor made all of the above submissions including the Debtor’s Petition, the
Debtor’s Amended Schedules, and the IFP Petition under penalty of perjury.352 In the Debtor’s
Petition, the Debtor also acknowledged being “aware that bankruptcy fraud is a serious crime and
that if [her] bankruptcy forms are inaccurate or incomplete, [she] could be fined or imprisoned.”353
At the January 341 Meeting, the Debtor’s statements were made under oath,354 as were generally
all the Debtor’s statements in her pleadings and at the various hearings before the Court.
348 See supra ¶ 10.
349 See supra ¶ 18
350 See supra ¶ 33.
351 See May Hearing Transcript, at 6:12–6:14 (the Debtor acknowledging that the second false submission
above, her omission of the creditors of her assets, was an intentional omission for at least the mortgage
company).
352 See Debtor’s Petition, p. 6 (the Debtor’s signature below a declaration that the information provided was
“true and correct” as to her Petition generally “under penalty of perjury”); id., p. 47 (same as to her
Schedules generally); id., p. 59 (same as to her Statement of Financial Affair); id., p. 64 (same as to her
Chapter 7 Statement of [Her] Current Monthly Income) & Second Amended Schedules, p. 5 (same); Filing
IFP Application, p. 3 (same as to her Filing IFP Application).
353 Debtor’s Petition, p. 8.
354 January 341 Meeting Transcript, at 3:10–3:13 (the Debtor taking the oath).
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119. 	In sum, the Court believes that the facts above reasonably show that the Debtor has
engaged in perjury. Thus, pursuant to its duty under 18 U.S.C. § 3057, the Court reports these
crimes to the Western District of North Carolina U.S. Attorney.
*************************
120. 	However, the Court would not recommend any criminal prosecution against the
Debtor for these crimes of criminal contempt and perjury. The reason for this is that the Court feels
that the financial costs to the Debtor from this case sufficiently punishes the Debtor.
121. 	These costs are not due to the civil contempt sanctions, which themselves are not
insignificant, but rather the reasonable administrative costs of the Trustee so far in this case. Only
considering the Trustee’s expenses and fees incurred December through May of 2025, the
administrative costs exceed of $43,000355 and will most likely be at least double that by the end of
these proceedings. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507, these expenses are given priority from distribution
of the Debtor’s assets. This case is uniquely an asset case and proceeds from the Debtor’s assets
will have to be liquidated, and the proceeds will go to covering these expenses and to pay the
Debtor’s creditors. The Court believes that this natural result of the Debtor’s actions is punishment
enough as an incurrence of expenses at this level is not an insignificant penalty.
C. The Trustee’s and Bankruptcy Administrator’s Requests
122. 	Lastly, the Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator have requested other relief
beyond that discussed. First, the Trustee asks the Court to issue “a final denial of the Debtor’s
discharge in this case.”356 Second, the Bankruptcy Administrator seeks imposition of Federal Rule
355 See First Fee Application & Order Awarding Compensation to Attorney Hamilton Stephens Steele +
Martin, PLLC, Trustee's Attorney [Doc. No. 306].
356 Seventh Status Report, p. 14.
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of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 sanctions due to the Debtor’s filing of pleadings making frivolous
or previously rejected arguments.357 Third, the Bankruptcy Administrator requests a prefiling
injunction barring the Debtor from filing pleadings based on (1) the dozens of pleadings filed by
the Debtor lacking any basis in law or fact or misrepresenting both, (2) the Debtor continually
seeking relief already denied and reasserting arguments previously rejected, (3) the Attempted
Representation, as well as (4) various duplicative filings.358
1. 	The Trustee’s Request for Final Denial of Discharge
123. 	The Court grants the Trustee’s final denial of the Debtor’s discharge. First, the
Court’s previous denial conditioned any possible discharge on the Debtor fully complying with the
Contempt Orders, which, because the Court has found that the Debtor can comply but choose not
to,359 interdicts any possible discharge. Additionally, although the Court is not recommending
further prosecution of the Debtor for perjury, it does not doubt it has occurred to a criminally
sanctionable extent which necessarily means the Debtor is ineligible for discharge under 11 USCS
§ 727(a)(4)(A) and Fourth Circuit precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Sieber (In re Sieber), 489
B.R. 531, 554 (Bankr. D. Md. 2013) (setting the standard for 11 USCS § 727(a)(4)(A)’s bar of
discharge due to a debtor having “made a false oath or account,” as requiring that the debtor made
a statement that was (1) false, (2) material to the bankruptcy case, and (3) it was done (a) under
oath, (b) knowing its falseness, and (c) with fraudulent intent (citations omitted)); see also Van
Robinson v. Worley, 849 F.3d 577, 583 (4th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
357 Limited Response Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011 to Debtor's Filing at ECF No. 290 [Doc. No. 298];
Limited Response Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011 to Debtor's Filing at ECF No. 292 [Doc. No. 299].
358 See id.
359 See supra ¶¶ 83–91.
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2. 	The Bankruptcy Administrator’s Request for Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 9011 Sanctions
124. 	As to the Bankruptcy Administrator’s request for Rule 9011 sanctions, the Court
denies it. First, the Court does not dispute Bankruptcy Administrator’s assertion that the Debtor
has persistently and flagrantly violated Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 through her
litany of pleadings and continual reassertion of meritless arguments long after the Court has
explicitly rejected them. One need look no further than six Outstanding Motions canvassed above
to see this.
125. 	Nevertheless, the Court feels itself is sufficiently to blame on this score to make
Rule 9011 sanctions unwarranted as of now. The Court should have made clear to the Debtor much
earlier that she could not continue to make such arguments in her filings and in court, and that
doing so would justify sanctions. It did not. The Debtor, as a pro se litigant (notwithstanding the
Tribe’s ostensible help), should have been informed of this consequence and its contours
sufficiently prior to any imposition of such sanctions. Since the Debtor was not so informed, the
Court is unwilling at this juncture to sanction the Debtor pursuant to Rule 9011.
3. 	The Bankruptcy Administrator’s Request for a Prefiling Injunctions
126. 	As to the Bankruptcy Administrator’s request for a filing bar on the Debtor, the
Court grants it. The Debtor’s continued reassertion of arguments the Court has rejected as well as
the Debtor’s multiple duplicate filings warrant such relief. Thus, any future filings by the Debtor
must be first sent to the Court before they are docketed. The Court will approve appropriate filings
as not reraising arguments the Court has rejected before allowing them to be docketed.
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III. 	CONCLUSION
The Court concludes with the following three notes to the Parties. First, to all the Parties,
the Court reiterates what it stated at first at November 3 Hearing, in the Final Contempt Order, and
the November 17 Hearing, that this order finally disposes of all the contempt matters such as those
relating to the Tribe and Tribal Entities, the Debtor’s contempt and perjury, any alleged bias against
the Debtor, etc. The Court sees absolutely no reason why it will need to hear these matters again,
especially since it has heard them repeatedly over the last seven months. To the extent any Parties
take any issue with this order, they can appeal it. Second, as to the Trustee and the Bankruptcy
Administrator, the Court commends the work they have done throughout this case. They have had
to spend an inordinate amount of time on this case, far more than is usual for a Chapter 7 case and
probably more than most cases under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code. Nevertheless, they have
never failed to do what was required to find the information vital to the case which the Debtor
would not or had not disclosed. This is particularly noteworthy for Bankruptcy Administrator who,
unlike the Trustee, is not paid hourly, and yet still has worked on this case outside of work hours
and even on the weekends. The bankruptcy system’s very existence depends on individuals like
the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator verifying parties’ submissions and litigating for the
good of the system overall. They are the frontline defense against the conduct that has occurred
here and the Court cannot stress enough their importance. Third, to the Debtor the Court states
again, for clarity’s sake, that the Court itself is not imposing any criminal penalties on the Debtor.
WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that
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1. 	The Debtor’s ongoing Civil Contempt Sanctions in the Chapter 7 Base Case and the Adversary
Proceeding are TERMINATED as of November 3, 2025, and the accrued sanctions of $11,200
are REDUCED to a Money Judgement;
2. 	The Debtor is ORDERED to pay this Money Judgement to the Court by May 30, 2026;
3. 	The Court will SEND this Order by both certified mail and electronic email to the U.S.
Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina and the Mecklenburg County District
Attorney as a formal report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3057 of possible crimes;
4. 	The Debtor’s Outstanding Motions are DENIED;
5. 	The Debtor’s DISCHARGE is DENIED;
6. 	The Debtor is BARRED from filing anything in the Chapter 7 Base Case that is automatically
docketed and any future such filings must first be forwarded by the Bankruptcy Court Clerk to
the Court before being docketed and the Court will review such filings to decide that they are
not duplicitous or completely without merit; and
7. 	The Bankruptcy Administrator’s Request for Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011
Sanctions is DENIED without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
This Order has been signed electronically. 	United States Bankruptcy Court
The Judge’s signature and Court’s seal
appear at the top of this order.
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