Greene v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
Charlyn Greene, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	) 	ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
) 	DISMISS
vs. 	)
)
Nationstar Mortgage LLC d/b/a Mr Cooper, 	)
et. al., And all other persons unknown 	)
claiming any legal or equitable right, title, 	)
estate, lien, or interest in the property 	)
described in the claim adverse to Petitioner’s 	)
title, or any cloud upon Petitioner’s title 	) 	Case No. 1:24-cv-131
thereto. Doe’s 1 through 25, 	)
)
Respondent(s). 	).
Before the court is a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6),
or to Strike filed by Respondent Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (“Nationstar”) on August 27, 2024.
(Doc. Nos. 6 and 9). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.1
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner initiated the above-captioned action pro se on July 3, 2024, by filing a document
captioned “Agreed Nihil Dicit Judgment Motion” along with several exhibits. (Doc. No. 1). She
asserts that she is entitled default judgment against Nationstar because Nationstar failed to respond
to her pre-filing communications. Specifically, under the heading “findings of fact,” she alleges:
The Nihil Dicit Judgment allows the legal process to proceed without further
consideration of Respondent’s “side of the story” . . . .
For the course of dealing, set forth herein, with Respondent Mr Cooper’s
failure, refusal, or neglect in the present of a verified response to the presented
‘Notice of Acceptance,’ ‘Notice of affect of Failure to Respond’, and ‘Certificate of
Non-Response’ signed and witnesses by a notary public/officer of the court,
1 The parties respectively filed notice of their consent to the undersigned’s exercise of jurisdiction on July
15 and August 28, 2024. (Doc. Nos. 5 and 8).
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constitutes that Respondent Mr Cooper’s failure to perform in good faith and
respondent Mr Cooper’s acquiescence and tacit agreement with all terms, conditions,
and stipulations set forth therein with this Agreed Nihil Dicit Judgment, filed for
Entry by the Clerk of this Honorable Court . . . .
The Respondent Mr Cooper admits that Respondent Mr Cooper received and
accepted Petitioners negotiable instrument for full satisfaction of alleged debt
allegedly owed by Petitioner. Respondent Mr Cooper has admitted via silence and
therefore has implied contracted with the Petitioner and has accepted the money
judgment amount of Eight Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($8,500,00.00)
which 	equates 	to 	Five 	Hundred 	Thousand 	Dollars 	($500,000.00) 	per 	each
presentment/collection 	effort 	made 	after 	alleged 	debt 	was 	fully 	satisified.
Respondent Mr. Cooper also admits Respondent Mr. Cooper is liable for the full face
amount of the negotiable instrument in the amount of Four Hundred Thirty
Thousand, Six Hundred Eighty One and 29/100, ($430,681.29) per the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and for NOT crediting Petitioners alleged account
and also having admitted Petitioner is entitled to a full set-off, discharge, settlement
of accounting with a zero balance receipt and full conveyance and Quiet Title of the
real property located at 8157 Lennox View Lane, Las Vegas, Nevada 89113.
Respondent Mr Cooper has waived all Respondent Mr Coopers rights to any claims,
arguments, choice of venue/jurisdiction or any further notice, now or in the future
regarding this matter. Respondent Mr Cooper admits that have after having received
and accepted full compensation for the alleged debt, Respondent Mr Cooper hired
MTC FINANCIAL, INC d/b/a TRUSTEEE CORPS to conduct an unlawful
foreclosure sale and emphasizes respondent Mr Coopers default by failing to rebut
or respond to any/all Petitioner’s Notice’s/Affidavits point by point. Respondent Mr
Cooper was asked multiple times through the complete and thorough Administrative
Process to “send a notice to dishonor from a qualified third party if the tendered
instrument was defective in form or substance.” Respondent Mr Cooper retained the
negotiable instrument which discharges the alleged debt per “UCC 3-603 Tender of
Payment” and continued to remain silent....
For 	respondent 	Mr 	Cooper’s 	failure 	to 	honor 	the 	Presentment
Contract/’Notice of Acceptance’ and ‘Notice of Affect of Failure to Respond”,
places Mr. Cooper in default....
(Doc. No. 1 at pp. 2-4) (errors and emphasis in original).
On August 27, 2024, Nationstar filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 6 and 9). On September 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a response to
motion. (Doc. No. 10). On September 19, 2024, Nationstar filed its reply. (Doc. No. 12). Thus,
Nationstar's motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for the court’s consideration.
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II. 	APPLICABLE RULES
A. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
Parties may assert a lack of jurisdiction by motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). This
defense may be brought in two ways: by facial attack or by factual attack. Branson Label, Inc. v.
City of Branson, 793 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2015). A facial attack simply asserts the plaintiff has
not pled a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Id. In a facial attack, the court must afford the
non-moving party the benefit of the Rule 12(b)(6) safeguards, and it may only consider the pleadings
and “materials that are 'necessarily embraced by the pleadings and exhibits attached to the
complaint.'" Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Cox v. Mortg.
Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 685 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 2012)). A factual attack asserts the actual
existence of subject matter jurisdiction is lacking “irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside
the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.” Branson Label, 793 F.3d at 914-15
(quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)).
B. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading to contain a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8
(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the dismissal of a claim if
there has been a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
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liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.. A plaintiff must show that success on the merits is more
than a “sheer possibility.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. The court
must accept all factual allegations as true, except for legal conclusions or “formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 681. Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Detailed factual allegations are not necessary under the
Rule 8 pleading standard, rather a plaintiff must set forth grounds of its entitlement to relief which
“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint does not
“suffice if it tenders a naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S.
at 678 (2009). The determination of whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be
granted is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Id. at 679. Dismissal will not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling the plaintiff to relief. Ulrich v. Pope Cnty, 715 F.3d
1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2013).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Nationstar avers that there can be no entry of default judgment as no decipherable complaint
has been served and/or filed. Noting that Plaintiff’s filings bear the hallmarks of the “sovereign
citizen” debt elimination movement, it avers that the court can and should dismiss this matter for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or failure to state a claim.
The court agrees and finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff has requested entry of default judgment. However, she has not filed a complaint much less
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referenced any lawsuit to which Nationstar has failed to respond. Pre-lawsuit communications to
Nationstar and its failure to respond to them involve no pending legal or administrative proceeding
and thus do not entitle Plaintiff to default judgment. See Green v. Blount Int’l, Inc., No. 09-cv-1468-
AC, 2010 Wl 2613532, at *3 (D. Ore. May 21, 20210).
Moreover, “[i]t is well-established in the Eighth Circuit that claims based on sovereign citizen
ideology are inherently frivolous and should be summarily dismissed as a waste of judicial
resources.” Hopper v. Addams, No. 2:24-CV-02129-TLB, 2024 WL 4730595, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Oct.
21, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:24-CV-2129, 2024 WL 4728418 (W.D. Ark.
Nov. 8, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-3405, 2025 WL 1525407 (8th Cir. Feb. 20, 2025); see also
United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding the sovereign citizen issues in
the case “are completely without merit, patently frivolous, and will be rejected without expending
any more of this Court's resources on their discussion.”); United States v. Hart, 701 F.2d 749, 750
(8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting “sovereign citizen” as a status); Engel v. Corizon, No. 4:20-CV-1744-HEA,
2021 WL 1105351, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 23, 2021) (“Arguments based upon sovereign citizen
ideology have been summarily rejected as frivolous and irrational in this Circuit and in other federal
courts around the nation.”); Meyer v. Pfeifle, No. 4:18-CV-04048, 2019 WL 1209776, at *5 (D.S.D.
Mar. 14, 2019), aff'd, 790 F. App'x 843 (8th Cir. 2020) (“[plaintiff's] allegations regarding rights as
a 	‘sovereign 	citizen’ 	are 	frivolous 	and 	fail 	to 	state 	a 	claim”); 	Engel 	v. 	Corizon, 	No.
4:20-CV-1744-HEA, 2021 WL 1105351, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 23, 2021) (“Arguments based upon
sovereign citizen ideology have been summarily rejected as frivolous and irrational in this Circuit
and in other federal courts around the nation.”); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 761-67 (7th
Cir. 2011) (recommending that sovereign citizen arguments “be rejected summarily, however they
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are presented”).
Although Plaintiff does not openly state that she ascribes to “sovereign citizen” ideology, her
arguments resemble the “legal-sounding but ultimately baseless arguments” courts typically see
“[w]hen sovereign citizens litigate.” Riding, No. 4:25-cv-00648-DGK, 2025 WL 3543006, at *4
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 10, 2025). For example, Plaintiff avers there is some sort of registered bond held
at the U..S Treasury documents that can be used to satisfy her debts, attempts to copyright and
trademark her name, and uses the phrases “all rights reserved” and “without recourse” on the
signature line of the “Agreed Nihil Dicit Judgment Motion” and attached exhibits. (Doc. No. 1 at pp.
1, 3, and 8; Doc. No. 1-2). These are hallmarks of filings by proponents of the “sovereign citizen
ideology. Riding v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, No. 4:25-cv-00648-DGK, 2025 WL 3543006, at
*4 (discussing practices that are characteristic of sovereign citizen activity).
III. 	CONCLUSION
Nationstar’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 6 and 9) are GRANTED. This matter is
DISMISSED in entirety for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Nationstar's
Motion to Strike (Doc. No. 9) is deemed MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 7th day of April, 2026.
/s/ Clare R. Hochhalter
Clare R. Hochhalter, Magistrate Judge
United States District Court
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