USA v. Dominguez et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ALFREDO VENANCIO DOMINGUEZ,
Defendants.
4:24CR3087
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Alfredo Venancio Dominguez’s
motion to suppress. Filing No. 89. Dominguez seeks to suppress evidence seized
by law enforcement from a black sling bag on July 15, 2024. Filing No. 90. He
argues the search of this bag violated his Fourth Amendment rights because: (1)
there was not probable cause to arrest him and, as such, the search could not
have been a search incident to arrest and (2) any search of the bag due to officer
safety concerns is without merit. The Court held a hearing on the pending motion
on October 1, 2025. Filing No. 122. It ordered a transcript of the hearing and
deemed the matter submitted upon receipt of the transcript. A transcript of the
proceedings has been filed, Filing No. 131, and the motion is now ripe for
disposition.
Additionally before the Court is Defendant’s second motion to suppress.
Filing No. 128. In this motion, Dominguez seeks to suppress evidence derived or
resulting from the use of a GPS tracking device on his vehicle between May 15,
2024 and June 11, 2024. Filing No. 128. Defendant’s motion can be decided based
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on the evidence submitted in conjunction with the motion and will be denied without
hearing.1
For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends
Defendant’s motions to suppress be denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
After hearing the testimony of the witnesses and reviewing the exhibits
received at the motion to suppress hearing, the undersigned finds the following
facts are credible.
In the summer of 2024, officers with the Lincoln Lancaster County Narcotics
Task Force (“Narcotics Task Force”) were investigating Dominguez’s co-defendant
Nathaniel Stephenson. Filing No. 131 at 32. As part of that investigation, on May
7, 2024, Investigators Barksdale, Strode, and Masek met with a confidential
informant (CI #1) of proven reliability. Filing No. 123, Exhibit 5. CI #1 had
conducted two previous controlled substance purchases from two separate
individuals. CI #1 identified Stephenson as a large source for methamphetamine.
At Investigator Masek’s direction, CI #1 contacted Stephenson via Facebook
Messenger. Stephenson agreed to sell the CI methamphetamine. Filing No. 123,
Exhibit 5.
Also on May 7, 2024, Investigators with the Narcotics Task Force were
conducting surveillance on Stephenson’s known residence. During this
surveillance, investigators observed a cream Cadillac CTS with no license plates
arrive and park in a parking lot to the north of Stephenson’s residence.
1 Defendant’s motion does not request a hearing and the government argues against
holding a hearing. Additionally, the Court finds an evidentiary hearing is not necessary
given the issues raised are limited and the evidence submitted is sufficient to determine
that suppression is improper. See United States v. Gjergji, No. 8:24CR109, 2025 WL
2306509, at *1 (D. Neb. May 23, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No.
8:24CR109, 2025 WL 1823112 (D. Neb. July 2, 2025) (discussing the standards for
determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required).
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Investigators were aware that Dominguez owned a cream 2003 Cadillac CTS.
Investigators then saw the Cadillac leave the parking lot and drive to a Walgreens
where Investigators Hyland and Wiarda observed Stephenson exit the front
passenger seat of the Cadillac and engage in a hand-to-hand transaction with
another individual who was a passenger of a gray Ford Fusion. The driver of the
gray Ford Fusion was later contacted and became a confidential informant (CI #2).
Filing No. 123, Exhibit 5. CI #2 confirmed that two days prior (on May 7, 2024) he
drove to Walgreens where the passenger in his car purchased methamphetamine
from an individual that was consistent with the physical description of Stephenson.
After the hand-to-hand transaction, and still on May 7, Investigators Hyland
and Wiarda saw Stephenson get back into the front passenger seat of the Cadillac
and leave. Filing No. 123, Exhibit 5. The Cadillac drove back to the parking lot
north of Stephenson’s residence. Investigators observed Stephenson exit the
vehicle and walk towards his residence. A short time later, investigators saw
Stephenson walking back to the Cadillac from the direction of his residence and
return to the front passenger side of the Cadillac. The Cadillac then drove to a
Burger King where investigators observed an unknown male exit the Burger King
and enter the back driver’s side seat of the Cadillac. The same male subsequently
exited the Cadillac and went back to the Burger King. While at the Burger King,
Investigators were able to positively identify Dominguez as the driver of the
Cadillac. Filing No. 123, Exhibit 5.
Under law enforcement supervision, CI #1 performed a controlled purchase
from Stephenson while still at the Burger King. Filing No. 123, Exhibit 5.
Investigators Wiarda and Hyland observed CI #1 get into Dominguez’s vehicle, the
cream Cadillac, and return with methamphetamine he had purchased with
controlled buy money. CI #1 confirmed Stephenson provided the
methamphetamine and Dominguez was driving the Cadillac. The substance
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pretested positive for the presence of amphetamine/methamphetamine and
weighed 57.1 grams. Filing No. 123, Exhibit 5.
Law enforcement conducted another controlled purchase of
methamphetamine from Stephenson on May 9, 2024. Shortly before this controlled
purchase Dominguez’s vehicle was again seen at Stephenson’s residence.
Officers observed the controlled purchase between CI#1 and Stephenson at
Casey’s General Store in a vehicle other than Dominguez’s. While the purchase
did not occur in Dominguez’s car, CI #1 confirmed Dominguez was in the
passenger seat of the vehicle during the purchase of methamphetamine. Filing No.
123, Exhibit 5.
On June 17, 2024, Narcotics Task Force officers were conducting
surveillance on Stephenson’s residence and observed Dominguez outside the
house in or around his Cadillac. Filing No. 131 at 36. Investigators observed
another car arrive at the residence at which time Dominguez engaged in behavior
consistent with a drug transaction. Id. Specifically, Dominguez and the unknown
party who arrived at the house exchanged an unknown item hand-to-hand and the
unknown party subsequently left the residence. During this same surveillance,
officers observed Stephenson exit the residence and mingle with Dominguez.
Later this same day, Stephenson sold narcotics to an undercover officer. Id. at 37.
On July 15, 2024, the date of Dominguez’s arrest, an undercover officer
arranged to purchase methamphetamine from Stephenson at a Pizza Hut. Filing
No. 123, Exhibit 5. Stephenson agreed to sell Investigator Denzin ¼ pound of
methamphetamine for $1,000. Investigator Masek observed Stephenson and
Dominguez arrive at gas pumps located near Russ’s Market (west of and
connected to the Pizza Hut) and meet with two individuals other than Investigator
Denzin. Filing No. 123, Exhibit 5. During this meet-up, Investigator Tenney
observed Dominguez wearing a black shoulder bag. When Investigators
approached Dominguez and the other individuals, Officer Tenney observed
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Dominguez remove the bag and place it near the front of the vehicle prior to getting
on the ground. Filing No. 123, Exhibit 5.
At the October 1, 2025 hearing, Dominguez testified he was the passenger
of a vehicle driven by Stephenson on July 15, 2024 when it arrived at a gas station
outside of Russ’s Market. Filing No. 131 at 7. Dominguez exited the vehicle with a
black sling over his shoulder. Id. at 12. Shortly after exiting the vehicle, various
unmarked police vehicles pull up to the gas station blocking in Stephenson’s car,
officers exited their vehicles with weapons drawn and ordered everyone to get on
the ground. Filing No. 123, Exhibit 3 (Barksdale BWC); Filing No. 131 at 8.
Dominguez testified he immediately recognized the individuals to be police
officers. Filing No. 131 at 9. Officers repeatedly yelled at the individuals to “get on
the ground,” “don’t move,” “put your hands out,” “don’t reach.” Filing No. 123,
Exhibit 3 (Barksdale BWC). Dominguez testified during this time he took the sling
bag off his body, extended his arms, and placed the bag on the ground. Filing No.
131 at 10. He further explained he did not want officers to believe he was reaching
in the bag and was “not trying to get shot by police.” Filing No. 131 at 9-10.
Dominguez testified he placed the bag near the front bumper of the car “a safe
distance away.” Filing No. 131 at 17. He then got on the ground. Id.
Though difficult to see from the gas station video footage, Dominguez’s
testimony is largely corroborated by such footage. Filing No. 123, Exhibit 4 at 3:10-
3:50. As law enforcement vehicles approach, Dominguez becomes aware of their
presence and can be seen removing something from his person. Filing No. 123,
Exhibit 4 at 3:20. While officers are handcuffing the individuals at the scene, a law
enforcement officer reaches straight down in front of the vehicle, picks up the bag,
and places it on the hood of the vehicle. Filing No. 123, Exhibit 4 at 3:50; Filing No.
123, Exhibit 2 (Eirich BWC) at 2:25. Investigator Masek testified that the bag was
within arm’s length of both Dominguez and Stephenson at the time the officer
moved the bag. Filing No. 131 at 39. The time between officers’ arrival on scene
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and Dominguez laying on the ground is approximately 10 seconds. Filing No. 123,
Exhibit 2 (Eirich BWC) at 1:48-1:58.
While on the scene, Officer Tenney indicates that the bag is Dominguez’s
and states “he threw it when we walked up.” Filing No. 123, Exhibit 2 (Tenney
BWC) at 3:14. He later states “I’m 99% certain it was Alfredo [Dominguez]” and
“I’m pretty sure it was Alfredo [Dominguez] . . . I want to check video first.” Filing
No. 123, Exhibit 2 (Tenney BWC) at 12:20-12:40. The affidavit authored by
Investigator Masek states that Officer Tenney observed Dominguez remove the
bag and place it near the front of the vehicle prior to getting on the ground. Filing
No. 123, Exhibit 5.
While on the scene, approximately one minute after officers’ arrival,
Investigator Eirich searched the black sling bag and located a Glock 17 9mm
handgun. Filing No. 123, Exhibit 5. Dominguez’s ID card, multiple bank cards, two
iPhones, and other personal items were also located in the bag. Id. Filing No. 123,
Exhibit 2 (Eirich BWC) at 2:55-3:30.
After being handcuffed and placed in the back of a police cruiser,
Dominguez asked for the contents of his bag, including his IDs and phone. Filing
No. 123, Exhibit 3 (Stream 0) at 2:35; Filing No. 131 at 11.
ANALYSIS
1) Motion to Suppress – Filing No. 89
Defendant argues the evidence obtained through the search of the bag
should be suppressed because the search was done without a warrant and there
was no applicable exception to the warrant requirement. Specifically, Defendant
contends his arrest was not supported by probable cause and, at the time of the
search, Dominguez was already in custody with his hands cuffed behind him and
laying face down on the pavement. Therefore, he contends, the search could not
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have been for officer safety, the underlying basis for a search incident to arrest.
Filing No. 90 at 3-4.
In contrast, the Government argues Dominguez has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the bag and, thus, there is no Fourth Amendment violation
because he abandoned the bag when officers arrived on scene. Filing No. 96 at 8;
Filing No. 131 at 3-4, 26-27. They further argue, even if Dominguez did not
abandon the bag, exigent circumstances permitted the search, the search was
lawful incident to Dominguez’s arrest, and the inevitable discovery doctrine
applies. Filing No. 96.
a) Abandonment
A warrantless search of abandoned property does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, as any expectation of privacy in the item searched is forfeited upon
its abandonment.2 United States v. Tugwell, 125 F.3d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1997).
Whether property has been abandoned “is determined on the basis of the objective
facts available to the investigating officers, not on the basis of the owner's
subjective intent.” James, 534 F.3d at 873; United States v. Nowak, 825 F.3d 946,
948 (8th Cir. 2016). The Court considers both whether the defendant physically
relinquished his property and whether he denied ownership of it. Nowak, 825 F.3d
at 948; United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 2006). A verbal
denial of ownership is not necessary for a finding of abandonment and the
conclusion is based on the totality of the circumstances. Nowak, 25 F.3d at 978.
2 While a defendant seeking the suppression of evidence bears the burden of proving he
had a reasonable expectation of privacy, United States v. Hayes, 120 F.3d 739, 743 (8th
Cir.1997), the Eighth Circuit has indicated that the government bears the burden of
establishing property has been abandoned. U.S. v. James, 353 F.3d 606, 616 (8th Cir.
2003); United States v. Voice, 622 F.3d 870, 877 n. 3 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting the
government presented no evidence to support abandonment); see also, United States v.
Fife, 356 F. Supp. 3d 790, 801 (N.D. Iowa 2019); United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449,
456 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Denny, 441 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Cofield, 272 F.3d 1303, 1306 (11th. Cir. 2001).
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Here, the Court finds Dominguez did not abandon the bag. While
Dominguez removed the bag from his person without being specifically instructed
to do so by law enforcement, the placement of the bag and statements from officers
do not indicate the bag was abandoned. As to physical relinquishment, Dominguez
did not move away from the bag a significant amount as it was still within arm’s
reach of Dominguez at the time it was placed on the car by officers. This is clearly
distinguishable from both cases relied upon by the Government wherein the
defendant fled the scene leaving their belongings behind. See United States v
Crumble, 878 F.3d 656 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Nowak, 825 F.3d 946 (8th
Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 494 (8th Cir.2006)
(defendant relinquished control and therefore abandoned his expectation of
privacy when he discarded a rifle and magazine while being chased by police);
U.S. v. Liu, 180 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 1999) (defendant abandoned his luggage when
he walked off the train leaving his luggage and subsequently fled police); United
States v. Segars, 31 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir.1994) (defendant abandoned his
expectation of privacy when he “dropped [a] package, backed away from the
apartment door, and attempted to flee” when officers confronted him in an
apartment building); United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1223 (8th Cir.1992)
(defendant abandoned shopping bag by dropping it in parking lot with police in hot
pursuit). Here, Dominguez did not move away from his bag after placing it on the
ground nor did he leave the premises or flee police. Under the circumstances, the
Court does not find that Dominguez physically relinquished it for the purposes of
abandonment.
The Government next argues that Dominguez did not object to the search
of the sling bag or make any claim until after he was already aware the gun was
found inside. Filing No. 96 at 9. But officers searched the bag while Dominguez
was face down on the ground. It is not clear he was even aware the search was
taking place. Moreover, the bag was searched approximately one minute after
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officers arrived on scene. See Filing No. 123, Exhibit 2 (Eirich BWC) at 1:57-3:00.
Based on the evidence submitted, there were no statements or acts done by
Dominguez prior to the search which would lead officers to believe he was denying
ownership of the property.3
Further, other evidence is consistent with the bag being placed on the
ground rather than thrown or discarded. See Filing No. 123, Exhibit 5 at 5 (“Tenney
observed Dominguez remove the bag and place it near the front of the vehicle”);
Filing No. 123, Exhibit 2 (Eirich BWC) at 2:25 (showing location of the bag); Filing
No. 131 at 39 (testimony that bag was within arm’s reach). In fact, officers
repeatedly attributed the bag to Dominguez and there was no indication they
believe Dominguez abandoned it. While Officer Tenney can be heard saying
Dominguez “threw” the bag when officers approached, this statement was made
after the search of the bag had already begun. Filing No. 123, Exhibit 2 (Tenney
BWC) at 2:50-3:20
The objective facts available to officers at the time the bag was searched
was that Dominguez placed the bag on the ground within arm’s reach when officers
approached with their guns drawn. In such circumstances, the Court finds the
property was not abandoned for Fourth Amendment purposes.
As the Court finds Dominguez had an expectation of privacy in the bag
searched, the Court next considers whether an exception to the warrant
requirement applies.
b) Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
Warrantless searches, meaning searches conducted “without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment –
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”
3 Dominguez claimed ownership of the bag after the search when he asked for his items
to be returned to him. As the Court considers whether the bag was abandoned at the time
of the search, these statements do not impact the Court’s decision.
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Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quotation omitted). “In the case of a
warrantless search, the government bears the burden of establishing an exception
to the warrant requirement.” United States v. Kennedy, 427 F.3d 1136, 1140 (8th
Cir. 2005). Here, the Government argues exigent circumstances permitted the
search, the search was lawful incident to Dominguez’s arrest, and the inevitable
discovery doctrine applies. Because the Court finds the search incident to arrest
exception applies, the Court declines to reach the governments other arguments.
i) Search Incident to Arrest
Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a
lawful arrest. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 337 (2009). Here, Defendant
contends this exception is inapplicable for two reasons: (1) there was not probable
cause to arrest him on July 15, 2024, and (2) any search of the bag due to officer
safety concerns is without merit. The Court addresses both below.
(1) Probable Cause
“Probable cause for an arrest exists when the totality of circumstances
demonstrates that the arresting officer personally knows or has been reliably
informed of sufficient facts to warrant a belief that a crime has been committed and
that the person to be arrested committed it.” United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d
765, 778 (8th Cir. 2001). “Because probable cause requires only a probability or
substantial chance of criminal activity, rather than an actual showing of criminal
activity, the police need not have amassed enough evidence to justify a conviction
prior to making a warrantless arrest.” United States v. Webster, 625 F.3d 439, 442
(8th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Winarske, 715 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir.
2013).
When determining probable cause, “[l]aw enforcement officers have
substantial latitude in interpreting and drawing inferences from factual
circumstances.” United States v. Henderson, 613 F.3d 1177, 1181 (8th Cir. 2010)
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(internal quotation omitted). “Because ‘[p]robable cause is a practical and
common-sensical standard,’ ‘an officer may draw inferences based on his own
experience’ to determine whether probable cause exists.” Soderman, 983 F.3d at
375 (alteration in original) (quoting Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d at 418). Moreover,
in determining whether probable cause exists, courts recognize that the police
possess specialized law enforcement experience and, thus, may “draw reasonable
inferences of criminal activity from circumstances which the general public may
find innocuous.” United States v. Caves, 890 F.2d 87, 94 (8th Cir. 1989) (citation
and internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Court views the totality of the
circumstances in this case through the eyes of the experienced narcotics agents
involved in his arrest. See U.S. v. Payne, 119 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 1997).
Dominguez argues investigators did not have probable cause for his arrest
because all of the drug transactions witnessed by officers were performed and/or
coordinated with Stephenson and not Dominguez. It is true that mere association
with a known or suspected criminal, or presence in that person’s automobile, does
not create probable cause to arrest. See United States v. Everroad, 704 F.2d 403,
406 (8th Cir. 1983). But Defendant was not arrested merely because he arrived at
a gas station in the car with Stephenson. Rather, investigators had been surveilling
Stephenson for multiple months and observed Dominguez and/or his known
vehicle to be present or used in furtherance of at least three known drug
transactions along with other suspicious conduct. His involvement cannot be
described as a “brief association with a suspected criminal” with “no other unlawful
or suspicious conduct” involved. See Everroad, 704 F.2d at 407.
For example, on May 7, 2024, Narcotics Task Force officers observed a
cream Cadillac CTS with no license plates, a car consistent with Dominguez’s
known vehicle, drive Stephenson to a known narcotics deal. Filing No. 123, Exhibit
5 at 2. Thereafter, NTF officers observed Dominguez’s vehicle return Stephenson
to his known residence, wait for Stephenson while he enters the house, and then
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observed Stephenson return to Dominguez’s vehicle. Officers were able to confirm
Dominguez was driving his vehicle at this time. Dominguez drove to a nearby
Burger King where officers used a confidential informant to conduct a controlled
purchase of methamphetamine. This purchase took place in Dominguez’s vehicle
and the confidential informant confirmed Dominguez was driving. Filing No. 123,
Exhibit 5 at 3. On May 9, 2024, officers arranged another methamphetamine deal
with Stephenson and a confidential informant. On this day, officers again observed
Dominguez’s vehicle park at Stephenson’s residence, wait for Stephenson to go
inside and later return, and then leave the residence with Stephenson. A short time
later Stephenson is observed walking to a Casey’s General Store where officers
again use a confidential informant to conduct a controlled purchase of
methamphetamine. While this transaction did not take place in Dominguez’s
vehicle, the confidential informant identified Dominguez as being the front
passenger of the vehicle when he purchased methamphetamine from Stephenson.
Filing No. 123, Exhibit 5 at 4. Dominguez and his vehicle were also observed at
Stephenson’s residence on June 17, 2024, at which time officers observed
Dominguez engage in behavior that, based on their training and experience, is
consistent with a hand-to-hand drug transaction. Filing No. 131 at 37. Finally, on
the date of his arrest, Dominguez arrived with Stephenson at what was planned to
be a controlled purchase of methamphetamine. Filing No. 123, Exhibit 5.
Investigators believed Dominguez had committed or was committing a drug
crime, such as conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute
controlled substances, based upon information gathered through confidential
informants, independent surveillance, Dominguez’s repeated presence and
interactions with Stephenson (a confirmed source of methamphetamine), his
driving patterns with Stephenson (which included short-term stops where drug
transactions were known to have occurred in Dominguez’s car and/or in
Dominguez’s presence), Dominguez’s conduct that was consistent with a hand-to-
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hand drug transaction, and finally, arriving with Stephenson at what was supposed
to be a controlled purchase of methamphetamine. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the Court finds there was ample probable cause to arrest
Dominguez on July 15, 2024. See U.S. v. Clark, 754 F.2d 789 (8th Cir. 1985)
(probable cause for a warrantless arrest where Defendant was present in her
husband’s car at all times before, during, and after a drug purchase and the
criminal nature of the transaction was apparent); U.S. v. Caves, 890 F.2d 87 (8th
Cir. 1989) (probable cause existed where the parties’ association was
contemporaneous with the time of the criminal activity and the activity could not
have been carried out without the defendant’s knowledge); Maryland v. Pringle,
540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003) (explaining a car passenger will often be engaged in a
common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the
fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing making it reasonable to infer a common
enterprise among them); United States v. Segars, 31 F.3d 655, 659 (8th Cir. 1994)
(probable cause for a warrantless arrest existed when suspect arrived when drug
courier was expected to arrive); United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864, (8th Cir.
2005) (finding probable cause to arrest occupant of vehicle even though no drugs
were found on occupant but drug related activity was indicated within the vehicle);
United States v. Romero, 2019 WL 6907932 (D.Minn. Dec. 19, 2019) (finding a
“common enterprise” between the vehicle’s occupants and sufficient evidence of
probable cause to support an arrest where defendant was known to law
enforcement through large-scale investigation and drove his co-defendant to
controlled purchase of methamphetamine).
(2) Officer Safety
Dominguez next argues the search incident arrest exception to the warrant
requirement does not apply because Dominguez was “in custody, face down on
the pavement, hands cuffed behind his back, with weapons drawn on him prior to
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the bag being searched,” and there were no concerns for officer safety. Filing No.
90 at 4.
A search incident to arrest may lawfully extend to “the arrestee’s person and
the area within his immediate control,” that is, “the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items.” Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted). This exception
“derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically
implicated in arrest situations.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009). Despite
Dominguez’s arguments, a bag being “beyond his reach” or officers restraining him
does not automatically render the exception inapplicable. See U.S. v. Perdoma,
621 F.3d 745, 750 (2010). Rather, the Eighth Circuit has “rejected the notion that
an officer’s exclusive control of an item necessarily removes the item from the
arrestee’s area of immediate control.” Perdoma, 621 F.3d at 750. Here, at the time
the officer placed the bag on the hood of the car, the bag was still within arm’s
reach of Dominguez. Filing No. 131 at 39. Dominguez and another individual being
detained remained within feet of the bag while officers worked to restrain, handcuff,
and pat down the suspects. Filing No. 123, Exhibit 2 (Tenney BWC) at 2:10-3:00.
Notably, the detention process is still ongoing when an officer searches the bag in
question. Id.; Filing No. 123, Exhibit 2 (Eirich BWC) at 3:00. At some point prior to
the search, an officer observes Dominguez move while on the ground and can be
heard yelling at Dominguez “Don’t fucking move.” Filing No. 123, Exhibit 2 (Eirich
BWC) at 2:25. Moreover, Investigator Masek testified that officers had information
that both Dominguez and Stephenson were gang members and “known to carry
firearms.” Filing No. 131 at 51.
Dominguez was within reach of the bag as officers worked to secure the
scene. He remained within reach of the bag during the search. Shortly before the
search, officers can be heard yelling at Dominguez, and others, to remain still
indicating officers did not have control of the scene and there remained a concern
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for officer safety. Under these circumstances, the bag was within the area of
Dominguez’s immediate control and officers were justified in searching the bag
incident to his arrest. See Perdoma, 621 F.3d at 750; United States v. Morales,
923 F.2d 621, 626–27 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Mefford, 658 F.2d 588,
591–93 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Horne, 4 F.3d 579, 586–87 (8th Cir. 1993);
see also United States v. Collier, 4:24CR3067 2025 WL 2426744 (D. Neb. August
22, 2025).
In conclusion, Dominguez’s bag was searched incident to his lawful arrest
and his motion to suppress the evidence found within it should be denied.
2) Motion to Suppress – Filing No. 128.
Dominguez next moves to suppress any evidence derived or resulting from
use of a GPS tracking device on his vehicle between May 15, 2025 and June 11,
2024. Filing No. 129. Dominguez contends that the affidavit in support of the
search warrant, Filing No. 129-1 at 6-12, lacks probable cause making the search
unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Filing No. 128.
On May 13, 2024, a search warrant was signed and issued by a District
Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska judge based on the affidavit of Investigator
Brent Masek.4 Filing No. 129-1. The warrant authorized the installation of a mobile
tracking device on Dominguez’s Cream 2003 Cadillac CTS
VIN:1G6DM57N430133856. Filing No. 129-1. This device was placed on
Dominguez’s vehicle and recorded data from May 15, 2024 to June 11, 2024. Filing
No. 129-1 at 2-3.
4 The affidavits for search warrant for both of Dominguez’s motions are signed by
Investigator Brent Masek at different points in the investigation. While the wording is not
identical, the substance of both affidavits is substantially the same. Compare Filing No.
129-1 with Filing No. 123, Exhibit 5. The Court only considers Filing No. 129-1 for
purposes of Dominguez’s second motion to suppress but will not restate the facts
contained therein.
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Placing a GPS device on a vehicle is a Fourth Amendment search “requiring
probable cause and a warrant.” United States v. Bradley, 924 F.3d 476, 480 (8th
Cir. 2019). As previously discussed, probable cause exists when, viewing the
totality of the circumstances, “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983); United States v. Reed, 921 F.3d 751, 757 (8th Cir. 2019). The court pays
“great deference to the probable cause determinations of the issuing judge or
magistrate,” in deciding “whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause existed.” United States v. Faulkner, 826 F.3d 1139,
1144 (8th Cir. 2016).
The facts presented to the issuing judge were substantially similar to those
considered in the Court’s determination that there was probable cause for
Defendant’s arrest, with the exception of the events that officers observed on June
17, 2024 and those that took place on July 15, 2024. See supra section 1(b)(i)(1).
And, based on the information provided to the issuing judge, combined with the
deference afforded to his findings, the Court finds probable cause existed to
support the issuance of the tracking warrant.
The issuing judge was presented with considerable evidence suggesting
that Dominguez and his vehicle were involved in criminal activity, including
associating with and transporting a known narcotics dealer to confirmed narcotics
sales, a controlled purchase of narcotics taking place in Dominguez’s vehicle with
him present, and another controlled purchase of narcotics taking place while
Dominguez was present in a different vehicle. See Filing No. 129-1. These facts
create a nexus between known drug activity, Dominguez, and Dominguez’s
vehicle, and the issuing judge had substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed. See cases cited supra section 1(b)(i)(1) p. 13; see also United
States v. Sanchez-Gonzalez, No. 22-CR-143 (KMM/DTS), 2023 WL 5218089 (D.
Minn. Aug. 15, 2023) (finding probable cause for tracking warrant of vehicle when
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Defendant picked up man who sold drugs to undercover officers and drove man to
second encounter that was consistent with drug dealing); United States v.
Martinez, No. CR 22-86 (PJS/BRT), 2022 WL 18051880 at *6-7 (D. Minn. Nov. 16,
2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 18011789 (D. Minn. Dec.
30, 2022) (probable cause for tracking warrant where vehicle was used by
suspects in a controlled purchase of narcotics). Having found the affidavit contains
probable cause, the motion to suppress can be denied on this basis alone.
Moreover, even if the affidavit did not support a finding of probable cause,
the evidence is still admissible. Because, as argued by the Government, the Leon5
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. Under the good-faith
exception, evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant issued by a magistrate
that is later determined to be invalid, will not be suppressed if the executing officer's
reliance upon the warrant was objectively reasonable. United States v. Proell, 485
F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2007). The “good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively
ascertainable question [of] whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have
known that the search was illegal despite the [issuing judge’s] authorization.”
United States v. Puckett, 466 F.3d 626, 630 (8th Cir.2006). The rationale for the
good-faith exception is that “no justification exists to exclude evidence ‘when an
officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge
or magistrate and acted within its scope.’” Puckett, 466 F.3d at 630 (quoting Leon,
468 U.S. at 920).
Leon identified various situations6 in which an officer’s reliance on a warrant
would be unreasonable, including when the affidavit in support of the warrant is
“so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
5 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
6 No party argues the other three circumstances in which the good faith exception is
inapplicable are at issue in this motion. Upon review, the Court finds these circumstances
are not present and suppression is not required on that basis.
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entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. Dominguez argues that is the case
here. See Filing No. 128 at 2. But, as already discussed, the affidavit in support of
the warrant did include sufficient information to establish probable cause. And even
if the evidence in support was open to doubt, it is the judge’s responsibility to
“determine whether the allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a
warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”
Ordinarily, an officer “cannot be expected to question the [judge’s] probable-cause
determination.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 921. Moreover, even if a different judge would
reach a differing conclusion as to probable cause, Investigator Masek’s reliance
on that affidavit would still be reasonable. U.S. v. Martin, 833 F.2d 752, 756 (8th
Cir. 1987) (“When judges can look at the same affidavit and come to differing
conclusions, a police officer’s reliance on that affidavit must, therefore, be
reasonable.”).
In sum, based on the totality of the circumstances,7 Investigator Masek’s
affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief
in its existence entirely unreasonable. And because it was objectively reasonable
for Investigator Masek to rely in good faith on the warrant, the Leon good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule also applies. As such, Dominguez’s motion to
suppress any evidence derived or resulting from use of a GPS tracking device on
his vehicle between May 15, 2024 and June 11, 2024, should be denied.
For the reasons stated above,
7 The Court recognizes that it may consider facts outside of the affidavit when assessing
good faith, including information known to the officer but not presented to the issuing
judge. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); United States v. Marion, 238
F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001). However, neither party requests a hearing in their briefing
and, based upon the search warrant at issue, the Court can conclude the good-faith
exception applies without looking outside the four corners of the affidavit.
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IT HEREBY IS RECOMMENDED to the Honorable Susan M. Bazis United
States District Judge, that defendant's motions to suppress, Filing Nos. 89 and
128, be denied in their entirety.
The parties are notified that failing to file an objection to this
recommendation as provided in the local rules of this court may be held to be a
waiver of any right to appeal the court’s adoption of the recommendation.
Dated this 24th day of November, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Jacqueline M. DeLuca
United States Magistrate Judge
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