Samora v. UPS-scs et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Inosencio Baez Samora
v. Civ. No. 23-cv-469-LM
UPS-SCS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Inosencio Baez Samora, appearing pro se, has sued UPS
Supply Chain Solutions (“UPS”), his employer until October
2016, claiming workplace discrimination and harassment in
violation of New Hampshire and federal law. See generally
Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 2-6; Compl. Add. (Doc. No. 1-1).
Invoking Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), UPS now moves to dismiss
Samora’s complaint on the basis of res judicata, claiming that
this suit is identical to a prior suit in this court which
Judge Barbadoro dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. See Samora v. UPS_SCS, No. 21-v-
0596-PB (“Samora I”), Order (Doc. No. 11) (D.N.H. Oct. 25,
2021). Pursuant to LR 72.1, UPS’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No.
5) has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a
report and recommendation. For the reasons that follow, the
district judge should grant the defendant’s motion and dismiss
this case.
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Standard of Review
To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must
contain sufficient factual material to “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations . . . [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Id. at 545
(internal citations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). In addition, “an adequate complaint must include not
only a plausible claim but also a plausible defendant.”
Peñalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 594 (1st Cir.
2011). In addition to the face of the complaint, the court may
also consider documents incorporated by reference in the
complaint, matters of public record, and other matters
susceptible to judicial notice. Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59,
65–66 (1st Cir. 2008).
As previously noted, Samora brings this case pro se. Where
a motion to dismiss is filed against a pro se litigant, any
document filed by the pro se party is “to be liberally
construed,” and “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
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must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do
justice.”). However, while pro se complaints “are accorded ‘an
extra degree of solicitude’. . . even a pro se plaintiff is
required ‘to set forth factual allegations, either direct or
inferential, respecting each material element necessary to
sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.’” Wright v.
Town of Southbridge, 2009 WL 415506, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 15,
2009) (quoting Adams v. Stephenson, 1997 WL 351633, at *1 (1st
Cir. 1997) (per curiam)).
Finally, although res judicata is an affirmative defense as
to which the defendant has the burden of proof, an affirmative
defense can be adjudicated on a motion to dismiss if the facts
that establish the defense are conclusively evident in 1) the
allegations of the complaint, 2) the documents (if any)
incorporated therein, 3) matters of public record and 4) other
matters of which the court may take judicial notice.” United
States v. Raytheon Co., 334 F. Supp. 3d 519, 523 (D. Mass.
2018), In analyzing an affirmative defense the court may take
judicial notice of proceedings in other courts, including state
courts. See Maher v. Hyde, 272 F.3d 83, 86 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001)
(“It is well-accepted that federal courts may take judicial
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notice of proceedings in other courts if those proceedings have
relevance to the matters at hand.”).
Background
A. Samora I
In January 2021, Mr. Samora sued UPS in state court. Samora
I, Compl.(Doc. 1-1). UPS subsequently removed the case to this
court. Mr. Samora sought monetary damages related to his
employment with UPS and alleged various instances of
mistreatment by his co-workers and managers. Id. He generally
alleged that he was blocked from being transferred to another
position and that he quit his job in 2016 after being subjected
to harassment and discrimination by his colleagues in 2016. Id.
at 6. In the absence of specific references in the complaint,
both UPS and the court construed Samora I as bringing a federal
anti-discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, a federal hostile work environment claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and a state law claim under the New Hampshire Law
Against Discrimination (“NHLAD”). Samora I, Order (Doc. No. 11)
at 2.
UPS timely moved to dismiss Samora I pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state claims upon which relief
can be granted. Id., Def. Mot. (Doc. No. 4), to which the
plaintiff objected. Id., Def. Obj. (Doc No. 6). Judge Barbadoro
granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to allege
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that he exhausted his administrative remedies under Title VII
and NHLAD and that his Section 1981 hostile work environment
claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Id.,
Order (Doc. No. 11). The court entered judgement in favor of
UPS on October 25, 2021. Id., Entry of Judgment (Doc. No. 12).
B. This Lawsuit
Mr. Samora filed this action on October 11, 2023. Compl.
(Doc. No. 1). This suit is based on the same period of
employment with UPS, and again asserts that he resigned from
UPS after he was denied a transfer and was subjected to
harassment and discrimination by his coworkers and managers.
Id. at 4.
Discussion
UPS’s sole argument in favor of dismissal is that this suit
is identical to Samora I and is therefore barred by the
preclusive effect of res judicata. The court agrees.
“The rules for res judicata, where a federal court is
considering the effect of its own prior disposition of a federal
claim on a newly brought federal claim, are a matter of federal
law.” AVX Corp. v. Cabot Corp., 424 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2005).
“[T]he elements of a [claim preclusion] defense are (1) a final
judgment on the merits in an earlier proceeding, (2) sufficient
identicality between the causes of action asserted in the
earlier and later suits, and (3) sufficient identicality between
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the parties in the two actions.” In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers
Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003). A plaintiff is also
barred from litigating claims in a subsequent action that could
have been, but were not, litigated in an earlier suit. Silva v.
City of New Bedford, 660 F.3d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 2011); see Taylor
v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (“By precluding parties
from contesting matters that they had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate, [res judicata] protect[s] against the
expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserve[s]
judicial resources, and foster[s] reliance on judicial action by
minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.”) (quoting
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979) (internal
quotations omitted)).
Here, it is “conclusively evident,” Raytheon Co., 334 F.
Supp. at 523, that the elements of res judicata are satisfied.
First, the court granted UPS’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim and issued a final judgment on the merits in favor
of UPS. Judge Barbadoro found that dismissal of plaintiff’s
claims was warranted on multiple grounds. Samora I, Order (Doc.
No. 11) at 3. Failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), operates as a dismissal on the merits with res
judicata effect. Isaac v. Schwartz, 706 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.
1983) see also Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S.
394, 399 n. 3 (1981) (“The dismissal for failure to state a
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claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a
‘judgment on the merits’”).
The second element of the res judicata analysis --
sufficient identicality between the two cases at issue -- is met
where “[t]he substance of the cause of action that [Plaintiff]
asserts is materially identical” in both actions. In re Colonial
Mortgage Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d at 17; see also Mass. Sch. of
Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir.
1998) (“This boils down to whether the causes of action arise
out of a common nucleus of operative facts.”). This element is
easily satisfied here. The plaintiff alleged in Samora I that he
resigned in 2016 after he was blocked from a position transfer
and was harassed and discriminated against by his colleagues and
managers. Samora I, Compl. (Doc. No. 1-1) at 6. In this case,
he again alleges he was blocked from a position transfer and was
harassed and discriminated against by his coworkers and
managers. Compl., (Doc. 1) at 4. It is indisputable that both
actions involve the same facts related to his employment and
purported mistreatment. The second requirement for res judicata
is therefore met. The third element is satisfied because the
parties in the two actions are the same.
For the most part, plaintiff’s objection (Doc. No. 6),
reiterates the factual allegations concerning harassment and
discrimination that form the basis of the complaint. In an
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attempt to avoid the preclusive effects of the judgment in
Samora I, plaintiff asserts that he was not “given a hearing
where a judge could hear my testimony.” Obj. (Doc. No. 6) at 1.
This argument is insufficient to defeat UPS’s motion, as there
is no entitlement to a hearing on a motion to dismiss. See
Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 364 (1st Cir.2001)
(observing that “motions to dismiss generally do not necessitate
evidentiary hearings”) (citing Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892
F.2d 1115, 1120 (1st Cir.1989))); see Also LR 7.1(d) (“Except as
otherwise provided, the court shall decide motions without oral
argument.”). Accordingly, res judicata bars Mr. Samora’s second
lawsuit against UPS.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the district judge should grant the
defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 5). As there are no
circumstances under which an amendment could overcome the
preclusive effect of Samora I, dismissal should be with
prejudice.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to
this Report and Recommendation are subject to review in the
district court. See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat'l Ins. Co.,
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617 F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010). Any issues not preserved by
such objection(s) are precluded on appeal. See id. Failure to
file any objections within the specified time waives the right
to appeal the district court's Order. See Santos-Santos v.
Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
______________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
February 26, 2024
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