Beard v. Bajco International et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
KIERAN BEARD,
Plaintiff,
v.
BAJCO INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 4:25-cv-170
Judge J. Philip Calabrese
Magistrate Judge
Jonathan D. Greenberg
OPINION AND ORDER
On behalf of himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff Kieran Beard brings
this class and collective action against Defendants for failure to pay minimum wage
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. and under numerous
analogous State statutes and for unjust enrichment. 	Defendants move to dismiss.
For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART the motion to dismiss.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construing them in
Plaintiff’s favor, as the Court must in the current procedural posture, the complaint
alleges the following facts.
A. 	The Parties
Bajco International, LLC, Bajco Restaurant Holdings, LLC, Nadeem Bajwa,
Malik Bajwa, and Faisal Bajwa refer to themselves collectively as the “Bajco Group.”
(ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 3, PageID #6.) The Bajco Group owns and operates “one of the largest
Papa John’s Pizza franchise chains,” with over 100 locations across the United States.
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(Id., ¶ 28, PageID #9–10.) 	Since March 21, 2021, Kieran Beard has worked for the
Bajco Group as a pizza delivery driver at the Bajco Group’s Papa John’s store located
in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. (Id., ¶ 167, PageID #28.) Plaintiff brings this class and
collective action “on behalf of himself and similarly situated current and former
delivery drivers nationwide” who are or were employed at the Bajco Group’s Papa
John’s stores. (Id., ¶¶ 8 & 113, PageID #7 & #21.)
B. 	Job Duties
At the Bajco Group’s Papa John’s store, Mr. Beard works “dual jobs—one inside
the store, and one outside the store.” 	(Id., ¶ 168, PageID #28.) 	Inside, Mr. Beard’s
duties include “taking orders, prepping food, counting inventory, doing dishes,
cashing customers out, and/or doing other tasks necessary for the operation of the
restaurant.” 	(Id., ¶ 170, PageID #28.) 	Outside, he delivers food to customers. 	(Id.,
¶ 169, PageID #28.) Mr. Beard “regularly makes approximately 2 deliveries per hour
during the hours he works on the road as a delivery driver” and “drives approximately
4 miles round trip per delivery.” (Id., ¶¶ 197–98, PageID #30.) Plaintiff alleges that
he and similarly situated employees were “paid minimum wage or slightly above
minimum wage for the hours they worked inside the restaurant.” (Id., ¶ 120, PageID
#22.) 	According to the complaint, they were “paid minimum wage, slightly above
minimum wage, or minimum wage minus a tip credit for the hours they worked while
completing 	deliveries.” 	(Id., 	¶ 	119, 	PageID 	#22.) 	But 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that
Defendants regularly changed his pay category to the lower driver rate while still
performing “inside duties.” (Id., ¶ 121.)
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Plaintiff alleges that he “is required to maintain and pay for operable, safe,
and legally compliant automobiles” and “an operable cellphone” to use for deliveries.
(Id., ¶¶ 177–78, PageID #28–29; see also id., ¶126, PageID #22–23.) He alleges that
he 	is 	“required 	to 	incur” 	job-related 	expenses, 	including 	automobile 	costs,
depreciation, maintenance, parts, insurance, and financing, gas, cell phone service,
GPS service, and “other equipment necessary for delivery drivers to complete their
job duties.” (Id., ¶ 179, PageID #29; see also id., ¶¶ 128–30, PageID #23.)
C. 	Compensation
“At all relevant times,” for the hours worked inside the restaurant, Mr. Beard
and similarly situated delivery drivers “have been paid minimum wage or slightly
above minimum wage.” 	(Id., ¶ 120, PageID #22.) 	Plaintiff admits that the Bajco
Group paid him and similarly situated delivery drivers “at or close to minimum wage
for all hours worked.” 	(Id., ¶ 237, PageID #38.) 	However, he also claims that the
Bajco Group “regularly changed” his and similarly situated delivery drivers’ pay
category to the “lower on-the-road rate” while they were still in the store, completing
their inside duties and waiting for delivery orders to be prepared. (Id., ¶ 121, PageID
#22.) 	For hours worked outside the restaurant delivering food, Mr. Beard was paid
“approximately $8.00 per hour.” (Id., ¶ 175, PageID #28.)
D. 	Reimbursement
Despite allegedly requiring delivery drivers to incur job-related automobile
and cellphone expenses, the Bajco Group does not track or record the actual expenses
incurred by their delivery drivers. (Id., ¶¶ 130, 133 & 181, PageID #23 & #29.) The
Bajco Group does not reimburse Mr. Beard for “his actual delivery-related expenses”
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or for “the IRS standard mileage rate for the miles he drove while completing
deliveries.” 	(Id., ¶¶ 194–95, PageID #30.) 	“In previous years,” the Bajco Group
reimbursed their delivery drivers for automobile expenses on a “commission basis” by
giving the drivers a “percentage of the sale amount.” 	(Id., ¶ 132, PageID #23.)
“[C]urrently, [they] reimburse their delivery drivers for automobile expenses “based
on a set amount per mile or set amount per delivery.” (Id., ¶ 131, PageID #23.) The
Bajco Group reimburses Mr. Beard for automobile expenses by “paying him $2.00 per
delivery.” 	(Id., ¶ 176, PageID #28.) 	Plaintiff does not specify when the method for
reimbursement 	changed 	or 	why. 	The 	current 	method 	allegedly 	results 	in
“reimbursements that are less than the IRS standard business mileage rate for each
mile driven.” (Id., ¶ 145, PageID #24.) According to the complaint, the Bajco Group
does not reimburse their delivery drivers for cellphone expenses. (Id., ¶ 129, PageID
#23.)
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	the 	set 	reimbursement 	amount 	per 	delivery 	is
inadequate to cover his actual expenses. (Id., ¶ 199, PageID #30–31.) “As a result of
unreimbursed automobile expenses and other job-related expenses,” Plaintiff alleges
that the Bajco Group “failed to pay him minimum wage as required by law.” 	(Id.,
¶ 200, PageID #31.) 	Accordingly, he claims that he and similarly situated delivery
drivers were “paid less than the minimum wage rate they were due in some or all
workweeks.” 	(Id., ¶ 239, PageID #38.) 	The complaint pleads that, “[r]egardless of
the 	precise 	amount 	of 	the 	reimbursements 	paid 	at 	any 	given 	point 	in 	time,
Defendants’ 	reimbursement 	formula 	has 	resulted 	in 	an 	unreasonable
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underestimation” of expenses for delivery drivers. 	(Id., ¶ 158, PageID #26.) 	But it
contains no specific allegations about whether his expenses related to use of his
vehicle or cellphone bring his pay below the minimum wage. (Id., ¶¶ 173–98, PageID
#28–30.) In one paragraph of the complaint, Plaintiff estimates that Defendants’ per-
delivery reimbursement of $2.00 falls below the IRS reimbursement rate per mile.
(Id., ¶ 199, PageID #30–31.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed this class and collective action lawsuit in State court. 	(ECF
No. 1-1.) Plaintiff brings a claim for failure to pay minimum wages in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (Claim 1). Plaintiff also brings nineteen State-law claims
on behalf of the collective regarding failure to pay minimum wage and other wage-
related violations: two Illinois claims (Claims 2 and 3); three Ohio claims (Claims 4,
5, and 6); one Indiana claim (Claim 7); two Pennsylvania claims (Claims 8 and 9); two
Wisconsin claims (Claims 10 and 11); one Florida claim (Claim 12); two Kentucky
claims (Claims 13 and 14); one Michigan claim (Claim 15); one Iowa claim (Claim 16);
one Missouri claim (Claim 17); two Arizona claims (Claims 18 and 19); and a claim
for unjust enrichment (Claim 20).
Defendants timely removed the action to federal court. (ECF No. 1.) They did
so based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 	(Id., ¶ 5, PageID #2.)
Defendants did not invoke diversity jurisdiction; instead, they invoked supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State-law claims. (Id., ¶ 6.) Then, they moved to dismiss.
(ECF No. 5.)
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ANALYSIS
In any civil action, a complaint must “state[] a claim for relief that is plausible,
when measured against the elements” of a claim. Darby v. Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d
440, 444 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Binno v. American Bar Ass’n, 826 F.3d 338, 345–46
(6th Cir. 2016)). 	A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” into the “realm
of plausible liability.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 n.5.
When analyzing a complaint under this standard, the Court construes factual
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts them as true, and
draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Wilburn v. United States, 616
F. App’x 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2015). But a pleading must offer more than mere “labels
and conclusions,” because “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	Nor is a
court required to accept “[c]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading
as factual allegations[.]” 	Eidson v. Tennessee Dep’t of Child.’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631,
634 (6th Cir. 2007).
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Therefore, the Court must distinguish between “well-pled factual allegations,”
which must be treated as true, and “naked assertions,” which need not be. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.”) (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Center for Bio-Ethical
Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 2011) (determining that
because some of the plaintiff’s factual allegations were “not well-pleaded[,]” “their
conclusory nature ‘disentitles them to the presumption of truth’”). 	Rule 8 “does not
unlock 	the 	doors 	of 	discovery 	for 	a 	plaintiff 	armed 	with 	nothing 	more 	than
conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
I. 	Fair Labor Standards Act (Claim 1)
The FLSA requires employers to pay employees a minimum wage of $7.25 per
hour. 	29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C). 	This minimum wage must be paid to the employee
“free and clear” of any direct or indirect “kick-back” to the employer or for the
employer’s benefit. 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. “The anti-kickback regulation prohibits any
arrangement that tends to shift part of the employer's business expense to the
employees to the extent that it reduces an employee's wage below the statutory
minimum.” 	Hatmaker v. PJ Ohio, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-146, 2019 WL 5725043, at *2
(S.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2019) (cleaned up). 	“For example, if it is a requirement of the
employer that the employee must provide ‘tools of the trade’ which will be used in or
are specifically required for the performance of the employer’s particular work, there
would be a violation of the [FLSA] in any workweek when the cost of such tools
purchased by the employee cuts into the minimum . . . wages required to be paid [to]
him under the [FLSA].” 29 C.F.R. § 531.35.
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In the pizza delivery business, the vehicles of delivery drivers constitute such
reimbursable “tools of the trade.” Waters v. Pizza to You, LLC., No. 3:19-cv-372, 2022
WL 3048376, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2022). 	“Accordingly, employers must ensure
that they reimburse drivers for the costs related to those vehicles, to the extent that
the failure to do so would drop the workers’ wage below minimum wage.” Id. But the
FLSA “does not describe how to calculate those costs, and calculating them in the
case of delivery drivers can be hard.” 	Parker v. Battle Creek Pizza, Inc., 95 F.4th
1009, 1017 (6th Cir. 2024).
Before the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Parker, “a substantial difference of
opinion exist[ed] regarding the correct valuation method” for reimbursement of
delivery drivers’ work-related expenses. In re Bradford, No. 22-0304, 2022 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17739, at *3–4 (6th Cir. 2022). Previously, two valuation methods generally
predominated throughout courts in this Circuit: 	the reasonable approximation
method and the IRS business mileage rate method. 	Id. 	Under the reasonable
approximation method, courts referred to 29 C.F.R § 778.217 to conclude that
employers must “either reimburse drivers’ actual costs or reimburse drivers using a
reasonable 	approximation 	of 	the 	actual 	vehicle 	costs 	associated 	with 	making
deliveries.” 	Bradford v. Team Pizza, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 3d 877, 882–83 (S.D. Ohio
2021). 	Alternatively, under the IRS business mileage rate method, courts gave
deference to the Department of Labor Field Operations Handbook, which “states that
when actual expenses have not been maintained, the IRS mileage rate is used to
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determine minimum wage compliance.” Hatmaker, 2019 WL 5725043, at *5; see also
Waters v. Pizza to You, LLC, 538 F. Supp. 3d 785, 793–94 (S.D. Ohio 2021).
In Parker, the Sixth Circuit rejected the use of either of these methods to
calculate an employee’s reimbursement for providing “tools of the trade.” 95 F.4th at
1018 (holding that neither “one-size-fits-all approximation of an employee’s costs”
appropriately reimburses employees under the FLSA). In rejecting the use of these
methods, the Sixth Circuit relied on the language of the FLSA, which “entitles a
minimum-wage employee to reimbursement of his actual costs incurred on his
employer's behalf, but the statute requires neither more nor less than that.” 	Id.
(emphasis added).
Accordingly, “if an employer requires a minimum-wage employee to provide
his own ‘tools’ for work, the employer must reimburse him for 100% of the cost of
doing so.” 	Id. at 1012. 	Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the
calculation of actual expenses “is difficult . . . because the information necessary to
make that calculation can be difficult or tedious to obtain.” Id. at 1018. Despite this
difficulty, “the risk of financial harm from borderline reimbursements . . . must fall
solely on the employer.” Id. at 1016.
Unlike Parker, which raised the calculation of expenses under the FLSA in two
cases involving grants of partial summary judgment, this case stands at the pleading
stage. 	Plaintiff alleges two separate violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
which the Court addresses in turn.
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I.A. 	Reimbursement of Actual Expenses
Rule 8 requires “ a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Here, Plaintiff repeatedly alleges
that Defendants failed to pay delivery drivers minimum wage for the time they
worked on the road making deliveries because drivers were not reimbursed for the
use of their cars and cellphones. 	(ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 114 & 124–29, PageID #21–23.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants do not reimburse delivery drivers for the actual
expenses incurred (id., ¶¶ 141 & 142, PageID #24), instead compensating them based
on a set amount per mile or per delivery (id., ¶ 131, PageID #23). “Regardless of the
precise amount the reimbursements paid at any given point in time, Defendants’
reimbursement formula has resulted in an unreasonable underestimation of delivery
drivers’ automobile expenses throughout the recovery period, causing systematic
violations of the minimum wage laws.” (Id., ¶ 158, PageID #26.)
At bottom, the complaint alleges that, as a result of Defendants’ compensation
practices, Plaintiff and those similarly situated “were deprived of minimum wages
guaranteed to them.” (Id., ¶ 155, PageID #26.) But these allegations are conclusory.
They simply assert a violation without making a showing of anything. Conceivably,
Defendants underpaid delivery drivers in violation of the Act. But the allegations do
not so show or otherwise comply with the longstanding Rule 8 pleading standard. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
With 	respect 	to 	Mr. 	Beard 	in 	particular, 	the 	allegations 	are 	similar.
Defendants pay him $8.00 per hour for making deliveries plus $2.00 per delivery.
(ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 175 & 176, PageID #28.) 	He claims that, “[a]s a result of
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unreimbursed automobile expenses and other job-related expenses, Defendants have
failed to pay Plaintiff minimum wage as required by law.” (Id., ¶ 200, PageID #31).
Again, these conclusory allegations fail to plead a showing of a violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.
The closest the complaint gets to meeting the pleading standard comes in two
paragraphs in which Mr. Beard alleges that he regularly drives 4 miles round trip
per delivery—an amount he estimates falls below the IRS mileage reimbursement
rate. (Id., ¶¶ 198 & 199, PageID #30–31.) His reasoning is as follows:
In 2024, for example, the IRS business mileage reimbursement had been
$0.67 per mile, which reasonably approximates the automobile expenses
incurred delivering pizzas. . . . Considering Plaintiff estimates an
average of 4 miles per delivery and he was reimbursed $2.00 per
delivery, that results in a per mile rate of $0.50. Because the IRS rate
business 	mileage 	rate 	is 	$0.67 	per 	mile, 	Plaintiff 	estimates 	that
Defendants under-reimbursed him by $0.17 per mile, $0.68 per delivery
($0.17 x 4 miles per delivery), and $1.02 per hour ($0.68 x 1.5 deliveries
per hour on the road).
(Id., ¶ 199.) This allegation and its reasoning fail to raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief
above the speculative level for two reasons.
First, this paragraph alleges only an under-reimbursement relative to the IRS
mileage 	reimbursement 	rate, 	which 	in 	any 	given 	case 	might 	over- 	or 	under-
compensate for use of a vehicle. Only one of those scenarios might result in an FLSA
violation. 	Either is plausible here. 	Nor is there any way to know based on this
allegation how unreimbursed cell phone expenses might affect the estimate. 	Even
with those additional costs, Plaintiff might still receive compensation in excess of the
minimum wage.
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Second, as the Sixth Circuit held in Parker, the FLSA “entitles a minimum-
wage employee to reimbursement of his actual costs incurred on his employer's behalf,
but the statute requires neither more nor less than that.” 	95 F.4th at 1018.
Ultimately, a plaintiff will have to prove a violation without using either of the
methods for approximating those costs that the Sixth Circuit rejected. One of those
methods involved use of IRS reimbursement rates. Although Parker did not speak to
the pleading stage, it stands to reason that a party may not allege a violation based
on a methodology that he may not use to carry his burden of proof at trial.
In any event, this allegation fails to make a showing of a violation. What the
complaint lacks, conspicuously, is any non-conclusory allegation that Mr. Beard (or
any person similarly situated) was paid below minimum wage while working as a
delivery driver taking into account the per delivery reimbursement paid and the
actual costs incurred in making the delivery. 	He might have been. 	Conceivably he
was. But even the low bar of Rule 8 asks for more.
In many respects, the allegations in this case look like those in Twombly.
There, the complaint alleged antitrust conspiracies. 	Because the allegations were
alternatively consistent with either a conspiracy or lawful parallel conduct, the
Supreme Court held that the complaint failed to meet the Rule 8 pleading standard.
550 U.S. at 556–57. 	Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest a conspiracy,
and a conclusory allegation of an agreement did not raise the right to relief above the
speculative level. 	So too here. 	Without more, Defendants’ alleged failure to
reimburse actual expenses of delivery drivers for the use of their vehicles, for
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example, does not suggest that any person was actually paid below the minimum
wage. 	Nor does his methodological estimation in paragraph 199 of the complaint
(even if proper) raise an inference of an underpayment because that reimbursement
might well leave his overall compensation above the minimum wage. 	Presumably,
Plaintiff possesses the evidence to know one way or the other and to make a sufficient
pleading at the outset. 	Or perhaps Plaintiff could develop evidence of this violation
in discovery. 	But the price for obtaining discovery is a well-pleaded complaint that
complies with the basic requirements of Rule 8. “[A] plaintiff must state a plausible
claim before she can invoke a right to discovery. In other words, a plaintiff can open
the door to discovery only if she first alleges ‘enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’” of an FLSA violation. 	Parker v.
Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
I.B. 	Dual Jobs
Second, Plaintiff claims that Defendants regularly changed his pay category to
the lower driver rate while still performing “inside duties.” 	(ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 121,
PageID #22.) This allegation implies a violation of the FLSA, but the complaint does
not clearly state a claim based on this alleged practice. To the extent Plaintiff intends
to do so, the allegations of the complaint make clear that Plaintiff does not plead a
violation of the FLSA. The complaint alleges that Mr. Beard and similarly situated
employees were “paid minimum wage or slightly above minimum wage for the hours
they worked inside the restaurant.” 	(Id., ¶ 120, PageID #22.) 	And the complaint
alleges that he was paid $8.00 per hour for hours worked on the road making
deliveries. 	(Id., ¶ 175, PageID #28.) 	Because his pay exceeds the required hourly
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rate, the complaint fails to state a claim under the Fairl Labor Standards Act based
on the alleged practice of paying workers at the lower driver rate while performing
inside duties.
II. 	State-Law Claims (Claims 2–20)
As for the remaining State-law claims, Defendants argue that this Court
should 	decline 	to 	exercise 	supplemental 	jurisdiction 	because 	these 	claims
predominate over the FLSA claim and because the unjust enrichment claim is not
amendable to class treatment. 	(ECF No. 5, PageID #85−89.) 	Plaintiff “does not
oppose Defendants’ request that the Court decline supplemental jurisdiction over
[them].” (ECF No. 6, PageID #98.)
Under federal law “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III.”
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 	This grant of jurisdiction brings all claims arising from a
common nucleus of operative fact before the Court. 	Soehnlen v. Fleet Owners Ins.
Fund, 844 F.3d 576, 588 (6th Cir. 2016).
Even then, a court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” in
certain circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine
of discretion.” 	United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
To determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, “a federal court should
consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of
judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity[.]” 	Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); see also James v. Hampton, 592 F. App’x 449, 462-
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63 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1882
(6th Cir. 1993)). 	Section 1367(c)(3) provides that a district court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction where (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue
of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim over which the
district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are
other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. When deciding whether to invoke
supplemental jurisdiction, “a federal court should consider and weigh . . . the values
of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” 	Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726–27).
After reviewing the record in this matter, the Court declines to exercise its
discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining claims under
State law. The Court dismissed the claim over which Defendants invoked its original
jurisdiction. 	Further, the remaining claims involve State laws over which the local
courts have more direct and immediate experience.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act and DECLINES to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State-law claims. 	Accordingly, the Court
DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification (ECF No. 13) and
REMANDS the case to the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas.
SO ORDERED.
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Dated: February 12, 2026
J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio
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