Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
EASTERN DIVISION
Ana Lucia Parco Pinduisaca, 	)
) 	ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR
Petitioner, 	) 	WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
)
v. 	)
) 	Case No. 3:26-cv-80
Andrew Schneider, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
Petitioner Ana Lucia Parco Pinduisaca petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. Doc. 1.
Respondents oppose the Petition. Doc. 2. Petitioner replied. Doc. 3. Respondents move to strike
portions of Petitioner’s reply, arguing it improperly raises new factual allegations and arguments.
Doc. 5. For the reasons below, the Court grants the Petition and orders Respondents to grant
Petitioner a bond hearing. Respondents’ motion to strike is moot.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Ecuador who entered the United States in April 2024.
Doc. 1 at 3. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) detained her upon entry, placed her
in removal proceedings under § 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and charged
her under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i). Id. DHS later released Petitioner on her own recognizance under
INA § 236. Id. The order states:
You have been arrested and placed in removal proceedings. In accordance with
section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the applicable provisions
of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, you are being released on your own
recognizance provided you comply with the following conditions.
Doc. 1-2. Section 236 of the INA corresponds to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. The conditions required
Petitioner to “report for any hearing or interview as directed by [DHS] or the Executive Office for
Immigration Review”; “surrender for removal from the United States if so ordered”; report in
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person to a deportation officer; refrain from changing her residence without written permission
from DHS; refrain from violating any laws or ordinances; and assist DHS in obtaining any
necessary travel documents. Id.
After her release, Petitioner remained at liberty for nearly two years while her removal
proceedings were pending. Doc. 1 at 3-4. Regarding her immigration check-ins while on release,
her Form I-213 states:
On January 15, 2025, [Petitioner] reported to ICE/ERO Grand Forks, North Dakota
as instructed . . . [Petitioner] was instructed to report again to ICE/ERO Grand
Forks, North Dakota on February 03, 2025. [Petitioner] failed to report and is not
in compliance with her conditions of release from immigration custody.
Doc. 1-5. The Form I-213 states she has no criminal history. Id.
On February 20, 2026, Border Patrol Agents stopped Petitioner’s vehicle in East Grand
Forks, Minnesota. Doc. 1 at 4. She was re-detained and transported to the Grand Forks County
Correctional Center in Grand Forks, North Dakota. Id. On March 11, 2026, Petitioner appeared
before an immigration judge for a custody redetermination hearing. Id. At the hearing, Petitioner
stated she believed she complied with her reporting requirements “because she went twice and was
not given a new appointment on the sign-in sheet after her second visit.” Id. The immigration judge
did not resolve that dispute. Instead, the judge denied release because “[r]espondent is subject to
Matter of Q Li, 29 I&N Dec.66 (BIA 2025) and is thus ineligible for release on bond.” Doc. 1-4
at 2. Since then, Petitioner has remained in custody.1
Petitioner filed this Petition on March 20, 2026. Doc. 1. She asserts her detention is
unlawful because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration
1 Respondents note that Petitioner has since been “transferred to Kandiyohi Co. Jail in Willmar,
MN for operational reasons relating to facility capacity.” Doc. 5 at 3-4. But Respondents “do not
intend to contest this Court’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 jurisdiction based on the transfer of Petitioner to a
different District.” Id.
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and Nationality Act. Id. at 5, 11. In addition to other forms of relief, she requests immediate release
from detention or a bond hearing. Id. at 15. Respondents oppose the Petition. Doc. 2. Petitioner
replied. Doc. 3. Respondents then moved to strike portions of Petitioner’s reply, arguing it
improperly raises new factual allegations and arguments. Doc. 5. Petitioner opposes the motion to
strike. Doc. 6. Respondents replied (Doc. 7) and Petitioner filed a sur-reply (Doc. 8-1).
Meanwhile, on April 27, 2026, a merits hearing was held on Petitioner’s removal
proceedings. Doc. 6 at 1. The immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed. Id. at 4. Petitioner
appealed the immigration judge’s decision. Doc. 6-1. The appeal remains pending. Doc. 6 at 2.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Motion to Strike
The Court first addresses Respondents motion to strike “new factual allegations and
arguments improperly raised by [Petitioner] on reply.” Doc. 5 at 1. Respondents seek “to have
stricken Petitioner’s allegations, arguments, and the exhibit . . . relating to II.C of the Reply,
‘Petitioner’s Status as a Crime Victim with PTSD Reinforces the Constitutional Need for an
Individualized Determination.’” Id. Petitioner argues the contested allegations are “responsive to
specific arguments the [Respondents] advanced” and the evidence could not have been included
with the Petition. Doc. 6 at 1. There is further argument contained in Respondents’ reply to the
motion to strike (Doc. 7) and Petitioner’s sur-reply (Doc. 8-1). The Court finds that the motion to
strike is moot. As is described below, the Court grants Petitioner’s habeas claim independent of
arguments and evidence about Petitioner’s psychological evaluation, her “Status as a Crime
Victim,” or the possibility of a U-Visa.
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B. 	Due Process
A district court may provide habeas relief to a person detained in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). That authority includes
jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges to immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 687 (2001). The burden is on Petitioner to prove illegal detention. 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941). Petitioner’s arguments raise two
questions: whether she is entitled to a bond hearing on either statutory or constitutional grounds.
Because the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention violates her right to procedural due process, it
need not address Petitioner’s statutory claim.2
Petitioner argues that Respondents violated her due process rights when they re-detained
her nearly two years after releasing her on her own recognizance “without any neutral adjudicator
ever making an individualized finding that her detention is necessary.” Doc. 1 at 11. She contends
that the immigration judge “denied bond on the sole basis of a categorical legal conclusion that
Matter of Q. Li rendered her ineligible for release.” Id. Respondents counter that because Petitioner
“is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)” and the statute does not provide for a bond
hearing, that she cannot succeed on her claim that her detention violates the Due Process Clause.
Doc. 2 at 11. The Court disagrees. Assuming that § 1225(b)(2) properly applies to Petitioner,3 the
provision is unconstitutional as applied to her.
2 The Court agrees with Respondents that Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026), is a
binding decision on this Court. See Doc. 2 at 8-10. However, it does not mandate a decision in
favor of Respondents here. Avila addressed the statutory interpretation question, not the question
of whether mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) may violate a noncitizen’s due process rights.
3 Respondents treat Avila as foreclosing Petitioner’s statutory claim. But there are factual
differences between Petitioner’s claim and Avila, namely, that Petitioner was apprehended at the
border and released under INA § 236, whereas the Avila petitioner entered the country without
inspection and was detained by DHS for the first time in late 2025. The Court finds that Petitioner’s
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To support their argument that Petitioner, as an “applicant for admission,” cannot be
entitled to any process beyond that which § 1225(b)(2) provides, Respondents rely on Department
of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020). Id. But Thuraissigiam considered
whether a noncitizen detained just inside the border, and continuously detained thereafter, had a
due process right to obtain habeas review of his asylum claim; it did not address a due process
challenge to re-detention following a lengthy period of release in the United States. Although the
political branches enjoy nearly plenary authority to set the procedures for “determining whether
an alien should be admitted” when “at the threshold of initial entry,” id. at 107, 139, it has long
been recognized that those who have crossed that threshold have greater constitutional protections.
See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693-94 (collecting cases). Petitioner—who remained on release in the
United States for nearly two years—has greater due process protections than those initially arriving
in the United States. Thuraissigiam does not preclude Petitioner’s due process claim. The Court
now turns to the merits of Petitioner’s procedural due process claim.
The Due Process clause applies to aliens within the United States “whether their presence
here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. To determine
whether a civil detention violates a detainee’s due process rights, courts apply the test in Mathews
v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Courts consider the following factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Id. at 335.
detention is unlawful on constitutional grounds and assumes without deciding that Petitioner falls
within the category of noncitizens who are subject to § 1225(b)(2)’s detention regime under Avila.
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Respondents argue a Mathews analysis is not applicable here because in Banyee v. Garland
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals “expressly rejected the type of Mathews balancing test
Petitioner now proposes.” Doc. 2 at 13 (citing Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928 (8th Cir. 2024)).
In that case, the Eighth Circuit pointed to Supreme Court authority in Demore v. Kim and
Zadvydas, finding they “leave no room for a multi-factor ‘reasonableness’ test.” Banyee, 115 F.4th
at 933.
The Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument. Banyee analyzed the detention of a
noncitizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) who was convicted of “theft, lying to the police . . . possessing
marijuana and drug paraphernalia . . . [and] robbery with a dangerous weapon”. Id. at 930. Demore
v. Kim similarly analyzed the detention of a noncitizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) with a criminal
record involving theft and first-degree burglary. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). These
authorities are distinguishable from Petitioner’s case.4 Besides the detention being based on a
different statutory section, the respondents in those cases demonstrated the petitioners were a
danger or flight risk based on their criminal convictions. As the following Mathews analysis will
reveal, that is not the case here.
The first Mathews factor requires consideration of the private interest affected by the
official action. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. “Freedom of imprisonment—from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty clause that [the Due
Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,
4 Some courts disagree and hold that a Mathews analysis is unwarranted in cases like Petitioner’s.
Compare Mejia v. Gardner, No. C26-64-LTS-MAR, 2026 WL 1557466, at *3 (N.D. Iowa June 2,
2026) (declining to apply Mathews factors), and Leiva v. Berg, No. 4:26-cv-3023, 2026 WL
948430, at *4 (same) with Milton A. v. Brott, No. 26-cv-2580, 2026 BL 197185, at *3-4 (D. Minn.
May 28, 2026) (applying Mathews factors), and Abbas v. Schneider, No. 26-cv-132, 2026 WL
1079292, at *7 (same). The proper framework for evaluating Petitioner’s claim is not well settled.
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80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”). Petitioner has resided in the United
States for nearly two years. Doc. 1 at 4. She has complied with the law. Id. at 3. The Court finds
that Petitioner has a strong liberty interest in her freedom from detention. See Lopez Miranda v.
Flores, No. 25-cv-584, 2025 WL 3901908, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2025) (“[N]oncitizens acquire
a protectable liberty interest when they spend years establishing a life in the interior of the United
States, regardless of their citizenship status.”).
Petitioner’s liberty interest is further strengthened by the fact that, in 2024, Respondents
released her from detention on her own recognizance. Doc. 1 at 3. “As ICE was not authorized to
release [Petitioner] if [she] was a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court must infer
from [the] release that ICE determined [she] was neither.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025,
1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025). Respondents appear to contend there are changed circumstances for
Petitioner’s re-detention, namely that she “failed to report to ICE/ERO in Grand Forks, ND on
February 3, 2025, as directed” and was thus in violation of her terms of release. Doc. 2 at 8. But
the judge at Petitioner’s bond hearing did not determine she was a danger or flight risk based on
the facts Respondents allege. Instead, the judge denied bond because Petitioner was “subject to
Matter of Q Li, 29 I&N Dec.66 (BIA 2025) and is thus ineligible for release . . . .” Doc. 1-4. See
Alvarez-Rico v. Noem, 4:26-cv-00729, 2026 WL 522322, at *3, 5-6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026)
(finding that re-detention of a noncitizen who was released on his own recognizance violated due
process when the custody redetermination hearing did not deny bond on the merits but instead
denied bond under Matter of Q. Li); Shilu v. Warden, No. 3:26-cv-01275-rbm-bjw, 2026 WL
926900, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. April 3, 2026) (same). The first Mathews factor weighs in Petitioner’s
favor.
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The second Mathews factor asks whether the challenged procedure creates a risk of
erroneous deprivation of individuals’ private rights and the degree to which alternative procedures
could ameliorate these risks. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. This factor also weighs in favor of
Petitioner. Civil immigration detention must be “nonpunitive in purpose” and bear a “reasonable
relation” to the authorized statutory purposes of preventing flight and danger to the community.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Respondents previously determined that Petitioner did not pose a
threat, releasing her into the United States on her own recognizance under INA § 236. Absent a
pre-detention hearing to determine—as Respondents appear to allege—that her circumstances
have changed such that she is now a danger or flight risk when Respondents previously determined
she was neither, the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest is obvious.
Respondents’ contention that Petitioner has already been afforded a custody redetermination
hearing is unpersuasive. As described above, no adjudicator determined whether Petitioner is a
danger to the community or a flight risk. Instead, the judge categorically denied bond based on
“Matter of Q Li, 29 I&N Dec.66 (BIA 2025).” Doc. 1-4 at 2.
To counter the risk of erroneous deprivation, a constitutionally adequate bond hearing is
appropriate. See Muse v. Mullin, No. 3:26-cv-4024-CJW, 2026 WL 1008532, at *5 (N.D. Iowa
April 14, 2026) (“Thus, the Court finds that respondents must provide petitioner with a bond
hearing. At the hearing, the government will bear the burden to demonstrate dangerousness or
flight risk.”) (citations omitted); Ramirez-Mendez v. Olson, No. 26-17-DLB, 2026 WL 907576, at
*4 (E.D. Ky. April 2, 2026) (holding that a custody redetermination hearing countered the risk of
erroneous deprivation of petitioner’s rights); Alvarez-Rico v. Noem, No. 4:26-cv-729, 2026 WL
522322, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026) (“Absent some sort of pre-detention hearing to determine
whether his circumstances have changed such that he now presents a danger or a flight risk when
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the government previously determined that he presented neither, the risk of erroneous deprivation
of [the petitioner’s] liberty interest is obvious.”). At the hearing, Respondents must prove by clear
and 	convincing 	evidence 	that 	Petitioner’s 	continued 	detention 	is 	warranted 	based 	on
dangerousness or flight risk. See Muse, 2026 WL 1008532, at *5; Dambreville v. Noem, No. 4:25-
cv-00514-SMR-SBJ, 2026 WL 602174, at *5 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 12, 2026) (“The Court therefore
orders that at the bond hearing, the Government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
Petitioner’s continued detention is warranted based on flight risk or dangerousness. This allocation
reflects settled practice in redetention cases.”). This is so because “[w]hen the government seeks
to continue detaining someone it previously released, fairness demands that the [g]overnment
shoulder the burden of justifying that detention.” Id.
Third, the Court recognizes that Respondents have a legitimate interest in ensuring that
noncitizens appear for removal hearings and do not pose a danger to the community. But here,
Respondents’ interest in detaining Petitioner is low because there has been no determination that
Petitioner is a threat to the community or is unlike to appear. See Alvarez-Rico, No. 4:26-cv-729,
2026 WL 522322, at *6 (granting habeas petition in part because there was no determination made
that petitioner was a danger or flight risk). Respondents previously determined Petitioner was not
a danger when they granted her parole. Although they may allege grounds for re-detaining her, a
constitutionally adequate bond hearing will allow Respondents to plead their case. Azalyar v.
Raycraft, 814 F. Supp. 3d 926, 935 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 2, 2026) (holding that a bond hearing does not
impede respondents’ interests). Nor is there a risk that requiring a bond hearing will impose more
than a minimal cost. Id. (citing Singh v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-801, 2025 WL 1918679, at *8 (E.D.
Cal. July 11, 2025)). More, that Petitioner’s alleged violation—a missed appointment on February
3, 2025—occurred more than a year before it was acted upon on February 20, 2026, undermines
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any suggestion that Respondents’ interests must be satisfied immediately or that the cost of
procedural safeguards would be insurmountable. The Court concludes that Respondents’ interests
do not outweigh Petitioner’s liberty interest, especially when a mechanism exists to safeguard due
process.
III. 	CONCLUSION
The Court has reviewed the record, the parties’ filings, and the relevant case law.
Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Respondents are
ENJOINED from detaining Petitioner unless she is provided with a bond hearing within seven
calendar days of the filing date of this Order. At the bond hearing, Respondents must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner’s continued detention is warranted based on flight
risk or dangerousness. Respondents’ motion to strike (Doc. 5) is MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 3rd day of August, 2026.
/s/ Peter D. Welte
Peter D. Welte, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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