Perfetto v. NH Department of Corrections, Director et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Jonathan Andrew Perfetto
v. Civil No. 22-cv-128-JL-AJ
Nicholas Duffy, Director, New Hampshire
Department of Corrections, et al.1
Report and Recommendation
Jonathan Perfetto, who is proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, is a New Hampshire Department of Corrections (“NHDOC”)
prisoner incarcerated at the Montana State Prison in Deer Lodge,
Montana. He has filed a complaint (Doc. No. 1) under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 asserting claims against the NHDOC Interstate Compact
Coordinator, the NHDOC Parole Board Chairman, members of the
NHDOC Parole Board, counsel for the NHDOC, Case Managers at the
New Hampshire State Prison (“NHSP”), and Case Managers at the
Northern New Hampshire Correctional Facility (“NCF”). The
1 Plaintiff Jonathan Andrew Perfetto has identified the
following New Hampshire Department of Corrections (“NHDOC”)
employees as defendants to this action: NHDOC Commissioner Helen
Hanks, NHDOC Directors Nicholas Duffy and Christopher H. Kench,
NHDOC Medical and Forensics Director Paula Mattis, NHDOC
Education Director Laura Hardwick, NHDOC Interstate Corrections
Compact Coordinator John/Jane Doe, New Hampshire State Prison
Case Counselor/Case Manager (“CC/CM”) Joseph Irrizary, Northern
New Hampshire Correctional Facility CC/CM Christine Bump, NHDOC
Parole Board Chairman Jennifer Sargent, NHDOC Parole Board
members Roger Phillips and Horace F. Enriques, and Legal Counsel
John/Jane Doe.
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complaint is before the undersigned Magistrate Judge for
preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A(a), and LR 4.3(d)(1).
Preliminary Review Standard
The court conducts a preliminary review of complaints filed
by prisoners seeking relief from government agents. See LR
4.3(d)(1); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Claims may be dismissed,
sua sponte, if the court lacks jurisdiction, a defendant is
immune from the relief sought, or the complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b); LR 4.3(d)(1)(A). In considering whether the complaint
states a claim, the court determines whether, stripped of legal
conclusions, and with all reasonable inferences construed in the
plaintiff's favor, the complaint contains “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
(2009) (citation omitted). The court construes pro se filings
liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Background
Mr. Perfetto asserts that in 2011, he pleaded guilty to
five counts of possessing child sex abuse images and was
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sentenced to serve two consecutive 10- to 20-year prison terms.2
Prior to that conviction, in 2002, Mr. Perfetto was convicted on
61 counts of possession of child pornography, for which he was
sentenced to serve three to seven years in prison, with four
additional sentences suspended with conditions. See State v.
Perfetto, 160 N.H. 675, 676, 7 A.3d 1179, 1181 (2010).
Following his 2011 conviction, Mr. Perfetto was incarcerated at
the NHSP until he was transferred to the Montana State Prison on
August 1, 2017.
Mr. Perfetto has filed two lawsuits challenging the
conditions of his confinement in Montana in the District of
Montana, Perfetto v. Harmon, No. 6:22-cv-00080-SEH (D. Mont.
filed Sept. 28, 2022) and Perfetto v. Cooper, No. 6:22-cv-00055-
SEH (D. Mont. filed July 7, 2022).3 Mr. Perfetto has also filed
multiple lawsuits in this court, in addition to this suit,
challenging the conditions of his confinement in Montana and New
2 Mr. Perfetto also pleaded guilty to “seven counts of
failing to comply with sex offender registration and/or
reporting requirements.” Perfetto v. Warden, N.H. State Prison,
No. 16-cv-473-SM, 2019 DNH 061, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52787, at
*1-*2, 2019 WL 1405837, at *1 (D.N.H. Mar. 28, 2019).
3 Both of the prison conditions cases Mr. Perfetto filed in
the District of Montana have been dismissed. See Harmon, 2022
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226323, 2022 WL 1769013 (Dec. 15, 2022);
Perfetto v. Cooper, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43054, 2023 WL 2500508
(Mar. 14, 2023).
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Hampshire. See Perfetto v. Poulin, 20-cv-528-PB (D.N.H. filed
Apr. 27, 2020); Perfetto v. Graves, 20-cv-527-JL (D.N.H. filed
Apr. 27, 2020); Perfetto v. Doe, 20-cv-526-SE-AJ (D.N.H. filed
Apr. 27, 2020); Perfetto v. Wilcox, 20-cv-525-SM-AJ (D.N.H.
filed Apr. 27, 2020); Perfetto v. Hanks, 18-cv-554-SE-AJ (D.N.H.
filed June 14, 2018); Perfetto v. Bennett, 15-cv-345-PB (D.N.H.
filed Aug. 25, 2015); Perfetto v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., Comm’r,
15-cv-244-JL (D.N.H. filed June 24, 2015); Perfetto v. Cusson,
14-cv-556-AJ (D.N.H. filed Jan. 30, 2015); Perfetto v. N.H.
Dep’t of Corr., Comm’r, 14-cv-481-JD (D.N.H. filed Oct. 30,
2014); Perfetto v. Alexis, 12-cv-393-JL (D.N.H. filed Oct. 24,
2012); Perfetto v. N.H. State Prison, Warden, 06-cv-372-PB
(D.N.H. filed Oct. 11, 2006); Perfetto v. N.H. State Prison,
Warden, No. 06-cv-307-JL (D.N.H. filed Oct. 4, 2006).
In 2020, Mr. Perfetto brought suit in the New Hampshire
Superior Court seeking an order directing that he be transferred
from the Montana State Prison to the Secure Psychiatric Unit
(“SPU”) at the NHSP. See State v. Perfetto, Case No. 2022-0414,
2023 N.H. LEXIS 171, at *1, 2023 WL 5815777, at *1 (N.H. Sept.
8, 2020). The Superior Court granted his transfer petition, but
the New Hampshire Supreme Court (“NHSC”) reversed that order on
appeal. See id., 2023 N.H. LEXIS 171, at *13, 2023 WL 5815777,
at *5. The NHSC Court remanded the case to the Superior Court
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for further development of the record and for the trial court to
“determine on remand whether [Mr. Perfetto] satisfied his burden
of proving both requirements of [N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. RSA §
(“RSA”)] 651:10.” Id. That statute provides that the Superior
Court “shall transfer any prisoner who is insane to the [SPU].”
RSA 651:10. It appears that case is still pending.
Discussion
In this case, Mr. Perfetto brings claims under § 1983,
alleging that certain defendants, who are all officials or
employees of the NHDOC: (1) denied him access to the courts by
failing to assist with his legal research in three cases, in
violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his
rights under the Interstate Corrections Compact (“ICC”); (2)
failed to provide him with adequate mental health care by
failing to oversee the mental health care he has received in
Montana and/or failing to return him to New Hampshire to receive
adequate mental health care, in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights and his rights under the ICC; and (3) failed to
provide him with a parole hearing when he was eligible for
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parole on his first of two consecutive sentences, in violation
of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.4
I. ICC Claims
Mr. Perfetto alleges that certain NHDOC officials violated
his constitutional rights by failing to provide services or take
actions that he alleges were required by the ICC. The ICC is a
state law, codified at RSA 622-B:2, which authorizes New
Hampshire to contract with other states for the confinement of
one another’s prisoners.5
Section 1983 provides a cause of action to challenge the
deprivation by state actors of rights secured by the United
States Constitution and federal law. See Fincher v. Town of
Brookline, 26 F.4th 479, 486 (1st Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
Section 1983, however, does not provide a cause of action to
enforce state law. See Borrás-Borrero v. Corporación del Fondo
del Seguro del Estado, 958 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 2020).
Violations of the ICC, therefore, are not actionable under §
1983. See Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir.
2006); Ghana v. Pierce, 159 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998).
4 Mr. Perfetto voluntarily dismissed a fourth claim alleging
that he had been improperly classified. See May 8, 2023 Order.
5 Montana has passed a version of the ICC. See Mont. Code
Ann. § 46-19-401.
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Accordingly, to the extent Mr. Perfetto’s claims are premised on
alleged violations of the ICC, they are not cognizable in this
action.
II. Denial of Access to the Courts Claims
Prisoners have a constitutional right to access the courts
to challenge their sentences and to challenge the conditions of
confinement. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996). The
right to access the court “requires prison authorities to assist
inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers
by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate
assistance from persons trained in the law.” Id. at 346
(internal quotation mark omitted). To state a claim for denial
of access to the courts in violation of the First Amendment (or
the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments), a plaintiff must allege
facts to demonstrate that he suffered an actual injury, that is,
that he lost a chance to present or pursue a nonfrivolous claim
that he has a constitutional right to pursue. Id. at 351;
Perfetto v. Hanks, Case No. 18-cv-554-SE, 2023 DNH 034, 2023
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59963, at *13, 2023 WL 2753631, at *5 (D.N.H.
Mar. 30, 2023); Collagan v. Aroostook Cty. Jail, 1:22-cv-362-
JAW, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39336, at *9, 2023 WL 2423268, at *4
(D. Me. Mar. 9, 2023).
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Mr. Perfetto alleges that he was denied access to the
courts when the defendants failed to provide him with necessary
assistance with legal research in three cases: Perfetto v.
Warden, 16-cv-473-SM (D.N.H.); Perfetto v. Englander, 2018-042
(N.H.), and Perfetto v. Cusson, 18-1124 (1st Cir.). Mr.
Perfetto alleges that the Montana State Prison has neither New
Hampshire law or cases nor cases from the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, and that Montana prison officials told him he could not
get those materials at the Montana State Prison. He further
alleges that he asked NHDOC officials to provide legal
assistance, but they refused.
Mr. Perfetto contends that the NHDOC defendants were
required to, and failed to, provide him access to the courts to
litigate his cases in New Hampshire. When a prisoner is
convicted and incarcerated in one state but then is transferred
under the ICC to another state, courts have held that officials
in the sending state retain responsibility to provide the
prisoner with assistance necessary for access to the courts.
See, e.g., Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1226 (10th Cir.
2006) (“In the context of a plaintiff serving time in an out-of-
state prison system pursuant to the ICC, ‘the general rule
imposes upon the sending state authorities the responsibility
for ensuring their prisoners incarcerated in sister state
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facilities are afforded access to state courts’” (citation
omitted)); Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 866 (7th Cir. 2004);
Boyd v. Wood, 52 F.3d 820, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)
(“state authorities maintain responsibility for providing state
legal materials to their prisoners incarcerated in out-of-state
facilities”); Hannon v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74-75 (D.
Mass. 2003) (responsibility to provide prisoner access to the
courts while he is incarcerated in a state other than the
sentencing state is shared between the sending and receiving
jurisdiction (citing Rich v. Zitnay, 644 F.2d 41, 43 n.1 (1st
Cir. 1981)). Therefore, NHDOC prisoners incarcerated out of
state may assert claims alleging a denial of access to the
courts at the out-of-state prison may proceed on those claims
against NHDOC defendants.
In support of his claim, Mr. Perfetto relies on his efforts
to litigate one case in this court, one case before the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, and one case before the First Circuit
Court of Appeals. Mr. Perfetto, proceeding pro se, filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court, Perfetto v.
Warden, 16-cv-473-SM (D.N.H.). As Mr. Perfetto acknowledges,
counsel was appointed to represent him in that case, and counsel
opposed the defendant’s motion to dismiss on Mr. Perfetto’s
behalf. See ECF No. 4; see also Jan. 16, 2019 Order. Mr.
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Perfetto, therefore, had trained legal assistance in the habeas
case in this Court, which precludes his claim for denial of
access to the courts based on the defendants’ failure to assist
him with legal research. Cf. Caraballo v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 124 F. App’x 284, 285 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(“Because [the plaintiff] had court-appointed counsel [in the
relevant legal proceeding], he had no constitutional right of
access to a law library in preparing [for that proceeding].”);
cf. also Cortez v. Mici, Civil Action No. 23-CV-10051-AK, 2023
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186953, at *7, 2023 WL 6881771, at *2 (D. Mass.
Oct. 17, 2023).
In Perfetto v. Englander, 2018-042 (N.H.), the NHSC
affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Perfetto’s claim against Dr. Celia
Englander on statute of limitation grounds. Id. 2019 WL 2743486
(N.H. June 20, 2019). In that case, Mr. Perfetto raised the
issue of his lack of access to New Hampshire law, but neither
the Superior Court nor the NHSC found that he lacked such
access. See id. at *2. Mr. Perfetto does not provide any
explanation as to how a lack of access to New Hampshire law
prevented him from pursuing a nonfrivolous claim or changed the
outcome in that case to his detriment.
In Perfetto v. Cusson, 18-1124 (1st Cir.), Mr. Perfetto
appealed the dismissal of his claims alleging “deficiencies in
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prison mail and medical treatment.” Perfetto v. Ellis, No. 18-
1124, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 39599, at *1, 2019 WL 11029626, at *1
(1st Cir. Oct. 2, 2019). The First Circuit affirmed the
district court’s conclusion that the challenged mail
restrictions did not violate Mr. Perfetto’s constitutional
rights as those restrictions served legitimate penological
purposes, and also found that Mr. Perfetto’s allegations did not
state Eighth Amendment claims based on allegedly inadequate
medical care. Id. 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 39599, at *2, 2019 WL
11029626, at *1. The court also concluded that Mr. Perfetto
waived his claim related to receiving injections and failed to
state a claim for a constitutional violation based on his
suicidal thoughts. Id. 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 39599, at *4, 2019
WL 11029626, at *2. Here, Mr. Perfetto has not alleged facts to
show that he had a nonfrivolous claim in that case which was
impaired or lost due to a lack of legal research assistance.
Mr. Perfetto has not alleged facts to show that the
defendants’ failure to provide him with legal research
assistance caused him actual injury in violation of his
constitutional rights. Therefore, the court should dismiss Mr.
Perfetto’s claims alleging denial of access to the courts.
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III. Mental Health Care Claims
Mr. Perfetto alleges that he had adequate mental health
care while he was incarcerated in New Hampshire, and that the
Montana State Prison has not provided the same level of care.6
Here, he brings claims against NHDOC officials, arguing that
under the ICC, those defendants should have authorized better
treatment in Montana or transferred him back to New Hampshire.
He contends that the named NHDOC officials are responsible for
officials at the Montana State Prison breaching the ICC by
failing to provide him with individual mental health therapy.
He also appears to allege that the NHDOC defendants are
breaching the ICC by failing to require certain mental health
treatment in Montana, or by failing to transfer him back to New
Hampshire to obtain that level of care.
As explained above, Mr. Perfetto cannot bring a claim under
§ 1983 to enforce the ICC. To the extent Mr. Perfetto’s mental
health care claims allege a violation of the ICC, therefore, the
District Judge should dismiss those claims.
To the extent Mr. Perfetto alleges that named NHDOC
defendants have denied him adequate mental health care in
6 As is noted above, Mr. Perfetto is seeking an order in
state court that he be transferred from the Montana State Prison
to the SPU at the NHSP. That case is pending.
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violation of the Eighth Amendment, to succeed on that claim, he
must allege facts to show that those defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious need for mental health
treatment. See Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir.
1991).
Mr. Perfetto is incarcerated in Montana pursuant to a
contract between New Hampshire and Montana, under the ICC,
“which allows receiving and sending states to allocate burdens
between themselves for the care of inmates and afford a prisoner
convicted out-of-state with the same rights as a prisoner
convicted in-state.” Lehn, 364 F.3d at 866-67. Mr. Perfetto
has not provided the Court with a copy of that contract, or
otherwise stated the specific manner in which that contract
divides the responsibility for his mental health care. For
purposes of preliminary review, the Court assumes, without
deciding, that the NHDOC defendants can be held responsible for
Mr. Perfetto’s mental health treatment in Montana.
“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the
conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny
under the Eighth Amendment.” Abernathy v. Anderson, 984 F.3d 1,
6 (1st Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). The Eighth Amendment
requires prison officials to provide humane conditions of
confinement, including adequate nutrition, medical services, and
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mental health care. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994).
Mr. Perfetto has asserted sufficient facts to demonstrate
that his mental health problems constitute a serious medical
issue in need of treatment. To prevail on an Eighth Amendment
claim, a prisoner must also present evidence of the defendant's
culpable state of mind. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 83
(1st Cir. 2014). A showing of deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm satisfies the subjective prong
of an Eighth Amendment claim. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To
establish deliberate indifference, the prisoner must demonstrate
that defendants were aware of his serious medical issue and need
for treatment, or were aware of facts giving rise to an
inference of his serious medical problem and need for treatment;
that the defendants actually drew the inference that such a risk
existed; and that the defendants, by act or omission, failed to
reasonably respond to Mr. Perfetto’s need for mental health
treatment. See id. at 828-29; Leite v. Bergeron, 911 F.3d 47,
52–53 (1st Cir. 2018). Deliberate indifference is a more
culpable state of mind than negligence and “requires evidence
that the failure in treatment was purposeful.” Kosilek, 774 F.3d
at 83.
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Prisons are not required to provide ideal care or a
prisoner's choice of care. Snell v. Neville, 998 F.3d 474, 495
(1st Cir. 2021). Further, disagreements between the prisoner
and the prison medical providers or prison officials about the
appropriate course of treatment are not actionable. See
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 82.
Mr. Perfetto alleges that he has received mental health
treatment at the Montana State Prison, but that he has not
received additional or different treatment he sought there, that
he had problems receiving treatment because of staffing issues
during the COVID pandemic, and because of his assigned housing
and other restrictions imposed due to disciplinary issues. Mr.
Perfetto also claims that he received better mental health care
when he was incarcerated at the NHDOC. Specifically, Mr.
Perfetto alleges that in Montana he was provided with group
therapy, whereas at the NHDOC he was provided with individual
therapy, which he believes he needs. Additionally, Mr. Perfetto
states that he was not always able to participate in group
therapy in Montana because of housing placements, restrictions
placed on him due to his disciplinary matters, and/or because he
believed he needed individual therapy. Mr. Perfetto also faults
the NHDOC defendants for failing to require Montana prison
officials to send him to the Montana State Psychiatric Hospital.
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Mr. Perfetto alleges that he sent letters to NHDOC
officials about obtaining what he believed would be appropriate
mental health care, and the officials responded to those letters
and were therefore aware that Mr. Perfetto believed his mental
health treatment in Montana was insufficient. The defendants
were also aware, due to the letters, that Mr. Perfetto was
receiving some treatment for his medical care. Although Mr.
Perfetto believes he needs individual therapy, but has only been
provided with group therapy in Montana, he has not shown that
the NHDOC defendants were aware that the treatment he was
receiving was actually inadequate to his mental health needs,
and that they nevertheless failed to take reasonable steps to
resolve the problem. At best, he has demonstrated that he was
not provided with the treatment of his choice, or that there
might have been better ways to treat him than those he was
provided. As Mr. Perfetto has failed to assert facts
demonstrating that the defendants were deliberately indifferent
to his need for mental health care, the District Judge should
deny his claims concerning his mental health care in Montana.
IV. Denial of Parole Eligibility Claims
Mr. Perfetto alleges that the NHDOC Parole Board
Chairperson, members of the Parole Board, and two case
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counselors at the NHSP violated his Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights and his Eighth Amendment right not to be subject
to cruel and unusual punishment by not providing him a parole
hearing when he became eligible for parole with regard to his
first sentence. In support of these claims, Mr. Perfetto states
that his minimum parole date on the first of his two 10-20 year
sentences was December 28, 2020. He alleges that because he has
not had a hearing, he has not yet been paroled from his first
sentence to his second (consecutive) sentence. Mr. Perfetto
states that he is now serving “dead time,” in that the time he
is serving now is still being credited against his first
sentence and not his second sentence.7 Mr. Perfetto asserts that
the lack of a parole hearing has affected his liberty interests,
because if he had been paroled to his second sentence when he
was first eligible for parole on his first sentence, the time he
7 Mr. Perfetto alleges that he is now serving “dead time,”
which is time that is not credited toward any sentence and which
therefore does not serve to hasten his release date. See Jones
v. FCI Berlin, Warden, Civil No. 17-cv-365-LM, 2018 DNH 25, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19796, at *7, 2018 WL 748319, at *3 (D.N.H.
Feb. 7, 2018). Mr. Perfetto was sentenced to a maximum
aggregated term of forty years in prison, and nothing before the
Court suggests that any of the time he has served toward that
sentence is not being credited toward that maximum term.
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has served since December 28, 2020 would have been credited
against his second sentence.8
Mr. Perfetto alleges that he wrote to his NHDOC case
manager in May 2020, requesting a parole hearing. He alleges
that his parole hearing was scheduled for August 5, 2021, but
that he was denied parole because he was then classified as
being in “close custody,” a maximum security classification. He
alleges that he will not be eligible for reclassification to
medium custody until May 2024 because he assaulted another
inmate.
Convicted prisoners do not have a constitutional due
process right or a liberty interest in being released on parole
before completing their full sentence(s). See Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). A
Fourteenth Amendment due process right to parole exists only if
state law creates such a right, and New Hampshire law does not
8 Mr. Perfetto does not allege that he would be eligible for
immediate release if he were granted parole from his first 10-20
year sentence. Were he to be granted parole prior to the
maximum date of his first sentence, he would be paroled to his
consecutive 10-20 year sentence. For that reason, the court
interprets his parole-related claims to be actionable pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82
(2005). To the extent Mr. Perfetto is challenging the duration
of his confinement, he must do so in a separate habeas corpus
action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 487-89 (1973).
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create such a right or otherwise provide prisoners with a
liberty interest in parole. See Chartier v. N.H. Dep’t of
Corr., Civil No. 16-cv-127-PB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64631, at
*6, 2016 WL 3001274, at *3 (Apr. 14, 2016) (citations omitted),
R&R adopted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64635, at *1, 2016 WL
2888976, at *1 (D.N.H. May 17, 2016); see also Ainsworth v.
Stanley, 317 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002) (neither federal law nor
New Hampshire law provides prisoners a “liberty right” to
parole). Because Mr. Perfetto has no liberty interest in being
paroled from his first sentence prior to the expiration of the
maximum term of his first sentence, he cannot state a Fourteenth
Amendment claim based on the NHDOC’s failure to hold a parole
hearing or to grant him parole, and the District Judge should
dismiss that claim.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district court judge should
dismiss the complaint (Doc. No. 1) in its entirety for failure
to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. Any
objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed
within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended upon
motion.
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Only those issues raised in the objection to this Report
and Recommendation are subject to review in the district
court. See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Natl Ins. Co., 617 F.3d
554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010). Any issues not preserved by such
objection(s) are precluded on appeal. See id. Failure to file
any objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the district court's order. See Santos-Santos v. Torres-
Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
______________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
January 22, 2024
cc: Jonathan Andrew Perfetto, pro se
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