Chastity Marie Ellison

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
In Re 	)
)
CHASTITY MARIE ELLISON 	) 	Case No. 25-10859
) 	Chapter 13
Debtor(s) 	) 	Judge Buchanan
)
)
ORDER GRANTING CREDITOR WAYNE E. ELLISON’S AMENDED MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME TO BRING ADVERSARY ACTION [Docket Number 66]
This matter is before this Court on the Amended Motion of Wayne E. Ellison for an
Extension of Time to Bring Adversary Action [Docket Number 66 amending Docket Number 55]
(the “Motion”); and Debtor Chastity Marie Ellison (“Debtor”)’s Objection [Docket Number 62].
Creditor Wayne Ellison (“Mr. Ellison”) requests an extension of the deadline to file an
adversary complaint against the Debtor to except a debt allegedly owed to him from discharge
pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). He argues that, because he only recently retained
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 20, 2026
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counsel and because his counsel’s informal request for records from the Debtor was refused, he
did not have sufficient time for fact gathering prior to the deadline.
The Debtor objects to the requested extension asserting that Mr. Ellison’s failure to retain
counsel until near the expiration of the deadline for filing an adversary complaint does not present
“good cause” for granting an extension of that deadline. She further argues that Mr. Ellison does
not present a likelihood of discovering facts that would establish a basis for such a complaint.
This Court held an evidentiary hearing on February 4 and continued to February 24, 2026
considering the Motion as well as other matters. Based on the evidence presented and legal
standard for determining motions to extend the deadline for filing a complaint pursuant to Rule
4007(c), this Court grants Mr. Ellison’s Motion.
I. 	FACTS
Mr. Ellison and the Debtor were married on March 29, 2019 [Docket Number 131,
Transcript of February 4, 2026 Evidentiary Hearing (“Tr.”) p. 17]. 1 Their marriage lasted
approximately three years ending on April 15, 2022 [Tr. p. 17]. They filed for divorce in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Kenton County Circuit Court, Family Division II (“Domestic
Relations Court”) [Tr. p. 17]. The parties had no children so the main issue to be determined was
the separation of assets and liabilities [Tr. p. 17].
A focal point of the divorce was the appropriate division of funds in Mr. Ellison’s
retirement plan with his employer, Fifth Third Bank [Tr. p. 18]. Mr. Ellison has been employed
1The evidentiary hearing held over a two day period on February 4 and 24, 2026 covered several motions and the
issues therein, including Mr. Ellison’s motion for relief from stay [Docket Number 68]. This Court made detailed
findings of fact within its Decision and Order Granting Creditor Wayne Ellison Limited Relief from the Automatic
Stay entered contemporaneously herewith. Many of the findings of fact are repeated in this order to ensure no conflict
in the court’s findings. To the extent additional evidence is relevant to the Motion considered in this order, additional
factual findings have been added.
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with the bank for thirty-one years and had a yearly salary during the marriage of approximately
$120,000 [Tr. p. 18]. Mr. Ellison testified that he had saved approximately $700,000 - $800,000
in his Fifth Third Bank retirement plan at the time of his marriage [Tr. p. 19].
As part of the divorce, the Domestic Relations Court entered a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order or “QDRO” on January 11, 2023 for the division of the Fifth Third Bank
retirement plan funds [Tr. p. 19 and Creditor Ex. A2 ]. The Debtor and Mr. Ellison were represented
by separate attorneys in the domestic relations case and the QDRO was signed by both the Debtor
and Mr. Ellison as well as their attorneys [Creditor Ex. A].
Pursuant to the QDRO as drafted, the Debtor grossed a total of $163,789.973 as her portion
of Mr. Ellison’s Fifth Third Bank retirement plan [Tr. pp. 23 and 26]. However, the amount Ms.
Ellison actually received was about $120,000 - $129,000 after deductions for taxes and penalties
[Tr. pp. 56-57, 75, 168].
According to Mr. Ellison’s testimony, the amount the Debtor received was significantly
more than intended. He testified that the QDRO was intended to accomplish what the parties
agreed to in mediation and the divorce decree, which was that the Debtor would receive 50% of
what was invested during the three years of their marriage plus any appreciation on her portion of
the marital contributions [Tr. pp. 19 and 25-26]. Mr. Ellison testified that, over the three year span
of their marriage, he invested $63,347.94 into the retirement plan and believed the Debtor would,
2 Creditor Wayne Ellison’s Exhibits A, B, C, D, F, K, L and M were admitted during the evidentiary hearing and may
be found on the record at Docket Number 122.
3 The Debtor testified that the gross amount of the disbursement was only $160,930.30 according to the 1099 she
received from Empower [Tr. pp. 57-58]. For purposes of this Court’s determination, the actual amount, whether
$160,930.30 or $163,789.97, is not relevant.
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thus, be entitled to approximately $31,673.97 plus the growth of that amount during the marriage
[Tr. pp. 21 and 25-26].
However, Mr. Ellison testified that, instead of stating that the Debtor was to receive 50%
of what was invested during the marriage, the QDRO stated that the Debtor was to receive 50% of
what was vested during the marriage [Tr. at pp. 19-20]. He testified that this error amounted to a
“huge difference” by awarding the Debtor half of the accumulated growth in the account during
the three year period of their marriage [Tr. pp. 20-22]. During the marriage, he thought the account
grew by roughly $330,000 [Tr. p. 19].
Mr. Ellison admitted that he received a draft of the QDRO that did not include a fixed
dollar amount or a tracing calculation [Tr. p. 50]. He further admitted that he did not object to the
draft QDRO even though the specific dollar amount was absent from the language [Tr. p. 50]. Mr.
Ellison’s claim that the Debtor received more than she was entitled to came only after the funds
were distributed [Tr. p. 51].
The Debtor testified that her understanding was that she would receive 50% of everything
that happened in the retirement fund during the marriage, including bonuses and “anything else.”
[Tr. p. 55]. She testified to her reliance on the QDRO and her belief that the amount she received
was correctly determined to be half of the retirement funds that were contributed during the
marriage [Tr. pp. 58-59].
Upon receiving the retirement funds, both parties agree that the Debtor quickly liquidated
the account and began spending the funds [Tr. pp. 34, 37-38, 67, 75-77, 83-84]. The Debtor
testified that her expenditures during the initial ten-day period after receiving the funds included
purchasing a vehicle for approximately $26,000 or $27,000 and also paying ordinary living
expenses, including rent, legal fees and credit card bills [Tr. pp. 75-77, 83-84, 140-41, 148]. While
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she could not fully account for the funds she spent in the approximate amount of $48,000 over the
initial ten-day period after receiving the funds, she stated she was confident she could trace the
spending if given time [Tr. pp. 86-88].
On February 14, 2023, Mr. Ellison filed an emergency motion in the Domestic Relations
Court to freeze the account containing the funds transferred to the Debtor [Creditor Ex. B]. In the
emergency motion, Mr. Ellison asserted that a mistake in the QDRO drafting and division caused
the Debtor to receive more funds than she was entitled to receive from Mr. Ellison’s retirement
plan. He requested that the Domestic Relations Court freeze the Debtor’s account on an emergency
basis to restrain her spending or disposing of the funds until such time as an evidentiary hearing
could be held to determine whether she received an overpayment. The Domestic Relations Court
entered an order on February 15, 2023 freezing the assets and scheduling a hearing [Creditor Ex.
C]. The same day the freeze order was entered, the Debtor purchased a vehicle for approximately
$25,000, but the Debtor testified that she was not yet aware of the freeze order at the time of the
purchase [Tr. p. 142, 148].
Upon that order being entered, the Debtor testified that she turned over what remained in
her account [Tr. p. 88]. The parties agree that the amount turned over was approximately
$79,759.78 [Tr. pp. 37-38, 79, 135].
Following an evidentiary hearing that occurred over three days in April and June of 2023,
the Domestic Relations Court entered an order in July of 2023 with detailed findings of fact
regarding the language of the QDRO and what led to its entry [Creditor Ex. D (“July 2023
Order”)]. The Domestic Relations Court concluded that the QDRO contained errors that did not
comply with the parties’ separation agreement that became part of the final decree of dissolution.
It determined that the $163,789.97 deducted from Mr. Ellison’s retirement plan and transferred to
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the Debtor was more than what she was entitled to receive based on the parties’ separation
agreement and that she was unjustly enriched. Accordingly, the Domestic Relations Court
determined that the QDRO was an error and set it aside nunc pro tunc. The Domestic Relations
Court directed the parties to agree to an expert to calculate the value of Mr. Ellison’s non-marital
interest and his marital interest in his retirement plan and determine the appreciation in value for
both portions. After completing the valuation, Mr. Ellison was to be entitled to a “Lump Sum
Judgment” in the “amount of the difference between fifty percent (50%) of the marital portion
which the [Debtor] should have received and the amount that was transferred by QDRO to the
[Debtor]” [Creditor Ex. D, p. 13]. To effectuate the Lump Sum Judgment, the balance of
$79,759.78 held by counsel for the parties in escrow was to be transferred to Mr. Ellison’s counsel
within ten days of the entry of the order [Id.].
Ms. Ellison testified that she appealed the July 2023 Order setting aside the QDRO but the
appeals court determined that the order was not a final order [Tr. pp. 137-38]. As of the hearing
date in this Court, $79,759.78 remains frozen and is being held in escrow by Mr. Ellison’s current
domestic relations lawyer, Jackie Sawyers [Tr. p. 34]. Mr. Ellison testified that Ms. Sawyers is
prohibited from disbursing the funds to him until a court determines who is entitled to the money
in escrow [Tr. pp. 34-35].
In August of 2023, Mr. Ellison filed a motion in the Domestic Relations Court requesting
specific performance and entry of an order to appoint an expert to make the required calculation
of the marital and nonmarital interest in his retirement plan so that the appropriate division could
be determined [Creditor Ex. F]. In the same motion, he also requested that the Domestic Relations
Court hold the Debtor in contempt for failing to comply with the July 2023 Order requiring the
parties to agree on an expert to calculate the values.
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Prior to a hearing being held on Mr. Ellison’s motion for specific performance and
contempt, the Debtor filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy case on September 25, 2023 with Case Number
23-11841 [Tr. pp. 41-42]. The case was dismissed on March 8, 2024 for the Debtor’s failure to
make plan payments [Tr. p. 42]. Mr. Ellison tried to get the matter set back in front of the Domestic
Relations Court, but the Debtor filed multiple appeals of state court orders that stayed the
proceedings [ Tr. pp. 42-43].
The Debtor filed her second and current bankruptcy case, Case Number 25-10859 on April
14, 2025 [Tr. p. 90]. The first date set for the 11 U.S.C. § 341 meeting of creditors was May 12,
2025 [Docket Number 12].4 The Debtor testified that she filed for bankruptcy to prevent a finding
of contempt against her in the Domestic Relations Court because she was unable to repay the
money [Tr. pp. 159-160].
On July 3, 2025, Mr. Ellison filed his original motion to extend time to file an adversary
proceeding to except a debt from discharge [Docket Number 55] that was later amended on July
17, 2025 [Docket Number 66]. In the Motion, as amended, and as argued at the evidentiary hearing,
Mr. Ellison asserted that he only recently retained counsel and counsel would not have the
opportunity to obtain the facts necessary to determine whether an adversary complaint to except a
debt from discharge was appropriate before expiration of the deadline to file the complaint.
Mr. Ellison’s counsel also noted that he informally requested that the Debtor submit to a
Rule 2004 examination to obtain records regarding the expenditures she made during the first ten
4 The Court takes judicial notice of its docket to determine the first date set for the § 341(a) Meeting of Creditors. See
ZMC Pharmacy, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 307 F.Supp.3d 661, 665 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (noting that
a court may take judicial notice of its own docket); Baccala Realty, Inc. v. Fink (In re Fink), 351 B.R. 511, 517 n.1
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (holding that a court make take judicial notice of the record in its own cases).
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days after receiving the retirement funds. At the evidentiary hearing, the Debtor admitted that she
refused, asking Mr. Ellison’s counsel to file a motion if he wanted to obtain an examination of her
records [Tr. pp. 82-83]. When Mr. Ellison’s counsel subsequently filed a Motion requesting a Rule
2004 examination, the Debtor objected to it [Id.].
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Ellison’s counsel also questioned the Debtor regarding the
accuracy of her bankruptcy petition, schedules and statement of financial affairs. She admitted that
her initial petition filing on April 14, 2025 was “skeletal” and contained errors and omissions even
though the document was signed by her under penalty of perjury [see Tr. pp. 92- 100]. She asserted
that many of the initial errors were corrected [Id.]. The Debtor filed her schedules on April 28,
2025 and this court took judicial notice of them as filed at Docket Number 19 [Tr. pp. 179-180].
Mr. Ellison’s counsel questioned the Debtor with respect to her schedules and her statement of
financial affairs filed at Docket Number 20 of which the court also admitted as an exhibit [Tr. pp.
99-131, 139, 179-180]. The Debtor testified as to errors in those documents as well [Id.].
Mr. Ellison’s counsel also questioned Ms. Ellison regarding the expenditures she made
during the ten day period after she received the retirement funds and before the freeze order was
entered. She admitted to purchasing a used vehicle during that time, but could not remember the
exact year of the vehicle or its price but she believed it was a Honda Civic [Tr. pp. 143-144]. She
testified that she took a loan out on the vehicle after its purchase in order to pay for an expert
witness, although she could not remember the amount, and then sold the vehicle not long after,
“probably less than a year” but was not sure exactly when [Tr. pp. 145-46]. She said that she sold
it to pay for moving expenses and to purchase another car, the car she currently possesses [Tr. pp.
147-49]. She was also unsure of other expenses made during that ten day period but testified that,
during the Domestic Relations Court hearing over a three day period in 2023 she was sure of the
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expenses because she had the receipts in her lap during the hearing but no one asked her specifics
at that time [Tr. pp. 153-54]. However, upon questioning she said that she no longer has the
information together [Tr. p. 154].
II. 	LEGAL ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Rule”) 4007(c) sets forth the deadline for filing
certain actions to determine the dischargeability of debts. Rule 4007(c) provides:
Except as (d) provides, a complaint to determine whether a debt is dischargeable
under § 523(c) must be filed within 60 days after the first date set for the § 341(a)
meeting of creditors. . . . . On a party in interest’s motion filed before the time
expires, the court may, after notice and a hearing and for cause, extend the time to
file.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c). The rule requires that both the adversary complaint to determine the
dischargeability of a debt under § 523(c),5 as well as any motion to extend time to file such a
complaint, be filed before the 60-day deadline expires. Id. The purpose of this deadline is two-
fold: (1) it promotes the prompt administration of bankruptcy cases, and (2) it promotes the
debtor’s fresh start goal to obtain bankruptcy relief. In re Sheppard, 532 B.R. 672, 676 (B.A.P. 6th
Cir. 2015).
Based on the first date set for the § 341(a) meeting of creditors, the 60-day deadline for
Mr. Ellison to file an action to except a debt from discharge, or request an extension of the deadline,
expired on July 11, 2025 [see Docket Number 12]. This makes Mr. Ellison’s original motion to
extend time, filed on July 3, 2025, timely. Consequently, the focus for this Court is whether Mr.
5 Rule 4007(c) sets the deadline for filing actions to determine the dischargeability of debts under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)
which in turn discuses debts falling within the provisions of § 523(a)(2), (a)(4) and (a)(6). However, in a chapter 13
case, § 523(a)(6) does not provide a basis to except a debt from discharge unless a hardship discharge is granted. See
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2), (b) and (c); Kimura v. Yager (In re Yager), Adv. Pro. No. 23-00094, 2024 Bankr. LEXIS
2150, at *10, 2024 WL 4165320, at *4 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Sept. 9, 2024); Jennings v. Bodrick (In re Bodrick), 509
B.R. 843, 858-59 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2014).
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Ellison establishes the necessary “cause” to extend the deadline. See In re Riggs, Case No. 22-
30575, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 400, at *9, 2023 WL 1998547, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2023)
(noting that the moving party carries the burden of showing that cause exists).
The term “cause” is not defined in either the Bankruptcy Code or the Bankruptcy Rules.
Sheppard, 532 B.R. at 677. Consequently, “discretion is given to the bankruptcy courts to
determine the definition of ‘cause’ on a case-by-case basis[.]” Id.; Riggs, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 400,
at *9, 2023 WL 1998547, at *5 (concluding that the determination of cause is “thus committed to
the court’s discretion”). While no definition is found in the Code or Rules, “there is precedent that
suggests the threshold for granting such motions should be set low” supporting the policy of
allowing cases to be decided on the merits. Sheppard, 532 B.R. at 677 (citing Brady v. McAllister
(In re Brady), 101 F.3d 1165, 1171 (6th Cir. 1996)).6
In this case, Mr. Ellison is requesting the extension of time to file a complaint to except a
debt from discharge citing that he retained bankruptcy counsel only as the deadline approached to
file such a complaint and his counsel did not have time for the fact gathering necessary to ensure
a basis for filing the complaint. In addition, Mr. Ellison’s counsel notes that the Debtor’s petition
and schedules have not proven reliably accurate for fact gathering purposes.
6 In McDermott v. St. George (In re St. George), the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel applied a five-factor
standard for granting a motion to extend time to file a complaint objecting to a debtor’s discharge. Case Nos. 16-
8017/8018, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1065, at *8-9, 2017 WL 1379321, at *4 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2017). Some courts
have noted that this standard may not be compatible with the more liberal standard espoused in the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel’s decision in Sheppard. See Riggs, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 400, at *8, n.3, 2023 WL 1998547, at *4 n.3;
In re Motil, Case No. 22-10571, 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 1938, at *4-5, 2022 WL 2761042, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July
14, 2022). However, as Judge Crist from this district has noted, St. George addresses a Rule 4004(b) motion to extend
time to object to a debtor’s discharge while Sheppard addresses extending time to object to dischargeability of a debt
under Rule 4007(c). See In re Winans, 2026 Bankr. LEXIS 575, at *19-20, 2026 WL 684887, at *8 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
Mar. 6, 2026). Given the differing impacts of objections to discharge and dischargeability, the standards might be
viewed slightly differently. Id. Because this Court is evaluating a motion to extend time under Rule 4007(c), this Court
will adopt the more liberal standard as discussed in Sheppard.
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At least one court has concluded that a client’s failure to hire counsel until a deadline
approaches suggests a lack of due diligence by the client and does not, by itself, establish cause to
extend the deadline to file a complaint. Riggs, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 400, at *16-17, 2023 WL
1998547, at *7. However, this factor is not considered in a vacuum. This Court also considers the
Debtor’s admission at the evidentiary hearing that her petition, schedules, and statement of
financial affairs contain omissions and inaccuracies as well as the Debtor’s refusal to cooperate
with the request for records from Mr. Ellison’s counsel. These “hurdles,” whether purposefully
put in place by the Debtor or not, may have prevented the fact gathering needed for Mr. Ellison’s
counsel to file a timely adversary complaint. These factors weigh in favor of granting the requested
extension.
This Court also takes into consideration that the Debtor described no prejudice to herself
that would arise from granting the extension except her argument that allowing Mr. Ellison to file
an adversary complaint would duplicate proceedings and increase costs unfairly. However, a cause
of action to except a debt from discharge is a unique bankruptcy cause of action that does not
duplicate the parties’ other litigation. To the extent that specific facts or issues relevant to
dischargeability are litigated in another proceeding, issue preclusion may be used in appropriate
circumstances to prevent re-litigation of those specific issues or facts. See Moyer v. Anthony (In re
Anthony), 648 B.R. 556, 571 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2023) (“That Congress intended bankruptcy courts
to determine issues of dischargeability does not require the bankruptcy court to redetermine all the
disputed facts.”).
Considering the evidence and arguments presented by the parties and the low threshold for
granting timely filed motions to extend time under Rule 4007(c), this Court GRANTS the Motion
of Wayne E. Ellison for an Extension of Time to Bring Adversary Action [Docket Number 66]. The
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deadline for Mr. Ellison to file a complaint to except a debt from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(c) is extended to July 20, 2026.7
SO ORDERED.
Distribution List:
Default List
7 If Ms. Ellison does not cooperate with appropriate discovery requests from Mr. Ellison’s counsel, this Court would
entertain a request from Mr. Ellison to extend this deadline.
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