USA v. BROWN

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
DAVID BROWN,
Defendant.
No. 23-cr-83
OPINION & ORDER
CECCHI, District Judge.
Defendant David Brown (“Defendant”) was charged by indictment with possession of a
firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ECF No. 27.
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s omnibus pretrial motion (the “Omnibus Motion”). ECF
No. 36. The Government filed a brief in opposition, ECF No. 39, and Defendant replied, ECF No.
41. On July 9, 2026, the Court held oral argument on the Omnibus Motion. ECF No. 65.
Thereafter, the parties submitted Court-ordered supplemental briefing. ECF Nos. 67, 69; see also
ECF No. 66. For the reasons stated below, the Court will largely deny Defendant’s motion, but
will reserve judgment on a discovery-related issue pending an additional submission from the
parties.
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I. 	BACKGROUND1
At around 3:45 p.m. on December 17, 2021, Newark Detectives Serrano, Severe, and
Johnson (the “Detectives”) observed a white Chevrolet Malibu (the “Malibu”) driving without a
license plate on the front bumper of the vehicle. ECF No. 36-1 at 5 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:3-
33). The Detectives began trailing the Malibu in their service vehicle and, shortly thereafter, they
observed the Malibu turn right without signaling. Id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-126). Although
Defendant states in an affidavit that he was driving “lawfully,” ECF No. 51 ¶ 3, visual evidence
confirms that the Malibu’s front license plate was placed on the passenger side of the vehicle’s
dashboard on the day of the incident, ECF No. 39-2, Gov’t Ex. 2; ECF No. 67 at 3. In addition,
Defendant does not state in his affidavit that he used his right turn signal. See ECF No. 51.
The Malibu then pulled into a parking lot and Defendant emerged from the driver’s seat,
closing the Malibu’s driver-side door but leaving the car’s windows open. ECF No. 36-1 at 5. As
Defendant began walking away from the Malibu, Detective Johnson stopped the police car and
identified himself and his partners as law enforcement officers. Id. The Detectives then exited
1 The Court takes background facts principally from the Newark Police incident report of
Defendant’s arrest (the “Incident Report”), which Defendant and the Government both attached to
and relied on in their initial briefing. See ECF No. 36-1 at 4–5; ECF No. 39-1 at 1–4; see also
ECF No. 36-1 at 1–2 (Defense counsel’s affidavit in support of the Omnibus Motion extensively
references the Incident Report). Defendant also submitted an affidavit “in support of [his] motion
to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search . . . as well as [his] request for a[n]
evidentiary hearing on this issue.” ECF No. 51 ¶ 2. However, Defendant submitted this affidavit
over seven months after submitting his Omnibus Motion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 47(d) (“The moving
party must serve any supporting affidavit with the motion.”). Notwithstanding Defendant’s failure
to comply with Criminal Rule 47(d), see United States v. Lewis, No. 17-CR-28, 2018 WL 3195158,
at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2018) (“[Rule] 47(d) requires . . . the moving party to ‘serve any
supporting affidavit with the motion,’ not at a later date.” (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 47(d)), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 17-CR-28, 2018 WL 1805554 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2018), the
affidavit does not change the Court’s analysis, so the Court will incorporate its contents as
background where relevant, see ECF No. 70 (“Hr’g Tr.”) at 21:6–8 (Assistant U.S. Attorney: “And
so erring on the side of caution and considering it . . . may be the safest course of action.”).
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their vehicle and Detective Serrano immediately smelled “an overwhelming odor of raw marijuana
emanating from” the Malibu. Id. One of the detectives then asked Defendant if there was anything
in the Malibu other than marijuana, to which Defendant replied, “yeah, a strap,” in an apparent
reference to a firearm. Id. at 2, 5. The Detectives then called the Essex County Sheriff’s Office
and requested a K-9 team. Id. at 5. While they waited for the K-9 team to arrive, the Detectives
checked Defendant’s identification and discovered two open traffic warrants against him. Id.
During this time, Defendant states that he “repeatedly asked” officers what crime he was alleged
to have committed, but none of the officers “revealed any information.” ECF No. 51 ¶ 6. But, as
the Government points out in its supplemental briefing, Defendant’s affidavit does not contest that
he made the “strap” statement. ECF No. 67 at 4; see also Hr’g Tr. at 20:2–4.
Roughly 40 minutes after the Detectives initially encountered the Malibu, Sergeant Graves
of the Essex County Sheriff’s Office arrived with two K-9s: Ollie, a weapons dog, and Kiera, a
narcotics dog. ECF No. 36-1 at 5. Sergeant Graves administered K-9 sniffs of the Malibu’s
exterior, during which Kiera failed to give an indication of narcotics, but Ollie gave a positive
indication of weapons on the driver’s side window and on the Malibu’s trunk. Id.
Shortly thereafter, the Detectives searched the Malibu and discovered a firearm loaded with
eight rounds in the car’s center console. Id. The Detectives also discovered a large quantity of
marijuana in the Malibu’s trunk. Id. The Detectives then arrested Defendant. Id. According to
Defendant, police informed him that officers had discovered a firearm in his car when he arrived
at Newark Police headquarters. ECF No. 51 ¶ 10.
On December 20, 2021, a federal criminal complaint was issued against Defendant for one
count of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
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922(g)(1). ECF No. 1. Defendant was indicted on that charge on February 1, 2023. ECF No. 27.
Defendant filed his Omnibus Motion thereafter. ECF No. 36.
II. 	OMNIBUS MOTION
Defendant raises several requests in his Omnibus Motion. Defendant asks the Court to (1)
suppress Defendant’s statement to law enforcement that there was a “strap” in the Malibu; (2)
suppress “all evidence seized from Defendant”; (3) hold an evidentiary hearing; (4) compel the
Government to produce a list of all potential witnesses; (5) compel the Government to preserve all
rough notes, drafts, and final reports created by law enforcement in the course of the investigation;
(6) compel the Government to produce all exculpatory evidence; and (7) compel the Government
to disclose all relevant information concerning all informants and witnesses. The Court will
address these requests in turn.
A. 	The Court Denies Defendant’s Motion to Suppress His Statement to Law
Enforcement
Defendant moves to suppress his statement to law enforcement that there was a “strap” in
the Malibu. ECF No. 36 at 6. In particular, Defendant argues that the Detectives did not read him
his Miranda warnings before asking him, “Is there anything besides marijuana in the vehicle?” Id.
Therefore, Defendant claims that the Fifth Amendment bars the Government from using his
response—“yeah, a strap”—at trial. Id.
The Court will deny Defendant’s request to suppress his statement that there was a “strap”
in the Malibu. Under the Miranda rule, the Government may not introduce during its case in chief
statements made by a defendant during a “‘custodial interrogation’ . . . unless he first had been
given the now-familiar Miranda warnings.” United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582, 584 (3d Cir.
1980) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)); see Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S.
344, 350–51 (1990). A defendant is in “custody” for Miranda purposes if “the relevant
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environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house
questioning at issue in Miranda.” United States v. Ludwikowski, 944 F.3d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 2019)
(quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012)). And a defendant is subject to an
“interrogation” for Miranda purposes if law enforcement either (1) engages in “express
questioning” or (2) speaks or acts in a manner that law enforcement “should know [is] reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response.” United States v. Williams, 635 F. Supp. 3d 333, 337
(D.N.J. 2022) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–02 (1980)). “A person must both
be ‘in custody’ and subject to ‘interrogation’ for Miranda safeguards to apply.” United States v.
Familetti, 878 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2017).
Defendant argues that the officer’s question, “is there anything besides marijuana in the
vehicle?,” was “offered to elicit an incriminating response.” ECF No. 41 at 1. From this, he argues
that “[a]ny statement [he] alleged[ly] . . . made” thereafter was elicited in violation of his Miranda
rights because “he was not free to leave the scene.” ECF No. 36 at 6.
The Court disagrees. Even if the Court assumes that Defendant was subject to an
interrogation under Miranda, “the . . . noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops” means “that
persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of
Miranda.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); see also United States v. Ley, 876
F.3d 103, 108–09 (3d Cir. 2017); United States v. Elias, 832 F.2d 24, 26 (3d Cir. 1987) (“[I]n the
normal traffic stop, statements elicited by interrogation are admissible as evidence even if made
by a suspect who had not been read the Miranda warnings.”). Here, the question—“is there
anything besides marijuana in the vehicle?”—and Defendant’s response—“yeah, a strap”—
occurred very shortly after the Detectives stopped him. See United States v. Caraballo, 643 F.
App’x 163, 168 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that defendant was not in custody where “[t]he first
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exchange occurred very soon after Officer White pulled over Caraballo’s Mercedes”). Moreover,
the Detectives “took no additional actions that would cause this interaction to rise from a non-
coercive traffic stop to a curtailment of [Defendant’s] freedom of movement to ‘the degree
associated with a formal arrest.’” Id. (citation omitted). As such, because Defendant’s initial
interaction with law enforcement did not “present the same inherently coercive pressures as the
type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda,” his request to suppress his statement must
be denied. Ludwikowski, 944 F.3d at 131 (citation omitted); see United States v. Whitney, 350 F.
App’x 627, 630 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming the admissibility of defendant’s statements during a
traffic stop based on the “well-established rule” of Berkemer).
B. 	The Court Denies Defendant’s Request to Suppress the Firearm and
Ammunition Seized from the Malibu
Defendant moves to suppress the firearm and ammunition recovered from the Malibu. ECF
No. 36 at 5–6. Specifically, Defendant argues suppression is warranted because the traffic stop
was an unlawful seizure and a pretext for the search; officers lacked probable cause to justify the
search; the Government cannot rely on the suspected scent of marijuana; the search was conducted
without a warrant; and Defendant did not give consent to search his vehicle. Id.
The Court will deny Defendant’s motion to suppress the firearm and ammunition recovered
from the Malibu. To start, the Court finds that the Detectives’ traffic stop of Defendant was lawful
and that Defendant’s pretext argument is irrelevant. Law enforcement may initiate traffic stops
“based on a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred.” United States v. Green,
897 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2018); see United States v. Barton, No. 14-cr-237, 2015 WL 7252426,
at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2015) (“With regard to traffic stops, officers may make a warrantless,
investigative stop of a vehicle when they have a ‘reasonable suspicion’ of criminal conduct.”).
Just before the traffic stop, the Detectives observed Defendant driving without a license plate on
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the front bumper of his vehicle. ECF No. 36-1 at 5. Indeed, a photograph of the Malibu just after
the incident shows that the license plate was displayed on the passenger side of the car’s dashboard
and was “obstructed.” ECF No. 39 at 4. And at oral argument, Defendant’s counsel acknowledged
that the “vehicle ha[d] the license plate displayed on the windshield,” not mounted to the front
bumper of the car. Hr’g Tr. at 14:23–25, 22:21–24. This observation supplied the reasonable
suspicion necessary to justify the traffic stop, because it established the Detectives’ reasonable
belief that Defendant was driving in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:3-33.2 See United States v.
Booker, 237 F. App’x 782, 783–84 (3d Cir. 2007); Bahgat v. Twp. of E. Brunswick, No. 16-1827,
2019 WL 2315031, at *5–6 (D.N.J. May 31, 2019) (noting that (1) N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:3-33
requires a front license plate to be displayed on a vehicle no “more than 48 inches from
the ground in a horizontal position” and (2) “New Jersey case law makes clear that a driver’s
failure to have a plate properly and ‘conspicuously’ displayed on his or her vehicle constitutes a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle offense has been committed, thereby
justifying a stop”; and rejecting plaintiff’s argument that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to
stop his vehicle where plaintiff admitted that “his license plate was not affixed to his vehicle, but
rather, ‘on the dashboard/in the windshield’” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 821 F. App’x 134 (3d Cir.
2020); see also United States v. Hong-Long, No. CR 22-210, 2025 WL 592357, at *2 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 24, 2025) (“A finding of reasonable suspicion is justified, where, as here, the officer who
initiates the traffic stop has ‘specific, articulable facts to believe that an individual has violated the
2 The Incident Report also states that the Detectives observed Defendant turn right without
signaling on a public street around 3:45 p.m. and that they believed that this turn violated New
Jersey law. ECF No. 36-1 at 5 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-126 (“No person shall so turn any
vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided in the event any
other traffic may be affected by such movement.”)). This observation similarly (and
independently) justified the traffic stop. See United States v. Draper, No. 22-CR-386, 2023 WL
3726506, at *6–7 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2023).
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traffic laws.’” (citation omitted)). As such, the Detectives’ supposed “[p]retextual motivations are
irrelevant.”3 United States v. Xiao Wu Zhou, No. 17-cr-394, 2018 WL 1858187, at *3 (M.D. Pa.
Apr. 18, 2018) (citing United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Supreme
Court established a bright-line rule that any technical violation of a traffic code legitimizes a stop,
even if the stop is merely pretext for an investigation of some other crime.”)); see United States v.
Leonard, No. CR 21-461-1, 2022 WL 2068251, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2022).
Next, the Court finds that the Detectives had probable cause to search the Malibu’s center
console, the location where the Detectives ultimately discovered the firearm and ammunition
central to Defendant’s criminal indictment. ECF No. 36-1 at 5. Therefore, as discussed below,
the Detectives did not need a warrant under the automobile exception and Defendant’s consent
argument is irrelevant.
If an officer develops “reasonable suspicion or probable cause” of criminal activity
(beyond the traffic infraction) during a traffic stop, the stop may be extended. United States v.
Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 269–70 (3d Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Miller, No. CR 23-135,
2024 WL 115686, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2024). And under the automobile exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, law enforcement can search a car without a warrant if
they have probable cause that the car contains contraband, i.e., if they reasonably believe there is
a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in” the car. United States
3 Defendant argues that the fact that the underlying traffic offenses were later dismissed
undermines the Detectives’ reasonable suspicion that formed the predicate for the traffic stop.
Hr’g Tr. at 15:13–19. But “[t]he later dismissal of . . . charges does not demonstrate that the
officers lacked probable cause [or reasonable suspicion] at the time of the” incident. Faisal v.
Rahway Police Dep’t, No. 13-376, 2014 WL 673066, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2014); see also Woods
v. Holloway, No. 25-1098, 2025 WL 2970253, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025) (“The fact that a
traffic citation or ticket is later dismissed does not show that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion
to conduct a traffic stop.”).
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v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 103 (3d Cir. 2002); see United States v. Nasir, 17 F.4th 459, 467 n.8 (3d
Cir. 2021); United States v. Donahue, 764 F.3d 293, 299–300 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that the
Government bears the burden of establishing the automobile exception).
Because the Detectives discovered the firearm and ammunition in the Malibu’s “center
console,” ECF No. 36-1 at 5, the key question is whether the Detectives had probable cause to
search the car’s center console, see United States v. Matthews, 597 F. Supp. 3d 694, 703 (D.N.J.
2022) (“Where the automobile exception applies, its authorization extends to ‘every part of the
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.’” (quoting Donahue, 764 F.3d
at 300)). And in determining probable cause, the Court must evaluate the evidence from “the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.” United States v. Mainor, 393 F. App’x 10,
17 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)); see also Devenpeck v.
Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (“[A]n arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that
he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.”); Donahue, 764 F.3d at 302.
Here, the Detectives had probable cause to search the center console. After stopping
Defendant, Detective Serrano “immediately” smelled an “overwhelming odor of raw marijuana
emanating” from the Malibu.4 ECF No. 36-1 at 5. Moreover, when the officers asked whether
4 Defendant argues that the Detectives cannot “rely on the aroma of . . . marijuana as the probable
cause for the officers to conduct [the] warrantless search of [D]efendant’s motor vehicle” given
the New Jersey Attorney General’s February 2021 guidelines concerning marijuana
decriminalization under state law. ECF No. 36 at 5. Those guidelines—which state that “the odor
of marijuana . . . by itself no longer establishes ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ to initiate a stop
or search of a person or their vehicle to determine a violation of a possession offense or a fourth-
degree distribution offense” under New Jersey law, ECF No. 36-1 at 9—have little bearing on the
Omnibus Motion. “[T]he use and possession of marijuana—even where sanctioned by a State—
remains a violation of federal law.” United States v. Cannon, 36 F.4th 496, 498 (3d Cir. 2022).
And “[i]t is well-settled that evidence seized by state officers in violation of state law is admissible
so long as the same search, if conducted by federal officers, would have complied with the Fourth
Amendment.” United States v. Dimas, 418 F. Supp. 2d 737, 741 (W.D. Pa. 2005); see, e.g., United
States v. Pavao, 134 F.4th 649, 657 (1st Cir. 2025); see also United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360,
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Defendant had anything other than marijuana in his car, Defendant did not dispute the officer’s
assessment that there was marijuana in the vehicle. At that point, the Detectives had probable
cause to search the Malibu for marijuana. See Green, 897 F.3d at 186 (“It is well settled that the
smell of marijuana alone . . . may establish . . . probable cause.” (citation omitted)); United States
v. Gaffney, No. 23-1895, 2026 WL 1948169, at *2 (3d Cir. July 6, 2026) (similar); see also
Leonard, 2022 WL 2068251, at *4 (similar, and noting that “probable cause [is]
determin[ed] . . . based on the totality of the circumstances”). This probable cause justified a
warrantless search of “any area of the vehicle in which [marijuana] [could] be found,” including
the Malibu’s center console. United States v. Baley, 505 F. Supp. 3d 481, 497 (E.D. Pa. 2020);
see, e.g., United States v. Lackey, No. 17-CR-269, 2018 WL 5920644, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13,
2018) (“[B]ecause marijuana could easily be concealed in the vehicle’s center console, the officers
were authorized to search the center console compartments.”), aff’d, No. 20-2977, 2022 WL
313807 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2022); United States v. Harrison, 2018 WL 1325777, at *3 (D. Del. Mar.
15, 2018) (“[T]he automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is
satisfied because the smell of marijuana was particularized and articulable, thus establishing the
requisite probable cause to conduct a search of Defendant’s entire vehicle and bags within.”). And
finally, the fact that law enforcement seized a firearm and ammunition from the center console—
not marijuana—does not change the Court’s analysis.5 See, e.g., United States v. Nowell, No. CR
363–64 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[E]vidence obtained in accordance with federal law is admissible in
federal court—even though it was obtained by state officers in violation of state law.”); United
States v. Castillo-Bienvenido, No. CR 03-487, 2004 WL 350765, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2004)
(“Although the initial search in this case was conducted by local police, the validity of searches
and seizures in our court is nevertheless governed by federal law and not by state law.”).
5 In addition, the fact that the K-9 sniff of the Malibu’s exterior was negative for narcotics did not
“vitiate[]” the Detectives’ “probable cause to search [Defendant’s] car.” United States v. Dennis,
527 F. App’x 221, 224 (3d Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Villafranco-Elizondo, 897 F.3d
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22-27, 2023 WL 129738, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2023); United States v. Lloyd, No. CR 21-81,
2022 WL 2916684, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2022). Thus, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to
suppress the firearm and ammunition.
C. 	The Court Denies Defendant’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing
Defendant asks the Court to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress. See,
e.g., ECF No. 36 at 6; ECF No. 41 at 1. “A motion to suppress requires an evidentiary hearing
only if the motion is sufficiently specific, non-conjectural, and detailed to enable the court to
conclude that (1) the defendant has presented a colorable constitutional claim, and (2) there are
disputed issues of material fact that will affect the outcome of the motion to suppress.” United
States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2010). “A defendant raises an issue of material fact by
submitting evidence that, if true, would tend to establish an essential element of his or her claim
that evidence was obtained unconstitutionally.” Id. at 106; see also United States v. Hutcherson,
No. CR 22-307, 2025 WL 3677545, at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2025) (“[T]he purpose of an evidentiary
hearing is not to assist the moving party in making discoveries that, once learned, might justify the
motion after the fact.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Vasquez-Rodriguez, Crim. No. 14-419,
2015 WL 3939057, at *3 (D.N.J. June 25, 2015) (“A suppression hearing is not a discovery
device.”).
The Court will deny Defendant’s request for a hearing. Even if the Court were to conclude
that Defendant presented a colorable constitutional claim, he has failed “to submit evidence that
creates a non-conjectural dispute of material fact.” Hutcherson, 2025 WL 3677545, at *9; see
United States v. Jackson, 363 F. App’x 208, 210 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that a defendant must
raise “significant factual disputes in order to receive a pretrial evidentiary hearing”). For example,
635, 644 (5th Cir. 2018) (rejecting “the notion that the failure of a drug dog to alert deprives
officers of existing probable cause”).
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Defendant argues that, to the extent the Government invokes the automobile exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing “to determine
whether the actions of the Newark Police were unforeseeable and spontaneous under the
circumstances of their encounter with the defendant.” ECF No. 36 at 6. But those issues are not
material to the Omnibus Motion. Hines, 628 F.3d at 105–06. As explained above, the Detectives
had the requisite reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to stop and search the Malibu, and
any suggestion that the Detectives’ actions were pretextual is irrelevant. In addition, this argument
is entirely speculative. Id. Indeed, Defendant “submits no relevant evidence” on this point, so
these issues are not in genuine dispute. Hutcherson, 2025 WL 3677545, at *9.
Similarly, Defendant argues in his first reply brief that an evidentiary hearing is necessary
to determine whether Defendant “was . . . free to walk away from the scene” when he said there
was a “strap” in his car. ECF No. 41 at 1. But this issue is not material. Hines, 628 F.3d at 105–
06. To be sure, “a traffic stop significantly curtails the ‘freedom of action’ of the driver and the
passengers.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 510 (citation omitted). However, “constraints on freedom of
movement are a necessary but not sufficient condition of custody” for purposes of Miranda.
Ludwikowski, 944 F.3d at 133–34. As noted above, to be in “custody” for Miranda purposes,
“[t]he individual must also be subject to ‘the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of
station house questioning at issue in Miranda.’” Id. (citation omitted). And, as discussed above,
detention pursuant to a traffic stop generally does not rise to this threshold of coercion given “the
temporary and relatively nonthreatening” nature of a traffic stop, notwithstanding the fact that the
traffic stop limits the subject’s freedom of movement. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112–13
(2010); see Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437–42. So, Defendant’s argument related to his freedom of
movement is unavailing. As such, the Court denies Defendant’s request for an evidentiary
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hearing.6 See United States v. Dougherty, No. CR 19-64, 2020 WL 3574467, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July
1, 2020) (noting that an evidentiary hearing is warranted only where there is an existing material
factual dispute that the Court “cannot reliably . . . resolve[] on a paper record” (citation omitted)).
D. 	The Court Denies Defendant’s Request to Order the Government to Produce
a List of Potential Witnesses
Defendant asks that the Court order the Government to produce a list of potential witnesses
who will testify against him at trial. ECF No. 36 at 6. As an initial matter, it is “‘firmly established’
that the government is under no obligation to ‘divulge the identity of its witnesses in a noncapital
case.’” United States v. Coles, 511 F. Supp. 3d 566, 580 (M.D. Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). In
any event, the Government represents that it has already functionally abided by this request by
providing Defendant with the Incident Report, which “indicates [the] officers [that] were present
during the traffic stop, the subsequent detention, and . . . the search of the Malibu.” ECF No. 39
at 16. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s request for a list of the Government’s trial
witnesses as moot.
E. 	The Court Denies Defendant’s Request for an Order Requiring the
Preservation of Notes
Defendant also seeks an order requiring that any notes, drafts, and final reports prepared in
relation to the case be preserved and disclosed to the defense. ECF No. 36 at 7. The Government
6 Defendant also argues in his reply brief that the officers’ failure to adhere to the “Newark Police
Body Worn Camera Policy” entitles him to an evidentiary hearing. ECF No. 41 at 2. To the extent
that Defendant seeks to justify an evidentiary hearing by speculating that officer-worn body
camera footage—if it existed—would show police misconduct, such speculation is insufficient to
generate a dispute of material fact. See Jackson, 363 F. App’x at 210 n.2. Moreover, the
Government submits that the Detectives “were . . . operating as Deputy United States Marshals
and as such, their failure to wear body-worn cameras was not in violation of Newark Police
Department policy in part because they were operating in their federal capacities.” ECF No. 67 at
5. And in any event, the Court agrees with the Government that this issue does not affect the
disposition of the Omnibus Motion. ECF No. 67 at 5–6 (citing United States v. Mejia, No. 24-CR-
212-1, 2025 WL 934343, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2025)).
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represents that “[t]he federal prosecutors and federal law enforcement agents who compose the
prosecution team in this case are all aware of, and intend to comply with,” their preservation
requirements, and that it will provide the Court with such materials for in camera review upon
request. ECF No. 39 at 16 (citing United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 259 (3d Cir. 1983)).
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s request as moot. United States v. Evans, No. 21-cr-
899, 2022 WL 16631263, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 2, 2022).
F. 	The Court Will Withhold Judgment on Defendant’s Request for Further
Production of Brady and Giglio Material
Defendant seeks the production of any evidence favorable to the defense or detrimental to
the Government’s case pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), as well as any evidence
required to be disclosed under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). ECF No. 36 at 8. In
its opposition brief, the Government represents that it has “complied with its [Brady] obligations
thus far and will continue to do so should any exculpatory material come into its possession.” ECF
No. 39 at 16. Accordingly, the parties are directed to meet and confer by October 30, 2026, to
discuss the disclosure of Brady and Giglio material. By November 6, 2026, the parties shall submit
a joint status letter (not to exceed five pages) advising the Court whether any issues related to
Brady or Giglio material remain outstanding.
G. 	The Court Denies Defendant’s Request for Disclosure Regarding Potential
Informants
Finally, Defendant requests that certain information regarding potential informants—
including their names and addresses, evidence of any former bad acts, drug and alcohol addiction,
mental illness, instances of dishonesty, and government payments—be disclosed to Defendant.
ECF No. 36 at 8–9. To the extent Defendant requests that the Government disclose information
regarding informants, “there is a qualified privilege possessed by the Government to refuse to
disclose the identity of a confidential informant from whom it has received information about
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alleged criminal activity.” United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 839 (3d Cir. 1983). To
determine whether the Government’s privilege must give way to disclosure, the Court must weigh
“the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare
his defense.” United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 196 (3d Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). Relevant
factors to consider include “the crime charged, the possible defense, [and] the possible significance
of the informer’s testimony.” Id. (citation omitted). And the defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating a specific need for disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant. Id. at 197.
Here, Defendant argues that “fundamental fairness requires full disclosure” of any potential
informant’s information, and such information is necessary to “appropriately prepare to cross-
examine and test the credibility of the witness.” ECF No. 36 at 8–9. However, these assertions
do not identify a specific need for disclosure and instead express a general desire to learn the
identity of individuals who may have informed against Defendant. Speculating that there is an
informant who might have information that could aid the defense is “insufficient to justify
disclosure of [an informant’s] identity.” United States v. Stanton, 566 F. App’x 166, 168 (3d Cir.
2014) (citation omitted); see also Coles, 511 F. Supp. 3d at 581 (finding that “a generalized desire
to know the identity of those who have informed against” a defendant is insufficient to justify
disclosure of an informant’s identity). Nor has Defendant established a sufficient basis for
disclosure on grounds that he must assess any potential informant’s credibility. See United States
v. Griffith, 598 F. Supp. 3d 221, 239 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (finding disclosure inappropriate where the
defendant “state[d] in conclusory fashion that disclosure is required so that he may properly
investigate the informants’ credibility”). As such, the Court denies Defendant’s request for
disclosure of information pertaining to potential Government informants.
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III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS on this 9th day of October 2026,
ORDERED that Defendant’s Omnibus Motion (ECF Nos. 36, 51) is DENIED in part; and
it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall meet and confer by October 30, 2026, to discuss the
disclosure of Brady and Giglio material. By November 6, 2026, the parties shall submit a joint
status letter (not to exceed five pages) informing the Court as to any outstanding issues related to
the disclosure of Brady or Giglio material.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Claire C. Cecchi
CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.
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