Automotive Lift Institute, Inc. v. Autokato Engineering, LTD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
___________________________________________
AUTOMOTIVE LIFT INSTITUTE, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	5:25-CV-106
(FJS/MJK)
AUTOKATO ENGINEERING, LTD, doing
business as Katool,
Defendant.
___________________________________________
APPEARANCES 	OF COUNSEL
THE LAW OFFICE OF SHARON 	SHARON M. SULIMOWICZ, ESQ.
SULIMOWICZ
118 North Tioga Street, Suite 202
Ithaca, New York 14850
Attorneys for Plaintiff
AUTOKATO ENGINEERING, LTD 	NO APPEARANCE
Doing business as Katool
Defendant
SCULLIN, Senior Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's renewed motion for entry of a default judgment
against Defendant in the amount of $168,616.50, comprised of $150,000.00 in statutory
damages, $17,847.50 in attorney's fees, and $769.00 in costs. See Dkt. No. 14, Notice of Motion
to Renew.
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II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action on January 22, 2025, by filing a Summons and
Complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 1-2. On March 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default
against Defendant. See Dkt. No. 7. The Clerk entered that default on the same day. See Dkt.
No. 8. Plaintiff filed a motion for entry of a default judgment against Defendant on April 28,
2025, and served that motion on Defendant on April 29, 2025. See Dkt. Nos. 10-11.
On February 3, 2026, the Court issued a Memorandum-Decision and Order, in which it
denied Plaintiff's motion "without prejudice and with leave to renew consistent with the guidance
set forth" in its decision. See Dkt. No. 12, Memorandum-Decision and Order, at 10.
On February 27, 2026, Plaintiff filed its second motion for entry of a default judgment
and, on March 2, 2026, it filed the required Notice of Motion. See Dkt. Nos. 13-14.
III. DICUSSION
A. 	Liability
By failing to answer the complaint or oppose Plaintiff's motion for entry of a default
judgment, Defendant is deemed to have admitted the factual allegations in the complaint. See
Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting
that "a party's default is deemed to constitute a concession of all well pleaded allegations of
liability" (citation omitted)).
Whether to enter a default judgment, however, is committed to the court's discretion. See
Greathouse v. JHS Sec. Inc., 784 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). "Even where a
defendant has admitted all well-pleaded facts in the complaint by virtue of default, a district
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court 'need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action,' and may decline to
enter a default judgment on that ground." Sadowski v. Urbanspotlite LLC, No. 1:22-cv-00887
(BKS/DJS), 2023 WL 2838376, *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2023) (Sannes, C.J.) (quoting City of New
York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Au Bon Pain Corp.
v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981))). In fact, "the Second Circuit has 'suggested that,
prior to entering default judgment, a district court is "required to determine whether the
[plaintiff's] allegations establish [the defendant's] liability as a matter of law."'" Id. (quoting
[Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 137] (quoting Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.
2009))).
"The Copyright Act of 1976 grants copyright owners the exclusive right to reproduce
their copyrighted work, to prepare derivatives of the work, and to sell copies of the work."
Feingold v. RageOn, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 3d 94, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citations omitted); see also 17
U.S.C. §§ 106-122. To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove two elements:
"'(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original.'" Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 113 L. Ed.
2d 358 (1991)) (other citation omitted).
With regard to the first element, a "certificate of registration" made within five years after
first publication of a work "constitute[s] prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright[.]"
17 U.S.C. § 410(c). If a party proffers a certificate of copyright registration, "'the party
challenging the validity of the copyright has the burden to prove the contrary.'" Stern v.
Lavender, 319 F. Supp. 3d 650, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Hamil Am. [Inc. v. GFI], 193 F.3d
[92,] 98 [(2d Cir. 1999)]). In this case, Plaintiff alleges that it "is the sole owner of all rights,
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title, and interest in and to U.S. Copyright Registration No. VA0000634769, which includes
safety labels (hereinafter "Safety Labels") used with, and affixed on automotive lifts." See Dkt.
No. 13-1, Second Affidavit of Robert W. O'Gorman, President of Plaintiff, at ¶ 3. Plaintiff has
provided the Court with a copy of this Certificate of Registration, see Dkt. No. 13-2, and,
therefore, has established ownership of a valid copyright. See Kelly Toys Holdings, LLC v.
alialialiLL Store, 606 F. Supp. 3d 32, 50-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (finding that the first element of
copyright infringement was met on a default judgment motion where the plaintiff "allege[d] that
it [was] the owner of U.S. Copyright Registration numbers covering" the works at issue), report
and recommendation adopted by 606 F. Supp. 3d 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)).
Next, to establish the compliance element, "'the plaintiff must first show that [its] work
was actually copied; second, [it] must establish a substantial similarity or that the copying
amounts to an improper or unlawful appropriation.'" Yague v. Visionaire Publ'g LLC, No. 19-cv-
11717 (LJL), 2021 WL 4894676, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2021) (quoting Tufenkian Imp./Exp.
Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
In this case, Plaintiff filed an email dated April 12, 2024, from a representative of
Defendant who acknowledged that the infringing labels were affixed to three of its 2-post lift
models and that there had been about 700 such labels. See Dkt. No. 10-3, Exhibit B to Plaintiff's
Affidavit, at 2. The Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations and supporting affidavits are sufficient
to make out a claim for copyright infringement.
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B. 	Damages
"[I]t is well established that '[w]hile a party's default is deemed to constitute a concession
of all well pleaded allegations of liability, it is not considered an admission of damages.'"
Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund, Pension Fund, Annuity Fund, Educ. &
Training Fund and Other Funds v. Metro Found. Contractors Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir.
2012) (quoting Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d
Cir. 1992)). When considering a motion for default judgment, a court must "conduct an inquiry
in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty." Credit Lyonnais Sec.
(USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Transatlantic Marine Claims
Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997)). "There must be an
evidentiary basis for the damages sought by plaintiff, and a district court may determine there is
sufficient evidence . . . based . . . upon a review of detailed affidavits and documentary
evidence." Cement & Concrete Workers, 699 F.3d at 234 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Fustok,
873 F.2d at 40).
1. Statutory damages
Plaintiff seeks to recover statutory damages for Defendant's willful infringement in the
amount of $150,000. See Dkt. No. 13, Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, at 7. To support this
request, Plaintiff's President states that "a representative of Defendant advised [him] in 2023 that
Defendant had sold approximately 2,500-3,000 automotive lifts that included infringing Safey
Labels. That would amount to damages to [Plaintiff] of between approximately One Hundred
Fifty Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($150,000.00) and One Hundred Eighty Thousand and
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00/100 Dollars ($180,000.00)." See Dkt. No. 13-1, Second Affidavit of Robert W. O'Gorman, at
¶ 8. Pursuant to the Copyright Acct, a plaintiff may elect to recover an award of statutory
damages, in lieu of actual damages, "in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the
court considers just." 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). Furthermore, when the court finds "that
infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of
statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000." 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
"When determining the amount of statutory damages to award for copyright
infringement, courts consider the following factors to determine the amount of statutory
damages: (1) the infringer's state of mind; (2) the expenses saved, and profits earned by the
infringer; (3) the revenue lost by the copyright holder; (4) the deterrent effect on the infringer
and third parties; (5) the infringer's cooperation in providing evidence concerning the value of
the infringing material; and (6) the conduct and attitude of the parties." Bryant v. Media Right
Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing N.A.S. Impor. Corp. v. Chenson Enter., Inc.,
968 F.2d 250, 252-53 (2d Cir. 1992)).
As an initial matter, Defendant's "[c]opyright infringement is deemed willful by virtue of
[its] default." Rovio Ent., Ltd. v. Allstar Vending, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 536, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(citations omitted). In light of Defendant's willful infringement, the first, fifth, and sixth factors
weigh against Defendant. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Metro Lounge & Café LLC, No. 5:10-CV-
1149 (NAM/ATB), 2013 WL 286361, *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013). In addition, the Court cannot
evaluate the second factor because Defendant has not appeared in this action. See Strike 3
Holdings, LLC v. Doe, No. 18-cv-7323 (DRH) (SIL), 2021 WL 4896862, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20,
2021) (noting that "it is impossible for the Court to ascertain what, if any, profits Defendant
earned by infringing"), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 4894161 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.
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20, 2021). With regard to the third factor, Plaintiff's President states in his Second Affidavit, that
although "Defendant has not formally appeared in this action, [Defendant's] Mr. Li was aware of
the infringement as early as April 2024, when he represented that Defendant had already
'changed the designs of the labels, including the electronic files, remaining labels at the
manufacturing facility, and print molds' and provided examples of the new labels." See Dkt. No.
13-1 at ¶ 12. Furthermore, Plaintiff's President asserts that,
[n]otwithstanding the aforementioned representations Mr. Li made
to me in April of 2024, I have photographs from November of
2024 of KATOOL automotive lifts with the infringing labels
attached . . . [and at] a tradeshow on July 29, 2025, [Plaintiff's
President] states that he] identified KATOOL lifts with the
infringing labels affixed to them.
See id. at ¶ 13.
Finally, the fourth factor weighs in favor of statutory damages because "an award of
statutory damages could deter future infringements by the Defendant and third parties."
Farrington v. Fingerlakes1.com, Inc., No. 19-CV-6802-FPG, 2020 WL 7350336, *6 (W.D.N.Y.
Dec. 15, 2020) (citation omitted).
Having considered all of these factors, the Court finds that an award of $120,000.00 in
statutory damages is reasonable. The Court also finds that this award of statutory damages
serves the "compensatory and punitive" purposes of statutory damages. Fitzgerald Publ'g Co.,
Inc. v. Baylor Publi'g Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 1110, 1117 (2d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
2. Attorney's fees and costs
Plaintiff seeks $17,847.50 in attorney's fees and $769.00 in costs for a total of
$18,616.50. See Dkt. No. 13-6, Attorney Affidavit, at ¶ 13. Under the Copyright Act, a "court in
its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United
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States," which may include "a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the
costs." 17 U.S.C. § 505. In determining the reasonableness of requested attorney's fees, "the
Court begins by using the 'lodestar method' to calculate a 'presumptively reasonable fee.'"
MyGlynn v. Cools, Inc., No. 19cv03520 (GBD) (DF), 2020 WL 6561658, *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 1,
2020) (quoting Millea v. Metro-N. R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted)).
"The lodestar is 'the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours
required by the case.'" Id. (quotation omitted). In the Second Circuit, there is a presumption in
favor of the "forum rule," which requires courts to employ "'the hourly rates . . . in the district in
which the reviewing court sits' in calculating the presumptive reasonable fee." Simmons v. N.Y.C.
Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation and other citations omitted). To rebut
this presumption, a party seeking higher out-of-district rates "must make a particularized
showing, not only that the selection of out-of-district counsel was predicated on experience-
based, objective factors, but also of the likelihood that use of in-district counsel would produce
substantially inferior results." Id. at 176.
Courts may, after the initial calculation of the presumptively reasonable fee, adjust the
total "when it 'does not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in
determining a reasonable fee.'" Lilly v. City of New York, 934 F.3d 222, 230 (2d Cir. 2019)
(quoting Millea, 658 F.3d at 167 (quoting Perdue, 559 U.S. at 554, 130 S. Ct. 1662)). "[T]he fee
applicant has the burden of showing by 'satisfactory evidence -- in addition to the attorney's own
affidavits' -- that the requested hourly rates are the prevailing market rates." Farbotko v. Clinton
Cty. of New York, 433 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff's counsel submitted Invoices she sent to Plaintiff that indicated the
type of work, although often not in great detail, that she and her paralegal performed on behalf of
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Plaintiff in this action. See Dkt. No. 13-6, Attorney Affidavit; Dkt. No. 13-7, Invoices. The
Court has reviewed Plaintiff's counsel's affidavit, in which she states that "Plaintiff [had] incurred
approximately $12,287.[]50 in attorney's fees . . . through the end of 2025" and that she had
"incurred an additional 8.9 hours through February 24, 2026 . . . and anticipate[d] incurring an
additional 4 hours to finish drafting the within motion including a memorandum of law and
conducting legal research for same for a total of $5,560." See Dkt. No. 13-6, Attorney Affidavit,
at ¶ 10, ¶ 12.
The Court has reviewed the invoices that Plaintiff's counsel filed, which demonstrate that
through November 19, 2025, she had expended 31.8 hours on this case and that her paralegal had
expended 10.2 hours on this case. This number does not include an entry dated 3/3/25 which
listed the work done simply as "ALI v. Katool" with no hours listed but showing the amount
billed as $364.00 and an entry dated 7/1/2025 with no explanation of the work performed, .2
hours expended on that undefined work, and showing the amount billed as $65.00. See Dkt. No.
13-7. With regard to the 8.9 hours of work Plaintiff's counsel states she has expended on this
case in the current year as of February 24, 2026, she does not indicate what the nature of that
work was and, therefore, the Court will not award attorney's fees for that work or for the
additional four hours of work she anticipates in conjunction with the present motion.
In addition, the Court finds that the 42.00 hours expended on this case is excessive for a
case involving a default judgment in a copyright infringement case. Therefore, the Court will
decrease these hours to 25 hours, which is much more reasonable. See Sadowski, 2023 WL
2838376, at *5 (finding that 8.5 hours "is a reasonable number of hours required by a motion for
default judgment in a copyright infringement case" (citing Broad Music, Inc. v. DeJohn's on
Lark, Inc., No. 19-cv-637, 2020 WL 1986903, *6 (N.D.N.Y. April 27, 2020) (finding 28.9 hours
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working on a motion for default judgment in a copyright infringement case reasonable); Broad
Music, Inc. v. Rider Rock's Holding LLC, No. 16-cv-1398, 2017 WL 2992498, *3, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 109383 (N.D.N.Y. July 14, 2017) (finding 15.5 hours working on a motion for
default judgment in a copyright infringement case reasonable)).1
With regard to the appropriate hourly rate for this work, Plaintiff requests the following
hourly rates: $325.00 per hour for Attorney Sulimowicz, who has been a member of the New
York Bar for 30 years, for work done prior to 2026 and $400.00 per hour for work done after
January 1, 2026; and $125.00 per hour for Ms. Springer, a paralegal. See Dkt. No. 13-6 at ¶¶ 8,
9, 11, 12.
In Malik v Ayryoga, Inc., No. 1:25-cv-00076 (AMN/MJK), 2025 WL 2029237 (N.D.N.Y.
July 21, 2025), a court in this District noted that ''[a] review of cases in this District indicates that
the following hourly rates (or rate ranges) are reasonable: $250-$350 for partners; $165-$200 for
associates; and $80-$95 for paralegals, legal assistants, and other paraprofessionals.'" Id. at *5
(quoting UFCW Local One Health Care Fund v. Greene Great American, 6:23-cv-1441
(BKS/MJK), 2025 WL 1506163, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2025)); see also Gallagher v. United
Court Sys. of State of New York, 3:18-CV-1476 (GTS/ML), 2025 WL 3761760, *10 (N.D.N.Y.
Dec. 30, 2025) (same).
The Court finds that Plaintiff's requested hourly rate of $325.00 for Attorney
Sulimowicz's work is reasonable given her 30 years of practice. However, the Court finds that
Plaintiff's requested hourly rate of $125.00 for Ms. Springer, a paralegal, exceeds even the
highest hourly rate in this District for paralegals, legal assistants, and other paraprofessionals.
1 The Court also notes that, had Plaintiff included all of the necessary information when it filed
its first Motion for a Default Judgment on April 28, 2025, it would not have incurred any
attorney's fees after that date.
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Therefore, the Court reduces the hourly rate for Ms. Springer to $95.00. Since the Court finds
that Plaintiff may recover attorney's fees for 25 hours that its attorney and paralegal expended on
this case, rather than the 42 hours Plaintiff sought, the Court has calculated those attorney's fees
as follows:
Of the 42 hours for which Plaintiff sought attorney's fees, 31.8
hours (or 76% of the 42 hours) were for the work of Attorney
Sulimowicz and 10.2 hours (or 24% of the 42 hours) were for the
work of Paralegal Springer. Therefore, the Court has used the
same percentages to divide the 25 hours for which Plaintiff will
receive attorney's fees; i.e., 19.0 hours for the work of Attorney
Sulimowicz and 6.0 hours for the work of Paralegal Springer.
This results in the following calculation:
Attorney Sulimowicz 19.0 hours at $325.00 per hour 	$6,175
Paralegal Springer 	6.0 hours at $ 90.00 per hour 	$ 	540
Total Attorney's Fees 	$6,715
Finally, Plaintiff seeks costs in the amount of $769.00, comprised of "$405 for the filing
and service of the Summons and Complaint and $364 for the filing and service of the original
motion papers[.]" See Dkt. No. 13, Memorandum of Law, at 8 (citing [Sulimowicz Aff.] at ¶ 10,
Exhibit A). The Court has reviewed the invoices that Plaintiff submitted to support its motion for
attorney's fees and costs and the only entry on those invoices that includes an amount of $364.00
charged is "Invoice no.: 7484" with "Invoice date: 03/07/2025" and "Due date: 03/22/2025" and
an item dated "03/03/2025" with a description of the service provided "ALI v KATOOL" and the
amount of "$364.00." In addition to the fact that "ALI v KATOOL" gives no indication of the
reason for this "$364.00" charge, it seems unlikely that it could be for the filing and service of
the original motion papers because the Court's docket indicates that Plaintiff filed its original
motion papers on April 28, 2025, see Dkt. No. 10, and the Affidavit of Service indicates that
these papers were served on April 29, 2025, see Dkt. No. 11. Therefore, the Court will not
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include the requested amount of $364.00 in its calculation of costs. However, the Court will
award Plaintiff $405.00 in costs because Plaintiff's billing records and the Court's docket
substantiate these costs. See Sadowski, 2023 WL 2838376, at *6 (citing Sony BMG Music Ent. v.
Larkin, 08-cv-702, 2009 WL 2176641, at *2, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62616 (N.D.N.Y. July 22,
2009) (awarding $480 for filing and service fees)).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to recover a total of $7,120.00
in attorney's fees and costs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, having reviewed the entire file in this matter, Plaintiff's submissions and the
applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Plaintiff's second motion for entry of a default judgment, see Dkt. Nos.
13-14, is GRANTED; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor against
Defendant as follows:
(1) statutory damages in the amount of $120,000.00
(2) attorney's fees in the amount of $6,715.00
(3) costs in the amount of $405.00
(4) post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961,
which shall run from the date that the Court enters judgment in this
case until the date payment is made in full;
and the Court further
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ORDERS that Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on
Defendant by regular mail at Defendant's last known address and file a certificate of service upon
completion of such service.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 8, 2026
Syracuse, New York
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