Bergeron v. Bergeron et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Deborah A. Bergeron
v. Case No. 26-cv-201-JL-AJ
Eric P. Bergeron, L. Johnathan
Ross, Jeffrey Gaumont, Scott
W. Murray, and Keely Noyes
Report and Recommendation
Plaintiff Deborah A. Bergeron, appearing pro se, brings
this action arising out of the divorce proceeding between her
and defendant Eric Bergeron. See Doc. No. 1 (Complaint).
Defendants Johnathan Ross and Jeffrey Gaumont were attorneys
involved in the proceeding, defendant Judge Scott Murray
presided over the proceeding, and defendant Keely Noyes acted as
a mediator between the parties. Ms. Bergeron’s complaint is
before the undersigned magistrate judge for a report and
recommendation on preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) and Local Rule 4.3(d)(2). For the following reasons,
the district judge should dismiss Ms. Bergeron’s complaint
because her claims against Judge Murray and Ms. Noyes are barred
by judicial and quasi-judicial immunity and the court should
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims.
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Legal Standard
The court conducts a preliminary review of complaints filed
by plaintiffs, like Ms. Bergeron, who are permitted to proceed
without prepaying the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2);
L.R. 4.3(d)(2). The court may dismiss claims, sua sponte, if
the court lacks jurisdiction, a defendant is immune from the
relief sought, or the plaintiff fails to allege facts to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. See id. The court
treats as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, and
construes reasonable inferences in Ms. Bergeron’s favor. See
Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.
2011). Because Ms. Bergeron proceeds pro se, the court
construes her pleading liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curium).
Background
The court derives the following facts from Ms. Bergeron’s
complaint in accordance with the standard of review.
Ms. Bergeron and Mr. Bergeron were once married. At some
point, Ms. Bergeron suffered a serious fall resulting in head
injuries and broken wrists. Following her fall, in March 2024,
Mr. Bergeron left Ms. Bergeron and initiated a divorce
proceeding in the 6th Circuit – Family Division – Franklin.
Judge Murray presided over that proceeding. Attorney Gaumont,
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representing Ms. Bergeron, filed a cross-petition for divorce.
Attorney Gaumont did not submit supportive evidence. Attorney
Gaumont ultimately withdrew from his representation of Ms.
Bergeron. Attorney Ross filed a motion Ms. Bergeron alleges was
inadmissible and slanderous.
Ms. Bergeron alleges that Judge Murray deleted “divorce
record” two weeks after the final hearing and withheld discovery
from the hearing. Judge Murray declined to appoint counsel for
Ms. Bergeron despite her report that medications she took for
her mental health disability caused mind altering effects,
exacerbating her stress. Ms. Bergeron alleges that Judge Murray
did not consider her health. She alleges that, at one point,
Attorney Ross, Mr. Bergeron, and Judge Murray went into chambers
during a hearing on a motion for reconsideration, leaving Ms.
Bergeron alone in the courtroom.
Ms. Bergeron alleges that she was entitled to spousal
support from Mr. Bergeron. She alleges that Mr. Bergeron hid
assets totaling over $30 million not disclosed in his financial
affidavit. Ms. Bergeron asserts that Mr. Bergeron earns almost
one million dollars a year, owns four properties, and has seven
bank accounts from which he withdraws $5,000 daily. She also
alleges that Mr. Bergeron has claimed her as a dependent on his
federal taxes.
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Attorney Ross told Ms. Bergeron that any money she received
could not be used to obtain counsel.
At some point, the parties engaged in court-sponsored
mediation. Ms. Noyes served as the mediator. Ms. Bergeron
alleges that this posed a conflict of interest because Ms. Noyes
previously worked at Attorney Ross’s law firm. There, Mr.
Bergeron was “not present” and Attorney Ross did all the
speaking. During mediation, Ms. Bergeron requested spousal
support. Ms. Noyes asked why Ms. Bergeron felt she was entitled
to spousal support. Ms. Bergeron responded that she was unable
to support herself as a disabled person. Attorney Ross told Ms.
Bergeron that if she did not “sign off from spousal support,”
she would not get any money.
Ms. Bergeron alleges that neither she nor Mr. Bergeron went
before a judge to sign spousal support. She also contends that
she never went to court to sign divorce papers. Attorney Ross
sent them via USPS and told her to sign and return them. She
alleges that they were not notarized.
Ms. Bergeron alleges that Attorney Gaumont only went to one
hearing but charged her almost $10,000. She asserts that his
bill of lading is missing $3,500 in payments. Ms. Bergeron
called Attorney Gaumont to refund her money. He did not return
her calls. On March 13, 2026, she went to his office to ask for
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a refund. Attorney Gaumont became aggressive and lunged at her,
screaming at her to get out of his office.
Ms. Bergeron contends that Mr. Bergeron has not complied
with a court order to pay her $13,950. She alleges that
Attorney Ross instructed him not to do so. Ms. Bergeron asserts
that, at one point, Mr. Bergeron threatened to have her beat up
at a storage unit.
Discussion
In her complaint, Ms. Bergeron does not enumerate specific
causes of action against the defendants. In her civil cover
sheet, however, she notes causes of action for “hidden assets”,
“violation disabled respondent/[Ms. Bergeron] on mediations and
severely injured”, and “violation constitutional rights, case
deleted illegally 2 [weeks] [after] hearing.” See Doc. No. 1-1.
Ms. Bergeron does not lay out the forms of relief she seeks but,
at minimum, the court understands that she seeks the institution
of a spousal support payment structure.
The court begins with the claims against Judge Murray and
Ms. Noyes. Regardless of the precise legal theory Ms. Bergeron
is pursuing, Judge Murray and Ms. Noyes are immune from suit.
“The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity for judges
seeks to ensure that judges, ‘in exercising the authority vest
in them, shall be free to act upon their own convictions,
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without apprehension of personal consequences to themselves’
from lawsuits filed by disappointed litigants.” Suny v. KCP
Advisory Grp., LLC, 152 F.4th 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871)). “To achieve that
aim, it bars all claims against judges for acts done ‘in the
exercise of their judicial functions.’” Id. (quoting Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978)). The application of
judicial immunity “depends on the nature of the functions
performed and ‘the effect that exposure to particular forms of
liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those
functions.’” Id. (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224
(1988)). “In other words, absolute judicial immunity protects
only ‘truly judicial’ — i.e., adjudicative — acts, and not
‘administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges
may on occasion be assigned by law to perform.’” Id. at 30
(quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227).
Ms. Bergeron alleges that Judge Murray “deleted divorce
record [two weeks after] final hearing before divorce [was]
final, withheld disc [sic] from hearing,” held an in chambers
conference with Mr. Bergeron and counsel without her, and
declined to award Ms. Bergeron spousal support despite knowing
of her health problems. Doc. No. 1. Judge Murray’s alleged
conduct was an exercise of his judicial functions. Though Ms.
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Bergeron may allege that Judge Murray purposefully interfered
with the proceeding, negatively impacting its result, that does
not bar immunity. Under the doctrine of judicial immunity, “[a]
judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he
took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Accordingly, Judge Murray is immune from suit for the conduct
alleged by Ms. Bergeron and any claims against him should be
dismissed on that basis. See Thomas v. Wilkins, 61 F. Supp. 3d
13, 19 (D.D.C. 2014) (applying judicial immunity to bar the
plaintiffs claims where he alleged that a judge sabotaged his
case by “falsifying documents, destroying documents and
infiltrating the administrative office of the clerk to
perpetuate his malicious endeavors”); cf. Palowsky v. Benson,
No. 23-760, 2025 WL 540459, at *4 (W.D. La. Feb. 18, 2025)
(analyzing quasi-judicial immunity and noting that “courts have
specifically held that clerks are entitled to immunity even when
alleged to have destroyed filings”).
The court next addresses whether the claims against Ms.
Noyes are likewise barred by quasi-judicial immunity. “Quasi-
judicial immunity, as the name suggests, is an outgrowth of
judicial immunity created to address the fact that certain
judicial functions are performed by nonjudicial actors.” Suny,
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152 F.4th at 30. The doctrine applies to “non-judges who act in
a judicial capacity, meaning that they ‘exercise a discretionary
judgment’ in helping resolve disputes between the parties.” Id.
(quoting Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436
(1993)). “Said differently, it extends to persons who,
‘irrespective of their title, perform functions essentially
similar to those of judges in a setting similar to that of a
court.’” Id. (quoting Bettencourt v. Bd. of Registration in
Med. of Mass., 904 F.2d 772, 782 (1st Cir. 1990)). Under that
principle, the doctrine has been extended to court-appointed
mediators. See Williams v. Truesdell, No. 2:25-cv-00301-BHH-
MHC, 2025 WL 2324828, at *6 (D.S.C. May 2, 2025) (collecting
cases for the proposition that court-appointed mediators are
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity); DeSouza v. Kennedy, No.
3:16-cv-01126, 2017 WL 3431393, at *5 (D. Conn. Aug. 9, 2017)
(same).
Ms. Noyes, as a court-appointed mediator, is entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity for the conduct Ms. Bergeron alleges.
In her role as a court-appointed mediator, Ms. Noyes exercised
discretionary judgment in helping resolve the dispute between
Ms. Bergeron and Mr. Bergeron. Ms. Noyes was acting within her
jurisdiction despite any alleged conflict of interest. See
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991) (explaining that
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judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or
malice). Accordingly, any claims against Ms. Noyes should be
dismissed because she is immune.
Having concluded the claims against Judge Murray and Ms.
Noyes are barred by the doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial
immunity, the court turns to the claims against Mr. Bergeron and
Attorneys Ross and Gaumont. Ms. Bergeron’s claims against those
defendants are grounded in state law. When only state-law
claims remain, “it is generally appropriate for a federal court
to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
remaining state-law claims.” Dispensa v. Nat. Conf. of Catholic
Bishops, No. 19-cv-556-LM, 2020 WL 2573013, at *12 (D.N.H. May
21, 2020) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carnegie-Mellon Univ.
v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Nothing in this case
provides good cause for deviating from that general rule. See
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009)
(“A district court’s decision whether to exercise [supplemental]
jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had
original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.”).
Because diversity jurisdiction is not appropriate here, see
BRT Mgmt. LLC v. Malden Storage LLC, 68 F.4th 691, 695 (1st Cir.
2023) (noting that diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) requires complete diversity; “that is, no plaintiff may
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be a citizen of the same state as any defendant”); Doc. No. 1
(noting Mr. Bergeron’s New Hampshire residence), and Ms.
Bergeron’s claims are either barred by judicial immunity or
based on state law, the court should decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss Ms. Bergeron’s state law
claims without prejudice to being filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should
dismiss Ms. Bergeron’s claims against Judge Murray and Ms. Noyes
and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims. Any objections to this Report and
Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of receipt of
this notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day
period may be extended upon motion. Only those issues raised in
the objection(s) to this Report and Recommendation are subject
to review in the district court. See Sch. Union No. 37 v.
United Nat'l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010). Any
issues not preserved by such objection(s) are precluded on
appeal. See id. Failure to file specific written objections to
the Report and Recommendation within the specified time waives
the right to appeal the district court’s order. See Santos-
Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
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__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
May 13, 2026
cc: Deborah A. Bergeron, pro se
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