Strickland-Petri v. Flaum et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
DONNA J. STRICKLAND-PETRI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARTIN JEFFREY FLAUMII, Judge; SARA
SHEFFRELD-PRICE, Magistrate; JESSICA
SPITZER, Registrar; CHRISTOPHER
TURNER, Spec. Admin.; KEITH
GANTENBEIN, Attorney; RORY FRANCIS,
Attorney; DIANNA MAYO, Fraudulent
Marriage Claims; JUDGE BABCOCK,
CLERKS OF THE COLORADO COURT OF
APPEALS, CLERK OF THE COLORADO
SUPREME COURT, ADAMS COUNTY
PROBATE COURT, ADAMS COUNTY
PROSECUTOR, WILL SMITH, JESSICA
ROMO, BEATRICE ROMO, WFG TITLE
COMPANY, CAPITAL GROUP/AMERICAN
FUNDS, MUTUAL OF OMAHA, HORACE
MANN INSURANCE, RUSHMORE LOAN
SERVICING, CREDIT UNION (UNNAMED
LENDER), SELLSTATE REALTY, REMAX
REALTY, REDPOINT CONSULTING LLC,
CASEY A. ROGERS, AMANDA PACHECO,
OFFICER BRODHEIM, ADAMS COUNTY
SHERIFF'S OFFICE, UNNAMED
WATCHDOG OFFICERS, COLORADO
STATE PATROL, COLORADO COUNTY
ASSESSOR'S OFFICE, COLORADO
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES, JOHN DOES 1-5, and JANE
DOES 1-5,
Defendants.
4:25CV3132
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a complaint, Filing No. 1, and what
the Court construed as two supplemental complaints, Filing No. 1-1; Filing No. 1-2, on
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June 17, 2025. Plaintiff subsequently filed a third supplemental complaint, Filing No. 15,
on June 23, 2025, followed by an amended complaint, Filing No. 35, on July 16, 2025.
Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on July 28, 2025. Filing No. 67.
The Court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint to determine whether
summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For purposes of this
initial review, the Court will consider the “Complaint” to include Plaintiff’s complaint, Filing
No. 1, supplemental complaints, Filing No. 1-1; Filing No. 1-2; Filing No. 15, and amended
complaint, Filing No. 35. See NECivR 15.1(b). The Court has also considered the
numerous supplemental filings Plaintiff has made in this Court, which consist of over 400
pages. Filing Nos. 5–12, 17–30, 34, 41–66.
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, a citizen of Nebraska, sues numerous Colorado state court officials,
attorneys, and other individuals or entities involved in the proceedings related to the
probate and administration of Plaintiff’s late husband’s estate in Colorado. Plaintiff was
married to Dennis Garth Petri (“Petri”) from June 29, 2003, until his death on July 3, 2023.
After Petri’s death, Plaintiff applied for an informal appointment as personal representative
of Petri’s estate, and her application was initially granted. See Filing No. 8 at 1. However,
Plaintiff alleges she was subsequently “wrongfully removed as Informal Personal
Representative of [Petri’s] estate in a Colorado court through fraud, sealed filings, and
false judicial orders,” Filing No. 35 at 2, after Defendant Dianna Mayo (“Mayo”) objected
to Plaintiff’s appointment and filed a fraudulent putative spouse claim, asserting that Mayo
should be considered Petri’s spouse for inheritance purposes. See Filing No. 1 at 4; Filing
No. 1-1 at 4; Filing No. 1-2 at 2. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief “restoring
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her standing as lawful spouse and estate representative,” Filing No. 35 at 3, and
preventing further transfers of estate assets or wrongful death payouts; a full accounting
of estate assets; “vacatur of all fraudulent court orders,” Filing No. 1-2 at 9; and
compensatory and punitive damages. See also Filing No. 1 at 5; Filing No. 1-1 at 5; Filing
No. 15 at 6.
In the multitude of documents she submitted, Plaintiff refers to Colorado Court of
Appeals case number 2024CA430, in which she “filed a timely pro se appeal in the matter
of the Estate of Dennis Garth Petri” and the court issued a final opinion on April 17, 2025.
Filing No. 12 at 5; see also Filing No. 15 at 6; Filing No. 27 at 2. The Court takes judicial
notice of the Colorado Court of Appeals’ April 17, 2025, decision in In re Estate of Petri,
No. 24CA0430, 2025 WL 1135226 (Colo. App. Apr. 17, 2025),1 and sets forth the following
from the court’s opinion as additional background:
After the decedent died without a will, Strickland, the decedent's
spouse of twenty years, applied for an informal appointment as personal
representative. Mayo objected to the appointment, claiming that she had a
common law marriage with the decedent, see § 14-2-109.5, C.R.S. 2024,
or was, in the alternative, his putative spouse, see § 14-2-111, C.R.S. 2024.
Mayo also alleged that, one day after the decedent's death, several of the
decedent's relatives forcibly entered the decedent and Mayo's house, took
his personal property, changed the locks, and threw a Fourth of July party
at the house.
1 The Court can sua sponte take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if they relate directly to the
matters at issue. Conforti v. United States, 74 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 1996).
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Given Mayo's objection and trespass allegations, the magistrate
appointed [Defendant Christopher] Turner to manage the decedent's estate
until the court ruled on Mayo's marriage claims.
After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied Mayo's common law
marriage claim, granted her putative spouse claim, and ordered that “Mayo
shall be considered the decedent's legal spouse for the purposes of
intestate distribution.” Turner remained the special administrator because
Mayo didn't seek appointment as the estate's personal representative.
. . . .
Strickland married the decedent in 2003, but they separated in 2005
when Strickland moved away from Colorado, resettled in another state, and
eventually entered into a committed relationship with another individual.
Strickland testified that she and the decedent knew about each other's
committed relationships.
Mayo testified that she and the decedent started dating and
cohabitating in 2018 and lived together in the same house most of the time.
She didn't have concerns regarding the decedent's marital status because
she believed that he had been married and divorced twice. Mayo said the
decedent proposed to her in 2020 with an engagement ring, they both wore
wedding bands, and they celebrated an anniversary.
Three disinterested witnesses testified to their belief that the
decedent and Mayo were married because the couple cohabitated, referred
to themselves as husband and wife, and wore wedding bands. In her order,
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the magistrate found these witnesses’ testimony credible and persuasive
but found the testimony of Strickland's daughter and the decedent's
stepdaughter, on which Strickland relied, not credible.
In re Estate of Petri, 2025 WL 1135226, at *1–2. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed
the state district court magistrate’s order finding Mayo a putative spouse under Colorado
law, and otherwise dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal with prejudice. Id. at *4.
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The Court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether
summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court must dismiss a
complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be dismissed.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”).
“The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim,
and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d
968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, “[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and
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pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Topchian, 760
F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s claims relate exclusively to the probate and administration of Petri’s
estate in Colorado and nearly all the Defendants named in her pleadings are either
alleged to be citizens of Colorado or have no discernible connection to the District of
Nebraska. Though Plaintiff alleges “[v]enue is proper in this district because Plaintiff
resides in Nebraska and the harm was felt here,” Filing No. 1-2 at 2, the Court concludes
venue is improper in this district but will decline to transfer this matter to the appropriate
district because Plaintiff’s claims appear to be barred by under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.
A. Venue Improper
Venue is generally governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which “govern[s] the venue of
all civil actions brought in district courts of the United States” and provides, in pertinent
part, that:
(b) Venue in general.—A civil action may be brought in—
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants
are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought
as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant
is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such
action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
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Liberally construed, Plaintiff alleges the named Defendants violated her
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, but she does not allege
facts establishing that the District of Nebraska is the proper venue. The events giving
rise to Plaintiff’s claims clearly arose in Colorado, and, of the more than thirty Defendants
named in this case, only two of them—“Nebraska Department of Social Services” and
“Mutual of Omaha”—appear to bear any association with the District of Nebraska. See
Filing No. 35. However, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for relief against either
of these Nebraska Defendants. First, the Nebraska Department of Social Services is not
a “person” capable of being sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70–71 (1989), and Plaintiff’s sole allegation against the “Department
of Social Services” appears to relate only to Defendant Colorado Department of Social
Services for failing to investigate alleged welfare fraud by Defendant Mayo. Filing No. 35
at 3; see also Filing No. 48. Additionally, the Complaint fails to state a claim against
Mutual of Omaha as Plaintiff’s allegation that “Mutual of Omaha has ignored life insurance
inquiries from Plaintiff,” Filing No. 35 at 3, does not state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, let alone a constitutional violation. As such, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims
against these two Nebraska Defendants must be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
All of the remaining Defendants are either alleged to be Colorado citizens or have
no connection with the District of Nebraska, and Plaintiff’s residence in Nebraska is not
controlling on the question of venue. Because Plaintiff’s claims arise out of events in
Colorado, the Court finds venue is not proper in this district but rather in the District of
Colorado. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406, if a plaintiff files a case in the wrong venue, the
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district court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any
district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). A district
court has the discretion to either dismiss a plaintiff’s claims or transfer the case, sua
sponte. See De La Cruz v. United States, No. 4:14CV3160, 2014 WL 4705145, at *2 (D.
Neb. Sept. 22, 2014); Camacho-Corona v. Douglas Cty. Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:12CV132,
2012 WL 3112020, at *4 (D. Neb. July 31, 2012).
Upon consideration, the Court declines to transfer this matter to the District of
Colorado and will instead dismiss this matter without prejudice. Plaintiff previously filed
a case in that court raising the same claims and issues asserted here, but her complaint
was dismissed after she failed to comply with the Court’s orders. See Strickland v. Flaum,
et al., No. 1:25-cv-1293 (D. Colo.) (Filing Nos. 7 & 8, June 3, 2025, order and judgment
dismissing case without prejudice for failure to cure deficiencies).2 The matter was
dismissed without prejudice, however, so Plaintiff is free to re-file her suit in the Colorado
federal court if she wishes to pursue her claims. The Court also declines to transfer this
matter because Plaintiff’s claims for relief appear to be barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine as explained below.
B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, with the exception of habeas corpus
petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state
court judgments and state proceedings. Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir.
2005). See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fid.
2 Indeed, one of the Defendants named in this action is Judge Babcock, see Filing No. 35 at 2, who entered
the order and judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s District of Colorado case. To the extent Plaintiff sues Judge
Babcock for his actions taken in that case, her claims fail because Judge Babcock is absolutely immune
from suit for actions taken in his judicial capacity. See Schottel v. Young, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 2012).
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Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Specifically, the doctrine “bars federal courts from hearing
cases brought by the losing parties in state court proceedings alleging ‘injury caused by
the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.’” Mosby, 418
F.3d at 931 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)).
“The basis for the Rooker/Feldman doctrine is that, other than in the context of habeas
claims, federal district courts are courts of original jurisdiction, and by statute they are
precluded from serving as appellate courts to review state court judgments, as that
appellate function is reserved to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.” Dornheim
v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2005).
In fact, federal district courts do not have jurisdiction “over challenges to state-court
decisions . . . even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was
unconstitutional.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; see also Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546,
548–49 (8th Cir. 2003) (dismissing claims under Rooker-Feldman doctrine where the
relief requested in the complaint would effectively reverse or undermine the state court
decision or void its ruling and noting that “[f]ederal district courts thus may not ‘exercise
jurisdiction over general constitutional claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with
specific claims already adjudicated in state court’” (citation omitted)). Put simply, a federal
district court does not possess authority in a civil rights case to review or alter a final
judgment of a state court judicial proceeding. See West v. Crnkovich, No. 8:12CV273,
2013 WL 2295461, at *3 (D. Neb. May 24, 2013); see also Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d
293, 297 (8th Cir. 1990) (the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine applies to Section 1983 actions
as well as claims for injunctive and declaratory relief).
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Here, Plaintiff’s requested declaratory and injunctive relief of restoring her standing
as lawful spouse and estate representative, granting her alleged share of Petri’s estate,
and preventing further transfers or payouts of estate assets, as well as the damages she
seeks, is premised on the idea that the Colorado probate and appellate courts’ decisions
granting Mayo’s putative spouse claim were erroneous and fraudulent. To grant Plaintiff
the relief she seeks would effectively reverse the Colorado state courts’ decisions or void
their rulings, and Rooker-Feldman precludes the Court from doing so. Accordingly, the
Court concludes it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims alleging harm
caused by, and seeking relief from, the state court decisions denying Plaintiff any share
of Petri’s estate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for relief against the only two Defendants
connected to Nebraska, and venue is improper in this District as to the remaining
Defendants. The Court shall dismiss this action, rather than transfer it, as Plaintiff’s claims
for relief are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Consequently, the Court will deny
all Plaintiff’s pending motions as moot.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1. This matter is dismissed without prejudice.
2. The Court will enter a separate judgment.
3. Plaintiff’s pending motions, Filing No. 3; Filing No. 4; Filing No. 36; Filing
No. 37; Filing No. 38; Filing No. 39; Filing No. 40; Filing No. 70; Filing No. 71; Filing No.
72, are denied as moot.
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Dated this 27th day of October, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
Joseph F. Bataillon
Senior United States District Judge
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