Thomas v. Beachwood City School District Board of Education

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
TIFFANY THOMAS,
individually and as parent of other C.A.,
a minor,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BEACHWOOD CITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendants.
CASE NO. 1:25-cv-2167
DISTRICT JUDGE
DONALD C. NUGENT
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JAMES E. GRIMES JR.
REPORT A ND
RECOMMENDATION
In October 2025, pro se Plaintiff Tiffany Thomas filed a motion for
preliminary injunction. Doc. 3. In December 2025, the District Court referred
this matter to a Magistrate Judge for pretrial supervision, including for
completion of a report and recommendation for case-dispositive motions. Doc.
16, at 1. This report and recommendation generally concerns Thomas’s motion
for preliminary injunction. The parties have also filed several additional and
related motions, which are also addressed below. For all the reasons stated, I
recommend that Thomas’s motion for preliminary injunction, Doc. 3, be denied.
Additionally, Thomas’s motion for an evidentiary hearing, Doc. 10, is denied,
and Defendant’s motion to file supplemental documents in opposition to the
motion for preliminary injunction, Doc. 13, is granted.
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Background
In October 2025, Thomas, filed a Complaint seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. Doc. 1. The Complaint stated four counts against Defendant,
Beachwood City School District Board of Education. Doc. 1, at 1, 3. Thomas
contemporaneously 	filed a 	motion 	for preliminary 	injunction 	seeking 	an
injunction ordering Defendant to:
1. 	Immediately 	restore 	Plaintiff’s 	ability 	to
communicate directly by email and in person
with 	her 	child’s 	teachers, 	therapists, 	and
service providers; and
2. 	Refrain 	from 	further 	retaliation 	or
interference 	with 	Plaintiff’s 	statutory 	and
constitutional 	rights 	pending 	resolution 	of
this case.
Doc. 3, at 1.
The circumstances underlying Thomas’s Complaint and motion for
preliminary injunction concern her child, C.A., and interactions beginning
before C.A.’s 2025–26 school year.1 In early 2025, Thomas filed a state
complaint 	alleging 	denial 	of 	inclusive 	extracurricular 	and 	mental-health
programing.2 See Doc. 1, at 2; Doc. 12-8. In August 2025, Thomas filed
1 	The following factual summary relies on facts alleged in the pleadings
and 	verified 	documents 	provided 	in 	relation 	to 	Thomas’s 	motion 	for
preliminary injunction.
2 	Although Thomas included this allegation in the Complaint, it does not
appear to be related to the claims in the Complaint.
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complaints with Defendant’s human resources department alleging retaliation
and harassment by school district administrators. Doc. 1, at 2.
From July 2025 to, at least, September 2025, Thomas engaged in
consistent email and in-person contact with various teachers and support staff
that allegedly violated the Defendant’s communication standards. See e.g.,
Doc. 3-8; 8-1, at 5–6; Doc. 8-2, at 8–10; Doc. 12-2; Doc. 12-4. In September 2025,
Defendant instituted a communication protocol, which established that email
communications from Thomas to C.A.’s teachers must be directed to only the
Superintendent, the Principal, and the Director of Pupil Services. Doc. 1, at 2.
Additionally, the communication protocol blocked all emails from Thomas’s
email address if sent directly to staff or teachers. Id. Thomas was informed
that this communication protocol was implemented based on her violations of
the district’s communication standards. See Doc. 3-8. On September 12, 2025,
following implementation of the communication protocol, Thomas asserted
that 	she 	“cannot 	meaningfully 	participate 	in 	[C.A.’s] 	IEP3 process” 	and
“cancel[ed] all pre-meetings with staff that had been scheduled in person” so
that she could “devote the coming week to [her] resolution meeting, to
3 	The initialism “IEP” stands for individualized education program. See
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988). The Individuals with Disabilities
Education 	Act 	(“IDEA”), 	reauthorized 	in 	2004 	as 	the 	Individuals 	with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act (“IDEIA”), see Pub. L. 108-446, 118
Stat 	2647 	(Dec. 	3, 	2004), 	and 	previously 	named 	the 	Education 	of 	the
Handicapped Act (EHA), mandates that an IEP be developed and reviewed,
through specific processes established by statute, for every disabled child to
ensure that each child receives the statutorily required free appropriate public
education (“FAPE”). Id.
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cooperation with the outside investigator working with the district and to
completing the filing of additional complaints with appropriate state agencies
in regard to Beachwood Staff.” See Doc. 8-1, at 50–54. A September 15, 2025,
letter 	from 	Thomas 	says 	that 	the 	Director 	of 	Pupil 	Services, 	Speech
Pathologist, and Occupational Therapist, conducted a meeting, as previously
requested by Thomas, but that Thomas did not appear at that meeting. Doc. 8-
1, at 55. Thomas’s letter asserts that she:
explicitly 	stated 	to 	you 	that 	I 	would 	not 	be
participating in meetings this week, including the
IEP meeting, because I am focusing my time and
energy 	on 	the 	state 	complaints 	and 	resolution
sessions 	currently 	pending. 	You 	yourself
acknowledged the cancellation of the IEP meeting
but failed to mention the cancellation of this related
provider meeting.
Id.
On 	September 	17, 	2025, 	Thomas 	filed 	a 	state 	complaint 	alleging
violations of IDEA and Ohio law arising out of the communication protocol and
other alleged conduct by Defendant. See Doc. 13-1. In October 2025, Thomas
filed an addendum to the state complaint alleging “procedural and ethical
violations” arising out of the allegedly “improper conduct” that was the
September 15 meeting. Doc. 8-1, at 58. On November 16, 2025, the Ohio
Department 	of 	Education 	and 	Workforce, 	issued 	findings 	on 	Thomas’s
September 	17 	complaint 	and 	found 	that 	the 	Defendant 	did 	not 	violate
Thomas’s parent-participation rights or the statutory provisions requiring
prior written notice. See Doc. 13-1, at 3–4.
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In October 2025, Thomas filed this action alleging that since the
Defendant 	employed 	the 	communication 	protocol 	banning 	certain 	email
communications, 	C.A. 	has 	“lost 	instructional 	time, 	missed 	services, 	and
regressed behaviorally.” Doc. 1, at 2. Based on the communication protocol and
alleged repercussions that the communication protocol has had on Thomas’s
ability to engage with school teachers and staff, she alleges: denial of C.A.’s
right to a FAPE under IDEA; disability discrimination on behalf of C.A. under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”); retaliation for her protected activity under Section 504, the ADA, and
the First Amendment; and a First Amendment claim that the communication
protocol unlawfully restricted her ability communicate with public officials. See
Doc. 1, at 3.
Legal Standard
When considering a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65, courts consider the same factors considered in determining
whether to issue a temporary restraining order. Northeast Ohio Coalition for
Homeless and Service Employees Int’l Union, Local 1199 v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d
999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Summit Cnty. Democratic Central and
Executive Committee v. Blackwell, 388 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2004)). The
moving party has the burden of establishing the following four factors: whether
(1) the moving party has a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) the moving party will suffer irreparable harm unless injunctive
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relief is granted; (3) the requested relief will cause substantial harm to others;
and (4) injunctive relief is in the public interest. Id.; see also Jones v. Caruso,
569 F.3d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 2009). “These factors are not prerequisites but are
factors that are to be balanced against each other.” Overstreet v. Lexington-
Fayette Urb. County Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002).
Discussion
Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Thomas makes two requests in her motion for preliminary injunction:
(1) immediately restore her ability to communicate directly by email and in
person with her child’s teachers, therapists, and service providers; and (2)
refrain 	from 	further 	retaliation 	or 	interference 	with 	her 	statutory 	and
constitutional rights pending resolution of the case. Doc. 3, at 1. Thomas
references and provides brief arguments for each of the four factors to be
considered on a motion for preliminary injunction. See Doc. 3, at 2. Each factor
and Thomas’s related arguments are discussed in turn.
1. 	Likelihood of success on the merits
To demonstrate the first factor, Thomas must show that she is likely to
succeed on the claims raised in her Complaint. Whether a movant is likely to
succeed on the merits is a question of law. See Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399
F.3d 754, 760 (6th Cir. 2005).
Thomas raises four claims in her Complaint: Count I – Denial of FAPE
(IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.); Count II – Disability Discrimination (Section
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504 	and 	ADA); 	Count 	III 	– 	Retaliation 	(Section 	504, 	ADA, 	and 	First
Amendment); and Count IV – First Amendment Violations. See Doc. 1, at 3.
As to Count I, Thomas alleges the following: “By preventing Plaintiff’s
meaningful 	participation 	in 	her 	child’s 	IEP 	and 	withholding 	service
information, Defendant violated IDEA procedural safeguards and deprived
C.A. of a Free Appropriate Public Education.” Doc. 1, at 3. In her motion for
preliminary injunction, Thomas does not make any specific argument as to how
she will prove her Count I claim. See Doc. 3, at 2. Instead, she generally claims
that “[t]he communication block violates 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (parental
participation). 29 U.S.C. § 794, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the First Amendment.
Defendant 	offers 	no 	lawful 	justification 	for 	banning 	a 	parent 	from
communication about her child’s education.” Doc. 3, at 2. As Defendant’s note,
however, a prerequisite to relief under IDEA is administrative exhaustion. See
20 C.F.R. § 1415(f), (g), (l).
Thomas makes no allegation, either in the Complaint, the motion for
preliminary injunction, or her reply to show that she has exhausted her
administrative remedies. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schools, 580 U.S. 154,
165–68 (2017) (explaining the IDEA exhaustion requirement and holding that
even claims brought under a statute other than IDEA require exhaustion
where the claim seeks relief for denial of FAPE based on application of 20
U.S.C. § 1415). Instead, in her reply, Thomas asserts that her filings with the
state satisfy the exhaustion requirement and that, regardless, she is excused
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from the exhaustion requirement because the Defendant’s conduct interfered
with her participation in the due process hearing. See Doc. 12, at 4.
In support of her assertion that she has satisfied the exhaustion
requirement, however, Thomas only asserts that she has filed certain state
agency complaints and that she filed, but then withdrew, a due process
complaint. Id. These assertions do not show that she has completed the
administrative 	processes 	required 	to 	exhaust 	her 	claims 	under 	IDEA.
Likewise, the allegation that the Defendant obstructed her due process hearing
is unsubstantiated and thus unpersuasive. See Bishop v. Oakstone Acad., 477
F. Supp. 2d 876, 883 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (recognizing that “the burden of
establishing the futility or inadequacy of the administrative remedies rests on
the party seeking to bypass them. Mere speculation at the futility or procedural
deficiencies of a proposed administrative proceeding is not enough to satisfy
this burden.”) (citations omitted). Based on the above, Thomas’s Count I claim
does not have a strong likelihood of success on the merits.
As to Count II, Thomas alleges the following: “Defendant discriminated
against C.A. on the basis of disability by restricting parental participation,
failing to provide equal access to extracurricular programs, and ignoring
accommodation needs.” Doc. 1, at 3. Thomas does not make any specific
argument as to the likelihood of success on the merits for Count II in her
motion for preliminary injunction. See Doc. 3, at 2. In response, the Defendant
again asserts that to the extent that Count II raises a Section 504 claim, that
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claim requires a showing of administrative exhaustion before initiating a court
action. See Doc. 8, at 13. As with Count I, Thomas’s complaint makes no
allegations regarding administrative exhaustion of her Count II claim. See
generally Doc. 1. And Thomas’s argument in reply, that exhaustion does not
apply to her Section 504 or ADA claims, fails because her claims specifically
concern allegations that C.A. was deprived of his right to a FAPE. See Doc. 12,
at 4 (citing Fry, 580 U.S. 154 in arguing that exhaustion does not apply). And
Fry, which Thomas cites to support her attempt to avoid the exhaustion
requirement, illustrates why the exhaustion requirement applies for her claim.
As the Court in Fry explained:
exhaustion rule hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks
relief for the denial of a FAPE. If a lawsuit charges
such denial, the plaintiff cannot escape § 1415(l)
merely by bringing her suit under a statute other
than the IDEA–as when, for example, the plaintiffs
in Smith claimed that a school’s failure to provide a
FAPE also violated the Rehabilitation Act. Rather,
that plaintiff must first submit her case to an IDEA
hearing officer, experienced in addressing exactly
the issues she raises.
Fry, 580 U.S. at 168.
More detrimental, however, to Thomas’s Count II claim––and generally
to all claims she purports to raise on behalf of C.A.––is that, as the Defendant
points out, Thomas is unable to represent C.A.’s interests. See Doc. 8, at 13.
Taking as fact the allegations in the Complaint, Thomas does not appear to be
an attorney. A non-attorney parent has no standing to represent her child’s
interests 	without 	assistance 	of 	counsel. 	See 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	17(c)(1)(A)
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(permitting a “general guardian” to “sue … on behalf of a minor”), (2) (“A minor
or an incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative
may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem.”); Sheperd v. Wellman, 313
F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[P]arents cannot appear pro se on behalf of their
minor child because a minor’s personal cause of action is her own and does not
belong to her parent, or representative.”) (citing Cheung v. Youth Orchestra
Found. Of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990)).
So, as to Count II, Thomas has not shown a likelihood of success on the
merits.
As to Count III, Thomas alleges retaliation under Section 504, the ADA,
and the First Amendment based on the following actions by Defendant: “After
Plaintiff filed protected complaints and founded a special education parent
teacher 	association 	chamber, 	Defendant 	retaliated 	by 	imposing 	a
communication block, mischaracterizing her advocacy as harassment, and
discouraging staff interaction.” Doc. 1, at 3. Again, Thomas makes no specific
argument as to the merits of Count III in her motion for preliminary injunction.
See Doc. 3, at 2.
As Count III’s likelihood of success, the first problem is that there is no
private cause of action for retaliation under Section 504. See Smith v. Michigan
Dep’t of Corr., 159 F.4th 1067, 1074–82 (6th Cir. 2025). As to retaliation under
the ADA, Thomas:
must 	show: 	(1) 	[that 	she] 	engaged 	in 	protected
activity; (2) the Board knew of the protected activity;
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(3) the Board took an adverse action against [her];
and (4) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse action.
M.L. v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 772 F. App’x 287, 291 (6th Cir. 2019).
In her motion for preliminary injunction, Thomas simply presents the
nature of her claims by citing the statutes she invoked in the Complaint and
the First Amendment and asserting that Defendant and its representatives
haven’t provided a lawful justification for their actions. Doc. 3, at 2. But
Thomas’s own evidence shows that’s not true. In an email to Thomas, the
District’s superintendent told her that her emails to staff members—who had
themselves filed a complaint against Thomas, see Doc.8-1, at 35–38—violated
the District’s “Communication Standards,’” see Doc. 8-1, at 4–6, and were
“received” by staff “as harassing, threatening and attempts to intimidate.” Doc.
3-8, at 2.
Further, although Defendant argued in opposition that Thomas could
not show that she suffered an adverse action as would be needed to sustain an
ADA retaliation claim, Doc. 8, at 17–18, Thomas merely restates the facts
without confronting whether the communication protocol amounts to an
adverse action, see Doc. 12, at 1–2. In other words, Thomas not only makes no
effort to show how she has met any of the prima facie elements of the ADA
retaliation claim asserted in Count III, but she ignores her own evidence which
belies the only basis that she asserts to support the claim. Consequently,
Thomas has not shown a likelihood of success on her ADA retaliation claim.
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Insofar as Thomas’s Count III raises a First Amendment Retaliation
claim, she must establish:
(1) 	that 	the 	plaintiff 	was 	engaged 	in 	a
constitutionally 	protected 	activity; 	(2) 	that 	the
defendant’s adverse action caused the plaintiff to
suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of
ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that
activity; 	and 	(3) 	that 	the 	adverse 	action 	was
motivated at least in part as a response to the
exercise of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 2010). As with the ADA retaliation
claim raised in Count III, Thomas makes no argument in her motion for
preliminary injunction that she has pleaded a prima facie First Amendment
retaliation claim.
Thomas 	also 	cites 	no 	case 	in 	which 	a 	court 	has 	held 	that 	a
communication protocol similar the one at issue here violated a parent’s First
Amendment 	rights. 	To 	the 	contrary, 	courts 	that 	have 	confronted 	this
circumstance 	have 	rejected First 	Amendment 	claims. 	See L. F. v. Lake
Washington Sch. Dist. #414, 947 F.3d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 2020); Boone v. Lowell
Area Schs., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193862, *9 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2025); see
also Searle v. Red Creek Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 21-cv-6086, 2021 WL 5086405, at
*4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2021); cf. McElhaney v. Williams, 81 F.4th 550, 559 (6th
Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 696 (2024) (“a school may impose reasonable,
viewpoint 	neutral, 	time, 	place, 	and 	manner 	restrictions 	on 	parental
interactions with the school”).
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In short, Thomas has not shown that her Count III claim is likely to
succeed on the merits.
As to Count IV, Thomas alleges that the Defendant violated her First
Amendment rights because: “The communication protocol unlawfully restricts
[her] right to petition and communicate with public officials about her child’s
education.” Doc. 1, at 3. Thomas makes no specific argument regarding the
likelihood of success on Ground IV in her motion for preliminary injunction.
See Doc. 3, at 2.
By contrast, and as noted above, courts have rejected similar First
Amendment claims. See Doc. 8, at 14–15 (citing Boone, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
193862, at *9–12); see also L. F., 947 F.3d at 626. And, as Defendant also
highlights, the Sixth Circuit holds that a school “may impose reasonable,
viewpoint 	neutral, 	time, 	place 	and 	manner 	restrictions 	on 	parental
interactions with the school.” See Doc. 8,at 15 (citing McElhaney, 81 F.4th at
559). Based on both the filings to date and the absence of any developed
argument from Thomas regarding the likely success on the merits, the
described communication protocol constitutes a permissible time, place, and
manner restrictions, rather than a content-based or retaliatory action in
violation of the First Amendment.
The first factor––likelihood of success on the merits––thus, does not
weigh in favor of granting Thomas’s requested preliminary injunction.
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2. 	Irreparable harm
Next, the Court considers whether Thomas has shown that she will
suffer irreparable harm unless injunctive relief is granted. See Blackwell, 467
F.3d at 1009. While the Court weighs all four factors, the Sixth Circuit has
held that when evaluating a motion for preliminary injunction “the extent of
an injury may be balanced against other factors, the existence of an irreparable
injury is mandatory.” D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 942 F.3d 324, 327 (6th Cir.
2019) (explaining that the irreparable harm requirement “is indispensable: If
the plaintiff isn’t facing imminent and irreparable injury, there’s no need to
grant relief now as opposed to at the end of the lawsuit.”) (emphasis in
original). Notably, “[t]o merit a preliminary injunction, an injury ‘must be both
certain and immediate,’ not ‘speculative or theoretical.’” Id. (citing Mich. Coal.
Of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 154 (6th Cir.
1991)).
Here, Thomas makes two claims in an effort to demonstrate irreparable
harm. First, she claims “[e]ach school day lost without parental participation
causes irreversible educational regression for a non-verbal child.” Doc. 3, at 2.
Second, she asserts that “[l]oss of meaningful IDEA participation is, by law, an
irreparable injury.” Id. To support his second assertion, Thomas cites the
Supreme Court decision Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). See id.
As to her first argument, Thomas provides no support for her assertion
that the communication protocol employed by the Defendant deprives her of a
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statutorily defined right to parental participation. In the body of her motion
Thomas cites the following statutory provisions in support of her position that
she was deprived meaningful parental participation:
• 	20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1), which provides that
the school district must establish a procedure
affording “[a]n opportunity for the parents of
a child with a disability to examine all records
relating to such child and to participate in
meetings with respect to the identification,
evaluation, and educational placement of the
child, and the provision of a free appropriate
public education to such child, and to obtain
an independent educational evaluation of the
child.”
• 	29 U.S.C. § 794 and 42 U.S.C. § 12132, which
generally prohibit disability discrimination,
including by exclusion or denial of benefits,
against qualified individuals on the basis of a
disability by any federally funded program or
public agency.
See Doc. 3, at 2. Based on what the parties have presented, the communication
protocol employed by the Defendant does not affect Thomas’s ability to
examine records or participate in meetings relevant to C.A.’s FAPE. Instead,
the communication protocol establishes three points of contact for Thomas
about any questions she may have related to C.A.’s FAPE. And Thomas
provides no support for the assertion that the Defendant’s implementation of
the communication protocol amounted to disability discrimination.
Additionally, the exhibits attached to Thomas’s motion indicate that she
is relying on several regulatory provisions, which establish the right to
meaningful parental participation. See Doc. 3-7, at 1 (citing 34 C.F.R. §§
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300.501, 300.503, 300.613). The sections Thomas cites do not provide the
support she appears to believe they do.
Section 300.501 establishes parental rights to inspect and review all
education records, participate in meetings, and be involved in placement
decisions. Thomas claims she has not been able to meaningfully participate
due to the communication protocol, Doc. 3, at 2, but that protocol only blocks
Thomas from directly communicating with certain teachers and support staff.
None of the provisions that Thomas cites entitle her to direct communication
with each teacher or staff member who interacts with her child. Nor does she
argue that those regulations impose such a requirement. And the record shows
that Thomas continues to communicate with, for instance, the Director of Pupil
Services regarding IEP meeting scheduling and that the only meeting that the
record shows that was missed appears to have been missed due to Thomas’s
refusal to participate. See Docs. 8-1, at 50–54; 13-1. So nothing in the
Complaint or the motion show that Thomas has been excluded meaningfully
participating in IEP meetings or placement decisions. See Docs. 1, 3.
As to Thomas’s right to inspect and review education records, see 34
C.F.R. § 300.501(a), nothing in the Complaint or motion show that Defendant
or its officers failed to comply with an inspection request within the required
timeframe. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.613(a) (providing 45 days for an educational
agency to respond to reasonable requests). Additionally, to the extent that
Thomas is arguing that she was not provided the prior written notice required
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by Section 300.503, that notice is only required before C.A.’s school either
proposes or refuses “to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of [C.A.] or the provision of FAPE to [C.A].” 34 C.F.R §
300.503(a)(1)–(2). Neither in Thomas’s motion, nor in her Complaint, does she
argue that such proposal or refusal have occurred without her participation or
the requisite notice.
Moreover, Thomas has not provided any evidence that C.A. experienced
any regression as a result of the communication protocol. In her reply, Thomas
lists for the first time “documented regression” that C.A. has allegedly suffered.
Doc. 12, at 3. To this end, Thomas asserts that the Defendant has not rebutted
certain alleged regressions that C.A. has experienced. Id. But because these
alleged “educational injuries” were not provided in Thomas’s motion for
injunctive relief, it is unsurprising that the Defendant did not rebut those
allegations. Indeed, a reply is not an appropriate vehicle for presenting new
evidence. See Lewis v. Gotham Ins. Co., No. 09-cv-52, 2009 WL 3698028, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2009) (“‘It is improper for a moving party to introduce new
facts ... in the reply brief than those presented in the moving papers’ when
those facts could have been presented in the opening brief.”) (citation omitted);
Springs Indus., Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 137 F.R.D. 238, 239–40 (N.D.
Tex. 1991); cf. Island Creek Coal Co. v. Wilkerson, 910 F.3d 254, 256 (6th Cir.
2018) (explaining that arguments not raised in an opening brief are forfeited).
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And, as discussed earlier, Thomas’s apparent status as a non-attorney means
that she cannot represent C.A.’s interests. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2).
As to her second argument, the Supreme Court’s decision in Honig does
not 	support 	Thomas’s 	broad 	assertion 	that 	she 	experienced 	a 	“loss 	of
meaningful IDEA participation” simply by having her email communications
directed to school administrators rather than directly to teachers or staff. See
Doc. 3, at 2. Indeed, beyond generally explaining the importance of parental
participation, see 484 U.S. at 309, Honig is inapposite to Thomas’s case. The
dispute in Honig arose when two students in different school systems were
expelled based on behavior attributed to conditions accounted for in their IEPs
while administrative proceedings pertaining to those IEPs remained pending.
See 484 U.S. at 312–17. The Supreme Court held that the expulsion violated
the students’ and parents’ rights under the EHA’s “stay put” provision.4 484
U.S. at 309, 325. Specifically, the Court found that by expelling the students
4 	The EHA’s stay-put provision cited in Honig is substantially the same
as the provision found in the now applicable IDEA, which provides in relevant
part:
[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings conducted
pursuant to this section, unless the State or local
educational agency and the parents or guardian
otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-
current educational placement of the child, or, if
applying for initial admission to a public school,
shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed in
the public school program until all such proceedings
have been completed.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).
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while the administrative process was ongoing, the school violated the parents’
rights to meaningfully participate in the administrative process without
detriment to the students’ education. 484 U.S. at 328 (affirming an injunction
stopping the students’ indefinite suspension pending resolution of the required
statutory procedures). By contrast, Thomas doesn’t assert that C.A. was
expelled. See Doc. 1, at 3; Doc. 3, at 2. The Complaint is also devoid of any
allegation 	that 	Defendant 	impeded 	Thomas’s 	participation 	in 	any
administrative proceedings related to C.A.’s IEP or that Defendant made any
change to C.A’s IEP without Thomas’s involvement. See Doc. 1, at 3.
Based on the above, Thomas has not shown that she is likely to face
imminent and irreparable harm based on Defendant’s alleged conduct. So this
factor weighs against granting the requested injunctive relief.
3. 	Balance of Equities and Public Policy
Because the two most important factors discussed above weigh against
granting Thomas’s requested preliminary injunction, the final two factors are
only discussed briefly together.
As 	to 	the 	balance 	of 	equities, 	Thomas 	asserts 	that 	“[r]estoring
communication imposes no burden on the District; continued restrictions
severely harm the student a parent.” Doc. 3, at 2. This general assertion
provides nothing to substantiate Thomas’s assertion that the Defendant would
be unburdened if it is enjoined from implementing the communication protocol.
By contrast, the Defendant asserts that if the communication protocol is lifted
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“District staff will be unnecessarily subjected to communications found to be
in violation of the District’s Communication Standards.” Doc. 8, at 25. And, as
discussed above, Thomas has not shown that the harms alleged are the sort
that require immediate injunctive relief or a likelihood of success on the merits
of her claims. So the balance of equities factor weighs against the requested
injunctive relief.
As 	to 	the 	public 	policy 	factor, 	Thomas 	asserts 	that 	“[e]nsuring
transparency and parental participation in special education furthers the
purposes of IDEA and protects constitutional rights.” Doc. 3, at 2. No one
disputes the importance of transparency and parental participation in special
education. 	See 	Honig, 	484 	U.S. 	at 	325 	(explaining 	the 	importance 	of
meaningful parental participation and how the stay-put provision protects the
interests of the student to allow for meaningful parental participation). As
discussed above, however, Thomas’s allegations and the arguments she raises
do 	not 	show 	that 	the 	Defendant’s 	alleged 	conduct—implementing 	a
communication protocol that requires that Thomas contact school officials
other than C.A.’s direct instructors interfered with this interest. So the public
policy factor does not support the requested injunctive relief.
Motion for evidentiary hearing
Separately, Thomas moves the Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing
regarding the motion for preliminary injunction. See Doc. 10. This motion
asserts that “live evidence” is necessary to the resolution of her motion for
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preliminary injunction because the motion “raises substantial and material
disputes of fact that cannot be resolved on the written record alone.” Doc. 10,
at 1. Thomas thus claims that a hearing is needed “to assess credibility,
evaluate omitted or distorted documents, examine the timeline of events, and
protect minor student C.A. from further irreparable harm.” Id.
Thomas presents nothing to show that the documents provided omitted
or distorted facts and, in any event, as discussed above, she has not shown that
she or C.A. have experienced irreparable harm. Indeed, for the reasons
explained above, it is apparent that she cannot represent C.A.’s interest. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2).
Thomas’s motion for an evidentiary hearing is thus DENIED.
Motion for leave to file instanter supplemental exhibit
The 	Defendant 	also 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	file 	instanter
supplemental authority in support of its opposition to Thomas’s motion for
preliminary 	injunction. 	See 	Doc. 	13. 	This 	document 	is 	pertinent 	to 	the
Defendant’s opposition and Thomas has not opposed the inclusion of this
supplemental exhibit. Defendant’s motion is thus GRANTED.
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Conclusion
For all the reasons stated, I recommend that the District Court deny
Thomas’s motion for preliminary injunction, Doc. 3. Additionally, Thomas’s
motion for evidentiary hearing, Doc. 10, is denied and Defendant’s motion, Doc.
13, is granted.
Dated: December 19, 2025
/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.
James E. Grimes Jr.
U.S. Magistrate Judge
OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with
the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served
with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure
to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the
District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–531 (6th
Cir. 2019).
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