Microtech Knives, Inc. v. NorthEDC ECOM, LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:26-cv-00093-MR
MICROTECH KNIVES, INC., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF
) DECISION AND ORDER
NORTHEDC ECOM, LLC, )
NORTHEDC, LLC, and JOHN DOE, )
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave
to Serve Third-Party Subpoenas Prior to Rule 26(f) Conference [Doc. 5].
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 1, 2026, Plaintiff Microtech Knives, Inc. filed a Complaint for
trademark infringement, alleging that NorthEDC, LLC, NorthEDC Ecom,
LLC, and John Doe (collectively, the “Defendants”) committed violations of
the Lanham Act, North Carolina common law, and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.
[Doc. 1]. On April 7, 2026, the Plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to
serve third-party subpoenas prior to a Rule 26(f) conference on Namecheap,
Inc., the domain registrar of the Defendants’ website, in order to obtain
information sufficient to identify the Defendants so that the Plaintiff can serve
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them with the Complaint. [Doc. 5]. Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks by way of
these subpoenas the “names, communications regarding the domain name,
physical addresses, email addresses, telephone number, and payment or
account information associated with Defendants.” [Id. at 1].
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Taking the factual allegations of the Plaintiff’s Complaint as true, the
following is a recitation of the relevant facts.
Plaintiff is the holder of four trademarks, referred to as the “Microtech
Marks,” which it uses to promote and distribute its “premium knives.” [Doc.
1 at ¶¶ 19-22]. Each of these marks is published on the Principal Register
in the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and two of these marks
have been used since 1994. [Id. at ¶¶ 23-24]. The marks have become
“well-known among consumers,” and represent an “extraordinarily valuable
goodwill.” [Id. at ¶ 36].
The Defendants market, sell, and distribute counterfeit knives that bear
the Microtech Marks. [Id. at ¶ 37]. The Defendants advertise these knives
through several online channels, including social media, “search ads,” and a
website called “www.NorthEDC.com.” [Id. at ¶¶ 39-41]. Consumers have
been confused as to the source of the Defendants’ products and have been
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led to believe that the counterfeit products are endorsed by or affiliated with
the Plaintiff. [Id. at ¶ 45].
The Plaintiff now moves the Court to allow it to take discovery from
Namecheap, the domain registrar of the website that the Defendants use to
sell their knives. [Doc. 5-1 at 1]. The subpoena will seek documents
containing information that can identify the Defendants. [Id.].
III. DISCUSSION
A plaintiff’s right to issue subpoenas on third parties before the Rule
26(f) conference in order to identify unknown defendants is well-established.
See, e.g., Moore v. Doe, No. 1:19-cv-01018-LMB-MSN, 2019 WL 13294603,
at *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2019). The Federal Rules explicitly authorize courts
to permit discovery before the Rule 26(f) conference. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1)
(“A party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have
conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except . . . when authorized by . . . court
order.”).
The only question is whether the anonymous defendant’s identity is
shielded from disclosure by the First Amendment. This question is
determined using the following factors: “(1) a concrete showing of a prima
facie claim of actionable harm; (2) specificity of the discovery request; (3) the
absence of alternative means to obtain the subpoenaed information; (4) a
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central need for the subpoenaed information to advance the claim; and (5)
the party’s expectation of privacy.” LHF Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-5, No. 1:17-
cv-00151-MR, 2017 WL 2960789, at *1 (W.D.N.C. July 11, 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
First, the Plaintiff’s Complaint states a prima facie claim of trademark
infringement. “To demonstrate trademark infringement under the Lanham
Act, a plaintiff must prove, first, that it owns a valid and protectable mark,
and, second, that the defendant’s use of a ‘reproduction, counterfeit, copy,
or colorable imitation’ of that mark creates a likelihood of confusion.”
CareFirst of Maryland, Inc. v. First Care, P.C., 434 F.3d 263, 267 (4th Cir.
2006) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)).
Here, the Plaintiff has shown that it owns valid and protectable marks.
[See Docs. 1-3 to 1-6]. It has also shown that the Defendants’ use of those
marks creates a likelihood of confusion: the Defendants’ offending use relies
on exact imitations of both the Plaintiff’s marks and the Plaintiff’s products.
[See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 38-47]. As such, the Plaintiff has made a concrete showing
of a prima facie claim of actionable harm.
Second, the discovery request is sufficiently specific to establish a
reasonable likelihood that the identities of the Defendants can be
ascertained so that they can be properly served. Third, the Plaintiff has
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shown that there are no alternative means to obtain information on the
identities of the Defendants. Namecheap, the registrar associated with the
Defendants’ website, “will not share customer or account information except
when required by law or legal process.” [Doc. 5-1 at 5-6].
Fourth, the Plaintiff has shown that the information it seeks to
subpoena is centrally needed to advance the Plaintiff’s claims. The Plaintiff
simply cannot identify the Defendants and serve process on them without
the information sought. Finally, the Defendants’ expectations of privacy are
minimal, as privacy is the very weapon that the Defendants are allegedly
using to infringe on the Plaintiff’s trademarks. As such, any minimal
expectations of privacy that the Defendants have are insufficient under the
circumstances to shield their identities from discovery.
In sum, the factors weigh in favor of allowing the Plaintiff to conduct
pre-Rule 26(f) conference discovery by service of subpoenas on
Namecheap.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
Serve Third-Party Subpoenas Prior to Rule 26(f) Conference [Doc. 5] is
hereby GRANTED.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED as follows:
1. The Plaintiff may issue a subpoena to Namecheap, Inc. pursuant
to which the Plaintiff may seek the following information: names,
communications regarding the domain name, physical addresses, email
addresses, telephone numbers, and payment or account information. The
Plaintiff shall attach to any subpoena a copy of this Memorandum of Decision
and Order.
2. Any information disclosed to the Plaintiff in response to a
subpoena may be used by the Plaintiff solely for the purpose of protecting
the Plaintiff’s rights as set forth in the Complaint.
3. Namecheap, Inc. shall preserve any subpoenaed information
pending the resolution of any timely filed motion to quash.
4. On or before sixty (60) days from the date of the entry of this
Memorandum of Decision and Order, the Plaintiff shall file a Status Report
with the Court briefly outlining its progress, including the expected
completion date of the discovery allowed by this Memorandum and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed: May 6, 2026
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