Harris et al v. Obama et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
RONALD E. HARRIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
BARRACK OBAMA, et al.,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Case No. 2:26-cv-593
District Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge S. Courter M. Shimeall
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Ronald E. Harris, an inmate at the London Correctional Institution (“LoCI”), in
London, Ohio, brings this pro se civil action on behalf of himself and family members Rebecca L.
Harris (“R. L. Harris”), Tonya D. Harris (“T. Harris”), and Keli C. Harris (“K. Harris”). He has filed
a “Complaint” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 18 U.S.C. § 670, as well as the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, against former Presidents Obama, Biden, and George W.
Bush, former Secretary of State Clinton, former Ohio Governor Taft, and President Trump. 	(See
generally ECF No. 1.) This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal
of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601,
608 (6th Cir. 1997).
Having performed the initial screen, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS
without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims to the extent that he brings them on behalf of R. L. Harris, T.
Case: 2:26-cv-00593-EAS-SCS Doc #: 4 Filed: 10/14/26 Page: 1 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
Harris, and K. Harris, and DISMISS with prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)
Plaintiff’s claims to the extent he brings them on his own behalf.
This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED.1 	(ECF No. 3.)
Plaintiff must pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts (Inmate
ID Number A806118) at London Correctional Institute is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial partial payment, 20% of
the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust account or the average monthly
balance in the inmate trust account, for the six-months immediately preceding the filing of the
Complaint.2
After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the
inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the account
exceeds $10.00 until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks should
be sent to:
Prisoner Accounts Receivable
260 U.S. Courthouse
85 Marconi Boulevard
Columbus, Ohio 43215
The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.
1 Although Plaintiff Ronald E. Harris paid a $5.00 filing fee, he submitted a “Complaint for Civil
Case” form and a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. Moreover, his claims do not sound in either
habeas corpus or mandamus. (ECF Nos. 1, 2, 3.)
2 As Plaintiff has already paid five dollars ($5.00), that amount should be deducted from the amount
of the initial partial filing fee.
Case: 2:26-cv-00593-EAS-SCS Doc #: 4 Filed: 10/14/26 Page: 2 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

3
It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without prepayment of fees
or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had
been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and the
prison cashier’s office. 	The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Order to the
Court’s financial office in Columbus.
I. 	Screening the Complaint
A. 	Legal Standard
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower
judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing
so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed
by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,
malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” 	Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324
(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e):
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—
* * *
(B) the action or appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. 	Thus, 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with
a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328–29; see also Lawler v. Marshall,
898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is
Case: 2:26-cv-00593-EAS-SCS Doc #: 4 Filed: 10/14/26 Page: 3 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

4
immune from suit or when the plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not
exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are
delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” 	Denton, 504 U.S. at 32;
Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic
or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff
must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 	By the same token, however, the complaint “must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007));
see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470–71 (noting that the “dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and
Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does
Case: 2:26-cv-00593-EAS-SCS Doc #: 4 Filed: 10/14/26 Page: 4 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

5
a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id.
at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
B. 	Plaintiff Ronald E. Harris’ Complaint
To the extent that the Court can discern them, Plaintiff Ronald E. Harris alleges three claims,
with little to no factual allegations: First, that each Defendant “has failed to provide and protect the
people and their property’s defined trade secrets requested to Congress.” (See Complaint, ECF No.1,
PAGEID #: 9.) He alleges that among these failures to protect are “intellectual property rights . . .
copyrights / patents” that he sought to file, including a patent for a serum treating “blood borne
disease,” “alternative energy patent,” and an “atomic and magnetic” patent. (Id. at PAGEID #: 8).
Second, according to Plaintiff, documents were created for a prior request on November 13, 2025,
“before Library demolition which in return has only been multiple setbacks to get this successive
request to not review all similar petition denied.” (Id.at PAGEID ##: 9–10.) Plaintiff indicates that
all Defendants were “in witness” to whatever the “setbacks” were, and that there is a “lack of good
serums of vaccines” stemming from this claim. (Id. at PAGEID #: 10.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts a
medical neglect claim for all Plaintiffs’ “mental and physical trauma for the very requesting of cancer
cures.” (Id.)
Plaintiff Ronald E. Harris requests monetary relief of thirty million dollars3 and injunctive
relief that “the order of Peace and dignity be restored to [non-prisoner Plaintiffs’] housing location”
that “was forfeited because of massive Heart attacks and multiple created dilemmas.” (Id.)
3 While Plaintiff earlier in his Complaint seeks only ten million dollars for property damages, he later
asserts ten million dollars for actual damages, ten million dollars for punitive damages, and ten million dollars
for exemplary damages. (See Complaint, ECF No. 1, PAGEID ##: 8, 10.) For screening purposes, the Court
will reference thirty million dollars as the total monetary relief sought.
Case: 2:26-cv-00593-EAS-SCS Doc #: 4 Filed: 10/14/26 Page: 5 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

6
C. 	Dismissal of Plaintiff Ronald E. Harris’ Complaint
i. 	Claims Brought on Behalf of R. L. Harris, T. Harris, and K. Harris
As an initial matter, Plaintiff cannot bring claims on behalf of others, as he attempts to do for
R. L. Harris, T. Harris, and K. Harris. See Zanecki v. Health All. Plan of Detroit, 576 F. App’x 594,
595 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Because, by definition, pro se means to appear on one’s own behalf, a person
may not appear pro se on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause of action.” (citation omitted)).
While 28 U.S.C. § 1654 permits individual parties to “plead and conduct their own cases personally,”
without an attorney, this provision does not authorize a non-attorney to bring suit on behalf of a third
person. See Coleman v. Indymac Venture, LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 759, 767 (W.D. Tenn. 2013) (“The
federal courts have long held that Section 1654 preserves a party’s right to proceed pro se, but only
on his own claims; only a licensed attorney may represent other persons.”).
R. L. Harris, T. Harris, and K. Harris did not sign the Complaint, and Plaintiff cannot assert
claims on their behalf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (“Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must
be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s name—or by a party personally if the
party is unrepresented.”); Sykes v. United States, 507 F. App’x 455, 459 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that
a plaintiff may not “appear pro se where the interests of others are at issue”). Because Plaintiff is
not represented by an attorney, it is RECOMMENDED that his claims, to the extent he brings them
on behalf of R. L. Harris, T. Harris, and K. Harris, be DISMISSED without prejudice.
ii. 	Claims Brought on Mr. Harris’s Own Behalf
To the extent that he brings his claims on his own behalf, the Court recommends that
Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed as frivolous because he does not make any claim with a rational or
arguable basis in law or fact. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328–29; see also Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1198.
Plaintiff’s claims, to the extent that the Court can parse them, are factually frivolous because
“the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or ‘wholly incredible.’” Denton,
Case: 2:26-cv-00593-EAS-SCS Doc #: 4 Filed: 10/14/26 Page: 6 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

7
504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. 	Plaintiff asserts that three former Presidents, a former
Secretary of State, a former Ohio governor, and the current President all denied him patents and
copyrights in a serum that purports to treat a “blood-borne disease,” an “alternative energy” patent,
and an “atomic and magnetic” patent, and that this denial led to physical and mental distress of
himself and his family members, including “massive Heart attacks.” (See ECF No. 1, PAGEID ##:
9–10.) 	Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s allegations were not “wholly incredible” they are also
conclusory, and lack any factual development setting out what each Defendant personally did and
when the Complaint’s events occurred. 	See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Consequently, the Complaint is frivolous, fails on its face, and should be dismissed.
II. 	Conclusion
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3) is
GRANTED. 	It is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS without prejudice the claims
Plaintiff purports to bring on behalf of R. L. Harris, T. Harris, and K. Harris. Further, to the extent
Plaintiff brings his claims on his own behalf, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s claims be
DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)).
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of the
recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed
findings and recommendations. 	This period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion
for an extension. 	Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be
accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. 	If the Report and
Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral hearing,
the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions of it as
all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District
Case: 2:26-cv-00593-EAS-SCS Doc #: 4 Filed: 10/14/26 Page: 7 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>

8
Judge otherwise directs. 	A party may respond to another party’s objections WITHIN 14 DAYS
after being served with a copy thereof. 	Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure
may forfeit rights on appeal. 	See Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019); see also
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Date: 	October 14, 2026 	S/ S. Courter M. Shimeall
S. Courter M. Shimeall
United States Magistrate Judge
Case: 2:26-cv-00593-EAS-SCS Doc #: 4 Filed: 10/14/26 Page: 8 of 8 PAGEID #: <pageID>