Amatucci v. Rae et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Josephine Amatucci
v. 	Case No. 22-cv-202-SM-AJ
Hawley Rae, et al.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Following the suspension of her New Hampshire driver’s
license, plaintiff Josephine Amatucci, appearing pro se and in
forma pauperis, sued several individuals involved in the
suspension process. 	Following preliminary review, the
undersigned Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of all claims
against all defendants, except for certain claims against New
Hampshire State Trooper Hawley Rae and New Hampshire Division of
Motor Vehicles Director John Marasco. (Doc. No. 25). 	In the
absence of an objection from Mrs. Amatucci, Judge McAuliffe
approved the report and recommendation. (Doc. No. 32).
Presently before the court for a report and recommendation
pursuant to LR 72.1 are the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc.
No. 45) and Mrs. Amatucci’s motions for summary judgment (Doc.
Nos. 27/9040, 31/9062, 35/9073 and 37/9080), motion for judgment
as a matter of law (Doc. No. 42/9097) and motions for hearing
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(Doc. Nos. 44/9115 and 46/9119).1 	As explained below, the
defendants’ motion should be granted and Mrs. Amatucci’s motions
should be denied.
Factual Background2
A. 	Traffic stops
This case stems from three traffic stops involving Mrs.
Amatucci in 2020 and 2021. 	First, on February 26, 2020, Trooper
Rae stopped Mrs. Amatucci after she passed through a stop sign
and turned left onto Route 28 from Route 109 in Wolfeboro, New
Hampshire. 	In contesting the stop at the scene, Mrs. Amatucci
denied that there was a stop sign at the intersection and that
she had almost caused a crash. Trooper Rae’s traffic ticket
charged Mrs. Amatucci with violating N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(“RSA”) 265:30, for failing to stop at the stop sign. (Doc. No.
9-1 at 10).
Next, on December 23, 2020, N.H. State Trooper Nikita
Klimashov saw Mrs. Amatucci pull out of a gas station onto a
divided section of Gosling Road in Portsmouth, New Hampshire --
directly in front of his cruiser -- and attempt to turn in the
1 As a courtesy to Mrs. Amatucci, the court includes the
four-digit number she has given to her filings along with the
docket number the court has assigned to her filings.
2 The court recounts the facts as set forth in Mrs.
Amatucci’s complaint, complaint addenda and the various
documents submitted with those filings.
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wrong direction on that one-way stretch of road. See Doc. No. 1-
1 at 6. The trooper sounded his airhorn, causing Mrs. Amatucci
to turn her car in the correct direction. After she pulled over,
Mrs. Amatucci explained to Trooper Klimashov that the incident
was not unsafe, and “no big deal,” because it had not caused an
accident. See Doc. No. 1-1 at 6. Mrs. Amatucci received a
traffic ticket on that date for a traffic violation described as
“failure to keep right – rotary,” in violation of RSA 265:23.
See Notice of Cleared Default, State v. Amatucci, No. 470-2021-
cr-0003 (N.H. Cir. Ct., 10th Cir., Dist. Div.-Portsmouth Apr. 7,
2022 (Doc. No. 1-1 at 30). After a hearing on December 15, 2021,
the state court entered an “administrative guilty” finding on
that charge and imposed a fine. See State v. Amatucci, No. 470-
2021-cr-0003 (N.H. Cir. Ct., 10th Cir., Dist. Div.-Portsmouth
Dec. 15, 2021).
The third incident occurred on June 3, 2021, when N.H.
State Trooper Mark Hensel saw Mrs. Amatucci make a u-turn across
a double yellow line, onto the opposite shoulder of Route 16 in
Ossipee, New Hampshire. After Trooper Hensel pulled her over,
Mrs. Amatucci said she did nothing wrong. The trooper issued
Mrs. Amatucci a ticket charging her with a “yellow/solid line”
violation, in violation of RSA 265:22. See Doc. No. 9-1, at 9.
Mrs. Amatucci pleaded not guilty to the traffic violations
alleged by Troopers Rae and Hensel, and trials on those
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violations occurred on December 1, 2021 in the New Hampshire
Circuit Court, Third Circuit, District Division in Ossipee
(“Ossipee District Court”). The troopers and Mrs. Amatucci
testified in those proceedings. After each trial, Judge Melissa
Countway issued a written order, finding that the troopers
testified credibly and that the State had met its burden of
proof. The court found that Mrs. Amatucci was guilty of both
traffic violations. See State v. Amatucci, No. 464-2020-cr-270
(Ossipee Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2021) (“stop sign case”) (Doc. No. 1-
1, at 21-22); State v. Amatucci, No. 464-2021-cr-559 (N.H. Cir.
Ct., 3d Cir., Dist. Div.-Ossipee Dec. 2, 2021) (Doc. No. 1-1, at
8-9) (“yellow line case”).
Judge Countway’s order in the stop sign case includes a
statement of the court’s concerns:
The . . . Defendant argued that she had the right to
operate as she did, since she had arrived at the
intersection first. The Court is concerned about the safety
of other motorists under these circumstances and notes that
the finding of guilty is intended to deter the Defendant
from failing to stop and failing to yield to oncoming
traffic in the manner described in this case.
Doc. No. 1-1 at 22. 	A similar expression of the court’s
concerns appears in the order in the yellow line case:
The . . . Defendant’s argument was focused on her belief
that her driving was legal. 	The Court is concerned about
the safety of other motorists under these circumstances
and notes that the finding of guilty is intended to deter
the Defendant from conducting U-turns in the manner
described in this case.
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Doc. No. 1-1, at 9. 	Mrs. Amatucci did not appeal the judgments
in those Ossipee District Court cases.
B. License suspension proceedings
Under New Hampshire law, the DMV Director is authorized to
order a re-examination of a driver’s abilities “for cause,” and
states specifically that “age,” standing alone, does not
constitute “cause.” 	RSA 263:7.3 	Id. 	Trooper Rae summarized the
three traffic stops described above, as well as the Ossipee
District Court’s concerns about Mrs. Amatucci, in a December 29,
2021, report to the DMV Bureau of Hearings. Trooper Rae’s report
concludes with a request that Mrs. Amatucci undergo a re-
examination of her driving ability. 	Request for Admin. Action
(Dec. 29, 2021) (Doc. No. 1-1, at 29 & 6-7). 	DMV Director
Marasco approved Trooper Rae’s request for re-examination of Mrs.
Amatucci. 	The DMV scheduled successive examinations for Mrs.
Amatucci in April, May, June, and August 2022. 	See Doc. No. 1-1,
3 RSA 263:7(I) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The director may require with cause any person holding
a license to drive motor vehicles . . . to pass such
examination as to the person’s qualifications as the
director shall prescribe. . . . 	No license shall be .
. . continued in effect until the director is satisfied
as to such person’s fitness to drive a motor vehicle.
The age of the license holder shall not constitute
cause for reexamination under this section.
Id.
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at 3 (Apr. 4, 2022 DMV Notice); Doc. No. 1-1, at 25 (May 6, 2022
DMV Notice); see also In re Amatucci, No. HR202211709, Report of
Hearing Examiner (Aug. 11, 2022) (Doc. No. 9-1, at 4-6).
Mrs. Amatucci did not show up for those retests. After she
failed to appear three times for scheduled re-examinations, Mrs.
Amatucci’s driver’s license was suspended. 	See N.H. Code Admin.
R. Saf-C 1009.02(g) (“[f]ailure to appear [three] times for a
scheduled reexamination . . . 	shall result in an immediate
suspension of the person’s driver license”); see also Doc. No. 9-
1, at 8.
Mrs. Amatucci requested a hearing on the suspension of her
license and on the order that she retake the driver’s test. 	A
“Notice of Hearing” directed Mrs. Amatucci to appear for an
administrative hearing on those matters. 	Doc. No. 9-1, at 22.
That administrative hearing occurred on August 11, 2022. 	The
evidence included Mrs. Amatucci’s testimony and the statements of
DMV representative Michael Mercier, as well as the December 2021
Report prepared by Trooper Rae, and proof that Mrs. Amatucci had
failed to appear for three scheduled reexaminations. The Hearings
Examiner’s September 21, 2022 written decision, Doc. No. 9-1, at
4-6, states that the December 2021 Report gave the DMV Director
“cause” to require Mrs. Amatucci to complete a reexamination.
The Hearings Examiner also found that Mrs. Amatucci had failed to
appear for three scheduled driver’s tests, which resulted in the
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temporary suspension of her license. 	Id. at 5. 	The Hearings
Examiner’s decision allowed the license suspension for the
multiple failures to appear to remain in effect and notified Mrs.
Amatucci that she could retake the driver’s test, pay the
reinstatement fee, and comply with other DMV requirements to
restore her driving privileges, and that she could appeal that
decision to the New Hampshire Superior Court. 	Id.
Mrs. Amatucci did not appeal the DMV decision. 	Her
driver’s license remains suspended, and she has not appeared for
any reexamination of her driving ability. 	She filed this
lawsuit in 2022 claiming violations of her state and federal
rights.
C. 	Legal claims
The operative claims remaining in this case after
preliminary review are asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Trooper Rae and Director Marasco in both their official and
individual capacities:
1. Claims against Trooper Rae
A. 	Trooper Rae requested that the DMV order Mrs.
Amatucci’s driving ability to be retested based, in
part, upon her advanced age and/or age-related
disabilities, manifesting unlawful discrimination on
those bases, in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection rights.
B. 	Trooper Rae requested that the DMV order Mrs.
Amatucci’s driving ability to be retested because of
Mrs. Amatucci’s expressed opinions regarding her
rights and duties under state driving laws, her
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objections to the traffic stops, and/or her arguments
challenging the traffic tickets, thereby subjecting
her to unlawful retaliation for her exercise of First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
2. Claims against Director Marasco
A. 	The re-examination was ordered without a prior
hearing, in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment
right to procedural due process.
B. 	The reexamination was ordered because of Mrs.
Amatucci’s expressed opinions regarding her rights and
duties under state driving laws, her objections to the
traffic stops, and/or her arguments challenging the
traffic tickets, thereby subjecting her to unlawful
retaliation for her exercise of First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
C. 	The DMV Director’s suspension of Mrs. Amatucci’s
driver’s license violated her right to due process as
she was not afforded a hearing before that suspension,
rendering the DMV Director liable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
Legal Standard
The defendants have moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), arguing that Mrs. Amatucci’s complaint fails to state
a claim for which relief can be granted. To defeat a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must include in her
complaint factual allegations sufficient to “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible if it
pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. Courts may augment those pleaded facts
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and inferences with information from “documents incorporated by
reference into the complaint, matters of public record, and
facts susceptible to judicial notice.” Haley v. City of Boston,
657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011).
To test a complaint's sufficiency, the court must first
identify and disregard statements that “merely offer ‘legal
conclusions couched as fact’ or ‘threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action.’” Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño-
Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (alterations omitted)). Second, the court must credit as
true all nonconclusory factual allegations and the reasonable
inferences drawn from those allegations, and then determine if
the claim is plausible. See id. In light of the plaintiffs’ pro
se status, the court liberally construes his pleadings. Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
Legal Analysis
A. 	Claims Against Trooper Rae
1. 	Equal Protection -- Age/Disability Discrimination
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause dictates
“that ‘similarly situated persons are to receive substantially
similar treatment from their government.’” 	Kuperman v. Wrenn,645
F.3d 69, 77 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 	The sole basis
for this claim is Trooper Rae’s notation, in the Request for
Administrative Action, that “[t]he State is not unsympathetic to
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AMATUCCI, being an elderly woman with possible declining health,
but it needs to consider the safety of the entire motoring
public over the individual.”4 Based on this comment, Mrs.
Amatucci asserts that “[Trooper Rae] bas[ed] her Complaint on
the age of the Plaintiff, stating that age was a consideration
of the mental health, and physical ability to drive.” Compl.
(Doc. No. 1).
Mrs. Amatucci’s claim fails for at least two reasons.
First, a full and fair reading of Trooper Rae’s report makes it
clear to the court that Mrs. Amatucci’s age was not a factor in
Trooper’s Rae’s request for re-examination. 	The first three
pages of the request recount the dangerous driving and near-
4 Trooper Rae’s request states, more fully:
. . . .
Based upon her above interactions with several
troopers, it is believed that AMATUCCI’s actions show a
pattern of conduct that causes a concern for her
ability to drive safely and obey traffic laws.
AMATUCCI’s erratic driving and disbelief she is
committing any motor vehicle violations is concerning.
She seems to believe as long as she did not cause a
crash, she did nothing wrong. 	She appears unwilling to
change her driving behavior, which is of upmost
concern. There is also concern her mental health is
declining and she is both mentally and physically
unable to safely operate a motor vehicle. 	The State is
not unsympathetic to AMATUCCI, being an elderly woman
with possible declining health, but it needs to
consider the safety of the entire motoring public over
the individual.
. . . .
Req. for Admin. Action (Dec. 29, 2021) (Doc. No. 1-1, at 29 &
6-7).
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accidents that led to multiple traffic citations over a sixteen-
month span. 	Trooper Rae also recounted Judge Countway’s
concerns – expressed after hearing Mrs. Amatucci’s testimony --
“about the safety of the other motorists . . .” in her findings
of guilty as to the two citations to which Mrs. Amatucci
responded. Req. for Admin. Action (Doc. No. 1-1) at 31-33. In
the context of the document, the reference to Mrs. Amatucci
being “elderly,” rather than serving as a basis for an
examination, appears to be little more than a factual
observation. 	As such it cannot support an equal protection
claim.
In addition to the plain reading of Trooper Rae’s
administrative request, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has
observed that
where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental
decision as being based on an impermissible criterion
and it is undisputed that the government would have
made the same decision regardless, there is no
cognizable injury warranting relief under § 1983.
Anderson ex rel. Dowd v. City of Bos., 375 F.3d 71, 94 (1st Cir.
2004) (quoting Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999). 	The
facts set forth in the complaint and attachments meet this
standard.
In her objection, Mrs. Amatucci’s does little more than
restate various applicable laws and proclaim her innocence as to
the three traffic violations. But as the court noted in its
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Report and Recommendation, the doctrine of collateral estoppel
prohibits Mrs. Amatucci from relitigating her liability in this
lawsuit. 	Doc. No. 25 at 12-13. 	Accordingly, the equal
protection claim against Trooper Rae should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
2. 	First Amendment – Retaliation
Mrs. Amatucci asserts that Trooper Rae’s request that her
driving ability be re-examined, as well as the DMV Director’s
order approving that request, were actions taken in retaliation
for her exercise of First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Specifically, she claims she suffered adverse
consequences because she expressed beliefs regarding her rights
and obligations under state traffic laws, she objected to the
traffic stops, and she challenged the traffic tickets in court.
To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, [plaintiff’s]
complaint must allege that (1) [plaintiff] engaged in
constitutionally protected conduct, (2) [plaintiff was]
subjected to an adverse action by [defendants], and (3) the
protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the
adverse action. The third prong of this test asks whether
[plaintiff has] alleged that [defendants] had retaliatory
animus. And to succeed, [plaintiff] must show that [defendants’]
retaliatory animus was the but- for cause of [plaintiff’s]
injuries, meaning that the adverse action against [the
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plaintiff] would not have been taken absent the retaliatory
motive. Gattineri v. Town of Lynnfield, 58 F.4th 512, 514-515
(1st Cir. 2023).
Once again, as with Mrs. Amatucci’s equal protection claim,
a full and fair reading of the facts alleged in the complaint
and the documents attached thereto undermines her First
Amendment claim. As described above, Trooper Rae’s references to
the content of Mrs. Amatucci’s speech – essentially her
complaints about the moving violations either at the scenes or
in court – were made in support of the request for re-
examination because the content of that speech created a concern
about diminished driving skills, without any indication of
retaliation.
As the Supreme Court has observed, “protected speech is
often a ‘wholly legitimate consideration’ for officers when
deciding whether to make an arrest.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587
U.S. 391, 401 (2019) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658,
668 (2012)). An officer may decide to arrest the suspect because
h[er] speech provides evidence of a crime or suggests a
potential threat. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 668. 	For example, in
Nieves, police officers decided to arrest the plaintiff for
disorderly conduct and resisting arrest because “they perceived
[the plaintiff] to be a threat” based in part on the combative
tone and content of his speech. 587 U.S. at 401; 	see also
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United States v. Regeneron Pharms., Inc., No. CV 20-11217-FDS,
2020 WL 7130004, at *17 (D. Mass. Dec. 4, 2020) (“It is hardly a
novel legal theory that speech may provide evidence of a crime,
or be an integral part of a crime, without running afoul of the
First Amendment.”).
Here, it is virtually beyond dispute that the substance of
Mrs. Amatucci’s reactions to her traffic citations and her court
appearances caused Trooper Rae to become concerned about Mrs.
Amatucci’s ability to drive safely, a concern Judge Countway had
already declared. 	As the defense argues, “[t]he crux of the
issue is that Plaintiff’s own statements demonstrate an obvious
misunderstanding of the rules of the road and a complete
disregard for the hazard that she poses to the safety of
others.” 	Def. Mem. (Doc. No. 45-1) at 16. 	Ultimately, the
allegations in the complaint demonstrate that Trooper Rae had a
legitimate and independent cause to support her Request for
Administrative Action. 	As such, Mrs. Amatucci’s complaint falls
short of a plausible allegation that her protected speech was
the ‘but-for,’ retaliatory cause of Trooper Rae’s request.
Gattineri, 58 F.4th at 515. 	Accordingly, the district judge
should dismiss the First Amendment Retaliation claim against
Trooper Rae.
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B. 	Claims Against DMV Director Marasco
1. 	First Amendment Retaliation
Mrs. Amatucci’s First Amendment retaliation claim against
Director Marasco is based on his approval of Trooper Rae’s
request for re-examination. 	Report and Recommendation (Doc. No.
25) at 15. 	As Mrs. Amatucci has alleged no independent basis
for a First Amendment claim against Director Marasco, the
district judge should dismiss this claim based on the same
reasoning the court applied to the claim against Trooper Rae.
2. Procedural Due Process
Mrs. Amatucci alleges that Director Marasco’s orders
directing her to undergo a re-examination of her driving ability
and suspending her license without prior hearings violated her
right to procedural due process.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state deprivations of
liberty or property without due process of law. 	U.S. Const.
amend. XIV. 	“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to the deprivation
of a driver’s license by the State.” 	Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S.
105, 112 (1977).
“[The court’s] identification of the specific dictates
of due process generally requires consideration of
three distinct factors: First, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative
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burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 	The Supreme
Court has, however, held that a driver's license can be revoked
without a pre-revocation hearing. See Dixon, 431 U.S. at 112–15.
The Court of Appeals has explained that:
The essentials of procedural due process comprise
notice of the charges and a reasonable chance to meet
them. The basic purport of the constitutional
requirement is that, before a significant deprivation
of liberty or property takes place at the state's
hands, the affected individual must be forewarned and
afforded an opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.’ As the rubric itself
implies, ‘procedural due process’ is simply ‘a
guarantee of fair procedure.’
Fusion Learning, Inc. v. Andover Sch. Comm., 609 F. Supp. 3d 5,
14 (D. Mass. 2022) (quoting Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 753
(1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted)).
First, with respect to the re-examination order, Mrs.
Amatucci fails to provide any factual support for her implicit
claim that the order itself, issued pursuant to RSA 263:7 and
N.H. Admin R. Saf-C 1009,5 deprived her of any interest in
5 Director Marasco’s authority to order driver re-
examination and suspend driver’s licenses prior to an
adjudicative hearing is established under New Hampshire
administrative rules and statutes. See RSA 263:7; RSA 263:59;
N.H. Admin. R. Saf-C 1009.02, et. seq. The Director may require
a licensee to pass a driver re-examination where cause exists to
question that person’s fitness to drive. RSA 263:7. When a law
enforcement official requests re-examination, the Director is
required to determine if a licensee is a high-risk driver. See
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liberty or property. 	Mrs. Amatucci does not assert that her
license was suspended pending the outcome of the re-examination.
The DMV only suspended Mrs. Amatucci’s license after she failed
to appear for three re-examinations, and canceled a fourth
appointment. Moreover, these several opportunities given to Mrs.
Amatucci are sufficient, under the circumstances present here,
to satisfy the state’s due process obligations. As the Supreme
Court has noted, even post-deprivation process (which is not
alleged here as the re-examinations were scheduled to take place
before any potential suspension) is sufficient for suspending a
driver's license where, as here, there is a significant public
safety issue. See Dixon, 431 U.S. at 113-14. As the bases for
the re-examination were explicitly safety-related, and her
license was not even suspended until after she was given several
opportunities to be heard, Mrs. Amatucci’s due process claim
necessarily fails.
Admin R. Saf-C 1009.02(d)(2). Once identified as a high-risk
driver, the Director has two options: order the high- risk
driver for re-examination or immediately suspend their license.
Admin R. Saf-C 1009.01(reexamination is needed where a driver is
determined to be high risk based on a physical or
psychological condition or impairment); Saf-C 1009.02 (d)(1)-(2)
(granting the director authority to order reexamination to
determine fitness to operate a motor vehicle or immediately
suspend a license under the emergency suspension authority
granted in RSA 263:59).
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C. 	Mrs. Amatucci’s motions
Mrs. Amatucci filed several motions for summary judgment
(Doc. Nos. 27/9040, 31/9062, 35/9073 and 37/9080), a motion for
judgment as a matter of law (Doc. No. 42/9097), which the court
construes as a motion for summary judgment, and two motions for
hearings (Doc. Nos. 44/9115 and 46/9119). 	In these motions,
filed before any discovery has been conducted, Mrs. Amatucci
does little more than restate the allegations of the complaint
(many of which are contradicted by the documents appended to the
complaint) and insist either that the case immediately proceed
to trial or that the defendants have no defense to her claims.
Having already concluded that the district court should dismiss
Mrs. Amatucci’s claims for failure to state a claim for relief,
it follows that her motions for summary judgment and judgment as
a matter of law should be denied. See also 	Amatucci v. Young,
No. 18-CV-1227-SM, 2021 WL 4477788, at *1 (D.N.H. Sept. 30,
2021) (“In light of its requirement of a factually supported
record, summary judgment is unusual as a pre-discovery tool; it
is usually reserved to a later phase of the case, after
discovery has sharpened the parties’ focus on the
facts.”)(cleaned up); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
322,(“plain language” in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) “mandates the
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery”).
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Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the district judge should grant the
defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 45). 	Plaintiff’s
motions for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 27/9040, 31/9062,
35/9073 and 37/9080) and judgment as a matter of law (Doc. No.
42/9097) should be denied. 	If these recommendations are
adopted, plaintiff’s motions for hearing (Doc. Nos. 44/9115 and
46/9119) should be terminated as moot.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to
this Report and Recommendation are subject to review in the
district court. See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat'l Ins. Co.,
617 F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010). Any issues not preserved by
such objection(s) are precluded on appeal. See id. 	Failure to
file any objections within the specified time waives the right
to appeal the district court's Order. See Santos-Santos v.
Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
July 17, 2024
cc: 	Josephine Amatucci, pro se
Counsel of Record
Case 1:22-cv-00202-SM-AJ Document 50 Filed 07/17/24 Page 19 of 19