Eiseman v. Patterson Dental Supply, Inc.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
Trent Eiseman,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Patterson Dental Supply, Inc.,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00270
ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, AND DENYING, IN PART, MOTION TO DISMISS
[¶1] THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendant
Patterson Dental Supply, Inc. (“Patterson Dental”), on January 23, 2026. Doc. No. 6. Plaintiff
Trent Eiseman (“Eiseman”) filed a Response on March 20, 2026. Doc. No. 11. Patterson Dental
filed a Reply on April 3, 2026. Doc. No. 12. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss
is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.
BACKGROUND
[¶2] For nearly twenty years, Eiseman worked in sales for Patterson Dental on a commission
basis. Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 9–10. In March 2023, Eiseman was on his way from Bismarck to Beulah,
North Dakota, on Interstate 94 performing work-related business on behalf of Patterson Dental
when a meth user driving a vehicle made an illegal U-turn and struck Eiseman’s vehicle head-on.
Id. at ¶ 10. The accident left Eiseman with a traumatic brain injury (“TBI”). Id. at ¶ 10. For a year
after the accident, Eiseman went through significant physical, occupational, and vision therapies
two to three days per week. Id. at ¶ 11.
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[¶3] Despite being fully aware of the nature and extent of Eiseman’s injuries, Patterson Dental
required Eiseman to travel by car to Minnesota to attend a dental convention over his objection.
Id. at ¶ 13. Because of his injuries, Eiseman had to make the trip from Bismarck to Minneapolis
over the course of two days, having to stop every twenty minutes to take lengthy breaks. Id.
[¶4] Eiseman requested Patterson Dental provide him with additional accommodations for the
TBI, including asking that his customers be reduced to more manageable levels and allowing him
to meet with customers via Teams calls, phone calls and emails. Id. at
¶ 14. Although Patterson Dental initially reduced Eiseman’s workload, it later assigned him
numerous customers from the “house account,” many of whom were not purchasing much if any
product. Id. This further burdened Eiseman because he needed to do the work to service these
customers but would not derive any sales from this work. Id. When Eiseman emailed his superiors
about the issue, their response was to assign him even more essentially worthless accounts. Id.
These actions lowered Eiseman’s sales numbers, making him look ineffective with his accounts
and less valuable to the sales team. Id.
[¶5] Following the TBI, Eiseman claims Patterson Dental treated him differently than other
similarly situated non-disabled sales employees working in North Dakota and Minnesota. Id. at
¶ 15. This includes one manager saying she was “watching him” and another manager telling him
he could not carry a tool bag or perform repairs for customers anymore after the TBI. Id. Other
similarly-situated sales employees were not subject to this kind of treatment. Id.
[¶6] Eiseman also claims he is owed over $100,000 in earned commissions and reimbursements
for his sales work which Patterson Dental refuses to pay. Id. at ¶ 17. Approximately $20,000 of
these owed amounts are day-to-day sales commissions and reimbursements that Patterson Dental
should have paid him. Id. at ¶ 26. The rest mostly derives from two high-value sales projects. Id.
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at ¶¶ 18, 21. The first project was for sales to Northland Community Health Center in Turtle Lake,
North Dakota and Ray, North Dakota (“Northland Project”). Id. at ¶ 18. Despite earning
approximately $40,000 to $50,000 under its written commission plan, Patterson Dental refused
and still refuses to pay Eiseman his commission for the Northland Project. Id. at ¶¶ 18–19. The
second project was for sales to the Three Affiliated Tribes Minne Tohe Health Center in New
Town, North Dakota (“New Town Project”). Id. at ¶ 20. Eiseman began working on the New Town
Project approximately a decade before it was completed in 2024. Id. at ¶ 21. Again, despite earning
approximately $80,000 to $100,000 in commissions for his work on the New Town Project,
Patterson Dental refused and still refuses to pay Eiseman his commission. Id. at ¶ 20.
[¶7] Instead, Eiseman claims Patterson Dental zeroed out the New Town Project invoice,
credited back to the customer the payment previously received, and then re-issued the invoice for
the project. Id. at ¶ 22. These “creative accounting” maneuvers removed Eiseman from the
invoicing and sales paperwork, effectively erasing his work and earned commission on the New
Town Project. Id. at ¶ 23. According to Eiseman, he did not know about Patterson Dental’s
“creative accounting” concerning the New Town Project until around late November 2024, when
he learned about it “through the proverbial grapevine.” Id. at ¶ 25. Beyond these hidden maneuvers
on the New Town Project, Eiseman asserts Patterson Dental routinely cooked the books, changing
commission metrics and sales dates after the fact to benefit executives and managers at the expense
of ordinary sales employees like Eiseman. Id. at ¶ 33.
[¶8] When Eiseman began asking questions to his superiors, including requests for commission
summaries and adjustments, he was fired shortly thereafter in September 2024. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 28.
Eiseman initially believed he would be paid his outstanding commissions and severance by late
November 2024 because other similarly situated non-disabled employees were paid these within
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a similar timeframe. Id. at ¶ 25. However, following his termination, Patterson Dental never
offered or paid Eiseman any outstanding commissions or severance. Id. at ¶¶ 30–31.
[¶9] Similarly, one of Patterson Dental’s company benefits was to provide LifeLock identity
theft protection to employees. Id. at ¶ 35. However, Eiseman claims Patterson Dental never
activated his LifeLock protection and he had his identity stolen in 2024. Id. at ¶ 36. Since his
identity was stolen, Eiseman has incurred costs and expenses relating to attempts to reverse the
identity theft and has been sued by creditors for the charges incurred by the identity thieves
pretending to be Eiseman. Id. at ¶ 37. According to Eiseman, his FTC identity theft report currently
exceeds $200,000 in fraudulent transactions. Id. Since approximately June 2024, Eiseman has
demanded Patterson Dental provide him with his LifeLock protection, but Patterson Dental has
not provided the protection and stated in writing that his claim regarding LifeLock coverage was
“resolved.” Id. at ¶ 38.
[¶10] Following his termination, Eiseman filed a Complaint against Patterson Dental. Id. The
Complaint contains four counts against Patterson Dental, namely: (1) Unlawful Discrimination
and Retaliation Under the ADA and North Dakota Law, (2) Breaches of Statutory and Contractual
Obligations, (3) Fraud and Deceit, and (4) Unjust Enrichment. Id. at ¶¶ 41–60. Patterson Dental
has moved to dismiss Counts One, Three, and Four of the Complaint. Doc. No. 6.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Dismiss Standard
[¶11] Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading to contain a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). A defendant may file a motion to dismiss asserting the complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive such a motion, a complaint
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must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified). A plaintiff must show
that success on the merits is more than a “sheer possibility.” Id. A complaint does not need detailed
factual allegations, but it must contain more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
[¶12] The Court must accept a complaint’s factual allegations as true, but it does not need to
accept a complaint’s legal conclusions or “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint does not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. However, the determination of whether a complaint
states a claim upon which relief can be granted is a “context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Dismissal will
not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt the plaintiff cannot provide a set of facts to support
a claim that would entitle him to relief. Ulrich v. Pope Cnty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2013).
The Court may look to materials that do not contradict the Complaint, as well as materials
necessarily embraced by the pleadings. Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab’y, Inc., 688 F.3d 928,
931 (8th Cir. 2012).
II. Count One: Unlawful Discrimination and Retaliation Under the ADA and North
Dakota Law
[¶13] Patterson Dental argues Count One of the Complaint alleging Unlawful Discrimination and
Retaliation under the ADA and North Dakota law should be dismissed because Eiseman failed to
file his discrimination complaint with the North Dakota Department of Labor and Human Rights
(“NDDOL”) and the EEOC in the timeframe set by the corresponding state and federal statutes.
Doc. No. 6-1, pp. 4–6. Eiseman responds that he timely raised the latest instance of continuing
discrimination with state authorities. Doc. No. 11, p. 11.
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[¶14] Under North Dakota law, an employee alleging unlawful discrimination or retaliation
“must file a complaint with the department within three hundred days after the alleged act of
wrongdoing.” N.D.C.C. § 34-01-20(4). Similarly, under federal law, a charge involving unlawful
employment practices “shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). However, if the individual alleging an
unlawful employment practice “has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency
with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with
respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the
person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred.” Id.
[¶15] In this case, the date of the last discriminatory act occurred in September 2024, when
Patterson Dental informed Eiseman that it was his last day at the company. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 9.
Accordingly, Eiseman had three hundred days from the date of his September 2024 termination to
file a discrimination complaint with the NDDOL under North Dakota law. N.D.C.C. § 34-01-
20(4). Based on an unspecified September 2024 termination, Eiseman needed to file his complaint
with the NDDOL by a specific date in July 2025 for it to be timely. Id. However, Eiseman did not
file his complaint until August 27, 2025, past the noted deadline set by the North Dakota Century
Code. See Doc. No. 6-3, p. 4.
[¶16] Eiseman contends the last date of discrimination was November 15, 2024, two months after
his termination, thereby extending the date by which he was required to file his discrimination
complaint with the NDDOL. Id. at 2. In his Response, Eiseman justifies this later date by arguing
that Patterson Dental’s actions, before and after his termination, amounted to ongoing
discrimination creating a hostile working environment for Eiseman. Doc. No. 11,
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p. 4–11. Accordingly, the November 15, 2024 date represents the final act of discrimination that
occurred as part of the hostile working environment, namely Patterson Dental’s refusal to pay
Eiseman the commissions he earned. Id.
[¶17] However, the first mention of a hostile working environment occurs in Eiseman’s Response
filed in March 2026, approximately eighteen months after his termination and eight months past
the deadline to file a discrimination complaint with the NDDOL. Id. His November 2025
Complaint and August 27, 2025 North Dakota discrimination complaint make no mention of a
hostile working environment. Doc. Nos. 1; 6-3. In fact, Eiseman had the opportunity to claim a
hostile working environment in the North Dakota discrimination complaint, but failed to check the
box confirming that allegation. Doc. No. 6-3, p. 2. Taken together, these facts demonstrate
Eiseman waived his right to file a discrimination complaint alleging a hostile working
environment. See N.D. Cent. Code § 34-01-20(4). The Court will not permit Eiseman to amend
his Complaint or recharacterize his discrimination claim as a hostile working environment claim
through his Response to rescue the claim. See Thomas v. United Steelworkers Loc. 1938, 743 F.3d
1134, 1140 (8th Cir. 2014) (claims can only be modified through Rule 15 and cannot be modified
through opposition briefs during motion practice). Accordingly, the proper date to refer to as the
last date of discrimination remains September 2024, when Patterson Dental terminated Eiseman,
rendering his state complaint untimely.
[¶18] Because Eiseman’s state complaint was untimely, it is beyond doubt the Eiseman cannot
provide a set of facts to support a claim that would entitle him to relief on his state discrimination
claim. Ulrich, 715 F.3d at 1058. The Court GRANTS Patterson Dental’s request to dismiss Count
One as to Eiseman’s claim under North Dakota law.
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[¶19] However, the same is not true regarding Eiseman’s federal claim. In the Complaint,
Eiseman states that prior to filing a discrimination complaint with the NDDOL, he “submitted an
ADA/Retaliation claim directly with the EEOC in 2024 but has lost his email communications
with EEOC but believes he completed the grievance request.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 7. Nothing in Patterson
Dental’s Response challenges this statement or the deadline governing the federal ADA claim.
Moreover, if Eiseman did in fact submit the federal claim before the North Dakota claim, then he
had one hundred and eighty days from his termination to file his claim with the EEOC. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). In that case, it remains plausible that Eiseman filed the ADA claim in the
appropriate timeframe in 2024. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Consequently, it would be
premature at this stage of litigation to dismiss Eiseman’s ADA claim. Because Patterson Dental
failed to properly challenge the ADA claim and it remains plausible Eiseman filed the ADA claim
within the one-hundred-and-eighty-day deadline, the Court DENIES Patterson Dental’s request to
dismiss Count One as to the ADA claim. Ulrich, 715 F.3d at 1058.
III. Count Three: Fraud and Deceit
[¶20] Patterson Dental argues Count Three of the Complaint should also be dismissed because
Eiseman’s fraud and deceit allegations are not pled with the specificity required under North
Dakota law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. No. 6-1, pp. 8–15. Eiseman asserts
these claims are legally and factually sufficient. Doc. No. 11, pp. 11–18.
[¶21] In North Dakota, fraud and deceit claims are governed by statute. See N.D.C.C. §§ 9–03–
08; 9–10–02. “Technically, fraud under Section 9–03–08 of the North Dakota Century Code
applies only when there is a contract between the parties, whereas deceit under Section 9–10–02
of the North Dakota Century Code applies when there is no contract between the parties.” Nagel
v. Sykes Realty, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1202 (D.N.D. 2005) (citing Dewey v. Lutz, 462
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N.W.2d 435, 439 (N.D. 1990)). “However, the conduct prohibited under the separate statutory
definitions of fraud and deceit is substantially identical.” Dvorak v. American Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 508 N.W.2d 329, 332 (N.D. 1993). Since a contract exists between the parties, namely the
commission plan, Eiseman’s claim in Count Three will be construed as a fraud claim.
[¶22] Under the Century Code, fraud is defined as “acts committed by a party to the contract, or
with the party’s connivance, with intent to deceive another party thereto or to induce the other
party to enter into the contract.” N.D.C.C. § 9–03–08. To prevail on a claim for fraud, a plaintiff
must show: (1) a contract between the parties, (2) misrepresentation of facts, suppression of facts,
misleading another, or promising without an intent to perform, (3) reliance on the false or
misleading representation; and (4) proof of actual damages proximately caused by the
misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Northstar Founders, LLC v. Hayden Capital USA, LLC, 2014
ND 200, 855 N.W.2d 614, 626.
[¶23] In addition to the Rule 12 pleading requirements of plausibility, claims for fraud must
satisfy Rule 9(b), which requires a party to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The Eighth Circuit has held this particularity requires the plaintiff to
“plead such facts as the time, place, and content of the defendant’s false representation, as well as
the details of the defendant’s fraudulent acts, including when the acts occurred, who engaged in
them, and what was obtained as a result.” United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441
F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006). In other words, claims for fraud require a plaintiff to plead the “who,
what, when, where, and how” to support the claim. Kuntz v. State, 2019 ND 46, ¶ 51, 923 N.W.2d
513, 528 (quoting BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 478 F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir. 2007)).
[¶24] In this case, Eiseman alleges Patterson Dental defrauded him on two grounds: (1) by using
“creative accounting” maneuvers to avoid paying Eiseman the commissions he earned for the New
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Town Project and (2) failing to activate his LifeLock identity protection and later allegedly
informing him that his LifeLock account issues were “resolved.” Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 50–53.
A. “Creative Accounting” Fraud Claim
[¶25] Beginning with the “creative accounting” fraud claim, Eiseman fails to specify with
particularity the “who, what, when, where, and how” of Patterson Dental’s false representation to
Eiseman. Kuntz, 923 N.W.2d at 528. When describing the nature of this fraud claim in his
Response, Eiseman states Patterson Dental “had a commission plan, Eiseman earned a commission
through a sale, and Patterson ‘erased’ Eiseman’s commission and gave it to someone else without
telling him.” Doc. No. 11, p. 16. Put simply, Eiseman’s contention is that Patterson Dental
committed fraud by failing to abide by the terms of its commission plan. However, Eiseman fails
to provide facts establishing that when Patterson Dental promised to pay him commissions for his
work on projects, it did so with the preconceived intention to not abide by its commission plan to
deceive Eiseman into completing additional projects for Patterson Dental. N.D.C.C. § 9–03–08;
Northstar Founders, LLC, 855 N.W.2d at 626 (establishing the elements of fraud). Absent facts
demonstrating Patterson Dental intended to deceive Eiseman to perform work it was not going to
pay him commissions for, his claim for fraud cannot succeed as pled.
[¶26] Moreover, a failure to pay amounts owed under a contract such as the commission plan is
more accurately characterized as a breach of contract issue, not fraud. Even if a party’s breach is
accompanied by a malicious intent, it is insufficient to transform a breach of contract claim into a
fraud claim. Pioneer Fuels, Inc. v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., a Div. of MDU Res. Grp., 474
N.W.2d 706, 710 (N.D. 1991) (“A breach of contract even if intentional, malicious, or in bad faith,
is not enough to convert a contract action into a tort action”). Notably, Eiseman already alleges
breach of contract in Count Two of the Complaint, including Patterson Dental’s failure to pay the
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commissions it allegedly owed Eiseman under the commission plan. Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 44–48.
Patterson Dental does not challenge Count Two in its Motion to Dismiss.
[¶27] Since Eiseman’s “creative accounting” fraud claim lacks facts demonstrating an intent to
deceive, is essentially a breach of contract claim disguised as a fraud claim, and is duplicative of
the allegations in Count Two of the Complaint, the Court GRANTS Patterson Dental’s request to
dismiss the “creative accounting” fraud claim.
B. LifeLock Fraud Claim
[¶28] Similarly, Eiseman’s fraud claim regarding the LifeLock identity theft coverage is more
properly understood as a breach of contract claim, not a fraud claim. In his Response, when
describing his LifeLock allegations, Eiseman states he “suffered harm for the lack of a Company
benefit he should have had in 2024 when his identity was hacked, he was further damaged when
he demanded the benefit be activated and Patterson refused to provide him, a Company employee,
the benefit enjoyed by everyone else.” Doc. No. 11, pp. 17–18. Like Eiseman’s “creative
accounting claim,” a failure to provide a benefit owed under a contract or company policy is a
breach of contract dispute, not a dispute over fraud. Pioneer Fuels, Inc., 474 N.W.2d at 710. As
mentioned above, Eiseman already alleges breach of contract in Count Two of the Complaint,
rendering this allegation unnecessarily duplicative. Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 44–48.
[¶29] Eiseman attempts to make his LifeLock claim sound more in terms of fraud by further
alleging Patterson Dental lied to him when it told Eiseman his LifeLock coverage issues were
“resolved.” Doc. Nos 1, ¶ 38; 11, p. 18. However, Eiseman again fails to plead any facts, with
sufficient particularity, to demonstrate Patterson Dental’s statement regarding the status of his
LifeLock coverage was an intentional misrepresentation. Kuntz, 2019 ND 46, ¶ 51, 923 N.W.2d
at 528. A conclusory allegation that the alleged misrepresentation was “patently untrue” is
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insufficient to establish that the representation was false, much less that it was intentionally false
and intended to deceive Eiseman. See N.D.C.C. § 9–03–08; Northstar Founders, LLC, 855 N.W.2d
at 626 (establishing the element of misrepresentation). One cannot infer fraud solely on the basis
that the underlying statement was untrue. See City of Granville v. Kovash, Inc., 118 N.W.2d 354,
361 (N.D. 1962) (“[f]raud or deception never will be inferred from a mere mistake, without other
circumstances”). Absent factual allegations showing Patterson Dental intended to deceive Eiseman
when it told him his LifeLock coverage issue was “resolved,” his claim for fraud cannot succeed
as pled. First Union Nat. Bank v. RPB 2, LLC, 2004 ND 29, ¶ 23, 674 N.W.2d 1, 8 (holding that
the plaintiff “failed to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate fraud” because his “own evidence does
not reflect the necessary intent”).
[¶30] Additionally, according to the chronology set forth in the Complaint, the allegedly false
statement that Eiseman’s LifeLock coverage issue was “resolved” occurred after the theft of his
identity. Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 36–38. Because the statement was made after his identity was stolen,
Eiseman cannot establish that relying on the statement proximately caused the damages he suffered
as a result of the identity theft. Northstar Founders, LLC, 855 N.W.2d at 626. Since proximate
causation and actual damages are essential elements of a tort action for fraud, this provides
additional reason to dismiss Eiseman’s fraud claim. Lang v. Schafer, 2000 ND 2, ¶ 8, 603 N.W.2d
904, 906 (quoting Sonnesyn v. Akin, 104 N.W. 1026, 1028 (N.D. 1905)); Northstar Founders,
LLC, 855 N.W.2d at 626.
[¶31] Since Eiseman’s LifeLock fraud claim is essentially a breach of contract claim disguised
as a fraud claim, lacks facts demonstrating an intent to deceive, and fails to satisfy the elements of
proximate causation and actual damages, the Court GRANTS Patterson Dental’s request to
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dismiss the LifeLock fraud and deceit claim. Count Three of the Complaint is dismissed its
entirety.
IV. Count Four: Unjust Enrichment
[¶32] Lastly, Patterson Dental argues Count Four of the Complaint should be dismissed because
Eiseman cannot maintain an unjust enrichment claim while also claiming a contract exists between
the parties. Doc. No. 6-1, pp. 15–16. Eiseman asserts he may plead unjust enrichment in the
alternative, fearing Patterson Dental may attempt to deny the existence of the written commission
plan. Doc. No. 11, pp. 18–19. The Eighth Circuit has held that “[s]o long as an adequate legal
remedy exists, equitable remedies like unjust enrichment are not available.” Loftness Specialized
Farm Equip., Inc. v. Twiestmeyer, 742 F.3d 845, 854 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing ServiceMaster of St.
Cloud v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 544 N.W.2d 302, 305 (Minn. 1996)). Count Four of Eiseman’s
Complaint would have this Court do just that by allowing the unjust enrichment claim to proceed
despite Eiseman having access to a legal remedy via Count Two’s breach of contract claim (for
Patterson Dental’s alleged failure to pay Eiseman the commissions it owes him under the
commission plan). Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 44–48. Consequently, the Court GRANTS Patterson Dental’s
request to dismiss Count Four of the Complaint. See Loftness Specialized Farm Equip., Inc., 742
F.3d at 854–55 (affirming a Rule 12 dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim and holding the
counterclaimants were not entitled to plead unjust enrichment in the alternative because the parties’
relationships were governed by existing contracts, “making unjust enrichment an unavailable
remedy.”).
CONCLUSION
[¶33] Based on the foregoing, Patterson Dental’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, in part, and
DENIED, in part. The part of Count One alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation under
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North Dakota law is DISMISSED with prejudice. Patterson Dental’s request to dismiss the part
of Count One alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation under the ADA is DENIED. Counts
Three and Four are DISMISSED with prejudice in their entirety.
[¶34] IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED July 27, 2026.
Daniel M. Traynor, District Judge
United States District Court
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