Duguay v. RBS Citizens - CCO Mortgage et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Danielle Mary Duguay
v. 	Case No. 26-cv-155-SM-AJ
RBS Citizens – CCO Mortgage, et al.
Report and Recommendation
Plaintiff Danielle Mary Duguay, who represents herself,
brings this suit against the defendants1 alleging fraudulent
conduct in connection with her 2009 mortgage loan. 	See Amended
Complaint (Doc. No. 3). 	Her amended complaint is before the
undersigned magistrate judge for a report and recommendation on
preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Local
Rule 4.3(d)(2). 	For the following reasons, the district judge
should dismiss Ms. Duguay’s amended complaint because her
federal law claims are time barred by the applicable statutes of
limitation and the court should decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
Legal Standard
The court conducts a preliminary review of complaints filed
by plaintiffs, like Ms. Duguay, who are permitted to proceed
1 The defendants include RBS Citizens – CCO Mortgage
(“Citizens Bank”), the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”), Brian Pecjo, Ann Pecjo, Dennis Cote,
Michelle Sama, and Does 1-100.
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without prepaying the filing fee. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2);
L.R. 4.3(d)(2). 	The court may dismiss claims, sua sponte, if
the court lacks jurisdiction, a defendant is immune from the
relief sought, or the plaintiff fails to allege facts to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. 	See id. 	The court
treats as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, and
construes reasonable inferences in Ms. Duguay’s favor. 	See
Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.
2011). 	Because Ms. Duguay proceeds pro se, the court construes
her pleading liberally. 	See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curium).
Background
Ms. Duguay alleges violations of the Truth in Lending Act
(“TILA”) (Count I), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(“RESPA”) (Count II), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”) (Count III), and brings several state
law claims sounding in fraud (Counts IV- XVI). 	Ms. Duguay’s
claims arise out of a mortgage loan related to property located
at 99 Ridge Road, Center Ossipee (the “property”). 	She seeks
various forms of injunctive and monetary relief.
In November 2009, Ms. Duguay engaged Citizens Bank and Mr.
Cote for a home equity loan. 	Doc. No. 3 ¶ 19. 	Ms. Duguay
alleges that, instead of only providing a limited home equity
loan, Citizens Bank and Mr. Cote originated a new mortgage loan
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for the property. 	Id. ¶ 23. 	Ms. Duguay alleges that this was
done without her knowledge or consent. 	Id. ¶ 25. 	Ms. Duguay
was unable to afford the monthly payments for the new mortgage
loan. 	Id. 	Ms. Duguay struggled to make payments on the
mortgage from 2009 to 2015. 	Id. ¶ 34.
In March 2015, Ms. Duguay’s mother contacted Citizens Bank
and spoke to Ms. Sama, a Citizens Bank employee, to express her
interest and ability to pay the balance of Ms. Duguay’s loan.
Id. ¶¶ 36–37. 	Ms. Sama told her that the payment could not be
processed and that Ms. Duguay and her mother would have to wait
until the property went on the market. 	Id. ¶ 37.
In July 2015, Citizens Bank foreclosed on the property.
Id. ¶ 57. 	On December 29, 2015, Ms. Duguay was evicted from the
property. 	Id. ¶ 59. 	At some point between the foreclosure and
Ms. Duguay’s eviction, the property was transferred to HUD which
sold it to Mr. Pecjo for $82,000. 	Id. ¶ 61. 	Ms. Duguay alleges
that the purchase price was a fraction of the property’s fair
market value. 	Id. 	She contends that Mr. Pecjo has acquired 15
other properties through similar transactions. 	Id. ¶ 64. 	Three
years after his acquisition of the property, Mr. Pecjo added Ms.
Pecjo to the deed, making her a co-owner. 	Id. ¶ 82. 	Ms. Duguay
alleges that she sent Mr. Pecjo a message on December 24, 2024
informing him that she was taking back her property and
demanding that he immediately vacate. 	Id. ¶ 68. 	She alleges
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that Mr. Pecjo did vacate and has not returned to the property.
Id. ¶¶ 69–70.
Ms. Duguay previously filed suit against RBS Citizens and
Mr. Cote in 2019.2 	See Duguay v. RBS Citizens Fin. Grp., et al.,
19-cv-1103-LM. 	In that suit, Ms. Duguay claimed that Citizens
Bank and Mr. Cote engaged in fraudulent actions related to the
2009 mortgage loan. 	See id., Doc. No. 1. 	The court dismissed
her suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 	See id., Doc.
No. 4 (R&R); 6 (R&R Adopted). 	Therein, the court noted that the
acts complained of took place in 2009 and 2015, beyond the scope
of New Hampshire’s statute of limitations period. 	Id., Doc. No.
4 at 5 n.5. 	That decision was not appealed. 	See generally id.
Ms. Duguay then filed this action on February 10, 2026.
Discussion
The court first addresses the relevant statutes of
limitations for Ms. Duguay’s federal claims before turning to
her state law tort claims.
2 The court considers Ms. Duguay’s 2019 suit because, while
the court may not ordinarily consider documents outside the
complaint on preliminary review, it is permissible to consider
official public records, including court filings. 	See Gillis v.
Chase, No. 1:16-cv-11451-ADB, 2017 WL 1535082, at *1 (D. Mass.
Apr. 27, 2017) (citing Alt. Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and
Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001)).
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I. 	Statute of Limitations
a. TILA
“The statute of limitations for claims for rescission under
TILA varies depending on the circumstances, but is—―at most―—
three years after the extension of credit.” 	In re Sheedy, 801
F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f)).
Because Ms. Duguay’s TILA claim is based on insufficient
disclosures, the limitations period runs from the date of the
transaction at which the disclosures should have been made,
i.e., November 2009. 	See Philibotte v. Nisource Corp. Servs.
Co., 793 F.3d 159, 164 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing 15 U.S.C. §
1640(e)). 	Accordingly, Ms. Duguay had until November 2012 to
bring her TILA claim. 	Having filed this suit in 2026, Ms.
Duguay failed to meet the TILA limitations period.
Ms. Duguay contends that she is entitled to rescind beyond
TILA’s ordinary three-year period because the defendants failed
to provide her with the required notice of recission rights or
make required disclosures. 	Some courts have applied equitable
tolling to TILA claims where the plaintiff has “in some
extraordinary circumstances. . . been prevented from asserting
[her] rights.” 	Taggart v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 355 Fed. Appx.
731 732 (3rd Cir. 2009). 	The equitable tolling doctrine does
not save Ms. Duguay’s claims. 	Ms. Duguay has not alleged that
the defendants prevented her from asserting her rights in any
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way. 	See Corcoran v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. 09-11468-
NMG, 2010 WL 2106179, at *3 (D. Mass. May 24, 2010) (citations
omitted). 	Her allegations do not feature extraordinary
circumstances warranting application of equitable tolling.
b. RESPA
The statute of limitations for RESPA claims is, at most,
three years from the alleged violation. 	12 U.S.C. § 2614. 	The
latest allegations that could give rise to RESPA violations
occurred in 2015. 	Accordingly, the statute of limitations on
those alleged violations expired in 2018 at the latest. 	Having
filed this suit in 2026, Ms. Duguay’s RESPA claim is untimely.
c. Tolling of the TILA and RESPA Limitations Periods
In her amended complaint, Ms. Duguay refers to her
inability to discover the full extent of the defendants’ conduct
until recently. 	Doc. No. 3 ¶ 99. 	In particular, Ms. Duguay
points to her recent discovery of: (1) her Social Security
records indicating she had zero income in 2009; (2) that the
subject loan was not properly securitized and Citizens bank
lacked standing to foreclose; (3) that forensic analysis would
reveal violations of TILA and RESPA; (4) that Mr. Pecjo acquired
14 other properties through similar HUD transactions; and (5)
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other facts giving rise to her claims discovered only through
consultation with legal experts and forensic audits.3 	Id.
In some instances, the statute of limitations may be tolled
where the plaintiff did not know or reasonably could have known
the factual basis for her claim. 	See Donahue v. United States,
634 F.3d 615, 623 (1st Cir. 2011) (applying the doctrine to an
FTCA claim). 	While the First Circuit has not directly addressed
whether a delayed discovery doctrine may apply to claims brought
under TILA or RESPA, other courts have and rejected its
applicability. 	See Tripp v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 6:18-cv-
00983-MK, 2019 WL 1373678, at *6 n.2 (D. Or. Feb. 12, 2019)
(collecting cases).
Even if the court were to apply the delayed discovery
doctrine to Ms. Duguay’s claims, it would not save them. 	Ms.
Duguay knew the factual basis for her claim by 2019 at the
latest. 	In her 2019 suit, she articulated the same concerns
underlying her claims here. 	Therein, she stated, “27 months ago
I realized I had been a victim of wrongful eviction,
3 Ms. Duguay also contends that her delay in filing was
caused by her lack of financial resources and difficulty
obtaining legal assistance. 	Financial restriction, however,
does not “constitute extraordinary circumstances necessary to
invoke equitable tolling of the statute of limitations period.”
Moser v. Ayala, No. 13-1329(MEL), 2013 WL 12234521, *2 (D.P.R.
Dec. 10, 2013) (citing Hannahs v. United States, 75 A.T.F.R.2d
95-1150, 1995 WL 230461 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 30, 1995) (“Financial
hardship … is not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling of the
limitations period.”)).
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foreclosure, and loan fraud.” 	19-cv-1103-LM, Doc. No. 1 at 5.
Ms. Duguay’s 2019 suit makes clear that she was aware of her
injury and of the causal connection between it and the
defendants’ alleged actions more than seven years ago. 	See
Brooks v. Gillen, No. 17-2672(MCA), 2018 WL 1981480, at *6
(D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2018) (holding that the plaintiff’s 1983 claim
was time-barred because he knew of his injury before the
limitations period expired as evidenced by his previous suit
against different defendants for the same injury). 	The five
reasons Ms. Duguay articulates for her delayed suit relate to
her acquisition of new evidence which she contends supports her
allegations, not information necessary for her to connect her
injury with the defendants’ actions. 	There is no reading of Ms.
Duguay’s allegations to support the conclusion that she did not
know nor could she have known that she had been injured by the
defendants’ actions.
Consequently, the district judge should dismiss Ms.
Duguay’s TILA and RESPA claims (Counts I and II) because she
filed suit beyond the applicable statutes of limitations and the
delayed discovery doctrine cannot save her otherwise untimely
claims.
d. RICO
A plaintiff seeking to recover under RICO must file suit
within four years of the date when she knew or should have known
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of her injury. 	See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 554 n.2
(2000) (leaving the question open as to whether the discovery
rule applies to the civil RICO statute of limitations); Lares
Grp., II v. Tobin, 221 F.3d 41, 43 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that
the statute of limitations in a civil RICO action begins to run
at “the time a plaintiff knew or should have known of his
injury”).
The record indicates that, at the latest, Ms. Duguay knew
of the alleged RICO fraud by 2019 when she first filed suit
regarding the mortgage transaction. 	At that point, she knew of
her injury and its connection to the alleged fraud.
Accordingly, because she filed this action in 2026, more than
four years after the record demonstrates that she had sufficient
knowledge to bring suit, her civil RICO claim is time barred.
Where the facts alleged in the complaint show that the
claims are time-barred, and there is no possibility that the
statute may have been tolled, the court may dismiss the
complaint on preliminary review. 	See Pigott v. Lynn Police
Dep't, 7 F.3d 218, 1993 WL 375821, at *5 (1st Cir. Sept. 27,
1993). 	For the reasons set forth above, the statutes of
limitations on Ms. Duguay’s federal law claims (Counts I–III)
have expired. 	The district judge should dismiss them on that
basis.
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II. 	Supplemental Jurisdiction
Without the federal law claims, Ms. Duguay’s amended
complaint is comprised solely of state law claims. 	Generally,
when a plaintiff alleges both federal and state law claims and
the claims are sufficiently closely related to form part of the
same case or controversy, federal courts may properly exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. 	See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a). 	However, when all federal claims are
dismissed prior to trial, “it is generally appropriate for a
federal court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over any remaining state-law claims.” 	Dispensa v. Nat. Conf. of
Catholic Bishops, No. 19-cv-556-LM, 2020 WL 2573013, at *12
(D.N.H. May 21, 2020) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carnegie-
Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). 	Nothing
in this case provides good cause for deviating from that general
rule. 	See Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635,
639 (2009) (“A district court’s decision whether to exercise
[supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over
which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.”).
Because Ms. Duguay relies on federal question jurisdiction4 and
dismissal of all federal claims is recommended, the district
judge should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and
dismiss Ms. Duguay’s state law claims (Counts IV-XVI) without
prejudice.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should
dismiss Ms. Duguay’s amended complaint without prejudice to her
ability to litigate her state law claims in state court.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. 	See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. 	Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to
this Report and Recommendation are subject to review in the
district court. 	See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat'l Ins. Co.,
617 F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010). 	Any issues not preserved by
such objection(s) are precluded on appeal. 	See id. 	Failure to
file specific written objections to the Report and
Recommendation within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the district court’s order. 	See Santos-Santos v. Torres-
Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
April 27, 2026
cc: 	Danielle Mary Duguay, pro se
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