LURCH v. BERNAL et al

1
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ROBERT DEREK LURCH, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
POLICE OFFICER DANIEL BERNAL,
et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 22-1506 (SDW) (SDA)
WHEREAS OPINION
October 16, 2026
WIGENTON, District Judge.
THIS MATTER having come before this Court upon Defendant Robson Roblete’s
(“Defendant Roblete”) Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 62 (“Motion”)) pro se Plaintiff Robert Derek
Lurch, Jr.’s (“Plaintiff”) Third Amended Complaint (D.E. 39 (“TAC”)) pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), and this Court having reviewed the parties’ submissions; and
WHEREAS Plaintiff filed his initial complaint (D.E. 1 (“Initial Complaint”)) pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 17, 2022. The Initial Complaint names three defendants: Officer
Daniel Bernal (“Defendant Bernal”), Officer Brian Holmes (“Defendant Holmes”), and a fictitious
“Doctor that ordered the sedatives.” (D.E. 1 at 1.) It alleges that on September 27, 2020, the two
officers arrested Plaintiff without probable cause, and the doctor authorized that Plaintiff be
involuntarily medicated in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Id. at 5–
10); and
WHEREAS this Court dismissed the Initial Complaint on April 21, 2022 for failure to
state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (D.E. 6.) On May 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed an
Case 2:22-cv-01506-SDW-SDA Document 78 Filed 10/16/26 Page 1 of 5 PageID:
<pageID>

2
amended complaint (D.E. 9 (“First Amended Complaint”)) against the same three defendants,
alleging additional facts and bringing an additional claim for excessive force. By orders dated
August 29, 2022 (D.E. 13) and September 16, 2022 (D.E. 16), this Court allowed Plaintiff’s
excessive force claim against Defendant Bernal and Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process
claim against the fictitious doctor defendant to proceed. This Court dismissed all other claims
with prejudice. (D.E. 13); and
WHEREAS on March 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a letter with this Court, identifying Ariel
Sena (“Defendant Sena”) as “the doctor who unlawfully ordered the sedative.” (D.E. 27 at 2.)
Although neither the Initial Complaint nor the First Amended Complaint named a nurse defendant,
Plaintiff’s letter identified Defendant Roblete as “the nurse who administered the medication,” and
classified the nurse as one of the “hospital defendants.” (Id. at 1–2.) Plaintiff then filed a Second
Amended Complaint on January 24, 2024, naming Defendant Bernal, Defendant Sena, and
Defendant Roblete as the three defendants. (D.E. 35.) On April 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Third
Amended Complaint against the same three defendants, which is now the operative pleading in
this action; and
WHEREAS Plaintiff’s “Force Medication Claim” is his only claim against Defendant
Roblete. (TAC at 15–18.) Plaintiff alleges that following his September 27, 2020 arrest, officers
transported him to University Hospital for further medical evaluation. (Id. at 9–10.) At the
hospital, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Roblete forcibly administered sedative medication to
Plaintiff in violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 10, 17–
18); and
WHEREAS to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
Case 2:22-cv-01506-SDW-SDA Document 78 Filed 10/16/26 Page 2 of 5 PageID:
<pageID>

3
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
federal courts “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint
in the light favorable to the plaintiff,” and determine “whether [the] plaintiff may be entitled to
relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d
Cir. 2010); and
WHEREAS a statute of limitations defense is an appropriate basis for dismissal on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss when the time alleged on the face of the complaint shows that a claim
is barred by the statute of limitations. See Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014);
and
WHEREAS this Court applies a state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to
claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197, 209 (3d Cir.
2024). All the events alleged in the complaint took place in New Jersey, which employs a 2-year
statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2 (providing that
personal injury actions “shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of any such
action shall have accrued”); and
WHEREAS in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, this Court applies federal law to determine when
a claim accrues. See Coello v. DiLeo, 43 F.4th 346, 352 (3d Cir. 2022). “Under that law, a § 1983
action begins to run from the time that a plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of any injury
which is the basis of the action.” Id. As for tolling defenses to the statute of limitations, federal
courts apply state law, unless inconsistent with federal law. See Dique v. New Jersey State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010); and
Case 2:22-cv-01506-SDW-SDA Document 78 Filed 10/16/26 Page 3 of 5 PageID:
<pageID>

4
WHEREAS Plaintiff alleges that on September 27, 2020, he was forcibly medicated
without his consent, and he “felt violated” when he woke up and realized that someone changed
his clothes while he was sedated. (TAC at 10.) It is therefore apparent on the face of the Third
Amended Complaint that on September 27, 2020, Plaintiff knew, or had reason to know, of the
injury giving rise to his claim against Defendant Roblete; and
WHEREAS because Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Roblete accrued on September
27, 2020, the applicable statute of limitations ran on September 27, 2022. But Plaintiff did not
bring any claim against Defendant Roblete, or even a fictitious nurse defendant, until Plaintiff filed
the Second Amended Complaint on January 24, 2024, more than one year after the limitations
period ran; and
WHEREAS New Jersey’s fictitious-party rule is inapplicable here. The fictitious-party
rule enables a plaintiff to timely file a claim against a defendant whose identity is unknown by
pleading a fictitious name and adding “an appropriate description sufficient for identification.”
N.J. Ct. R. 4:26-4. It does not, of course, apply when the plaintiff describes one fictitious defendant
but later seeks to join a claim against a new, undescribed defendant outside of the applicable
limitations period. See Greczyn v. Colgate-Palmolive, 869 A.2d 866, 869–870 (2005). Here, the
Initial Complaint describes and asserts a claim against a distinct, fictitious doctor defendant who
authorized the medication. (D.E. 1 at 1, 6.) The First Amended Complaint adds further detail and
alleges the involvement of both a doctor and a nurse; but specifically alleges that the doctor “was
dictating the nurse[’]s actions,” and asserts the Fourteenth Amendment claim only against the
“Doctor who ordered sedatives and directed the nurse . . . to forcefully medicate the plaintiff.”
(D.E. 9 at 11, 24–25.) Plaintiff fictitiously named the doctor, not the nurse, as a defendant, and
Case 2:22-cv-01506-SDW-SDA Document 78 Filed 10/16/26 Page 4 of 5 PageID:
<pageID>

5
Plaintiff’s March 27, 2023 letter later identified the fictitious doctor defendant as Defendant Sena,
not Defendant Roblete. (D.E. 27 at 2); and
WHEREAS for similar reasons, Plaintiff’s claim does not relate back to the Initial
Complaint under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). That Rule provides that when an amended pleading changes
the party against whom a claim is asserted, the amendment will only relate back to the date of the
original pleading when the new defendant “(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be
prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the action would
have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C). The Initial Complaint alleges that “officials went and got a doctor to agree to
forcibly medicate [Plaintiff],” and names a fictitious “Doctor that ordered the sedatives” as a
defendant. (D.E. 1 at 1, 6.) This does not, as Plaintiff argues, “place[] all involved actors at issue,”
(D.E. 70 at 2), and Defendant Roblete had no basis to know the claim would have been brought
against him if Plaintiff knew his identity; and
WHEREAS based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Roblete is barred
by the applicable statute of limitations; therefore
Defendant Roblete’s Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant
Roblete are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. An appropriate order follows.
_ /s/ Susan D. Wigenton
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.
Orig: Clerk
cc: Parties
Stacey D. Adams, U.S.M.J.
Case 2:22-cv-01506-SDW-SDA Document 78 Filed 10/16/26 Page 5 of 5 PageID:
<pageID>