Rankin v. Dick

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI
BRYAN RANKIN,
Petitioner, 	: 	Case No. 1:25-cv-00612
- vs - 	District Judge Susan J. Dlott
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz
KENNETH W. DICK,
Sheriff, Adams County, Ohio,
:
Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This habeas corpus case, brought pro se by Petitioner Bryan Rankin pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, is before the Court for decision on the merits and on Petitioner’s most recent Motion for
Injunction (ECF No. 29).
Injunctive Relief
Petitioner seeks immediate release on the grounds he is actually innocent. In part he relies
on the Affidavit of Jordan Brackett (ECF No. 24). The Court has stricken that Affidavit for reasons
explained at length in the Decision and Order (ECF No. 28). Moreover, a stand-alone claim of
“actual innocence” is not as basis for habeas corpus relief. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408-
11 (1993).
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The Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends the Court deny the Motion for Injunction.
In the body of his Motion, Petitioner threatens that he will file a new motion for injunction
every week until it is granted. 	This is abusive behavior on Petitioner’s part and violates
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. Further like conduct may result in sanctions under that rule.
Litigation History
Petitioner Bryan Rankin, a resident of Kentucky, fathered a child with Amy Mahaffey, an
Ohio resident. 	The volatility of their relationship reached a point where Ms. Mahaffey
recommended Rankin obtain a parenting order form the Adams County, Ohio, juvenile court.
When that court issued the order, it made Ms. Mahaffey the residential parent, subject to visitation
rights in Mr. Rankin. The parenting order was subject to modification on agreement of the parties.
The instant case arises out of their dispute of whether Mr. Mahaffey had agreed to allow Mr.
Rankin custody of their daughter on July 31, 2023. When Mr. Rankin did not surrender custody
on that date, Ms. Mahaffey sought assistance from the Sheriff of Adams County.
This case commenced with the filing of a criminal complaint charging Mr. Rankin with
interference with custody in violation of Ohio Revised Code § Section 2919.23 (A)(l), a
misdemeanor of the first degree under Ohio law, carrying a maximum penalty of 180 days in jail
and a fine of $1,000 (State Court Record, ECF No. 16, Ex. 3). The Complaint was filed August
16, 2023, and apparently was not accompanied by an arrest warrant in that Mr. Rankin appeared
for arraignment on September 11, 2023. Id. at Ex. 51 . The case was assigned to Adams County
Court Judge Roy E. Gabbert, Jr., who presided throughout. Judge Gabbert advised Mr. Rankin of
1 The Constitution does not require a finding of probable cause for the filing of a complaint and the issuance of a
summons to appear to answer that complaint.
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his right to counsel, but Rankin declined (Transcript, State Court Record, ECF No. 16, PageID
111). Mr. Rankin failed to appear for a pretrial conference on December 7, 2023. Id. at PageID
141. Judge Gabbert issued a bench warrant 2 which he later withdrew at the next pretrial conference
on December 21, 2023. 	Id. at Ex. 8. 	Mr. Rankin again declined appointment of counsel and a
proffered plea bargain for a minor misdemeanor on which Judge Gabbert projected a likely fine of
$25.00.
A final pre-trial hearing was set for April 2, 2024, but Mr. Rankin filed an Affidavit of
Disqualification as to Judge Gabbert (State Court Record, ECF No. 16, Exs. 11 and 12).After that
and several more Affidavits of Disqualification were denied, the case proceeded to jury trial on
June 20, 2024, and Mr. Rankin was convicted as charged (Transcript of Jury Trial, State Court
Record, ECF No. 16, Ex. 19). On July 25, 2024, he was sentenced to 180 days imprisonment with
sixty days suspended. Id. at Ex. 23. Judge Gabbert then stayed execution of the sentence pending
appeal. Id. at Ex. 26.
After appealing to the Fourth District Court of Appeals, Mr. Rankin filed a Memorandum
Supporting Appeal Errors, but not an appellate brief. 	Id. at Ex. 27. 	That court, through a
Magistrate, ordered him to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file a
brief. Id. at Ex. 30. 	In response Mr. Rankin asked for appointment of counsel, but refused to
complete an application showing indigency that Ohio appellate courts require. 	Id. Exs. 33, 34.
Eventually the Fourth District dismissed the appeal for failure to file a brief. Id. at Ex. 36. Mr.
Rankin sought review in the Ohio Supreme Court, but that court declined to exercise jurisdiction.
Id. at Ex. 40.
At the time he filed his Petition in this case, Mr. Rankin gave his address as being in
2 Judge Gabbert plainly had probable cause to issue the bench warrant (sometimes called a capias) because he could
observe Mr. Rankin’s failure to appear with his own eyes.
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Hazard, Kentucky (Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID 16). 	However apparently prior to filing his
Traverse, he was extradited to Ohio (Traverse, ECF No. 22, at PageID 953 showing return address
of the Athens County Jail). Respondent Sheriff Dick acknowledges having custody (Answer, ECF
No. 17).
The Petition pleads the following grounds for relief3 :
Ground One: States witness committed perjury 3 times knowingly.
This interferes with right to fair tribunal under due process clause in
the 14th Amendment.
Supporting Facts: The states witness perjured her testimony and
the state knew she was going to do this. The states witness agreed in
writing to allow petitioner to keep his daughter on one specific day
and the visitation order permits arranged agreements outside the
court order. In another case the witness stated under oath she no
longer had the phone that contained certain text (evidence) during
the trial she told the jury that she did still have the phone. This is a
knowingly false statement. In another statement the states witness
claimed she never made an arrangement with The petitioner and the
proof shows this is false as it does the other statements.
Ground Two: In this criminal case at the trial, sentencing, and on
appeal the petitioner was not granted any counsel. This is an obvious
violation of the 6th Amendment.
Supporting Facts: The petitioner never waived his rights to court
appointed counsel in the criminal proceedings. Rankin did decline
counsel before trial for purposes of trial but not knowingly and
intelligently. Rankin was not aware of the state of Ohio taking
advantage and during trial offering evidence of Rankins religion &
prohibited acts as well as having to dispute perjured testimony that
the judge would not let me offer evidence to refute such instances.
Rankin asked for counsel on appeal but did not receive counsel and
unfortunately his appeal was dismissed not on the merits. Federal
law requires a defendant not to serve jail time for misdemeanor
when the defendant request for counsel but did not receive counsel.
Ground Three: 	Deprivation of 1st amendment & RF restoration
Act 1993.
3 Rather than clutter the text with “sic,” the misspellings have been corrected.
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Supporting Facts: The state’s goal was to flame the passions of the
jury in order to acquire a conviction by involving the petitioners
religion that had absolutely zero relevance to the situation that was
being argued. The state told the jury my religion was extreme as if
it had anything to do with the interference with custody. The state
of Ohio knew that a conviction was not leasable unless this trial was
prejudiced towards the petitioner. They made me out to be a cult
leader to prove interference with custody for 1 day that the witness
agreed to in writing.
Ground Four: 	Violation of the 4th amendment, no warrant shall
be issued unless supported by probable cause.
Supporting Facts: 	In this case there was no proper prefiling
investigation completed before issuing the warrant to bring the
petitioner to court proceedings over the matter of interference with
custody. The petitioner and the states witness have a court order
permitting agreed arrangements outside the court order. The states
witness agreed to the 1 specific day at dispute. This agreement will
be attached to this petition and or preliminary injunction. This is the
arrangement made & authenticated by the states witness. The state
had no probable cause to bring these charges against the petitioner
if you consider the court visitation order& the agreement made by
the states witness. This bring dangers to children and sound parents
who follow the court order & agreements made by the domestic
courts.
(Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID 5-10).
Analysis
Respondent asserts that merits review of Mr. Rankin’s claims is barred by his procedural
default in presenting them to the Ohio courts (Answer, ECF No. 17, PageID 867).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals requires a four-part analysis when the State alleges a
habeas claim is precluded by procedural default. Barton v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 786
F.3d 450, 464 (6th Cir. 2015), Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir. 2010)(en banc);
Eley v. Bagley, 604 F.3d 958, 965 (6th Cir. 2010); Reynolds v. Berry, 146 F.3d 345, 347-48 (6th
Cir. 1998), citing Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); accord Lott v. Coyle, 261
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F.3d 594, 601-02 (6th Cir. 2001); Jacobs v. Mohr, 265 F.3d 407, 417 (6 th Cir. 2001).
First the court must determine that there is a state procedural rule
that is applicable to the petitioner's claim and that the petitioner
failed to comply with the rule.
. . . .
Second, the court must decide whether the state courts actually
enforced the state procedural sanction, citing County Court of Ulster
County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 149, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777
(1979).
Third, the court must decide whether the state procedural forfeiture
is an "adequate and independent" state ground on which the state
can rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional claim.
Once the court determines that a state procedural rule was not
complied with and that the rule was an adequate and independent
state ground, then the petitioner must demonstrate under Sykes that
there was "cause" for him to not follow the procedural rule and that
he was actually prejudiced by the alleged constitutional error.
Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); accord, Hartman v. Bagley, 492 F.3d 347, 357
(6th Cir. 2007), quoting Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568, 576 (6th Cir. 2002).
Ohio has a relevant procedural rule, Ohio R. App. P. 16, which prescribes the content of
an appellant’s brief. 	The Fourth District Court of Appeals enforced this rule by ordering Mr.
Rankin to file a conforming brief and then dismissing his appeal for failure to comply (Judgment
Entry, State Court Record, ECF No. 16, Ex. 36).
The adequacy of the state ground is determined by examining the State’s legitimate
interests in the procedural rule in light of the federal interest in considering federal claims. Maupin
v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135 (6 th Cir. 1986), citing Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-48 (1965).
The adequacy of a state procedural bar is itself a federal question. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449
(2009), citing Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 736 (1991). 	Ohio’s interest in requiring certain information in appellate briefs is certainly
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legitimate: it assists in producing a coherent body of appellate decisions for use by the bar and
other courts in deciding cases. It parallels the practice in the federal courts and in other appellate
courts throughout the country. 	The rule is also independent of federal law. 	It does not require
different kinds of briefing or citations for federal issues.
With the analysis progressed to this point, the burden falls on Petitioner to show excusing
cause and prejudice. 	In his Traverse Petitioner claims the cause was the refusal of the Fourth
District to appoint an attorney (ECF No. 22, PageID 929). But that is not adequate excusing cause
for at least two reasons.
First of all, the Fourth District declined to appoint counsel because Mr. Rankin would not
prove his entitlement to appointment in accordance with standard practice in that court. Indigent
criminal defendants are entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel on an appeal of right.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). But no court is obliged to accept an appellant’s mere
assertion he is too poor to afford counsel. Instead of completing the proof required by the Fourth
District, Mr. Rankin insisted that the fact his trial transcript had been furnished without cost was
enough and he refused to conform when told it was not.4 Mr. Rankin has not shown the form was
overly burdensome or that he was required to file it when others were not.
Secondly, Mr. Rankin has not demonstrated he could not prepare an appropriate appellate
brief himself. He is proceeding pro se in this case, he tried the case to a jury without an attorney,
and he even learned how to postpone the trial by filing an affidavit of disqualification against Judge
Gabbert.
Later in his Traverse, Mr. Rankin invokes the concept of “actual innocence” to excuse his
procedural defaults (ECF No. 22, PageID 943, et. seq.). 	While new evidence proving actual
4 The reader of a certain age will recall Frank Sinatra’s signature song, “My Way.”
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innocence will excuse a procedural default, Mr. Rankin’s actual innocence claim consists of
rearguing the merits of his custody claim. This is not new evidence, but is a reargument of the
evidence presented to the jury on which he lost. Compare the new evidence presented successfully
in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006).
Conclusion
Based 	on 	the 	foregoing 	analysis, 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge 	respectfully 	recommends
Petitioner’s Motion for an Injunction be3 denied and his Petition be dismissed with prejudice.
Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with this conclusion, it is also recommended that
Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability and that the Court certify to the Sixth Circuit that
any appeal would be objectively frivolous and should not be permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis.
December 31, 2025.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Because this document is being served by mail, three days are added under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, but service is complete when the document is mailed, not when it is received. Such
objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections
in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal.
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