Mathis v. Standard Fire Insurance Co

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
BRITTANY MATHIS, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-25-207-SLP
)
STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE 	)
COMPANY, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
O R D E R
Before the Court are three related motions. First, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Defer
Consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Under Rule 56(d) and Rule
37 [Doc. No. 33], to which Defendant has responded [Doc. No. 23], and Plaintiff replied
[Doc. No. 34]. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART.
Second, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel [Doc. No. 32], which is noncompliant
with the Local Rules of Procedure and is therefore DENIED.
Finally, Plaintiff filed an Unopposed Motion to Extend All Deadlines and Continue
Trial [Doc. No. 35] by a period of four months which is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART.
I. 	Background
Before addressing the pending motions, a brief recitation of recent events is
necessary. This case is currently set on the March 2026 trial docket. Defendant’s Motion
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for Summary Judgment is pending, and Defendant has submitted pretrial filings including
jury instructions and motions in limine. Aside from the Joint Pretrial Report, Plaintiff has
submitted no pretrial filings and the deadline to do so has passed.
This case arises out of an automobile accident and a subsequent small claims action
filed against Plaintiff for property damage. 	Plaintiff alleges Defendant, her automobile
insurer, failed to timely defend her in the underlying small claims matter, resulting in an
undefended judgment. She asserts claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, and constructive fraud. 	See [Doc. No. 1-2]. 	Defendant disputes
liability in this action and contends it did not receive timely notice sufficient to trigger any
duty to defend before judgment was entered.
Discovery in this case was open for approximately ten months and closed on
February 2, 2026. 	On May 22, 2025, Defendant served written responses to Plaintiff’s
discovery requests, asserting objections and indicating that certain materials would be
produced pursuant to a protective order. [Doc. No. 33-2] at 9. 	Under the Court’s original
Scheduling Order, discovery was set to close on October 1, 2025. [Doc. No. 8]. In July
2025, the Court granted the parties’ request to extend all scheduling deadlines by
approximately four months, resulting in a new discovery deadline of February 2, 2026.
[Doc. Nos. 11, 12]. 	During the discovery period, Plaintiff did not move to compel
discovery or otherwise properly seek Court intervention regarding Defendant’s discovery
responses.
The record reflects relatively little activity by the parties during the pendency of this
action aside from the agreed extension of scheduling deadlines. 	Yet, following the
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dispositive-motion deadline and the discovery cutoff, there has been a burst of last-minute
activity, asserting longstanding discovery deficiencies. Defendant timely filed its Motion
for Summary Judgment on the dispositive motion deadline of January 2, 2026. 	In the
weeks that followed, Plaintiff filed the following motions, nearly all at or beyond
applicable deadlines:
• 	Motion to Defer Consideration of Summary Judgment (filed on January 21,
2026—two days before January 23, 2026 deadline);
• 	Motion to Quash Deposition of Plaintiff Brittany Mathis (filed on January 28,
2026 at 11:36 P.M.—for deposition scheduled less than twelve hours later);
• 	Motion to Compel Discovery (filed on February 4, 2026—two days after the
close of discovery); and
• 	Motion to Extend Scheduling Order Deadlines and Continue Trial (filed on
February 6, 2026—after discovery and pretrial deadlines have closed and only
weeks away from trial).
Many of these filings fail to comply with basic procedural requirements, requiring
repeated Court intervention. This includes the Court’s Order striking Plaintiff’s Motion to
Quash the deposition of Plaintiff Brittany Mathis, which failed to certify that the parties
had conferred in good faith as required by LCvR 37.1. See Order [Doc. No. 26]. The Court
also struck Plaintiff’s Motion to Defer, but permitted refiling, because Plaintiff’s counsel
failed to sign the Motion and his attached declaration, in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Order [Doc. No. 31].
The dispute central to Plaintiff’s motions is the assertion that Defendant withheld
discovery—most notably, the claim file—necessary for Plaintiff to respond to the summary
judgment motion and proceed with the case. 	Conspicuously absent from Plaintiff’s
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briefing, however, is any explanation for why these alleged deficiencies were not pursued
earlier through the ordinary discovery process, despite months of opportunity to do so.
Defendant’s conduct, however, is not without fault. Defendant does not dispute that
it failed to produce the claim file, which it apparently has since provided. 1 See [Doc. No.
23] at 4 n.1. This omission is particularly difficult to reconcile given that this action arises
from an insurance coverage dispute. Defendant likewise does not dispute that it attached
documents to its Motion for Summary Judgment that were not produced to Plaintiff during
discovery. See [Doc. No. 23]. Defendant offers no explanation for either failure.
1 Plaintiff appears to dispute Defendant’s assertion that the claim file has been produced. 	The
Motion to Compel attaches a sworn affidavit by Plaintiff Brittany Mathis dated February 3, 2026,
which states:
To my knowledge, Defendant has not produced the claim file or internal
communications relating to my claim. Defendant has taken the position that it will
not produce documents without a protective order, even though no protective order
was proposed or entered.
Mathis Aff. 	[Doc No. 32-1] ¶ 8. 	Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Blair Hollaway, also submitted an
affidavit dated February 3, 2026, which states:
To date, Defendant has produced virtually no substantive documents responsive to
Plaintiff’s 	Requests 	for 	Production, 	including 	the 	claim 	file 	and 	internal
communications central to this case.
Hollaway Aff. [Doc. No. 32-5] ¶ 5. However, an Agreed Protective Order was entered on January
28, 2026, [Doc. No. 22], and the Motion to Compel itself acknowledges that a claim file was
produced, albeit with redactions. [Doc. No. 32] at 3. Accordingly, the affidavits submitted to the
Court contain materially inaccurate statements—ones that Plaintiff’s counsel would have known
were incorrect at the time the Motion to Compel was filed. Plaintiff’s counsel is admonished that
submitting sworn statements containing inaccurate representations to the Court raises serious
concerns and treads perilously close to conduct governed by Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Counsel is therefore warned that any future submissions that contain materially
inaccurate factual representations may result in sanctions or other actions as the Court deems
necessary.
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Given the procedural posture of the case and the parties’ respective conduct, the
Court temporarily stayed Plaintiff’s deadline to respond to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and ordered expedited briefing. See Order [Doc. No. 20]. The pending
motions are now before the Court for resolution.
II. 	Governing Standards
A. Motion to Defer Summary Judgment Ruling
Following a party moving for summary judgment, if a nonmovant, pursuant to Rule
56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “shows by affidavit or declaration that . . .
it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering
the [summary judgment] motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or
declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(d). 	“A party may not invoke Rule 56[d] ‘by simply stating that discovery is
incomplete but must state with specificity how the additional material will rebut the
summary judgment motion.’” Garcia v. U.S. Air Force, 533 F.3d 1170, 1179 (10th Cir.
2008) (quoting Libertarian Party of N.M. v. Herrera, 506 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir.
2007)).
The party seeking discovery and to defer a ruling on summary judgment under Rule
56(d) must provide an affidavit “explain[ing] why facts precluding summary judgment
cannot be presented.” Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Health Care Mgmt. Partners, Ltd., 616 F.3d
1086, 1096 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “This includes identifying (1) the probable
facts not available, (2) why those facts cannot be presented currently, (3) what steps have
been taken to obtain these facts, and (4) how additional time will enable the party to obtain
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those facts and rebut the motion for summary judgment.” Id. (cleaned up and citations
omitted). 	“Rule 56(d) motions [should] be robust, and . . . [an] affidavit’s lack of
specificity counsels against” granting the Rule 56(d) motion. Ellis v. J.R.’s Country Stores,
Inc., 779 F.3d 1184, 1206 (10th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotations omitted). “The
purpose of the affidavit is to ensure that the nonmoving party is invoking the protections
of Rule 56[(d)] in good faith and to afford the trial court the showing necessary to assess
the merits of a party’s opposition.” Id. (citation omitted).
Further, a request for additional discovery under Rule 56(d) focuses on the moving
party’s diligence. 	See Lewis v. City of Ft. Collins, 903 F.2d 752, 758 (10th Cir. 1990)
(Rule 56(d) affidavits should be treated liberally “unless dilatory or lacking in merit.”).
“[I]f the party filing the Rule [56(d)] affidavit has been dilatory . . . no extension will be
granted.” Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 998 F.2d 1550, 1554 (10th Cir.
1993) (denying a 56(d) request where “the record reflect[ed] that plaintiffs were dilatory
in pursuing discovery prior to the filing of their [56(d)] affidavit”). “Although discovery
is the norm prior to granting summary judgment, a party’s mere hope that discovery may
yield further evidence is insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” 	Trans-W.
Petroleum, Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., 830 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2016).
B. Motion to Compel
Civil litigants “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides the framework for enforcing
discovery rules against a party. 	Upon certification that a movant has in good faith
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conferred, or attempted to confer with the party failing to make disclosure or discovery
responses, the Court may, upon party motion, enter an order compelling those disclosures
and responses. Id.; see also LCvR 37.1 (requiring a certification that counsel engaged in a
good faith attempt to resolve the issues).
C. Motion to Amend Scheduling Order
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require “good cause” to modify a Scheduling
Order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “Good cause” under Rule 16(b) “requires the movant to
show the ‘scheduling deadlines cannot be met despite [the movant’s] diligent efforts.’”
Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C. v. Wells Fargo Nat. Bank Ass’n, 771 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir. 2014)
(alteration in original) (quoting Pumpco, Inc. v. Schenker Int’l, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 667, 668
(D. Colo. 2001)). “Good cause” also “obligates the moving party to provide an adequate
explanation for any delay.” 	Tesone v. Empire Mktg. Strategies, 942 F.3d 979, 988 (10th
Cir. 	2019). 	The 	Court 	is 	“afforded 	broad 	discretion 	in 	managing 	the 	pretrial
schedule.” Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 1247, 1254 (10th Cir. 2011).
III. 	Discussion
A. Motion to Defer Consideration
1. 	Rule 56(d)
Plaintiff seeks relief under Rule 56(d) on the ground that Defendant allegedly
withheld discovery necessary to oppose Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration identifies categories of discovery Plaintiff contends were
unavailable due to Defendant wrongfully failing to produce, including Defendant’s claim
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file2 and internal records. 	Decl. [Doc. No. 33-1]. 	For purposes of this order, the Court
assumes that Plaintiff’s declaration sufficiently identifies the probable facts not available
and asserts that Defendant has withheld materials relevant to Plaintiff’s opposition to
summary judgment.3 Even accepting those assertions, however, Plaintiff’s showing does
not satisfy the remaining requirements for relief under Rule 56(d).
Specifically, Plaintiff has not demonstrated what steps were taken to obtain the
identified discovery. 	Defendant served written discovery responses on May 22, 2025,
asserting objections and indicating that certain materials would be produced pursuant to a
protective order. 	[Doc. No. 33-2] at 9. 	Discovery remained open for more than eight
months thereafter, including an approximately four-month extension granted by the Court
at the parties’ request. During that time, Plaintiff did not move to compel discovery, seek
Court 	intervention 	regarding 	Defendant’s 	responses, 	or 	otherwise 	pursue 	available
remedies to resolve the asserted discovery dispute.
While the Court is certainly skeptical of Defendant’s conduct in failing to produce
a claim file in an insurance dispute, the appropriate time for Plaintiff to challenge that
conduct was at any point in the last eight months using the proper vehicle of a motion to
2 Defendant states the claim file has since been produced to Plaintiff. See [Doc. No. 23] at 4, n.1.
3 The assumption that Plaintiff’s declaration satisfies the first two prongs is tenuous, at best, given
that Plaintiff’s declaration fails to explain why Plaintiff, herself, cannot provide the documents and
evidence necessary to establish the date(s) that she notified Defendant regarding the accident and
small claims action. 	See Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Health Care Mgmt. Partners, Ltd., 616 F.3d
1086, 1096 (10th Cir. 2010) (affirming denial of Rule 56(d) relief where affidavit failed to explain
why the nonmovant could not supply evidence within its own possession or control, or what efforts
were made to obtain such evidence from its own counsel).
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compel. This is especially so given the language of the Court’s Scheduling Order warns
parties that “[i]f the deadline for dispositive motions and Daubert motions precedes the
discovery deadline, the parties are expected to conduct any discovery necessary for such
motions in advance of the motion deadline.” 	[Doc. No. 12] ¶ 7. 	Plaintiff provides no
explanation of why these disputes were not brought to the Court’s attention months ago.
The purpose of Rule 56(d) is to protect parties who, despite diligent efforts, are
unable to present essential facts in opposition to summary judgment. 	It does not operate
to excuse a failure to timely pursue discovery or to raise discovery disputes while discovery
remained open. 	The failure to pursue discovery until Defendant moved for summary
judgment demonstrates a lack of diligence that necessitates a denial of the Rule 56(d)
Motion. 	Jensen, 998 F.2d at 1554. 	Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not met
her burden of demonstrating that the Court should defer ruling on Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment or permit additional discovery.
2. 	Rule 37(c)
Plaintiff 	argues, 	and 	Defendant 	does 	not 	dispute, 	that 	Exhibits 	4 	and 	9 	to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment were not produced by Defendant in discovery.
See Mot. [Doc. No. 33] at 11; Resp. [Doc. No. 23] at 1-2. 	Under Rule 37(c)(1), “[i]f a
party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the
party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at
a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” 	A
district court has broad discretion to determine whether a Rule 26 violation is “substantially
justified” or harmless, and the Tenth Circuit has set forth various factors to guide the
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analysis. 	Woodworker’s Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 985, 993
(10th Cir. 1999).
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Defendant does not cite any of the above
standards or framework for analyzing a Rule 37(c) issue. Instead, Defendant argues in a
conclusory fashion and without citation to authority that Plaintiff’s alleged “possession or
knowledge” of the exhibits somehow relieves Defendant of its discovery obligations under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Not so. Defendant’s Response conspicuously fails
to explain why Exhibits 4 and 9 were not produced. See Resp. [Doc. No. 23]. Under these
circumstances, the Court finds that Defendant has not shown that its failure to disclose
Exhibits 4 and 9 is substantially justified or harmless under Rule 37(c)(1). The Court will
not consider those exhibits in ruling on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Relatedly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel [Doc. No. 32] suggests that more exhibits
beyond just Exhibits 4 and 9 were attached by Defendant without disclosing them to
Plaintiff in discovery. 	See, e.g. [Doc. No. 32] at 2 (referencing exhibits 2, 5, 10, 16, and
17). Defendant’s explanation seems, at least impliedly, to support that conclusion. [Doc.
No. 23] at 2. Defendant appears to suggest—without citing any applicable authority—that
because a document may be publicly available, a party does not have an obligation to
produce it in discovery. 	“The Court is aware of no requirement that information be
unavailable to the public in order to be discoverable.” 	Phillips v. Hanover Ins. Co., No.
CIV-14-871-R, 2015 WL 1781873, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 20, 2015) (gathering cases
where “[c]ourts consistently hold that parties have an obligation to produce even publicly
available information”); see also Martino v. Kiewit N.M. Corp., 600 Fed. Appx. 908, 911
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(5th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “even if a document is publicly available or in the opposing
party’s possession, a party must still disclose it under Rule 26(a)(1)(A) to provide notice
of evidence central to its claims or defenses”). To the extent that additional exhibits were
attached to the summary judgment briefing without proper disclosures as governed by Rule
26 and Rule 37(c), then the Court is inclined to similarly not consider those exhibits in
ruling on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Given that it is presently unclear
which exhibits were not properly disclosed in discovery, the Court directs the parties to
meaningfully meet and confer in-person or telephonically regarding the exhibits and submit
a single joint notice informing the Court as to whether each exhibit was produced in
discovery and if it were, by whom and when.
3. 	Remaining Requests for Relief in Motion to Defer Ruling
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Motion to Defer Ruling is fairly characterized to be
numerous combined motions filed as one. In addition to the above-addressed requests for
relief, Plaintiff’s Motion also requests the Court compel discovery that Plaintiff claims she
is entitled to and cites to Rule 37(d)(2)—the discovery sanction provision. [Doc. No. 33]
at 12-13. 	Not only is combining multiple requests for relief in an omnibus motion
prohibited under the local rules, see LCvR 7.1(c), but Plaintiff also failed to certify
compliance with LCvR 37.1, which requires parties to meet and confer in person prior to
filing a discovery motion, as well as Rule 37(d)(1)(B), which requires certification that the
party moving for sanctions has conferred with the party failing to act. Accordingly, to the
extent Plaintiff intends to use her Rule 56(d) motion as a vehicle to compel discovery or
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impose sanctions, those requests are not properly before the Court and will not be
considered.4
B. Motion to Compel
Turning to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, Plaintiff seeks an order that would require
Defendant to “serve full and complete” discovery responses to Plaintiff, require production
of all responsive, non-privileged documents, produce a privilege log, preclude Defendant
from “relying on improperly withheld materials,” and award Plaintiff sanctions pursuant
to Rule 37(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Again, omnibus motions are not
permitted in this district, see LCvR 7.1(c), and Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel appears to
largely re-tread many of the same arguments set forth in her Rule 56(d) Motion to Defer.
Plaintiff 	includes 	a 	certificate 	of 	compliance 	stating 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	counsel
attempted to meet and confer regarding the discovery disputes complained of in the
Motion. 	See Mot. 	[Doc. No. 32] at 6-7. 	Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that defense counsel
refused to confer and attaches what is described as an “email exchange[] between counsel
regarding these discovery issues.” Id. A review of that correspondence does not support
Plaintiff’s characterization. 	[Doc. No. 32-7]. 	Rather, the email exchange concerns
preparation of the pretrial report and defense counsel’s request that Plaintiff produce
documents identified therein. The correspondence makes no reference to the “boilerplate
4 This ruling should not be construed as an endorsement of Defendant’s conduct, as alleged by
Plaintiff. 	The Court expects attorneys practicing before it to exercise reasonable diligence,
professional courtesy, and faithful compliance with their discovery obligations. 	A failure to
produce key documents—such as a claim file in an insurance dispute—certainly raises legitimate
concerns. However, those concerns are not properly or timely raised in a Rule 56(d) Motion to
Defer Ruling.
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objections” or other discovery disputes raised in the Motion to Compel. 	Accordingly,
Plaintiff has again failed to demonstrate meaningful compliance with LCvR 37.1 and Rule
37(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 As such, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel
is DENIED.6
C. Motion to Extend Scheduling Order Deadlines
On February 6, Plaintiff filed an Unopposed Motion to extend all scheduling order
deadlines by a period of four months. Plaintiff specifically seeks an extension of deadlines
to “allow more time to complete discovery” and claims that “discovery is still ongoing.”
However, discovery is not ongoing as the deadline for discovery has passed and, therefore,
Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion is untimely. 	See Sched. Order [Doc. No. 12] (discovery
deadline of February 2, 2026). However, untimeliness does not, by itself, require denial.
The controlling inquiry is whether the movant has shown diligence and good cause. 	See
Minter v. Prime Equip. Co., 451 F.3d 1196, 1205 n.4 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that
lateness itself does not justify denial of a motion to amend scheduling order, but “undue”
lateness does). Aside from time to complete discovery, Plaintiff’s counsel also requests an
extension due to having been recently informed that he will “need a second surgery within
5 And again, Plaintiff is reminded that seeking sanctions under Rule 37(d) requires its own
certification. Id.
6 See also Harvest Grp. LLC v. Love’s Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc., No. CIV-20-00435-
JD, 2024 WL 4880747 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 25, 2024) (denying motion to compel for failure to
comply with LCvR 37.1); Smith v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. CIV-19-00849-PRW, 2020 WL 13648610
(W.D. Okla. Nov. 4, 2020); Jobson v. United States ex rel. Dep’t of Veteran Affs., No. CIV-17-
574-SLP, 2018 WL 8299886, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 27, 2018) (refusing to hear portion of motion
that were not discussed in the meet and confer); Taylor v. Boise Cascade Express, a Div. of Boise
Cascade Off. Prods., No. CIV-04-0266-L, 2004 WL 7332758 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 14, 2004).
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the next few months” which will require a period of two months recovery thereafter. [Doc.
No. 35] at 2. Be that as it may, it is unclear to the Court why deadlines could not be met
under a shorter timeframe in the weeks and months leading up to that surgery.
Regarding diligence, Plaintiff offers no explanation whatsoever as to the efforts
taken to diligently comply with the deadlines. 	Nor does Plaintiff “provide an adequate
explanation for the delay” in seeking relief. In fact, Plaintiff does not even address that the
request is untimely or acknowledge that the deadlines have passed. See Strope v. Collins,
315 F. App’x 57, 61 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s denial of a motion to amend
under Rule 16(b) where the plaintiff “failed to even address the untimeliness of the motion”
(internal quotations omitted)). Further, the Court’s Amended Scheduling Order provides
the following warning to parties regarding the sequencing of deadlines: “If the deadline for
dispositive motions and Daubert motions precedes the discovery deadline, the parties are
expected to conduct any discovery necessary for such motions in advance of the motion
deadline.” 	[Doc. No. 12] ¶ 7. 	Finally, when granting the parties’ previous request for a
four-month extension, the Court cautioned that “given the length of the extension, the Court
does not anticipate granting further extensions absent compelling circumstances.”
On this record, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause to
amend scheduling order deadlines pursuant to Rule 16(b)(4) because she has not provided
an adequate explanation for the delay in order to show that she has been diligent in
attempting to meet those deadlines. 	While the Court recognizes that this result may be
harsh, “the Court must apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and they mandate that
a scheduling order may only be modified for good cause.” Landon v. Winston Hosp., Inc.,
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No. 20-CV-01547-MEH, 2021 WL 463624, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2021); see also
Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that if parties “could
ignore court orders . . . without suffering the consequences, then the district court cannot
administer orderly justice . . .”).
Accordingly, the Unopposed Motion [Doc. No. 35] is DENIED to the extent it seeks
an extension of scheduling order deadlines other than a continuance of trial.
IV. 	Conclusion
The record reflects a pattern of avoidable procedural missteps by both parties that
has unnecessarily burdened the Court and impeded the orderly progression of this case.
The Court will not continue to expend judicial resources addressing filings that fail to
comply with governing procedural rules. Any further requests for relief must be presented
in strict compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules.
Continued noncompliance will result in the summary disposition of filings and, as
necessary, may result in the imposition of appropriate sanctions.
The Court is deeply troubled by the conduct of counsel and the clear lack of
diligence to comply with the Court’s orders or applicable rules. The Court further notes in
observing the recent filings, including copies of communications between the parties, that
the tone and temperature of communications have become increasingly contentious and
caustic. 	The Court reminds the parties of its expectation that both parties will conduct
themselves in a professional, cooperative, and civil manner. The Court takes a dim view
of any conduct to the contrary and in the event the parties’ actions continue along this path
or degrade further, that conduct will be addressed accordingly.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Defer Consideration of
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Under Rule 56(d) and Rule 37 [Doc. No. 33]
is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
1. 	Plaintiff’s request that Exhibits 4 and 9 of Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. No. 18] be excluded from the Court’s consideration pursuant to
Rule 37(c)(1) is GRANTED.
2. 	Plaintiff’s request to defer consideration of Defendant’s summary judgment
motion pursuant to Rule 56(d) is DENIED.
3. 	Any remaining requests for relief in the Rule 56(d) Motion to Defer such as
requests to compel discovery or issue sanctions are not properly before the Court
in this motion, and the Court declines to consider those requests.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for the parties shall meaningfully meet
and confer in good faith in person or telephonically regarding the exhibits attached to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and shall submit a single Joint Notice, limited
to two pages, informing the Court as to whether each exhibit was produced in discovery
and if it were, by whom and when, so that the Court may determine whether such exhibits
should be excluded in consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule
37(c). This Notice is not an invitation for the parties to submit more argument as the time
to present argument has passed. 	The Joint Notice shall be submitted no later than
February 16, 2026.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file her Response to the Motion for
Summary Judgment no later than February 27, 2026. Defendant’s Reply shall be filed
in accordance with the timing set out in the Local Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel [Doc. No. 32] is
DENIED for noncompliance with LCvR 37.1.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Extend All
Deadlines and Continue Trial is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART such that
the trial date is STRICKEN to be reset, if necessary, following resolution of the Motion for
Summary Judgment but all other deadlines in the Amended Scheduling Order [Doc. No.
12] are unchanged and remain in effect.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if attorney Dereck Owens is representing Plaintiff
in this action, see [Doc. No. 34] at 12 (listing Mr. Owens with Mr. Hollaway in the
signature block as “attorneys” for Plaintiff), then Mr. Owens shall enter his entry of
appearance no later than February 13, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of February, 2026.
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