Thomas v. Beachwood City School District Board of Education

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
TIFFANY THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BEACHWOOD CITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant.
CASE NO. 1:25-cv-2167
DISTRICT JUDGE
DONALD C. NUGENT
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JAMES E. GRIMES JR.
REPORT AND
RECOMENDATION
Introduction
In October 2025, Plaintiff Tiffany Thomas filed a four-count Complaint
against Defendant Beachwood City School District Board of Education alleging
claims concerning the Board’s institution of a “communication protocol” related
to Thomas’s communications with school officials about her child, C.A. Doc. 1.
After she failed to attend the case management conference, the Court ordered
her to appear for a show cause hearing on January 28, 2026. See Doc. 27.
On January 27, 2026, Thomas filed a motion for leave to file a first
amended complaint. Doc. 32. The next day, the Court determined at the show
cause hearing that Thomas had shown cause for her failure to attend the case
management conference. See Doc. 34.
A few weeks later, the Board filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, Doc. 42, and an opposition to Thomas’s motion to file a first amended
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complaint, Doc. 43. Thomas next moved for leave to file a second amended
complaint. Doc. 47. In light of Thomas’s motion to file a second amended
complaint, the Court denied as moot her motion to file a first amended
complaint. Doc. 48.
After the Board opposed Thomas’s motion to file a second amended
complaint, Thomas filed a reply, Doc. 50, and a document styled as a motion
for leave to file a second amended complaint—not to be confused with her
earlier motion for leave to file a second amended complaint—and to treat
Thomas’s earlier motion for leave as her response to the Board’s motion to
dismiss, Doc. 52.1
In short, the Court has to adjudicate the Board’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings, Doc. 42, and Thomas’s motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint, Doc. 52. Because the Court ultimately recommends
granting the Board’s motion and has determined that Thomas’s motion should
be denied, the Court has determined that the best course is to address the
Board’s 	motion 	for 	judgment 	on 	the 	pleadings 	in 	this 	report 	and
recommendation and to deal with Thomas’s motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint in a contemporaneously filed accompanying order.
1 	Stated differently, Thomas clarified in Document 52, that her first
motion for leave to file a second complaint, see Doc. 47, should be construed as
her response to the Board’s motion to dismiss.
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Background
Although Thomas is unrepresented and is not an attorney, the face of
the Complaint indicates that she filed it “individually and as parent of C.A. a
minor.” Id. at 1. According to the Complaint, the Board:
imposed a unilateral “communication protocol” that
blocks 	Plaintiff 	from 	directly 	contacting 	[C.A.’s]
teachers, 	therapists, 	and 	service 	providers,
rerouting 	every 	message 	through 	three
administrators. The restriction was imposed after
Plaintiff filed protected complaints and advocacy
efforts, and it has prevented her from participating
in [C.A.’s] education.
Id.
According to the facts alleged in the Complaint, which the Court takes
as true for purposes of this report and recommendation, see Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007), C.A. is 12 years old and is enrolled at
Beachwood Middle School.2 Doc. 1, at 2. He is autistic, non-verbal, and
“cognitively delayed.” Id.
Thomas has been an enthusiastic participant in C.A.’s “educational
planning,” having gone so far as to “found[] the local Special Education PTA …
to promote inclusion.” Id. In June 2025, she “filed a state complaint concerning
denial 	of 	inclusive 	extracurricular 	and 	mental-health 	programming.” 	Id.
Thomas does not allege the entity against whom she filed this state complaint
2 	In 	her 	verified 	Complaint, 	Thomas 	states 	that 	she 	“resides 	in
Beachwood, Ohio.” Doc. 1, at 1. Her signature block and the Court’s docket,
however, list her address as a residence in Cleveland, Ohio. Id. at 4
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but she is pro se and when adjudicating a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, 	this 	Court 	must 	“construe 	[the 	complaint] 	‘in 	the 	light 	most
favorable to [Thomas], accept [the complaint’s] allegations as true, and draw
all reasonable inferences in [Thomas’s] favor.” Mills v. Barnard, 869 F.3d 473,
479 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir.
2007)); see also See Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Pro
se plaintiffs enjoy the benefit of a liberal construction of their pleadings and
filings.”). So the Court infers that Thomas filed this state complaint against
the Board.
The following month, Thomas “filed [human resources] complaints
alleging retaliation and harassment by district administrators.” Doc. 1, at 2.
And in September 2025, “Superintendent Robert Hardis directed the district’s
[information technology] department to block [Thomas’s] emails to teachers
and reroute 	all communications 	to 	himself, 	Principal Tony 	Srithai, 	and
Director of Pupil Services Jen Polak.” Id.
According to Thomas, there is “no board policy” that “authorizes this
communication 	restriction.” 	Id. 	Instead, 	and 	as 	confirmed 	“[i]n
correspondence” 	from 	the 	Board’s 	President, 	Megan 	Walsh, 	“the
Superintendent may act at his discretion.” Id.
Because of this communication protocol, Thomas “cannot email or
receive 	timely 	responses 	from 	[C.A.’s] 	service 	providers.” 	Id. 	Further,
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“[q]uestions about assignments, data, or incidents[,] such as an unexplained
eye injury[,] go unanswered.” Id.
The 	Complaint 	alleges 	that 	“[t]he 	district 	has 	justified 	the
[communication] 	restriction 	by 	claiming 	that 	staff 	felt 	‘harassed 	or
threatened.’” Id. The Complaint follows this assertion with three bullet points:
• 	No staff complaint was filed with HR;
• 	The 	Beachwood 	Police 	Department 	reported 	no
investigation or criminal complaint;
• 	Public-records 	searches 	produced 	no 	supporting
documents.
Id. Given Thomas’s pro se status, the Court infers that these points allege that
(1) no member of the district’s staff complained to human resources about
Thomas harassing or threatening them; (2) the local police did not investigate
Thomas for harassing or threatening anyone and did not file a criminal
complaint about that sort of conduct; and (3) Thomas searched public records
and could not locate documents that would support the district’s assertion that
staff members “felt ‘harassed and threatened’” by Thomas.
According to the Complaint, the school district’s human resources
director “later admitted that a related teacher-communication complaint was
‘inadvertently omitted’ for more than thirty days.” Doc. 1, at 2. The Complaint
does not say what the teacher-communication complaint was omitted from or
explain the significance of the reference to 30 days. But the Complaint adds
without explanation that this omission “confirm[s] administrative delay and
inconsistency.” Doc. 1, at 2.
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Finally, the Complaint alleges that since August 2025, C.A. “has lost
instructional time, missed services, and regressed behaviorally.” Id. And
although Thomas “has filed state and federal complaints seeking relief, … the
district continues to enforce the communication ban.” Id.
Based on these factual assertions, the Complaint alleges four claims for
relief. Count one requires some unpacking. It alleges the “Denial of FAPE
(IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.),” and asserts the “[b]y preventing [Thomas’s]
meaningful participation in [C.A.’s] IEP and withholding service information,”
the Board “violated IDEA procedural safeguards and deprived C.A. of a Free
Appropriate 	Public 	Education.” 	Id. 	at 	3. 	IDEA 	is 	the 	Individuals 	with
Disabilities Education Act, which is codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 and the
provisions that follow it.3 See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 157
(2017). The acronym FAPE, in turn, stands for Free Appropriate Public
Education. Id. at 158. The Act makes a FAPE “available to all children with
disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21.” 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(1)(A). “[A] FAPE comprises ‘special education and related services’—
3 	Acronyms and initialisms, which only help the author and not the
reader, are a bane of the legal profession. See Del. Riverkeeper Network v.
FERC, 753 F.3d 1304, 1320-21 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Silberman, J., concurring). But
their use is unfortunately unavoidable here. That said, the Individuals with
Disabilities 	Education 	Act, 	or 	IDEA, 	was 	reauthorized 	in 	2004 	as 	the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (“IDEIA”), see Pub.
L. 108-446, 118 Stat 2647 (Dec. 3, 2004). This latter acronym seemingly hasn’t
caught on. See Alzandani v. Hamtramck Pub. Schs., No. 25-1601, - - F.4th - -,
2026 WL 1296044, at *1 (6th Cir. May 12, 2026). So the Court will stick with
IDEA.
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both ‘instruction’ tailored to meet a child’s ‘unique needs’ and sufficient
‘supportive services’ to permit the child to benefit from that instruction.” Fry,
580 U.S. at 158 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), (26), (29)). Finally, The initialism
“IEP” stands for individualized education program. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S.
305, 311 (1988). Putting all of this together, Thomas is claiming that through
the 	communication 	protocol, 	the 	Board 	“violated” 	unnamed 	“procedural
safeguards” found in the IDEA and thus deprived C.A. of a Free Appropriate
Public Education.
Count two alleges “Disability Discrimination (Section 504 & ADA).” Doc.
1, at 3. Section 504 refers to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which is
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794. It “prohibits discrimination against certain
handicapped individuals ‘under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.’” Moreno v. Consol. Rail Corp., 99 F.3d 782, 784 (6th Cir.
1996). The ADA is the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-
336, 104 Stat. 327, which is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 through 12213.
Count two contains the assertion that the Board “discriminated against C.A.
on the basis of disability by restricting parental participation, failing to provide
equal access to extracurricular programs, and ignoring accommodation needs.”
Doc. 1, at 3.
Count three alleges retaliation under the ADA, Section 504, and the
First 	Amendment. 	Id. 	The 	Complaint 	alleges 	that 	after 	Thomas 	“filed
protected 	complaints 	and 	founded 	a 	special 	education 	parent 	teacher
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association chapter, the Board retaliated by imposing a communication block,
mischaracterizing [Thomas’s] advocacy as harassment, and discouraging staff
interaction.” Id.
Finally, count four alleges a First Amendment violation. Id. According
to the Complaint, the “communication protocol unlawfully restricts Thomas’s
right 	to 	petition 	and 	communicate 	with 	public 	officials 	about 	[C.A.’s]
education.” Id.
Discussion
Rule 12(c) standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a party to “move for
judgment on the pleadings.” A motion under Rule 12(c) is an appropriate
vehicle to argue that a complaint “[f]ail[s] to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2); see Savel v. MetroHealth Sys., 96 F.4th
932, 938 n.2 (6th Cir. 2024) (“A district court can dismiss a complaint on a Rule
12(c) motion for failure to state a claim as it would on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”).
A court deciding a motion under Rule 12(c), therefore, applies the same
standard applicable to motions under Rule 12(b)(6). Bates v. Green Farms
Condo. Ass’n, 958 F.3d 470, 480 (6th Cir. 2020).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint by
evaluating the complaint’s allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff
to determine whether they state a valid claim for relief. In re NM Holdings Co.,
LLC, 622 F.3d 613, 618 (6th Cir. 2010). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6)
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motion, the Court must dismiss a claim unless the “[f]actual allegations [are]
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption
that all of the complaint's allegations are true.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(internal citations and footnote omitted).
In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “must construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” In re NM Holdings Co.,
LLC, 622 F.3d 613, 618 (6th Cir. 2010), and must “assum[e] that all the
allegations in the complaint are true,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. But “courts
‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.’” Id. (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level,” and “‘must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that
merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.’” Id. (quoting
5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235–236
(3d ed. 2004)).
Courts deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “may not consider evidence
outside the pleadings.” Clark v. Jackson, No. 22-5553, 2023 WL 2787325, at *2
(6th Cir. Apr. 5, 2023); see Bates, 958 F.3d at 483. But a court may consider
matters attached to a complaint or “incorporated into [it] by reference.”
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Bassett
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). A court can
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also consider “matters of which [it] may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, 551 U.S.
at 322.
Although 	the 	Court 	should 	liberally 	construe 	pro 	se 	filings, 	this
requirement “has limits.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir.
2001). When considering a pro se complaint, a court is “not require[d] … to
conjure allegations on a litigant’s behalf.” Id. Instead, a pro se complaint must
comply with basic pleading requirements and “provide notice to the opposing
party of the relief sought.” Id. The Court is thus not required to accept as true
mere legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).
Count one
Count one alleges that through the communication protocol, the Board
denied or “deprived C.A. of a Free Appropriate Public Education.” Doc. 1 at 3.
The Board says that this count is subject to dismissal for failure to allege that
Thomas exhausted administrative remedies. Doc. 42, at 5.4 Before discussing
the problems with this count, there is a wrinkle to iron out.
“Because the failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense,” it is normally
the case that “dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) is appropriate only if the
face of the complaint shows that the plaintiff has not in fact exhausted her
administrative remedies.” Bushong v. Delaware City Sch. Dist., 851 F. App’x
4 	The Court cites the CM/ECF generated pages numbers found at the top
of the parties’ filings.
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541, 545 (6th Cir. 2021). And because the face of Thomas’s Complaint does not
show that she failed to exhaust administrative remedies, one might think that
dismissal under Rule 12(c) would not be appropriate.5 But in the context of the
IDEA, Title VII, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act, exhaustion is essentially
a condition precedent, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(c), making dismissal under Rule
12(c) available, see Li v. Revere Loc. Sch. Dist., No. 21-3422, 2023 WL 3302062,
at *8–11 (6th Cir. May 8, 2023); L.G. by & through G.G. v. Bd. of Educ. of
Fayette Cnty., Kentucky, 775 F. App'x 227, 230–32 (6th Cir. 2019); see also
Bullington v. Bedford Cnty., Tennessee, 905 F.3d 467, 470 (6th Cir. 2018)
(holding that a “district court correctly dismissed [an] ADA claim” for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies); Robinette v. Union Hosp., No. 17-3471,
2018 WL 2106403, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 2018) (Title VII); cf. Mitchell v.
Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 819–20 (6th Cir. 2003) (“a party’s exhaustion of
administrative processes for filing a claim of discrimination is a condition
precedent to filing suit in the district court, rather than a jurisdictional
prerequisite”). We can thus move to the Board’s challenge.
Under the IDEA, a plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative
remedies as a prerequisite to bringing suit over the denial of a FAPE. See 20
5 	Exhaustion under IDEA is likely not jurisdictional. See Li v. Revere Loc.
Sch. Dist., No. 21-3422, 2023 WL 3302062, at *10 & n.12 (6th Cir. May 8, 2023);
see also Doe by K.M. v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 56 F.4th 1076, 1084 (6th Cir.
2023) (“We have healthy skepticism for those courts that view the exhaustion
rule as jurisdictional.”).
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U.S.C. § 1415(l). The Complaint, however, contains no allegations showing that
Thomas exhausted administrative remedies with respect to this claim.
There’s more. As the Supreme Court has explained, it is the “eligible
child” who “acquires a ‘substantive right’ to” the “‘special education and related
services’” that “comprise[]” a FAPE. Fry, 580 U.S. at 158 (emphasis added); see
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). The IDEA does not give a parent a right to a FAPE
because of her status as a parent of a child entitled to the IDEA’s benefit. See
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). To the extent that Thomas seeks to advance her own
claim in count one, that effort must fail.6
The 	Complaint 	says 	that 	the 	Board 	“violated 	IDEA 	procedural
safeguards.” To be sure, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(6) provides “that Children with
disabilities and their parents are afforded the procedural safeguards required
by 20 U.S.C. § 1412. But the Complaint doesn’t allege what safeguards were
violated or how they were violated. And section 1415 does not include among
its provisions a right for parents to directly email teachers.
Further, as a pro se litigant, Thomas cannot represent C.A.’s interests.
Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (“parents cannot
appear pro se on behalf of their minor children because a minor’s personal
6 	“A parent may represent herself pro se to vindicate rights that may be
intertwined with her child’s granted under a statutory scheme such as
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.” H.C. v. Fleming Cnty. Kentucky
Bd. of Educ., No. 17-6269, 2018 WL 11589034, at *2 (6th Cir. July 11, 2018)
(citing Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 535 (2007)). In count
one, however, Thomas alleges only that the Board “deprived C.A. of a free
appropriate public education.” Doc. 1, at 3.
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cause 	of 	action 	is 	her 	own 	and 	does 	not 	belong 	to 	her 	parent 	or
representative.”). Thomas thus lacks standing to vindicate C.A.’s right to a
FAPE.
Count one should be dismissed.
Count two
Count two alleges disability discrimination under Section 504 and the
ADA and asserts that the Board discriminated against C.A. on the basis of his
disability. Doc. 1, at 3. But, as noted, Thomas is pro se and thus cannot
represent C.A.
Count two should be dismissed.
Count three
Count three alleges retaliation under Section 504, the ADA, and the
First Amendment. Doc. 1, at 3. Thomas alleges that “after” she “filed protected
complaints and founded a [special education parent teacher association]
chapter, 	the 	Board 	retaliated 	by 	imposing 	a 	communication 	block,
mischaracterizing 	[her] 	advocacy 	as 	harassment, 	and 	discouraging 	staff
interaction.” Id.
As the Board notes, there is no private cause of action under Section 504
for retaliation. Doc. 42, at 9 (citing Smith v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 159 F.4th
1067, 1074-1082 (6th Cir. 2025)). The Section 504 aspect of count three thus
fails at the threshold. This leaves Thomas’s ADA and First Amendment
retaliation claims.
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The ADA prohibits a “public entity,” including a school district from
denying “someone access to one of its ‘services, programs, or activities’ or
otherwise … ‘subject[ing]’ someone ‘to discrimination.’” Y.A. by Alzandani v.
Hamtramck Pub. Schs., 137 F.4th 862, 870 (6th Cir. 2025); see 42 U.S.C. §
12132. The ADA contains a retaliation provision which provides:
No person shall discriminate against any individual
because such individual has opposed any act or
practice made unlawful by this chapter or because
such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To make out an ADA-retaliation claim, a plaintiff must
allege that:
(1) she engaged in activity protected under the ADA;
(2) the [defendant] knew of that activity; (3) the
[defendant] took an adverse action against plaintiff;
and (4) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse action.
Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1046 (6th Cir. 2014). In the context of
the ADA, “‘protected activity[],’ … mean[s] an ‘action taken to protest or oppose
a statutorily prohibited discrimination.’” Pemberton v. Bell’s Brewery, Inc., 150
F.4th 751, 767 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted).
The Board argues that Thomas’s ADA-retaliation claim fails because it
is subject to the same exhaustion requirement that applies to a claim under
the IDEA. Doc. 42, at 9–10; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l); Deister v. Auto Club Ins.
Ass’n, 647 F. App’x 652, 658 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Sagan v. Sumner County
Bd. of Educ., 726 F.Supp. 2d 868, 878 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (“Regardless of how a
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claim is couched ... any claim that relates directly to a student’s access to an
FAPE is subject to the exhaustion requirement.”). The Sixth Circuit caselaw is
consistent with the Board’s argument. See W.R. v. Ohio Health Dep’t, 651 F.
App’x 514, 520 (6th Cir. 2016); see id. at 519 (explaining that under authority
granted by Congress, the Department of Education had promulgated 34 C.F.R.
§ 303.448(e), which requires exhaustion of ADA claims and that Ohio had
“adopted” this requirement). Some courts, however, have held that the ADA’s
exhaustion requirement, which is found in Title V of that Act, does not apply
if “an individual is retaliated against for protesting acts that violate Title II of
the ADA,” which deals with discrimination by public entities, such as public
schools. Bennett v. Bd. of Educ. of Washington Cnty. Joint Vocational Sch.
Dist., No. 08–CV–663, 2010 WL 3910364, at *3–5 (S.D. Ohio Oct.4, 2010); see
Mitchell through Mitchell v. Cmty. Mental Health of Cent. Michigan, 243 F.
Supp. 3d 822, 833 (E.D. Mich. 2017).
Even so, in light of W.R. and that fact that the Complaint does not allege
that Thomas exhausted administrative remedies as to her ADA retaliation
claim, the ADA aspect of count three fails.
But even if Thomas were not required to exhaust the ADA aspect of
count three, Thomas has not alleged facts that would support the inference
that there is a causal connection between any ADA-protected activity and the
communication 	protocol. To be sure, the 	Complaint 	alleges 	that “[a]fter
[Thomas] filed protected complaints and founded a SEPTA chapter, [the
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Board] retaliated.” Doc. 1, at 3. But this is just a rote recitation of the elements,
which is not enough to satisfy Rule 8. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do”).
Review of the Complaint reveals that it contains only two factual
allegations about potentially protected activity at any time before the Board
implemented the communication protocol. See Doc. 1, at 2. First, the Complaint
alleges that “[i]n June 2025, [Thomas] filed a state complaint concerning denial
of inclusive extracurricular and mental-health programming.” Id. And “[o]n
August 25, 2025, [Thomas] filed HR complaints alleging retaliation and
harassment by district administrators.” Id.
Recall that the ADA deals with disabilities. And its anti-retaliation
provision specifically deals with an “individual [who] has opposed any act or
practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or” an “individual [who] made a charge,
testified, 	assisted, 	or 	participated 	in 	any 	manner 	in 	an 	investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under” the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). In other words,
“[t]he ‘ADA is not … a catchall statute creating a cause of action for any …
retaliation, 	but 	[instead] 	protects 	individuals 	only 	from 	retaliation 	for
engaging in ... activity covered by the ADA.” Pemberton, 150 F.4th at 760
(quoting Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1046). To make out an ADA-retaliation claim,
therefore, the alleged victim must allege facts showing that she opposed
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disability-based discrimination or, among other things, “made a charge” about
disability-based discrimination. See id. at 768 (explaining that “[t]he ADA does
not protect” every activity; the “activity has [to] relat[e] to a disability, or to an
action opposing an ADA-prohibited discrimination.”).
Taking the two factual assertions in reverse order, Thomas alleges that
she filed the August complaints with human resources concerning retaliation
and harassment by district administrators. But retaliation and harassment for
what? Thomas does not allege that these complaints were made “to protest or
oppose a statutorily prohibited discrimination.” Pemberton, 150 F.4th at 767.
And she does not otherwise allege that her August complaints had anything to
with the matters to which the ADA applies.
This leaves the June complaints filed with state authorities “concerning
[the] denial of inclusive extracurricular and mental-health programming.” Doc.
1, at 2. Inferentially, Thomas’s alleged complaints concerned C.A., whom she
has 	alleged 	is 	disabled. 	But 	she 	doesn’t 	allege 	that 	the 	Board 	denied
programming based on C.A.’s disability.
Further, 	Thomas 	does 	not 	allege 	facts 	showing 	that 	the 	Board
implemented the communication protocol in response to her June complaints.
Implicitly, therefore, she asks the Court to infer a connection between the June
complaints and the communication protocol based solely on the fact that the
two events are about two-and-a-half months apart.
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In this regard, the Sixth Circuit has “noted that temporal proximity
alone is not sufficient to support a retaliation claim … and that plaintiffs
generally must show temporal proximity combined with ‘other compelling
evidence’ of retaliation to support their claims.” Howington v. Quality Rest.
Concepts, LLC, 298 F. App’x 436, 446 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Nguyen v. City
of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 566 (6th Cir. 2000)). On the other hand, “‘there may
be 	circumstances 	where 	evidence 	of 	temporal proximity 	alone 	would be
sufficient to support [an] inference’ of retaliation.” Id. (quoting Nguyen, 229
F.3d at 567). If the retaliatory conduct follows within one to two days of
protected activity, a court may infer causation without more evidence. See id.at
446–47. The cases in which a court could infer causation based solely on a
temporal connection are “‘limited [in] number.’” Id. at 447 (quoting Mickey v.
Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008)); cf. Mickey, 516 F.3d
at 523–26 (involving an “employer [who] fires an employee immediately after
learning of a protected activity,” although the activity occurred 12 days before).
Basically, “the more that a protected activity is temporally distant from the
adverse employment action, ‘the more the plaintiff must supplement his claim
with other evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish causality.’” Boshaw v.
Midland Brewing Co., 32 F.4th 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Vereecke v.
Huron Valley Sch. Dist., 609 F.3d 392, 400 (6th Cir. 2010)); cf. Lemaster v.
Lawrence Cnty., Kentucky, 65 F.4th 302, 310 (6th Cir. 2023) (“In most cases,”
when “a plaintiff … show[s] some moderate time gap—say, a matter of
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months,” the Court’s “summary-judgment inquiry … asks whether the plaintiff
has offered enough ‘other evidence of retaliatory conduct’ apart from this
temporal proximity”). And “three months … between” protected activity “and
… termination[] [is] a firm indicator of a lack of a causal link.” Boshaw, 32
F.4th at 605.
Given Sixth Circuit precedent, Thomas’s bare allegation that she filed
complaints in June is, without more, insufficient to show that the Board
implemented the communication protocol in September in retaliation for the
June complaints. See Vereecke, 609 F.3d at 400–01; Brown v. Chase Brass &
Copper Co., 14 F. App’x 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2001) (“the mere fact that an adverse
… action occurs subsequent to the protected activity does not, standing alone,
support an inference of retaliation”) (citing Cooper v. City of N. Olmstead, 795
F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1986)).
Thomas’s ADA-retaliation claims thus fails.
As to Thomas’s First Amendment claim, retaliating against a person
because the person exercised her constitutional rights “is itself a violation of
the Constitution.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999); see
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10 (1998). To make out a valid First
Amendment retaliation claim, Thomas must allege that:
(1) 	… 	[s]he 	was 	engaged 	in 	a 	constitutionally
protected activity; (2) … the defendant’s adverse
action caused h[er] to suffer an injury that would
likely 	chill 	a 	person 	of 	ordinary 	firmness 	from
continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) … the
adverse action was motivated at least in part as a
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response 	to 	the 	exercise 	of 	[her] 	constitutional
rights.”
Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 477–78 (6th
Cir. 2006).
Thomas’s 	First 	Amendment 	claim 	suffers 	from 	the 	same 	causal-
connection problem as her ADA-retaliation claim.7 The First Amendment
retaliation claim also fails because, as this Court has explained, “courts that
have confronted” communication protocols like the one Thomas alleges, “have
rejected First Amendment claims.” Thomas v. Beachwood City Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-2167, 2025 WL 3684251, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2025)
(citing McElhaney v. Williams, 81 F.4th 550, 559 (6th Cir. 2023), cert. denied,
__ U.S. __, 144 S. Ct. 696 (2024); L. F. v. Lake Washington Sch. Dist. #414, 947
F.3d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 2020); Boone v. Lowell Area Schs., 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 193862, *9 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2025); Searle v. Red Creek Cent. Sch.
Dist., No. 21-cv-6086, 2021 WL 5086405, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2021)), report
and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 297678 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 2026). And
the reason courts have rejected claims like Thomas’s is that “a school may
impose reasonable, viewpoint neutral, time, place, and manner restrictions on
7 	Because Thomas didn’t allege that the August complaints related to
C.A.’s disability, the Court’s temporal-connection analysis as to the ADA-
retaliation claim focused on the June complaints. But the same analysis would
apply to the August complaints because the Board did not implement the
protocol within a day or two of the August complaints. See Howington, 298 F.
App’x at 446–47 (explaining that retaliatory conduct that follows within one to
two days of protected activity, would fall within “the ‘limited number of cases’
in which” a court could “‘infer’” causation without additional evidence).
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parental interactions with the school.” McElhaney, 81 F.4th at 559. Further,
Thomas has not alleged any facts showing that her speech was chilled or
restricted in any way. She also has not alleged that she was “prohibited from
communicating concerns about [C.A.’s] education or treatment; rather, she
claims that the manner in which she was able to communicate with the School
and its employees was restricted.” Boone, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193862, at
*10; see Doc. 1, at 2 (alleging that Thomas “cannot email or receive timely
responses from [C.A.’s] service providers”). But whether or not Thomas can
email C.A.’s teachers, the communication protocol channels her emails to
C.A.’s principal, the superintendent, and the director of pupil services. Doc. 1,
at 2. It is not “a ‘ban’ or ‘restraint’ on [Thomas’s] speech.” Boone, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 193862, at *10. So the First Amendment retaliation claim fails.
Count three should be dismissed.
Count four
In count four, Thomas alleges that the communication protocol violates
the 	First 	Amendment 	because 	it 	restricts 	her 	“right 	to 	petition 	and
communicate with public officials about her child’s education.” Doc. 1, at 3.
The initial problem with count four is that the right to petition under
the First Amendment does not give Thomas, or any parent, a right to
unfettered communication with the teachers of the parent’s child. See Borough
of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388 (2011) (“The right to petition
allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government
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and their elected representatives.”). Rather, the right to petition “protects the
‘right of access’ to courts and government forums. It does not go further.”
Wisconsin Voter All. v. Millis, 166 F.4th 627, 636 (7th Cir. 2026) (citations
omitted); see Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271,
285 (1984) (“Nothing in the First Amendment or in this Court's case law
interpreting it suggests that the rights to speak, associate, and petition require
government 	policymakers 	to 	listen 	or 	respond 	to 	individuals’
communications”); Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., 441 U.S. 463, 465
(1979) (“the First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on
the government to listen, [or] to respond”).
It is thus unsurprising that, as noted, courts have rejected First
Amendment challenges to similar communication protocols. See, e.g., Boone,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193862, *9–10. At bottom, there is no basis to find that
Thomas has a First Amendment-based right to direct email access to C.A.’s
teachers. Cf. Doe v. Salina, No. 23-cv-3529, 2024 WL 5077629, at *21 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 11, 2024) (“the ‘right to petition government afforded by the First
Amendment does not include the absolute right to speak in person to officials.
Where written communications are considered by government officials, denial
of a hearing does not infringe upon the right to petition.’”) (quoting Cronin v.
Town of Amesbury, 895 F. Supp. 375, 389–90 (D. Mass. 1995), aff’d, 81 F.3d
257 (1st Cir. 1996)). Indeed, “First Amendment does not guarantee the right to
communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be
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desired.” Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 642
(1981).
Count four, alleging that the Board infringed Thomas right to petition
under the First Amendment fails.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court should grant the Board’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings.8
Dated: May 19, 2026
/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.
James E. Grimes Jr.
U.S. Magistrate Judge
OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with
the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served
with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure
to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the
District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–31 (6th
Cir. 2019).
8 	Ordinarily, on recommending dismissal of Thomas’s Complaint, the
Court 	might 	grant 	Thomas 	leave 	to 	file 	a 	second 	amended 	complaint,
conditioned on the District Court accepting the recommendation to dismiss the
Complaint. See Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 614–16 (6th Cir. 2011).
But Thomas has filed a motion to file a second amended complaint, Doc. 47,
which the Board has opposed, see Doc. 53. And Thomas has asked that the
Court 	treat 	the 	proposed 	second 	amended 	complaint 	as 	the 	“operative
pleading.” Doc. 50, at 2; Doc. 52, at 1. As noted, the Court adjudicates the
motion to file a second amended complaint in a separate order.
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