United Telemanagement Corporation

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
In re:
United Telemanagement Corporation,
Debtor.
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Case No. 24-31365
Chapter 7
Judge Crist
ORDER: (I) APPROVING INTERIM APPLICATION OF CHRISTINE B. HILL, AS
ATTORNEY FOR TRUSTEE, FOR ALLOWANCE OF COMPENSATION AND
REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES FOR THE PERIOD OF 8/20/2024 THROUGH
1/12/2026, BUT (II) NOT APPROVING PAYMENT BEFORE FINAL DISTRIBUTION
WITHOUT PROVIDING A BASIS AND THE TRUSTEE’S EXPRESS APPROVAL
(DOC. 55)
I. 	Introduction
This matter is before the Court on the Interim Application of Christine B. Hill, as Attorney
for Trustee, for Allowance of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses for the Period
8/20/24 Through 1/12/26 (Docs. #15 and #44) (Doc. 55) (the “Interim Fee Application”). The
Interim Fee Application included a Notice of Interim Fee Application with twenty-one (21) day
response period, in accordance with Local Bankruptcy Rule (“LBR”) 9013-1(a)(1)(C), and was
served on all creditors and parties in interest pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
(“Bankruptcy Rule”) 2002(a)(6). There were no responses. Ms. Hill seeks the allowance of
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 6, 2026
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$27,204.37 in interim fees for the period of August 20, 2024, through January 12, 2026, and
reimbursement of $154.24 in expenses, for a total of $27,358.61.
II. 	Background
As referenced in the Interim Application, the Chapter 7 Trustee, Eileen K. Field (the
“Trustee”), filed the Trustee’s Application to Employ Special Counsel Christine B. Hill (Doc. 15)
(the “First Application to Employ”) on September 24, 2024. The First Application to Employ
asked that Ms. Hill be employed “as special counsel for the Trustee, because there exist the
possibilities of fraudulent transfer(s), preferential payments, and allegations of misappropriation
of funds, embezzlement, and/or conversion, in connection with this bankruptcy estate.” First. Appl.
to Employ at 1. It further provides that Ms. Hill’s rate will be $275.00 an hour, “subject to the
Court’s approval.” Id. The Trustee “requested that an Order be entered authorizing the Trustee to
employ Christine B. Hill as special counsel for the Trustee as set forth above.” Id. There was no
mention of the date from which the Trustee was asking the Court to approve Ms. Hill’s
employment or whether Ms. Hill had already performed any work. On October 21, 2024, the Court
entered the proposed Order Granting Trustee’s Application to Employ Special Counsel (Doc. #15)
(Doc. 18), which simply said the First Application to employ was granted.
On October 6, 2025, the Trustee filed a second Trustee’s Application to Employ Special
Counsel (Doc. 44) (the “Second Application to Employ”), “to expand the authority of previously
appointed special counsel to the Trustee, Christine B. Hill, Esq., . . . for the purpose of filing an
adversary proceeding to request a declaratory judgment regarding the limits of liability on a policy
of insurance issued by the Cincinnati Insurance Company covering occurrences of theft against
the Debtor.” Second Appl. to Employ at 1. Again, Ms. Hill’s proposed hourly rate was $275.00,
“subject to the Court’s approval.” Id. And again, there was no mention of the date from which the
Trustee wished this expanded authority to take effect. There was no opposition and on November
12, 2025, the Court entered a proposed Order Granting Trustee’s Application to Employ Special
Counsel (Doc. #44) (Doc. 49), which similarly simply said the Second Application to employ was
granted.
In the meantime, there has been a fair amount of activity in this case, and the prior two
adversary proceedings initiated by the Trustee (prior to the most recent adversary with The
Cincinnati Insurance Company), by and through Ms. Hill, have been settled and closed. See Field
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v. Hague, et al., Adv. Pro. No. 24-3024 and Order Granting Appl. of Trustee to Authorize and
Approve Compromise and Settlement (Doc. 46) (Oct. 30, 2025); Field v. Hague, Adv. Pro. No.
25-3017 and Order Granting Appl. of Trustee to Authorize and Approve Compromise and
Settlement (Doc. 57) (Jan. 22, 2026). The adversary proceeding with The Cincinnati Insurance
Company, No. 25-3048 remains pending.1 To round out the picture, in the Trustee’s most recent
Interim Report (Doc. 56), she summarized the status of this chapter 7 case by stating “[t]he
collection of all funds is expected to take a period of years.”
III. Analysis
A. 	Allowance of Interim Fees and Expenses
There are several issues the Court identified in reviewing this Interim Fee Application.
First, neither the First nor Second Application to Employ, nor the Orders entered thereon, state an
effective date for Ms. Hill’s employment. This now matters because she is seeking approval for
attorney fees starting on August 20, 2024, which was just over a month before the First Application
to Employ was filed, and neither the First nor Second Application to Employ request a specific or
retroactive date of approval of employment or justification therefore. Moreover, the default rule
set forth in LBR 2014-1(e), which applies when a trustee engages themselves or their law firm as
attorney, provides that “the employment shall be effective as of the date the application was filed,
unless otherwise ordered by the court.” The Court has applied this same approach in chapter 11
cases such that if the parties do not explain whether the counsel or other professional they seek to
employ has already done work and why, and why a retroactive date of employment is justified, the
employment, if approved, will be from the date of the filing of the application, which is consistent
with case law. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 327.03[3] & n.41 (16th ed.) (“The prevailing approach
is that a bankruptcy court should grant retroactive retention orders only in extraordinary or
exceptional circumstances to deter attorneys and other professionals from general nonobservance of
section 327.”).
Accordingly, the analogous default under LBR 2014-1(e) and the case law would be that
the earliest date from which fees can be approved is September 24, 2024. In this case, however,
because: (1) this only concerns one month of work, specifically 5.175 hours of work; (2) it appears,
1 Pursuant to the Pretrial Order (Doc. 14), dispositive motions are presently due by September 2, 2026.
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from the time entries attached to her Interim Fee Application, that Ms. Hill hit the ground running
to work on this matter at the request of the Trustee; and (3) because this might be a change from
prior practice, the Court will exercise its discretion in this instance and consider whether to approve
fees back to August 20, 2024. However, for future reference, the Court will require that any request
to approve employment retroactively – post facto – be specifically requested and justified, lest it
may be denied.2
Second, the Court undertook to replicate Ms. Hill’s calculation of the hours worked on this
matter but could not calculate her total of 98.925 hours. Sometimes this occurs because of no
charging travel time or making other adjustments to an invoice. But no matter how many times the
Court did the calculation it could only identify a total of 98.70 hours, such that this is the number
of hours it will consider for approval. Given that all the time is billed at the same hourly rate this
is a very minor reduction of 0.225 hours (13.5 minutes) from the total 98.925 hours claimed.
Third, it is common practice to bill in tenths of an hour. See 28 C.F.R. § 58 app. A(b)(4)(v)
(1996) (Appendix A to Part 58—Guidelines for Reviewing Applications for Compensation and
Reimbursement of Expenses Filed Under 11 U.S.C. § 330) (stating “[t]ime entries should be kept
contemporaneously with the services rendered in time periods of tenths of an hour.”). Counsel,
however, has billed time in fortieths of an hour (increments of 1.5 minutes), combined with tenths
(6 minutes) and quarters (15 minutes) of an hour in some instances. Perhaps this allows for yet
more precision that works to the benefit of the estate; however, it might also have resulted in the
discrepancy in attempting to replicate Ms. Hill’s calculation of her total hours. But while on the
topic of guidelines, there are some instances in which more than one discrete service has been
2 The movant will need to fully explain the reasons that approval was not sought earlier and establish a basis upon
which employment should be approved post facto, retroactive to a date prior to filing the application to employ in
accordance with applicable case law. For opinions in this District pre-dating the Supreme Court of the United States’
opinion in Roman Cath. Archdiocese of San Juan v. Feliciano, 589 U.S. 57, 65 (2020), see In re Vlachos, 61 B.R.
473, 477 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (Waldron, J.) (adopting the view expressed in In re Tom’s Variety and Hardware
Inc., 30 B.R. 298 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) as not being inconsistent with Hunter Savs. Assoc. v. Baggott Law Offices
Co., L.P.A. (In re Georgetown of Kettering, Ltd.), 750 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1984)); In re McDaniels, 86 B.R. 128, 133
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio) (Calhoun, J.) (concluding that “[t]o establish the basis for a nunc pro tunc order of employment,
an applicant must demonstrate each of the following [eleven] requirements and, all evidentiary matters must be
established by clear and convincing evidence[.]”); In re Carter, 533 B.R. 632, 636-38 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2015)
(Preston, J.). For a post-Feliciano opinion see In re Roberts, 618 B.R. 213, 217 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2020) (Preston, J.)
(holding that “[b]ased on the Supreme Court’s ruling [in Feliciano], the use of nunc pro tunc orders to retroactively
seek employment of professionals is an improper use of the mechanism and this Court will no longer enter such
orders[,]” but concluding that it would still “grant late-filed applications that comply with the Bankruptcy Code and
Bankruptcy Rules” and “the requirements set forth in Carter”).
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included in a time entry, and it was not the only time entry on that day. See, e.g., Fee Schedule at
3, entry 11/4/24, .25 (regarding both a phone conference and review of a follow up email); Fee
Schedule at 8, entry 1/14/25, .7 (regarding both an email and then an apparent separate conference
call). However, there were only a couple such instances and on balance the time entries are
sufficiently detailed and not lumped. Moreover, certain non-travel time entries were “no charged.”
Fourth, it is unclear what amount of travel time was not charged as it does not appear to be
reflected in the attached Fee Schedule, although some of the time descriptions for which time is
charged still include a description of travel. For example, looking at the first time entry dated
December 16, 2024, it is unclear what amount of time was to “[t]ravel to and from UTC offices in
Dayton for conference” as opposed to the conference time once in Dayton. This is in comparison
to entries dated June 19, 2025 and July 14, 2025, which were solely for travel to and from Dayton
that was not charged. The Court presumes that the above-referenced conference lasted for 2.4
hours and that the travel time not charged is not reflected in the Fee Schedule; however, it would
be clearer if the travel time not charged was identified separate from the non-travel time charged
so that there is no confusion as to whether the time charged still includes travel, but is backed out
in the total.
Even absent any objections to the Interim Fee Application, the Court has an independent
duty to review the fees and expenses sought. See, e.g., In re Spear, 636 B.R. 765, 769 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 2022) (Humphrey, J.) (citing Cupps & Garrison, LLC v. Rhiel (In re Two Gales, Inc.), 454
B.R. 427, 432-33 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011); In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., 19 F.3d 833, 841 (3d Cir.
1994)). After reviewing the time entries attached to Counsel’s Interim Fee Application, as well as
the docket of this chapter 7 case and the related adversary proceedings, because all of the time,
excluding travel time, was charged at the approved hourly rate of $275, and in accordance with
the analysis set forth in the governing Sixth Circuit case law,3 the Court finds the fees and expenses
are both reasonable and necessary, and hereby approves the allowance of the requested fees and
expenses pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331, minus the 0.225 of time that it could not replicate,
but does not approve payment at this time as discussed below.
3 See In re Boddy, 950 F.2d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 1991) (adopting the loadstar approach in fee calculations); In re Vill.
Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 952-53 (6th Cir. 2022) (court can consider “results obtained” in reviewing bankruptcy
fees pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)).
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B. 	Payment of Interim Fees and Expenses
Although payment of interim fees may be awarded in chapter 7 liquidations under 11
U.S.C. § 331, professionals “ ‘must spell out special circumstances which are generally not present
in liquidation cases’ to just payment of an interim allowance.” 3 Collier on Bankruptcy
¶ 331.06[1][a] (quoting In re Car Hauler Specialist, Inc., 128 B.R. 325, 327 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1990)). This is because “it will not always be known in the middle of a liquidation how much of
the already liquidated assets can be distributed to professionals without creating a risk of
overpaying them on a pro rata basis.” Id. (further observing that “in many, if not most, of the
smaller chapter 7 liquidations, interim compensation will not be appropriate.”).
The Interim Fee Application does not expressly state whether Ms. Hill is seeking to be paid
her interim compensation and reimbursement of expenses now and, if so, what the basis is for
doing so in advance of a final distribution. She does represent that “[a] final application for further
work and reimbursement of expenses is expected in connection with possible enforcement of the
terms of the James and Tammie Hague settlement agreements and the continued prosecution of
the case of Field v. The Cincinnati Insurance Company.” Interim Fee Appl. at 3. At this time there
is no indication that the Trustee has determined whether the projected future administrative
expenses and assets of the estate are such that select administrative expenses can safely be paid
now without creating a situation in which disbursed funds might have to be clawed back in order
to make a pro rata distribution amongst administrative claimants. In other words, the Interim Fee
Application does not state a basis upon which the Court is comfortable approving the immediate
payment of Ms. Hill’s fees and expenses prior to a final distribution in this chapter 7 case that is
anticipated to “take a period of years” to be resolved. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 331.06[1][a]
(stating that “[w]hether payment of interim compensation is appropriate in a chapter 7 case will
depend on several factors, including” (a) the availability of funds; (b) the amount of other
administrative expense claims “of the same or higher priority that might exhaust available funds;”
(c) “the continuing need for funds to pay future necessary administrative expenses likely to be
incurred in completing the administration of the case;” and (d) the “inability to file a final fee
application in the near future.” (citing In re Com. Consortium of Cal., 135 B.R. 120, 124-25
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991))).
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Based on the foregoing, payment of the fees and expenses approved through this Order is
not authorized at this time. The Trustee, however, may file a motion, with appropriate notice and
an opportunity to object, to permit payment of Ms. Hill’s allowed fees and expenses prior to the
final distribution of the estate’s assets pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 726, in the event the Trustee
determines there is no risk of administrative insolvency or harm to the estate in doing so, that Ms.
Hill will not soon be able to file a final fee application, and that it is appropriate to make such
payment from the currently available funds of the estate.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Interim Fee Application is hereby
GRANTED as set forth in this Order and the Court awards attorney fees and reimbursement of
expenses to Christine B. Hill, Esq. pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 330(a) and 331, in the total amount of
$27,296.74, comprised of $27,142.50 in fees and $154.24 in expenses, for the services rendered
and expenses incurred during the period from August 20, 2024, through January 12, 2026.
However, it is further hereby ORDERED that such amounts awarded shall not be paid
from the estate unless and until the Trustee determines, based on the factors identified in this Order,
that payment of the awarded fees and expenses to Ms. Hill will have no impact on the ability of
the Trustee to pay all chapter 7 administrative expenses in full and can be safely paid prior to the
final distribution of the estate’s assets, and the Trustee files a motion and provides appropriate
notice and opportunity to object to this determination with a supporting analysis of the projected
administrative expenses and available estate assets, as well as the projected timing to a final
distribution.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Copies to:
Default List
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