USA v. Taborn et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
LARYAN BROOKS,
Defendant.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Case No. 3:26-cr-72(3)
Judge Thomas M. Rose
______________________________________________________________________________
ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER BOND PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (DOC. NO. 29)
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is the Defendant Laryan Brooks’ (“Defendant”) Motion to Reconsider
Bond Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (the “Motion”) (Doc. No. 29), as well as the Government’s
Response (Doc. No. 30) thereto. For reasons outlined below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s
Motion and ORDERS that Defendant remain detained in federal custody pending sentencing.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On June 23, 2026, the Grand Jury returned an Indictment against Defendant for conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(C). (See
Doc. No. 18 at PageID 69.) Pursuant to the Government’s motion, Magistrate Judge Caroline
Gentry held a detention hearing on June 18, 2026. (See Minute Entry, 6/18/2026.) Following the
detention hearing, Magistrate Judge Gentry ordered that Defendant remain detained pending trial.
(See generally Doc. No. 14.) On October 6, 2026, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the above
charge pursuant to a plea agreement. (See Minute Entry, 10/6/2026; see also Doc. No. 33.) Just
prior to entering his guilty plea, on October 1, 2026, Defendant filed his Motion to Reconsider
Case: 3:26-cr-00072-TMR Doc #: 35 Filed: 10/13/26 Page: 1 of 4 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
Bond Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)1 (Doc. No. 29). The Government responded on October 5,
2026. (Doc. No. 30.) Concurrently with Defendant’s plea at the October 6 hearing, the Court heard
argument regarding Defendant’s request for revocation of the detention order. (See Minute Entries,
10/6/2026.) After taking the matter under advisement at the time of the hearing, the Court now
finds that the instant matter is ripe for disposition.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The procedural vehicle employed by Defendant’s Motion in pursuing the instant review is
by way of 18 U.S.C. § 3145, which provides, in relevant part:
If a person is ordered detained by a magistrate judge, . . . the person may file, with
the court having original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation or
amendment of the order. The motion shall be determined promptly.
18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). “This Court reviews de novo an appeal from a magistrate judge’s order of
release or detention.” United States v. Fata, No. 13-30484, 2013 WL 4084765, at *5 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 13, 2013) (citing United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1985)). In other words, after
conducting a hearing, if the reviewing “judicial officer finds that no condition or combination will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other persons and
the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before the trial.”
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Put simply, “[e]ither finding—flight risk or community danger—can support
detention.” United States v. Brown, 601 F. Supp. 3d 196, 200 (W.D. Ky. 2022).
1 18 U.S.C. § 3142 addresses the burden a defendant must meet in order to avail himself of bond pending trial,
generally, and most commonly, at the initial detention hearing. However, in order to review or appeal a detention
order, as is the case here, a defendant must invoke 18 U.S.C. § 3145. And for defendants who have already been found
guilty of an offense, the vehicle for seeking pre-sentencing bond is Section 3143. See United States v. Adams, No.
2:18-CR-20641, 2020 WL 2733883, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 26, 2020) (“Because Adams has already pled guilty to a
federal offense and is awaiting sentencing, his motion is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3143, a provision of the Bail Reform
Act applying to decisions of release or detention of a defendant pending sentencing or appeal.”). For purposes of this
Order, the Court assumes Defendant intended to invoke Sections 3145 and 3143.
Case: 3:26-cr-00072-TMR Doc #: 35 Filed: 10/13/26 Page: 2 of 4 PAGEID #: <pageID>

3
However, when, as here, a defendant has pled guilty to an offense described in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3242(f)(1)(A), (B), or (C), Section 3143(a)(2) prescribes the requirements for release pending
sentencing of a convicted defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)(2); see also United States v. Tefteller,
No. 3:19-CR-00059, 2020 WL 2733728, at *1 n. 3 (M.D. Tenn. May 26, 2020) (“Section 3143
(a)(2) prescribes the requirements for release pending sentencing for a defendant who has been
convicted of an offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), (B), or (C).”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(f)(1)(C) (“[A]n offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years of more
is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act . . . .”). Section 3143(a)(2) mandates as follows:
(2) [T]he judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found guilty of an
offense in a case described in [Section 3142(f)(1)(A), (B), or (C)] and is awaiting
imposition . . . of sentence be detained unless--
. . . .
(B) the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not
likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community.
18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). At bottom, Section 3143 creates a rebuttable
presumption in favor of detention. See United States v. Vance, 851 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir. 1988).
This showing is the defendant’s to make, and it is a “heavy” one. See id.; see also United States v.
White, No. 6:13-CR-20, 2025 WL 1176955, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 27, 2025), R. & R. adopted, 2025
WL 1170289 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 22, 2025).
III. 	ANALYSIS
As mentioned, the Court held a hearing on October 6, 2026, where it heard argument from
both Parties regarding Defendant’s request for bond reconsideration. (See Minute Entry,
10/6/2026.) By way of new evidence, Defense Counsel called Shanell Worthy, Defendant’s family
friend, who attested to her willingness to serve as a third-party custodian and house Defendant in
the event of his pre-sentencing release. (See id.) Apart from Ms. Worthy’s testimony, the Defense
Case: 3:26-cr-00072-TMR Doc #: 35 Filed: 10/13/26 Page: 3 of 4 PAGEID #: <pageID>

4
presented no new evidence that was not presented at the initial detention hearing. (Id.) The mere
existence of a willing third-party custodian is insufficient to overcome the onerous presumption
favoring detention. See United States v. Faulkner, No. 2:22-CR-20074, 2022 WL 2663849, at *2
(E.D. Mich. July 11, 2022). As Magistrate Judge Gentry concluded at the initial detention hearing,
the fact of the matter remains: considering Defendant’s extensive criminal history, his history of
failing to appear, and the gravity of the offense at issue, there are simply no bond conditions that
could assure the Court that Defendant is not likely to flee and does not pose a risk of danger to the
community.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider Bond
(Doc. No. 29) and ORDERS that Defendant remain detained in federal custody pending
sentencing.
DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Tuesday, October 13, 2026.
s/Thomas M. Rose
________________________________
THOMAS M. ROSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case: 3:26-cr-00072-TMR Doc #: 35 Filed: 10/13/26 Page: 4 of 4 PAGEID #: <pageID>