J&J Hudson LLC v. Simmons Bank et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
J&J HUDSON, LLC, an Oklahoma limited
liability company,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
v.
SIMMONS BANK, an Arkansas state bank,
Defendant/Counterclaimant,
v.
PIVOT PROJECT DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Oklahoma limited liability company;
CANDACE BAITZ, an individual;
JONATHAN DODSON, an individual;
RUSSELL WANTLAND, an individual;
DAVID WANZER, an individual; and JE
DUNN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and
PRISM ELECTRIC, INC.,
Counterclaim Defendants.
Case No. CIV-24-1071-D
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant/Counterclaimant Simmons Bank’s Motion to Strike
Demand for Jury Trial [Doc. No. 65]. The Bank moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 39(a)(2) to strike the jury trial demand asserted by Plaintiff/Counterclaim
Defendant J&J Hudson, LLC and Counterclaim Defendants Pivot Project Development,
Case 5:24-cv-01071-D Document 78 Filed 11/21/25 Page 1 of 14

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LLC, Candace Baitz, Jonathan Dodson, Russell Wantland, David Wanzer. The motion is
fully briefed [Doc. Nos. 69, 70, 75] and at issue.1
Background
This action concerns the financing and construction of a commercial real estate
project. Although the case has a somewhat complicated factual background, for purposes
of resolving this motion, the relevant facts are straightforward.
J&J and the Bank entered into a Loan Agreement whereby the Bank would extend
financing to J&J for the construction of a commercial building. The Loan Agreement
contains the following provision:
See Movant’s Br., Ex. 1 at 30 § 6.1. A group of Guarantors (Counterclaim Defendants Pivot
Project Development, LLC, Candace Baitz, Jonathan Dodson, Russell Wantland, David
Wanzer) executed Guaranty Agreements guarantying J&J’s obligations under the Loan
Agreement. The Guaranty Agreements contain the following provision:
1 Only J&J filed a response in opposition. The Guarantors did not respond and have
therefore confessed the argument. See LCvR7.1(g).
6.
1 	W IVER OF JURY. BORROWERANDL NDER(BYITSACCEPTANCE
HEREOF) 	FUL. Y, 	VOL 	TARILY, 	KNOWI GL , 	JRR.E OCABLY
	AND
UNCO DITIO ALLY WAIVE 	NY RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY OR TO HAVE A
JURY PARTICIPATE IN 	DISPUTE, ACTION OR PROCEEDING TO 	NFORCE
OR DEFEND A 	RIGHTS (WHETHER BA ED ON CO TRACT, TORT OR
OTHERWISE) 	DER THIS LOA 	AGREE 	T OR 	DER
ANY
AME D 	NT,
INSTR MENT, DOCUMENT OR AGREEME T DELIVERED (OR WIDCH MA V lN
THE FUTURE BE DELIVERED) IN CONNECTIO 	HEREWITH OR ARISING FROM
A V BANKI G RELATIO	
SlllP
EXISTI
	GIN
CO 	CTlON WITH THIS LOAN
AGREEMENT, THE NOTES AND/OR THE SECURITY IN TRUMENT . BORROWERAND LENDER AGREE THAT
ANY	
UCH 	CTION OR PROCEEDING SHAL ' B
TRIED BEFORE A COURT A D NOT BEFORE A JURY. 	THIS PROVISIO 	IS
MATERIAL INDUCEMENT TO LE D. R TO PROVIDE THE FINANCING
AND
COMl
\U
TME T DESCRIBED HEREIN OR IN 	HE
OTa
ER LO 	DOCUME TS.
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See Movant’s Br., Exs. 2-6 at 6 § 14(i). Certain aspects of the construction project did not
go as planned and this action followed.
In its Complaint, J&J asserts claims against the Bank for breach of contract, fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach
of construction trust. The claims are premised on allegations that the Bank refused to make
loan advances as required by the Loan Agreement, misrepresented that it would extend the
loan period, and misrepresented that it would issue a letter of credit. The Bank filed an
Answer and Counterclaims against J&J and the Guarantors seeking recovery of the
amounts owed under the Loan Agreement, enforcement of the guaranties, appointment of
a receiver, and foreclosure of the Bank’s mortgage and security interests securing
repayment of loan. 2
2 The Bank also named JE Dunn (the contractor on the project) and Prism Electric (a
subcontractor) as counterclaim defendants because they filed liens against the property the
Bank is seeking to foreclose on. JE Dunn asserts a breach of contract claim against J&J
and is seeking foreclosure of its lien.
(i) 	GUARA 	TOR WANES THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY ruRY 1
ANY ACTIO 	OR PROCEED[NG BASED UPON OR RELATED TO, THE SUBJECT
MATTER 	OF 	THIS 	GUARANTY. 	THIS 	WANER 	IS 	KNOWINGLY,
INTE TIO ALLY 	AND 	VOLUNTARILY 	MADE 	BY 	GUARANTOR, 	D
GUARA 	TOR AC . 	OWLEDGES THAT 	EITHER LENDER NOR ANY PERSO
ACTrnG ON BEHALF OF LENDER HAS MADE A 	REPRESE TATIO 	S OF
FACT TO INDUCE THIS WAIVER OF TRIAL BY JURY OR HAS TAKEN 	Y
ACTIO 'S 	WHICH 	[N 	'Y 	WAY 	MODIFY 	OR 	NULLIFY 	ITS 	EFFECT.
GUARA 	TOR FURTHER AC 	o,VLEDGES THAT IT HAS BEE 	REPRESENTED
OR HAS HAD THE OPPORT 	ffY TO BE REPRESENTED) [N THE SIGNING OF
THIS GUARANTY A 	D 	THE 	A.JUNG OF THIS WANER BY INDEPE 	D 	T
LEGAL COUNSEL. 	GUARANTOR AC 	OWLEDGES THAT EACH HAS READ
D I 	DERST 	DS THE ilvlEA 	ING A 	D RAMIFICA TIO 	S OF THIS W AIYER
PROVISIO '. 	THIS GUARANTY CONSTITUTES A WR.ITT 	CO 	SE 'T TO
WAIVER 	OF 	TRIAL 	BY 	JURY 	A D 	L 	DER 	IS 	AUTHORIZED 	A 'D
EMPOWERED TO FILE THIS G ARANT¥ WITH THE CLERK OR JUDGE OF 	'Y
COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTIO 	AS A ST ATUTORY WRITT 	CONSENT
TOW AIYER OF TRIAL BY JURY.
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In its civil cover sheet [Doc. No. 1-3] and Joint Status Report [Doc. No. 38], J&J
demands a jury trial on its claims. The Bank moves to strike the jury trial demand,
contending that J&J and the Guarantors knowingly and voluntarily waived their right to a
jury trial in the Loan Agreement and Guaranty Agreements and such waivers are
enforceable under federal law. J&J counters that state law governs the issue and, under
Oklahoma law, pre-dispute contractual jury trial waivers are unenforceable.
The motion therefore presents two questions: first, does a federal court sitting in
diversity apply federal or state law to determine the enforceability of a pre-dispute
contractual jury trial waiver and second, are pre-dispute contractual jury trial waivers void
under Oklahoma law? Neither question presents an easy answer but after thoroughly
considering the parties’ positions, the Court concludes that the Bank has the better
argument.
Discussion
“Absent any conflicting constitutional requirements, federal statutes or Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal district court sitting in diversity applies federal
procedural law and state substantive law.” Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 674 F.3d 1187,
1203 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n. 7
(1996).3 Substantive laws are those that provide the “rights and remedies that bear upon
the outcome of the suit” whereas procedural laws provide “the processes or modes for
3 “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 39 relate to jury trial waivers, but only in the
context of cases already in litigation.” In re Cnty. of Orange, 784 F.3d 520, 529 (9th Cir.
2015). Thus, there does not appear to be a federal statute or rule that conflicts with the issue
presented here.
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enforcing those substantive rights and remedies.” Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v.
Americulture, Inc, 885 F.3d 659, 668 (10th Cir. 2018). But “distinguishing between
procedural and substantive law is not always a simple task.” Id. “Where the line between
procedure and substance is unclear, the Supreme Court has set forth a multi-faceted
analysis[,]” known as the Erie analysis, “designed to prevent both forum shopping and the
inequitable administration of the laws.” Id.
The Supreme Court, applying the Erie doctrine, has twice concluded that the right
to a jury trial is a governed by federal law. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc.,
356 U.S. 525, 538-540 (1958), the Supreme Court held that, despite state law to the
contrary, a federal court must apply the federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed
fact questions. Subsequently, in Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963), the Supreme
Court, in considering whether state or federal law defines an action as legal or equitable,
stated that “the right to a jury trial in the federal courts is to be determined as a matter of
federal law in diversity as well as other actions.”
The Tenth Circuit applied Simler’s holding to a pre-dispute contractual jury trial
waiver in Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1988). The
specific issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in failing to enforce the jury
waiver provision based on a finding of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally
without proof that the waiver provision was itself fraudulently induced. Id. The Tenth
Circuit, citing to Simler, stated that “[t]he right to jury trial in the federal courts is governed
by federal law” and further observed that “[a]greements waiving the right to trial by jury
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are neither illegal nor contrary to public policy.” Id.4 The Tenth Circuit then concluded that,
under federal law, general allegations of fraud were insufficient to invalidate the jury trial
waiver provision, and the provision was therefore enforceable. Id. at 837-38.
In accord with Telum, numerous courts in the Tenth Circuit have enforced pre-
dispute contractual jury trial waivers as long as they were knowing and voluntary. See, e.g.,
Bevill Co. v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 304 F. App'x 674, 682-83 (10th Cir. 2008); Walker
v. SC Realty Servs., Inc., No. 15-CV-9932-JAR-TJJ, 2016 WL 4245487 (D. Kan. Aug. 11,
2016); Am. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bond Int'l Ltd., No. 06CV0317-CVE-FMH, 2006 WL
2947088, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 16, 2006). The Bank, relying on this line of authority,
argues that the contractual jury trial waivers involved here – which were a conspicuous
part of a contract that was negotiated by sophisticated parties – are enforceable.
J&J has a decidedly different take on the issue. It argues that, under Erie and its
progeny, the validity of the waiver is a matter of substantive state law and the cases cited
by the Bank are factually distinct because none involved the enforcement of a contractual
provision that is void under state law. This argument is not without merit.
Although not universally true, questions concerning a contract’s validity and
interpretation are often characterized as substantive matters governed by state law. See
Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Contract law—including
4 For this latter proposition, Telum cited to McCarthy v. Wynne, 126 F.2d 620, 623 (10 th Cir.
1942), which involved claims originating under Oklahoma law. In McCarthy, the Tenth
Circuit found that a private contract to waive a jury trial on certain claims was “neither
illegal nor contrary to public policy” and was binding on the parties. Id. at 623. However,
in that case, as in Telum, the parties did not appear to contest the validity of the waiver
under the state constitution.
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the 	rules 	governing 	contract 	interpretation—is 	quintessentially 	substantive 	for 	Erie
purposes, and therefore primarily the realm of the states.”). Further, two circuit courts have
concluded that state law governs the validity of a pre-dispute contractual waiver provision.
In IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir.
2008), the Seventh Circuit explained that “[t]here is no general federal law of contracts”
and “that state law governs the validity of a bench-trial agreement in a case under the
diversity jurisdiction.” In In re Cnty. of Orange, 784 F.3d 520, 531 (9th Cir. 2015), the
Ninth Circuit, after conducting a thorough Erie analysis, concluded that “[t]he law
governing jury trial waivers in federal court is federal procedural law” but that “federal
courts sitting in diversity must apply the relevant state law to evaluate the validity of a pre-
dispute jury trial waiver when that law is more protective than federal law.” Additionally,
in jurisdictions where, as argued here, state law precludes pre-dispute contractual jury trial
waivers, district courts have split on whether state or federal law controls. Compare IHI
E&C Int'l Corp. v. Robinson Mech. Contractors, Inc., No. 1:19-CV-04137-JPB, 2020 WL
13594954, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 18, 2020) with Georgia Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Co. LLC, No. CV 112-167, 2013 WL 12204328, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2013); see also
9 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2303 (4th ed.) (“However, federal courts have not reached a
consensus on whether state or federal law governs the enforcement of a pre-dispute
contractual jury waiver.”).
Here, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Telum provides strong support for the argument
that the enforceability of a pre-dispute contractual jury trial waiver is a matter of federal
law. However, as both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have recognized, the court in Telum
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was not presented with the precise issue involved here – whether federal or state law
controls the validity of a contractual waiver when there is an (alleged) conflict between the
federal standard and state law. Ultimately, however, the Court finds it unnecessary to wade
into these unsettled waters. If, as the Bank contends, federal law governs, the waiver is
enforceable because it was knowing and voluntary.5 But even assuming, as J&J contends,
that state law controls, the Court is unpersuaded that this contractual provision is void under
Oklahoma law.
The Oklahoma Constitution, like the Seventh Amendment, protects the right to trial
by jury in certain actions. OK Const. Art. II, § 19. The Oklahoma Constitution also contains
a “unique” provision, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Shear, 796 P.2d 296, 301 (Okla. 1990)
(Kauger, J., concurring), referred to as section 8:
Any provision of a contract, express or implied, made by any person, by
which any of the benefits of this Constitution is sought to be waived, shall be
null and void.
OK Const. Art. XXIII, § 8. In Home Vest Cap., LLC v. Ret. Application Servs., Inc., 466
P.3d 1 (Okla. Civ. App. 2020), the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that the “plain
language” of section 8 rendered a pre-dispute contractual jury trial waiver contained in a
5 J&J relies on its argument that the federal knowing and voluntarily standard is
inapplicable and does not specifically contest the Bank’s assertion that the standard is
satisfied in this case. The Bank has adequately shown that the provisions were a
conspicuous 	part 	of 	the 	Loan Agreement 	and 	Guaranty Agreements 	and 	that 	the
Agreements were negotiated by sophisticated parties. The waivers were therefore knowing
and voluntary and enforceable under the federal standard. See Am. Bank & Tr. Co., 2006
WL 2947088, 	at 	*2 	(enforcing 	waiver 	where 	“both 	parties 	to 	the 	contract 	were
sophisticated and represented by legal counsel”).
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bank account deposit agreement void. Id. at 3. J&J relies on section 8 and Home Vest to
argue that the waiver in this case is also void under Oklahoma law.
When interpreting state law, federal courts “are not bound by decisions of lower
state courts” but must instead “determine issues of state law as we believe the highest court
in the state would determine them.” Fransen v. Conoco, Inc., 64 F.3d 1481, 1492 n. 10
(10th Cir. 1995). In making this determination, federal courts consider “decisions of a
state’s intermediate appellate courts [as] some evidence of how the state supreme court
would decide the issue …, even if they are not binding precedent under state law.” Id. Home
Vest was approved for publication by the Court of Civil Appeals but not the Oklahoma
Supreme Court.6 As a result, the decision does not have precedential value, but only
persuasive effect. Okla. Sup. Ct. R. 1.200(d)(2); Leo v. Oklahoma Water Res. Bd., 536 P.3d
939, 946 (“Opinions published by the Court of Civil Appeals have no precedential value
and are merely persuasive.”). Giving Home Vest the appropriate deference as persuasive
authority, the Court is nevertheless convinced that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would
decide the issue differently.
To start, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality
of arbitration agreements, which necessarily involve the waiver of the right to a jury trial.
In City of Bethany v. Pub. Emps. Rels. Bd. of State of Okl., 904 P.2d 604, 614-15 (Okla.
1995), which addressed the constitutionality of a statute requiring mandatory grievance
arbitration in the collective bargaining context, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
6 The Oklahoma Supreme Court initially granted certiorari in Home Vest before recalling
its previous grant and denying certiorari.
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section 8 “does not preclude such arbitration agreements” because, among other reasons,
“the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Okla. Const. art. 2, § 19, is waivable and not all
disputes between the parties are required to be resolved by a jury—the right to a jury trial
depends on the nature of the dispute.” The Oklahoma Supreme Court reiterated this
conclusion in Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 910 P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1996). The specific
issue in Rollings was whether a private agreement to submit a future dispute to arbitration
violates OK Const. Art. II, § 6, which protects access to the courts. Id. at 1031. However,
amicus curiae also argued that the arbitration agreement violated the right to a jury trial
contained in OK Const. Art. II, § 19. Id. at 1031 n.1. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
concluded that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and cited with approval to City
of 	Bethany’s 	conclusion 	that 	mandatory 	grievance 	arbitration 	does 	not 	violate 	the
constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. Next, in City of Anadarko v. Fraternal Ord. of Police,
Lodge 118, 934 P.2d 328, 331 (Okla. 1997), the Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on City
of Bethany and Rollings to hold that binding interest arbitration does not violate the
Oklahoma Constitution because the right to a jury trial codified in section 19 is waivable.
Home Vest briefly acknowledged this line of cases but concluded that arbitration
agreements are “distinguishable from jury trial waivers” without explaining how they are
materially different. On the contrary, as the Tenth Circuit has explained, analogizing
between 	arbitration 	agreements 	and 	contractual 	jury 	trial 	waivers 	is 	“especially
appropriate” because “submission of a case to arbitration involves a greater compromise
of procedural protections than does the waiver of the right to trial by jury.” Telum, 859 F.2d
at 838. Thus, if a party can contractually agree to forego a judicial forum altogether without
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offending the right to a jury trial contained in section 19, it follows that a party can
contractually agree to resolve a dispute via a bench trial.
Further, the construction of section 19 and section 8 advanced by Home Vest is
inconsistent with the way the Oklahoma Supreme Court has interpreted these constitutional
provisions. In Rollings, 910 P.2d at 1032, the Oklahoma Supreme Court explained that
section 8 “has not been interpreted literally and restrictively” and that “[a] violation of
Section 8 is dependent on the abridgment of some other state constitutional right.” The
constitutional violation alleged here is the right to a jury trial contained in section 19. But
Oklahoma’s highest courts have repeatedly interpreted section 19 as a constraint on the
government, rather than a constraint on a party’s ability to voluntarily waive a jury trial.
See Massey v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 837 P.2d 880, 884 (Okla. 1992) (interpreting section 19
and stating that “no act of government may deny the right of trial by jury to a person. While
as in the case of arbitration, a person may waive his right to jury trial, the legislature cannot
waive it for him”); Barzellone v. Presley, 126 P.3d 588, 601 (Okla. 2005) (“The
constitutional right to a jury trial is a personal right which the Legislature cannot waive
through creating a fiscal barrier so unreasonable as to eliminate the right itself.”); Seymour
v. Swart, 695 P.2d 509, 511 (Okla. 1985) (“This right cannot be abrogated arbitrarily by a
court; it can be surrendered only by voluntary consent or waiver… it cannot be annulled,
obstructed, impaired, or restricted by legislative or judicial action.”); Jenkins v. State, 120
P. 298, 299 (Okla. Crim. App. 1912) (“The right of trial by jury is purely a personal right
and privilege that may be waived by the defendant. The provisions of the Bill of Rights
quoted are restrictions on the legislative power, and place the right beyond the power of
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the Legislature to abridge it.”). Because section 19 operates as a restraint on the
government, a party’s voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial, whether by contract or
otherwise, does not abridge a state constitutional right. And without an underlying state
constitutional violation, “there is no Section 8 violation.” Rollings, 910 P.2d at 1032; see
also City of Anadarko, 934 P.2d at 331 (holding that binding interest arbitration did not
implicate section 8 because the there was no violation of section 19’s right to a jury trial).
There is one additional point that, in the Court’s opinion, undercuts the persuasive
value of Home Vest. The argument advanced by J&J and adopted in Home Vest has been
discussed in several concurring opinions filed in cases involving arbitration clauses. See,
e.g., Cannon v. Lane, 867 P.2d 1235 (Okla. 1993) (Opala, J., concurring); Long v. DeGeer,
753 P.2d 1327, 1330 (Okla. 1987) (Opala, J., concurring). Although the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has had several opportunities to adopt this argument and declare the jury
trial waiver implicit in every arbitration agreement unconstitutional, a majority of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has never elected to do so. The repeated refusal to embrace this
argument suggests that Home Vest’s holding is at odds with the way the Oklahoma Supreme
Court would decide the issue.
For all these reasons, the Court concludes that the waiver provision involved here –
which was clear, conspicuous, and negotiated by sophisticated parties – is not void under
Oklahoma law. Notably, this conclusion is in accord with the only other federal district
court that has addressed Home Vest’s effect on the enforceability of a contractual jury trial
waiver. See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC v. Kibby Welding, LLC, No. 18-CV-0445-
CVE-FHM, 2019 WL 3754211, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 8, 2019) (“Plaintiff has not shown
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that there is binding Oklahoma precedent that would clearly establish that Oklahoma law
is actually more protective than federal law.”).
Having concluded that, under either federal or state law standards, the waiver
provision 	is 	enforceable, 	the 	only 	issue 	that 	remains 	is 	whether 	the 	claims 	and
counterclaims fall within the waiver’s scope. The waiver provision contained in the Loan
Agreement states that it applies to “any dispute, action or proceeding to enforce or defend
any rights (whether based on contract, tort or otherwise) under this Loan Agreement…or
arising from any banking relationship existing in connection with this Loan Agreement.”
Similarly, the waiver provision contained in the Guaranty Agreement states that it applies
to “any action or proceeding based upon, or related to, the subject matter of this guaranty.”
Despite this broad language, J&J contends that its tort and statutory claims do not
fall within the scope of the waiver. The Court disagrees. The plain language of the waiver
provision indicates that it extends to claims based in contract, tort or otherwise that arise
from the Loan Agreement or the banking relationship existing in connection with the Loan
Agreement. J&J’s tort claims, alleging that the Bank misrepresented its intention to extend
the loan or issue a letter of credit for the purpose of inducing J&J’s reliance on the Bank
for financing, arise from the banking relationship that existed between the parties in
connection with the Loan Agreement. Similarly, J&J’s claim for breach of construction
trust, alleging that the Bank violated the duty of trust imposed upon the loan funds by
refusing to make disbursements, arises from the Loan Agreement and the parties’ banking
relationship. The claims therefore fall within the scope of waiver. See Pinstripe, Inc. v.
Manpower, Inc., No. 07-CV-620GKFPJC, 2009 WL 1457704, at *2 (N.D. Okla. May 22,
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2009) (finding that broadly worded contractual jury trial waiver applied to tort claims);
Little v. Gray Media Grp., Inc., 717 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1065 (D. Kan. 2024) (applying
contractual jury trial waiver to statutory claims).
Conclusion
In Telum, the Tenth Circuit applied federal law to determine the enforceability of a
pre-dispute contractual jury trial waiver. Although not on all fours with this case, Telum
weighs against J&J’s argument that the Court should defer to state law to determine the
validity of a contractual jury trial waiver. But even if state law governs the issue, the Court
is not persuaded that Oklahoma law is in conflict with the federal standard. To be sure,
Home Vest says otherwise. But there is no binding authority establishing that a contractual
jury trial waiver is invalid and, as outlined above, there is good reason to think that this
issue would be decided differently by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. In sum, the parties
knowingly and voluntarily executed contractual jury trial waivers that encompass the
claims asserted in this case and the waivers are enforceable.
Defendant/Counterclaimant Simmons Bank’s Motion to Strike Demand for Jury
Trial [Doc. No. 65] is therefore GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 21 st day of November, 2025.
. DeGIUSTI
Chief United States District Judge
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