USA v. Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANGELA MICHELLE BROWN,
Defendant.
8:21CR172
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant Angela Michelle Brown’s (“Brown”)
pro se Motion for Sentence Reduction (Filing No. 47) under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A),
often referred to as compassionate release. 	See United States v. Totaro, 91 F.4th 1263,
1264 (8th Cir. 2024).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Brown was originally charged in a three-count Indictment (Filing No. 1) on
June 17, 2021. 	Count I alleged a conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute 	50 	grams 	or 	more 	of 	methamphetamine 	(actual), 	in 	violation 	of 	21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1) and 846. 	Count II charged Brown with knowingly and
intentionally possessing with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of methamphetamine
(actual), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1). 	Count III charged Brown with
knowingly using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to and knowingly possessing
such firearm in furtherance of drug-trafficking crimes described in Counts I and II of the
Indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
On December 20, 2021, Brown pleaded guilty to Counts I and III of the Indictment
under a written plea agreement. On March 18, 2022,1 Brown was sentenced to a term of
1 Count II was later dismissed on motion of the government, consistent with the
written plea agreement.
8:21-cr-00172-RFR-MDN Doc # 59 Filed: 03/17/26 Page 1 of 6 - Page ID #
<pageID>

2
120 months on Count I and 60 months on Count III, to be served consecutively to the
sentence imposed on Count I, for a total of 180 months.2 	Brown received a supervised
release term of 5 years on each of Counts I and III, to be served concurrently. Brown did
not appeal her conviction or sentence.
On 	March 1, 	2024, 	Brown 	filed 	her 	motion 	for 	sentence 	reduction 	under
Amendment 821 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G. or “Guidelines”).
That motion was denied (Filing No. 43). 	Brown then filed her first motion under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) seeking compassionate release (Filing No. 45). That motion was denied
on September 23, 2024 (Filing No. 46), because Brown failed to demonstrate that she had
met the statutory prerequisites for judicial review.
On November 10, 2025, the current motion (Filing No. 47) was filed. 	Upon the
filing of that motion, the Court directed the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services Office to
investigate Brown’s request and file a report upon completion of that investigation. 	In
addition, the Court appointed the Federal Public Defender for the District of Nebraska to
represent Brown to determine whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce
her 	term 	of 	imprisonment” 	existed 	(Filing 	No. 	48). 	The 	Compassionate 	Release
Investigation Report was filed on January 12, 2026 (Filing No. 50) (including the
voluminous medical records submitted as part of the report), and the Court has reviewed
the original pro se motion (Filing No. 47) as well as briefing both from court-appointed
counsel (Filing No. 54) and from the United States Attorney’s Office (Filing No. 57). The
matter is now ripe for review.
II. 	DISCUSSION
As amended by the First Step Act, § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) authorizes Brown to ask the
Court to “reduce [her] term of imprisonment for internal “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” 30 days after the warden of the facility where the defendant is incarcerated
2 The consecutive sentences on Counts I and III were both mandatory-minimum
sentences (10 years to life on Count I, and 5 years on Count III).
8:21-cr-00172-RFR-MDN Doc # 59 Filed: 03/17/26 Page 2 of 6 - Page ID #
<pageID>

3
receives a request for relief by the defendant. See United States v. Sims, 87 F.4th 917, 919
(8th Cir. 2023) (noting a district court has discretion to “grant or deny relief” when those
statutory requirements are met), United States v. Stogsdill, 2026 WL 395283 at *1
(E.D. Mo., Febr. 12, 2026).
Brown 	provides 	evidence 	that 	she 	has 	properly 	presented 	her 	request 	for
compassionate release to the warden of her facility and that the request was denied. The
Court will therefore proceed to the merits of the motion.
Brown, who is fifty years old, claims her life is endangered by her continued
incarceration. 	She claims, and no one disagrees, that she suffers from “a host of chronic
medical conditions that impact her heart, lungs and legs” for which she is regularly treated
or even hospitalized. 	Brown is incarcerated in a Federal Medical Facility (“FMC
Carswell”), where she receives ongoing medical care, both within that facility, and when
necessary, in nearby hospitals.
In evaluating her request for compassionate release, the Court considers the
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); and
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a). The Court has done so here.
The United States Sentencing Commission has provided guidance (as Congress has
directed) on what the Court should consider in ruling on a compassionate-release request.
Extraordinary and compelling reasons under the Guidelines are defined at § 1B1.13:
(b) Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons.—Extraordinary and compelling reasons
exist under any of the following circumstances or a combination thereof:
(1) Medical Circumstances of the Defendant.—
(A) 	The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and
advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life
expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not
required. Examples include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia.
8:21-cr-00172-RFR-MDN Doc # 59 Filed: 03/17/26 Page 3 of 6 - Page ID #
<pageID>

4
(B) 	The defendant is—
(i) 	suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,
(ii) 	suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or
(iii) 	experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the
aging process,
that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-
care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or
she is not expected to recover.
(C) The defendant is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term
or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which
the defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.
(D) The defendant presents the following circumstances—
(i) 	the 	defendant 	is 	housed 	at 	a 	correctional 	facility 	affected 	or
at imminent risk of being affected by (I) an ongoing outbreak of
infectious 	disease, 	or 	(II) 	an 	ongoing 	public 	health 	emergency
declared by the appropriate federal, state, or local authority;
(ii) due to personal health risk factors and custodial status, the defendant
is at increased risk of suffering severe medical complications or death
as a result of exposure to the ongoing outbreak of infectious disease
or the ongoing public health emergency described in clause (i); and
(iii) such risk cannot be adequately mitigated in a timely manner.
Brown is not suffering from a terminal illness as that term is defined under
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(A). Her situation is more properly evaluated under § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B), as
she is certainly suffering a number of serious physical conditions. 	That much is not
disputed. 	However, there is no evidence that those “substantially diminish the ability of
the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and
from which he or she is not expected to recover.” Id.
The volume of medical records detail her many medical issues and support that she
frequently needs medical intervention “within the federal medical facility and in nearby
8:21-cr-00172-RFR-MDN Doc # 59 Filed: 03/17/26 Page 4 of 6 - Page ID #
<pageID>

5
hospitals.” However, those same records establish that Brown is receiving the necessary
and adequate medical care. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C).
Brown then generally argues that she is in danger of being exposed to “influenza,
COVID-19, 	measles, 	or 	some 	other 	respiratory 	virus,” 	seeking 	relief 	under
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(D). 	While Brown may be more susceptible to complications due to a
respiratory ailment contracted at the BOP facility, there is no evidence that the risk of
exposure is higher at FMC Carswell than in the general public. 	Moreover, there is no
current evidence of an “ongoing outbreak of infectious disease” or a “declared ongoing
health emergency.”
Another factor to be considered is what would happen if Brown were to be released,
a so-called “release plan.” 	A review of Brown’s submission (and that of her court-
appointed counsel) indicates Brown has no release plan apart from hoping to be placed at
a “halfway house or a sober-living house.” 	Based on the record and the current release
plan, there is no evidence that, if released, Brown would receive more medical care than
she is now receiving.
Again, the Court conducted an individualized inquiry, as it must, of the factors under
§ 3553(a) and the guidance under § 1B1.13, and finds that relief should be denied. United
States v. Felters, 163 F.4th 513, 515 (8th Cir. 2026).
Given Brown’s charges of conviction (including a firearms charge), her criminal
history, and the fact that she has only served approximately 35% of her sentence, and for
all the reasons set forth above, Brown’s motion is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
8:21-cr-00172-RFR-MDN Doc # 59 Filed: 03/17/26 Page 5 of 6 - Page ID #
<pageID>

6
Dated this 17th day of March 2026.
BY THE COURT:
Robert F. Rossiter, Jr.
Chief United States District Judge
8:21-cr-00172-RFR-MDN Doc # 59 Filed: 03/17/26 Page 6 of 6 - Page ID #
<pageID>