Nicholas v. Progressive Direct Insurance Company

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ANTHONY NICHOLAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
PROGRESSIVE DIRECT INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.
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) 	Case No. CIV-24-813-PRW
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ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiff’s Witness
Deborah C. Rankin (Dkt. 30). This matter has been fully briefed and the Court heard
argument on the Motion on March 30, 2026. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s
Motion (Dkt. 30) is GRANTED.
Background
This action arises from an insurance claim related to a vehicle fire that occurred on
May 31, 2024, in Arkansas while Plaintiff Anthony Nicholas was driving from Tennessee
to Oklahoma. Plaintiff submitted a claim to Defendant Progressive Direct Insurance
Company that same day. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to handle the claim in good
faith and improperly subjected him to a fraud investigation. Plaintiff has retained Rankin
as an expert related to Progressive’s handling of Plaintiff’s comprehensive coverage claim.
Rankin’s expert report outlines her opinions on standards she asserts form the basis for
properly handling insurance claims and Progressive’s failure to follow those standards.
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Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires district court judges to gatekeep expert
testimony, “ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is
relevant to the task at hand.”1 The district court must first determine whether the proffered
“expert is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to render an
opinion.”2 Then, should the court find the expert qualified, the court must assess the
underlying reasoning and methodology that forms the basis of the expert’s opinion to
determine if such an opinion is reliable.3 It is the proffering party’s burden to show his
expert’s testimony is admissible.4 Further, the district court must satisfy itself that the
expert’s testimony “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue.”5
Analysis
I. 	Rankin is not qualified to provide expert testimony in this case.
Rankin worked as a licensed insurance adjuster for thirty-three years, retiring from
State Farm Insurance in 2016.6 Rankin represents that she has evaluated hundreds of
uninsured/underinsured motorist claims, trained other insurance adjusters on claims
1 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
2 United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
excluded) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).
3 Id. (internal citations omitted).
4 Id. (internal citations omitted).
5 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).
6 Plf.’s Expert Report (Dkt. 30, Ex. 1), at 1.
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handling, and facilitates continuing education classes related to UM/UIM claims.7 While
Rankin states she handled hundreds of property claims earlier in her career,8 Defendant
notes the last such claim she handled was in 1995.9
The Court finds that Rankin is likely not qualified to offer expert testimony in this
case. Rankin has been admitted as an expert in another case in this district, though that case
dealt with an action for bad faith breach of a UM/UIM motorist policy.10 This case doesn’t
involve a UM/UIM claim, but rather a comprehensive property claim. Plaintiff argues that
Defendant has not shown that the distinction makes a material difference. But at the pretrial
hearing, counsel for Defendant argued that the type of comprehensive claim at issue here
is covered under a different term of coverage of an insurance policy than the UM/UIM
claims Rankin handled throughout her career. Plaintiff merely replied that though it’s been
approximately thirty years since she last handled a comprehensive claim, she still has
testified as an expert in cases that deal with bad faith and which include issues that would
be relevant to those that will arise here.
The Court is unconvinced that Plaintiff has met his burden to show that Rankin’s
experience is sufficiently timely to qualify her as an expert in testifying to the claims
handling process for comprehensive claims such as this. In reviewing the cases in which
7 Id.
8 Id. at 2.
9 Daubert Mot. (Dkt. 30), at 7.
10 Graves v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Indemnity Co., Case No. CIV-19-60-SLP, 2019
WL 10058881, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 24, 2019).
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Rankin represents she’s provided expert testimony, it appears none of these cases were
related to comprehensive claims like the one in this case. None of this is to say that Rankin
might not be qualified to testify as an expert in a UM/UIM case—indeed, she has been—
but that isn’t this case.
Further, based on a review of the five cases disclosed by Rankin, the Court was
unable to locate the first she listed, Sweat v. Zurich, as the Bryant County case related to
Case Number CJ-2020-247 is actually captioned Midland Credit Management v. Brackett
and was a debt collection case.
II. 	Rankin’s opinions are not reliable.
Even if the Court found Rankin qualified to opine on the issues in this case, the
Court does not find Rankin’s methodology and reasoning reliable, for the simple reason
that it isn’t clear to the Court how Rankin arrived at her reported conclusions. Rankin’s
report fails to cite any specific industry standards to which insurers are to be held. Rankin
vaguely states that “[insurance] standards are based on multiple sources that work together
to result in best practices.”11 She goes on to say that those standards “are based on state
law, state case law, industry training and best practices[,]” but other than a cursory cite to
the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, Rankin does not further develop the foundation
for the industry standards with which she contrasts Progressive’s actions.12 Further, the
Court is uncomfortable with admitting Rankin as an expert because, as Defendant notes in
11 Plf.’s Expert Report (Dkt. 30, Ex. 1), at 5.
12 Id. at 5–6.
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her report, she misstates Oklahoma law in arguing that insurance adjusters are required to
be licensed in Oklahoma and meet venue-specific training requirements.13 These are not
blanket rules, and Rankin’s opinion did not consider whether the exceptions listed in 36
O.S. §§ 6203(8) and 6208 would apply to the adjuster in this case.
In sum, Plaintiff has not shown that Rankin’s “testimony is based on sufficient facts
or data” due to her failure to provide the bases for her opinions in anything but the most
generalized terms.14 Further, Plaintiff has failed to show Rankin’s “opinion[s] reflect[] a
reliable application of [] principles and methods to the facts of the case” due to her inability
to properly interpret Oklahoma law related to adjuster licensing.15
III. 	Rankin’s testimony will not assist the triers of fact to determine the facts in
issue.
Finally, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how Rankin’s testimony will “help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue[.]”16 The question in
this case is whether Progressive “unreasonably, and in bad faith,” withheld payment of
Plaintiff’s claim.17 Bad faith is a common law tort that requires the judgment of
“reasonable, prudent [people.]”18 The jury will be called upon to consider the facts of the
13 Daubert Motion (Dkt. 30), at 4–5.
14 Fed. R. Evid. 702(b).
15 Fed. R. Evid. 702(d).
16 Fed. R. Evid. 702(a).
17 McCorkle v. Great Atlantic Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 587 (Okla. 1981) (internal citation
omitted).
18 Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 417 (1892) (“The policy of the
law has relegated the determination of such questions to the jury, under proper instructions
from the court. It is their province to note the special circumstances and surroundings of
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case and apply its own conceptions of reasonableness to them in rendering its verdict. The
jury is not required to determine the reasonableness of Progressive’s actions with respect
to any industry standards. That isn’t to say that failure to comport with industry standards
can never be probative of bad faith, but when those “industry standards” are based on
amorphous, vague, and sometimes incorrect references to supposedly governing laws, the
testimony is more likely to confuse the jury than aid it.
Conclusion
For 	these 	reasons, 	the 	Court 	GRANTS 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	(Dkt. 	30) 	and
EXCLUDES Rankin’s testimony.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 31st day of March 2026.
each particular case, and then say whether the conduct of the parties in that case was such
as would be expected of reasonable, prudent men, under a similar state of affairs.”).
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