Hunt v. Davis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ANTHONY HUNT,
Plaintiff,
v.
WARDEN ANTHONY DAVIS,
Defendant.
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Case No. 4:24-cv-1820
Judge J. Philip Calabrese
Magistrate Judge
Darrell A. Clay
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Anthony Hunt, a prisoner in State custody, filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant. 	The Magistrate Judge recommends denying and
dismissing the petition, and Petitioner objects to that recommendation. 	For the
reasons that follow, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objection, ADOPTS the
Report and Recommendation, and DENIES and DISMISSES the petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the report and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge set forth the history
of this case. 	(ECF No. 15, PageID #1634–38.) 	In short, following a trial in State
court, a jury convicted Mr. Hunt of two counts of felonious assault for twice shooting
a victim who later died of her wounds. (ECF No. 6-1, PageID #212–16.) Throughout
trial, Mr. Hunt maintained that he shot in self-defense. 	(Id.) 	Afterward, he
unsuccessfully challenged his conviction through direct appeal in the Ohio courts.
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(See generally ECF No. 6-1.) 	As a result of this conviction, Mr. Hunt is currently
serving a sentence of 14 to 18 years in prison. (Id., PageID #216.)
In his habeas petition, Petitioner raises two grounds for relief: 	(1) the trial
court denied Petitioner due process by giving a jury instruction that arguably
collapsed the distinction between the objective and subjective elements of self-defense
under Ohio law, and (2) trial counsel’s failure to object to portions of the prosecutor’s
closing argument that “conflated the objective and subjective elements of self-
defense” constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 	(ECF No. 1, PageID #3; ECF
No. 13, PageID #1618-22.) 	The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court deny
the first ground because the jury instruction did not violate clearly established federal
law and deny the second ground because the prosecutor’s statements were deemed
proper under State law. (ECF No. 15, PageID #1641–48.)
Subsequently, Petitioner filed objections to the report and recommendation,
raising the following objection:
In his ruling recommending denial of the petition, the magistrate
examined each of the two claims separately. While this deconstruction
is ordinarily appropriate, it fails to take into account the combined effect
of the two errors, one by the trial court in its instruction to the jury, the
other 	by 	defense 	counsel 	in 	failing 	to 	object 	to 	the 	prosecution’s
statements. Those two errors combined to allow the the jury to believe
that they could convict Hunt without engaging in analysis of the
subjective component of self-defense.
The magistrate found that neither of Hunt’s claims were meritorious,
and found there was no cumulative error as well. 	But the cumulative
error doctrine presupposes unrelated assignments of error. 	. . . Here,
the two allegations are intertwined. Separately, they may not constitute
a 	due 	process 	violation 	entitling 	Hunt 	to 	habeas 	relief, 	but 	in
combination they do.
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(ECF No. 19, PageID #1660.)
objections in turn.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court judge may direct a Magistrate Judge to submit “proposed
findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court,” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the Court does
by Local Rule, see L.R. 72.2. When reviewing a report and recommendation, if a party
objects within the allotted time, the district court is required to “make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which the objection is made.” 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949–50 (6th Cir. 1981). Objections must be specific,
not general, and should direct the Court’s attention to a particular dispute. Howard
v. Secretary of Health & Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). “The filing
of objections to a magistrate’s report enables the district judge to focus attention on
those issues––factual and legal––that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.”
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985).
Upon review, the court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings 	or 	recommendations 	made 	by 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge.” 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). 	Importantly, the Court’s job is not to conduct a free-wheeling
examination of the entire report and recommendation, but only to address any
specific objections that a party has advanced to some identified portion of it.
Accordingly, it is the Court’s task in this matter to review the Magistrate Judge’s
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report and recommendation de novo, based on the specific objections that Petitioner
raises.
ANALYSIS
Where a petitioner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States,” he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. 	28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241(c)(3) & 2254(a). 	The writ tests the fundamental fairness of State court
proceedings resulting in the deprivation of an individual’s liberty. See, e.g., Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463 (1953); Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376, 388 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991)); Skaggs v. Parker, 235 F.3d 261,
266 (6th Cir. 2000). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim
(1) 	resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) 	resulted 	in 	a 	decision 	that 	was 	based 	on 	an 	unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
“With the AEDPA, Congress limited the source of law for habeas relief to cases
decided by the United States Supreme Court.” Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1135
(6th Cir. 1998); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
A State court adjudication is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent under
Section 2254(d)(1) “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached
by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law,” or “if the state court confronts facts
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that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent” and
arrives at a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. “Avoiding these pitfalls does
not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases—indeed, it does not even require
awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result
of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).
Under Section 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal law is
different from an incorrect application of federal law. See Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). 	A State court adjudication
involves “an unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent under Section
2254(d)(1) in one of two ways: 	(1) if the State court identifies the correct governing
legal rule from the Supreme Court’s cases[,] but unreasonably applies it to the facts
of the particular State prisoner’s case; or (2) if the State court either unreasonably
extends a legal principle from the Court’s precedent to a new context where it should
not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it
should apply. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 407.
At 	bottom, 	the 	writ 	tests 	the 	fundamental 	fairness 	of 	the 	State 	court
proceedings resulting in the deprivation of the petitioner’s liberty. See, e.g., Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463 (1953); Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376, 388 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991)); Skaggs v. Parker, 235 F.3d 261,
266 (6th Cir. 2000).
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CUMULATIVE ERROR
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because of the cumulative
effect of the alleged errors, even if neither error supports relief independently. (ECF
No. 19, PageID #1660.) 	On direct appeal, a criminal defendant may obtain a new
trial based upon cumulative error by demonstrating “that the combined effect of
individually harmless errors was so prejudicial as to render his trial fundamentally
unfair.” United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 614 (6th Cir. 2004). However, in the
context of federal habeas review, under the law of this Circuit, “claims of cumulated
trial errors are not cognizable.” 	Webster v. Horton, 795 F. App’x 322, 327 (6th Cir.
2019) (citing Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 816 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Petitioner suggests that this principle does not apply where the allegations of
error are legally or factually intertwined. (ECF No. 19, PageID #1660.) But the Sixth
Circuit recognizes no such exception. 	See e.g., Webster v. Horton, 795 F. App’x 322,
327 (6th Cir. 2019) (dismissing a cumulative error claim as not cognizable where
three allegations of error concerned the admission of related evidence); Sheppard v.
Bagley, 657 F.3d 338, 348 (6th Cir. 2011) (dismissing a cumulative error claim as not
cognizable where several allegations of error concerned the handling of mental health
evidence).
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Without a certificate of appealability, a habeas petitioner cannot appeal a final
order in a habeas proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). 	A court may issue a
certificate of appealability only if the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the
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denial of a constitutional right.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 	This means that the
petitioner 	must 	show 	that 	reasonable 	jurists 	could 	find 	the 	district 	court’s
determination of the relevant constitutional claims debatable or incorrect. Tennard
v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004). The petitioner need not show that the appeal will
succeed. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003).
Based 	on 	this 	standard, 	Petitioner 	does 	not 	qualify 	for 	a 	certificate 	of
appealability. The Sixth Circuit does not recognize the basis on which he objects to
the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. 	“Where a plain procedural bar
is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a
reasonable jurist [cannot] conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing
the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further. In such a
circumstance, no appeal would be warranted.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000). 	Because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing that he was denied
any 	federal 	constitutional 	rights, 	Petitioner 	is 	not 	entitled 	to 	a 	certificate 	of
appealability.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections
(ECF No. 19), ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation (ECF
No. 15), and DENIES and DISMISSES the petition (ECF No. 1).
SO ORDERED.
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Dated: September 28, 2026
J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio
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