Young v. Gonzalez et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-00870-KDB-MTO
ARIEL YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER
ERIC GONZALEZ ET AL,
Defendants.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
(Doc. No. 2). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will GRANT the Motion for the limited
purpose of conducting an initial review but DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Doc. No. 1), after
conducting that review.
I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, enacted in 1892 and presently codified as 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
335 U.S. 331, 342-43 (1948)). To achieve its goal, the IFP statute “allows a litigant to commence
a civil or criminal action in federal court in forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit
stating . . . that he is unable to pay the costs of a lawsuit.” Id. In her IFP motion, Plaintiff states
that her income is $0.00 (she does not specify a pay period), and with only $100.00 in her bank
account and expenses of $100.00 per month, she does not have enough funds in her bank account
to pay the filing fee. (See Doc. No. 2). While the affidavit lacks information that the Court would
expect in a comprehensive financial affidavit, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have assets
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that would allow her to pay for these proceedings. (See Doc. No. 2). Based on these
representations, the Court will conditionally grant the motion and permit Plaintiff to proceed IFP
solely for the limited purposes of this initial review.
II. Initial Review
Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court must review the Complaint to determine
whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In its frivolity review, this Court
must determine whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded
upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. See Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327-28. Furthermore, a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit
a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in the Complaint which set forth a claim that
is cognizable under federal law. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege a statutory or constitutional violation that might plausibly
support the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. She states only that “Defendants expressed personal
view to Lindsay Clancy. A gag order must issue.” (Doc. No. 1). Even liberally construed, these
statements do not plausibly give rise to any cognizable federal claim. Plaintiff’s Complaint
therefore fails frivolity review and must be dismissed.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s IFP motion (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED for purposes of this Order;
2. Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED; and
3. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order.
SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED. Signed: October 15, 2026
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