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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
Amanda Mae Crawford, 	)
) 	ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
) 	MOTION FOR SUMMARY
Plaintiff, 	) 	JUDGMENT, GRANTING
) 	COMMISSIONER’S MOTION FOR
v. 	) 	SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND
) 	AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER’S
Commissioner of Social Security, 	) 	DECISION
)
) 	Case No.: 1:20-cv-00170
Defendant. 	)
The plaintiff, Amanda Mae Crawford (“Crawford” or “claimant”), seeks judicial review of
the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for Title II Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). This court reviews the
Commissioner’s final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Before the court are competing
motions for summary judgment filed by Crawford and the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”). (Doc. Nos. 23, 26).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Crawford filed an application for disability benefits and supplemental security income on
December 14, 2017, alleging disability relating to spinal stenosis, ankylosing spondylitis, sciatica,
herniated disk, a knee problem, irritable bowel syndrome/stomach problem, depression, attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and a neck problem. (Doc. No. 23-1 at 1). The alleged
onset disability date was November 15, 2015. (Id.). Crawford amended the alleged onset date to
March 13, 2017, after a snow blowing incident. (Id.). Crawford’s application was denied upon its
initial review and again upon reconsideration. (Id.). A hearing was held on September 9, 2019,
before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Chris Stuber. (Id. at 1-2). Crawford was represented at
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the hearing by attorney Hannah Yancy Pierce. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 42). Vocational expert Stuart
Gilkison appeared telephonically. (Id.). On October 2, 2019, ALJ Stuber issued a decision finding
Crawford was not disabled. (Doc. No. 23-1 at 2).
The Appeals Council denied a request for review on July 14, 2020, rendering the ALJ’s
decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id.). On September 21, 2020, Crawford filed a
Complaint in this court seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision. (Doc. No. 6).
At the time of the amended alleged onset disability date, Crawford was forty-two years of
age. (Doc. No. 25 at 3). At the time of the ALJ’s decision, Crawford was forty-four. (Doc. No. 23-
1 at 3). She has a high school education and has worked in various capacities, including as a
technician, cashier, hand packager, and general clerk. (Doc. No 19-2 at 45-46, 60; Doc. No. 23-1
at 3).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months….” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or
mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to
do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in
which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he
would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with
respect to any individual), “work which exists in the national economy” means
work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual
lives or in several regions of the country.
Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
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In determining whether an individual has a disability under the Social Security Act, the
Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a),
416.920(a). Under the first step, the Commissioner must consider a claimant’s work activity. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). An individual is not disabled if they have engaged
in substantial gainful activity. Id.
Second, the Commissioner “determines whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Igo v.
Colvin, 839 F.3d 724, 727-78 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)) (internal
quotations omitted); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). Basic work
activities mean “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.922(b),
404.1522(b). Basic work activities include (1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting,
lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and
speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of
judgment; (5) responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and
(6) dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.922(b), 404.1522(b).
Third, 	the 	Commissioner 	considers 	“the 	medical 	severity 	of 	[the 	claimant’s]
impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant has an
impairment or combination of impairments which meet or are equal to the criteria of the listed
impairments [in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1], the claimant will be presumed disabled. Dols
v. Saul, 931 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 2019); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987). “To
meet a listing, a claimant must show that he or she meets all of the criteria for the listed
impairment.” Dols, 931 F.3d at 744 (quoting Blackburn v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir.
2014)).
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Fourth, the Commissioner considers residual functional capacity and past relevant work of
the claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). Residual functional capacity is
defined as “the most [the claimant] can still do despite [their] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). A claimant is not disabled if they have residual functional capacity to perform past
relevant work. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
Lastly, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age,
education, and work experience to determine whether the claimant may make an adjustment to
other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant may do other work,
they are not disabled. Id. To support a finding that the claimant is not disabled, there must be a
demonstration of work that the claimant may do which exists in the national economy.
Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004).
Upon reviewing the record, the court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s
decision, with or without remanding the case for hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). To affirm, the court
must find substantial evidence appearing in the record as a whole supports the Commissioner’s
decision. Id.; see also Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1184 (8th Cir. 1989); Emerson v. Kiljakazi,
No. 1:18-CR-146, 2022 WL 17403569, at *6 (D.N.D. Dec. 2, 2022).
“Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind would find adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.”
Igo v. Colvin, 839 F.3d 724, 728 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). “If, after reviewing
the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and
one of those positions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.”
Dols v. Saul, 931 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th
Cir. 2005)); see Igo, 839 F.3d at 728.
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The court need consider evidence which supports the Commissioner’s decision, as well as
that which detracts from it. Charette v. Saul, No. 3:18-CV-254, 2019 WL 7605835, at *2 (D.N.D.
Nov. 22, 2019); see Dols v. Saul, 931 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 2019). The court will not disturb the
ALJ’s decision unless it lies outside the available “zone of choice.” Nicola v. Astrue, 480 F.3d 885,
886 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 936 (8th Cir. 2006)). An ALJ’s
decision is not outside the “zone of choice” simply because the court may have reached a different
conclusion if it were the initial fact finder. Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
The ALJ applied the five-step test to determine whether Crawford was disabled. First, the
ALJ found that Crawford was not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 13, 2017,
the amended alleged onset disability date. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 14). Second, the ALJ concluded
Crawford had the following severe impairments: obesity; degenerative disc disease; cervical and
lumbar spine; degenerative joint disease; bilateral knees; and cubital tunnel syndrome, status post
release. (Id.). Third, the ALJ found Crawford did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments meeting or medically equal to the severity of one of the impairments listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 17). Fourth, the ALJ determined that Crawford has
the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as is defined under 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1567(a) and 416.967(a). (Id. at 18). Specifically, the ALJ determined:
[t]he claimant is able to lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10
pounds frequently. The claimant can stand and/or walk about 2 hours in an 8-hour
workday and can sit about 6 hours. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and
stairs but never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant should avoid all exposure to
hazardous machinery and unprotected heights.
(Id.). The ALJ also found that Crawford was unable to perform past relevant work. (Id. at 23).
Fifth, the ALJ considered Crawford’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
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capacity (“RFC”), and determined there were a significant number of jobs Crawford could perform
within the national economy. (Id.).
Crawford alleges that (1) “[t]he ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial
evidence because he failed to explain a notable deviation from otherwise favorably-viewed State
Agency opinions and the likely worsening of issues with maintaining position relevant to that
deviation;” (2) “[t]he ALJ failed to adequately consider Plaintiff’s upper extremity limitations,
leaving the decision to omit upper extremity limitations unsupported by substantial evidence;” and
(3) “[t]he ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s subjective report of symptoms is unsupported by substantial
evidence.” (Doc. No. 23-1 at 1).
A. Residual Functional Capacity Determination
The court first considers Crawford’s claim that “[t]he ALJ’s determination is not supported
by substantial evidence because he failed to explain a notable deviation from otherwise favorably-
viewed State Agency opinions and the likely worsening of issues with maintaining position
relevant to that deviation.” (Doc. No. 23-1 at 1). Crawford argues that while the ALJ found the
State Agency opinions persuasive, he needed to address the opinions referencing Crawford’s “need
to alternate sitting and standing more than what she would have with normal breaks as her knees
get sore and achy.” (Id. at 16).
The ALJ determines a claimant’s RFC “based on all relevant evidence, including medical
records, observations of treating physicians and others, and claimant’s own descriptions of [their]
limitations.” Tellez v. Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pearsall v. Massanari,
274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001)). There is not a requirement that the ALJ’s RFC finding be
supported by a specific medical opinion, nor is the ALJ limited to only considering medical
evidence. Schmitt v. Kijakazi, 27 F.4th 1353, 1360 (8th Cir. 2022).
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When making the RFC determination, the ALJ determined that Crawford is able to
lift/carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently, can stand and/or walk about
2 hours in an 8-hour workday and can sit for 6 hours, can on occasion climb ramps and stairs but
never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, and
should avoid exposure to hazardous machinery and unprotected heights. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 18).
In addressing the State agency opinions, the ALJ concluded:
The undersigned has considered the State agency medical consultants assessments,
including the finding on initial determination of ability to lift and carry at the
sedentary level, but with ability to stand/walk about six hours in an eight-hour
workday, and the finding on reconsideration of similar capacity for sedentary level
lift and carry but with stand/walk for up to four hours in an eight-hour workday
(Exs. 2A; 4A; 6A; 8A). The undersigned finds persuasive the limitation to
sedentary level lift and carry, but is also satisfied that the evidence, including more
recent medical records, supports, for example, a limitation to standing and walking
for about two hours in an eight-hour workday. The undersigned also accepts that
the claimant is otherwise somewhat more limited than indicated by the State agency
consultants including, for example, from a postural standpoint and in terms of
exposure to hazards from an environmental standpoint. Still, the undersigned
remains satisfied that the claimant has neither been nor has become more limited
than set forth in the above-established residual functional capacity.
(Doc. No. 19-2 at 22) (error in original).
The ALJ’s decision is properly supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ provided he
“will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any prior
administrative medical finding(s) or medical opinion(s), including those from [claimant’s] medical
sources. [He] fully considered the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings in
[claimant’s] case.” (Doc. No. 19-2 at 22). Further, the ALJ is not required to accept or reject an
entire medical opinion as a whole. Olson v. Colvin, No. C14-4086-LTS, 2016 WL 3747878, at *10
(N.D. Iowa July 8, 2016); see, e.g., Tuley v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 524, 527 (8th Cir. 1991). Rather,
the ALJ is entitled to conclude that some portions of an opinion hold more weight than others.
Olson, 2016 WL 3747878, at *10. The ALJ considered the State agency consultant assessments
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and did not accept or reject them as a whole, rather, he found the opinions persuasive, while
acknowledging Crawford required more limitation in some areas.
While the ALJ did not specifically mention the State agency opinions that “[Crawford] will
need to alternate sitting and standing more than what she would have with normal breaks as her
knees get sore and achy” (Doc. No. 19-3 at 14, 30, 45, 61), the ALJ addressed Crawford’s sitting
requirements throughout his findings. The ALJ noted both Crawford’s testimony that she can only
stand for 15 minutes before needing to sit, her ability to walk for only 15 minutes with a walker,
and her ability to sit for only 15 minutes before needing to get up and move around. (Doc. No. 19-
2 at 18-19). The ALJ also identified that Crawford’s mother did not mention problems with
Crawford’s ability to sit but did mention issues with standing and walking. (Id. at 22). The ALJ
similarly considered Crawford’s weight pursuant to SSR 19-2p and how it limits her ability
regarding standing/walking. (Id. at 19). His findings also include medical records providing that
Crawford was “observed as ambulating normally, including normal gait and station (Ex. 7F, pgs.
14-15).” (Id.).
The 	ALJ 	also 	addressed 	Crawford’s 	knees. 	The 	ALJ 	found 	that 	Crawford’s
musculoskeletal impairments, including those of the back and legs would limit her to a degree.
(Doc. No. 19-2 at 19). The evidence shows degenerative changes to the cervical spine and increase
in degenerative disc disease to the lumbar spine. (Doc. No. 19-9 at 166-67.) The ALJ also
considered that Crawford exhibited restricted lumbar flexion and intermittent indication of
bilateral paraspinal spasm and noted that she appeared to be in a degree of pain-related distress.
(Doc. No. 19-2 at 20). The medical records likewise provide that Crawford had mild to moderate
degenerative changes to her left knee. (Doc. No. 19-9 at 98). However, the records also reflect that
Crawford was able to “sit up and actually touch her feet without difficulty,” as well as ambulate
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without difficulty. Id. at 151. During a 2019 assessment of Crawford’s knees at the Bone & Joint
Center, objective findings upon examination noted generally benign findings. (Id. at 21; Doc. No.
19-12 at 168).
“Reversal is not warranted… ‘merely because substantial evidence would have supported
an opposite decision.’” Tiley v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Reed v.
Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2005). 	The court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s RFC
determination was outside the zone of available choice.
B. Upper Extremity Limitations
The court next considers Crawford’s claim that the “ALJ failed to adequately consider
Plaintiff’s upper extremity limitations, leaving the decision to omit upper extremity limitations
unsupported by substantial evidence.” (Doc. No. 23-1 at 1). Crawford argues that the ALJ barely
addressed her upper extremity complaints, or the extent to which the “severe impairment affected
the RFC.” (Doc. No. 23-1 at 19).
The ALJ adequately considered Crawford’s upper extremity limitations. In reference to
Crawford’s hand limitations, the ALJ noted:
The claimant testified at the hearing to exceptionally poor ability to lift. She
explained that she tries to help carry groceries, but can only carry in one or two
bags and then is done and unable to assist further. The claimant additionally to
issues with weakness and debilitating feelings of pins and needles down her arms
and into her hands and fingers. She noted poor ability to grab and grasp with
tendency to drop things, including testifying at times to inability to even hold toilet
paper. She further testified to needing her mother to help her dress with her
condition.
***
Interestingly, despite the claimant’s allegations of being essentially an invalid,
including inability to perform household chores and needing her mother to assist in
even dressing herself, the claimant reported during her psychological examination
with Dr. Johnson discussed above that since she was not working her mother
expected her to do all the household chores (Ex. 14F, pg. 3). In fact, the claimant
stated “I’m a maid” in terms of the above, which is not consistent with her alleged
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essentially total reliance on her mother in terms of day to day functioning (Ex. 14F,
pg. 3).
(Doc. No. 19-2 at 18-20) (error in original). The ALJ also acknowledged that Crawford’s mother
reported “some days [Crawford’s] hands do not work (Ex. 6E).” (Id. at 22). However, her mother
also acknowledged that the claimant continued to work some. (Id.). The medical records further
reveal that Crawford’s cubital tunnel release provided relief from her symptoms both prior to and
after the alleged amended onset date. (Id. at 19).
The ALJ also addressed Crawford’s cervical and lumbar degrative disc disease, noting it
as severe. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 19). While the ALJ does not specifically address the May 2018
cervical spine MRI, the ALJ discussed imaging of Crawford’s back. (Id.). “The claimant does have
several significant musculoskeletal impairments, including about the back and legs, which would
certainly limit her to a degree. The above imaging of her back reflecting fairly significant
degenerative changes in addition to degenerative joint disease of the bilateral knees.” (Id.) The
ALJ also found that Crawford engaged in ESI treatment which had been effective and provided
good relief. (Id.). Her treatment records also reflect such a finding, with Crawford reporting the
cervical and lumbar ESIs had “amazing results,” with a benefit of around three months. (Doc. No.
19-9 at 37). They also note that she continues to benefit from serial cervical and lumbar ESIs.
(Doc. No. 19-12 at 112, 120, 130, 178). Crawford also testified at her hearing to the injections in
her neck helping for three months, and the lumbar for a month. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 47).
Based on the analysis above, the court finds the ALJ properly evaluated Crawford’s upper
extremity limitations. The ALJ provided valid reasoning, based on Crawford’s testimony and the
record as a whole. Therefore, the court will defer to the ALJ’s finding as it is supported by
substantial evidence.
C. ALJ’s Analysis of Crawford’s Subjective Report of Symptoms
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Lastly the court considers whether the “ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s subjective report of
symptoms is unsupported by substantial evidence.” (Doc. No. 23-1 at 1). Crawford alleges that the
ALJ was required to use a two-step analysis wherein she was required to “i) determine whether
there is a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce pain
or other symptoms, and ii) evaluate the intensity and persistence of those symptoms.” See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1), 416.929(c)(1); (Doc. No. 23-1 at 21). In response, the Commissioner
asserts that the ALJ properly considered the consistency of Crawford’s subjective allegations,
along with the medical evidence and other records. (Doc. No. 25 at 12).
When evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints, the ALJ is required to assess the
claimant’s credibility in light of objective medical evidence and evidence relating to “the
claimant’s daily activities; the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain; precipitating and
aggravating factors; dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication; functional restrictions.”
Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). The ALJ is not required to address each
Polaski factor explicitly, rather, the ALJ may consider and acknowledge the factors prior to
discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints. Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 524 (8th Cir.
2009); see also Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2005).
Here, the record reflects that the ALJ properly considered the Polaski factors and
articulated the basis for discounting Crawford’s subjective report of symptoms. The ALJ stated
that he “has considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be
accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence….” (Doc. No. 19-
2 at 18). Moreover, the ALJ properly considered and weighed Crawford’s testimony and available
medical evidence.
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Crawford asserts that the ALJ’s analysis is flawed and unsupported by substantial evidence
as it pertains to her ability to partake in chores. As referenced above, the ALJ considered
Crawford’s testimony pertaining to her inability to carry groceries, dress, or utilize the bathroom
without assistance. (Id. at 18). The ALJ also considered Crawford’s testimony that she has
difficulty walking, sitting, sleeping at night, assisting with tasks and chores around the home and
requires frequent breaks, but has tried to help with cooking. (Id. at 19). However, the ALJ also
noted Crawford’s report to Dr. Johnson that she was expected to do all household chores and
referred to herself as a maid. (Id. at 19-20).
The ALJ also considered the third-party function report of Crawford’s mother. In
considering the report, the ALJ provided:
However, she acknowledged that the claimant had continued to work some (Ex.
6E). Ms. Johnson also noted that the claimant continued to prepare food for herself
daily (Ex. 6E). In addition, she noted that the claimant participated in household
chores and the like, to including cleaning the kitchen and bathrooms and
straightening up the house. (Ex. 6E). She also noted that the claimant would get out
to visit her grandmother an her friends, continued to get outside two or three times
a day, and had remained pretty calm in terms of her ability to handle stress (ex. 6E).
(Doc. No. 19-2 at 22) (error in original). “Acts which are inconsistent with a claimant’s assertion
of disability reflect negatively upon that claimant’s credibility.” Medhaug v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 805,
817, (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1148 (8th Cir. 2001)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that “‘daily activities [such] as getting up, eating, reading, cleaning the house, making
the bed and doing the dishes with the help of [a spouse], making meals, visiting with friends, and
occasionally shopping and running errands’ are inconsistent with a claimant’s subjective
complaints of disabling pain”).
Crawford also argues that the ALJ’s analysis is unsupported regarding conservative
treatment. She argues that the ALJ has not shown that treatment was conservative, while the
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Commissioner asserts that the ALJ properly considered Crawford’s treatment during the relevant
periods as consisting of medications and injections. (Doc. No. 23-1 at 23; Doc. No. 25 at 13-14).
The ALJ properly considered the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication and
treatment. Crawford testified during the hearing that surgery was “not going to fix [her] problem.”
(Doc. No. 19-2 at 48). Further, Crawford was provided with prescription pain medications and
epidural steroid injections for pain relief. See Medhaug v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 805, 816, (8th Cir.
2009); see also Kisling v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1255, 1257 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that an
impairment cannot be considered disabling if it can be controlled through treatment or medication).
The ALJ indicated that she had conservative treatment with multiple indications noting that the
treatment, such as ESIs, were effective and provided reasonably good relief. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 19).
As previously noted, Crawford’s medical records provide that the cervical and lumbar injunctions
have provided “amazing results,” and she continues to benefit from the ESIs. (Doc. No. 19-8 at
67; Doc. No. 19-9 at 58; Doc. No. 19-12 at 112, 120, 130, 178). The medical records also reflect
Crawford noting that her pain management program was going well, she was able to work, and
she was reasonably comfortable. (Doc. No. 19-9 at 68).
Crawford argues the ALJ’s analysis of the encouragement by Dr. Smith to Crawford to
exercise is flawed and unsupported by substantial evidence. She argues that there is no indication
that Dr. Smith was considering exercises inconsistent with his opinion, and the ALJ’s discussion
was “insufficiently explained and contrary to fact.” (Doc. No. 23-1 at 22; Doc. No. 28 at 2).
Crawford’s medical notes from Dr. Smith provide for “Weight Assessment and Counseling:
Exercise.” (Doc. No. 19-12 at 176). The ALJ interpreted this to mean “Dr. Smith encouraged the
claimant to exercise, which is indicative of at least a tacit acknowledgement that the claimant has
remained more capable over time that she has alleged.” (Doc. No. 19-2 at 21). While the treatment
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notes do not expressly state that Dr. Smith counseled Crawford to exercise, the notes are clear that
exercise was supported by Dr. Smith, as was written under the weight management and counseling
section of the medical records. This supports the ALJ’s notation of there being “at least a tacit
acknowledgment” of Crawford being capable of exercise. (Id.) (emphasis added); see also Moore
v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 524 (8th Cir. 2009) (“A lack of functional restrictions on the claimant’s
activities is inconsistent with a disability claim where…the claimant’s treating physicians are
recommending increased exercise.”).
Pertaining to the clinical notes, Crawford also argues that the ALJ did not consider the
fluctuating nature of Crawford’s issues. (Doc. No. 23-1 at 23); see also Nowling v. Colvin, 813
F.3d 1110, 1123 (8th Cir. 2016) (“the ALJ improperly accorded great weight to statements
in…treatment notes indicting [claimant] demonstrated ‘improvement’ without acknowledging that
[claimant’s] symptoms waxed and waned throughout the substantial period of treatment, without
acknowledging the unpredictable and sporadic nature of symptoms, and without assessing the
effect of [their] structured living environment”). The court is unpersuaded by Nowling, as it refers
to a claimant’s mental impairments. See Wellman v. Berryhill, No. 4:16-CV-04159-LLP, 2017 WL
5990116, at *28 (D.S.D. Nov. 9, 2017) (“It is well-established that mental impairments can wax
and wane.”) (citing Nowling, 813 F.3d at 1123; Dillon v. Colvin, 210 F.Supp.3d 1198, 1209
(D.S.D. 2016)). The ALJ acknowledged Crawford’s mental impairments, however, Crawford fails
to address her mental impairments in her motion for summary judgment, so the court will not
consider the issue.
As discussed above, the objective evidence is consistent with the ALJ’s analysis of
Crawford’s subjective report of symptoms. This court may not reweigh the evidence. Renstrom v.
Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1064 (8th Cir. 2012). The court finds that the ALJ’s determination
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concerning 	Crawford’s 	subjective 	complaints 	is 	supported 	by 	substantial 	evidence 	after
considering the record as a whole and affording deference to the ALJ’s reasoning.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the court is satisfied that substantial evidence in the
record as a whole supports the ALJ’s findings and the conclusion that Crawford was not disabled
from the amended alleged onset date through the date of the ALJ’s decision. Accordingly,
Crawford’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 23) is DENIED, the Commissioner’s motion
for summary judgment (Doc. No. 26) is GRANTED, and the decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 1st day of May, 2024.
/s/ Clare R. Hochhalter
Clare R. Hochhalter, Magistrate Judge
United States District Court
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