Waddle v. Mullendore et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
AUDRIA WADDLE, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-25-00768-JD
)
JOSHUA MULLENDORE, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Audria Waddle’s Motion for Judge’s Recusal
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and 28 U.S.C. § 144 (“Motion”) [Doc. No. 26]. For the
reasons stated below, the Court denies the Motion.
On October 28, 2025, Ms. Waddle was directed by the Court to file an amended
complaint within 21 days, addressing the deficiencies outlined in the October 28 Order
and the Court’s previous Orders and to do so without attaching an excessive number of
exhibits. See [Doc. Nos. 10, 16, 25]. Instead, Ms. Waddle filed the instant Motion seeking
disqualification of the undersigned judge under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Ms. Waddle
asserts that the undersigned judge “has failed to consider the FACTS presented by
Plaintiff, including police reports, restraining orders, and other evidence that support
Plaintiff’s claims of abuse and injustice.” Motion at 1. Further, Ms. Waddle contends that
the undersigned judge “has denied Plaintiff the right to be heard and present evidence to
the court” by restricting the parties from submitting further filings without leave of Court
until Ms. Waddle has filed an amended complaint in compliance with the Court’s orders.
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Id. at 1–2.
Section 144 provides that “[w]henever a party to any proceeding in a district court
makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is
pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse
party, such judge shall proceed no further. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 144. Section 455(a) requires
disqualification of “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States . . . in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Id. § 455(a).
Section 144 requires the moving party to prove actual bias. Disqualification under
§ 144 “places a substantial burden on the moving party to demonstrate that the judge is
not impartial.” In re McCarthey, 368 F.3d 1266, 1269 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that
the judge does not have to prove that she is impartial). The moving party’s “affidavit of
personal bias and prejudice need be timely, sufficient, and accompanied by a certificate
of good faith of counsel.” See id. Section 144’s explicit timeliness requirement requires
that the affidavit “be filed promptly after the allegedly disqualifying facts are
discovered.” Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 938 (10th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
Under § 455(a), what “‘matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its
appearance.’” Barnett v. Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., 956 F.3d
1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994)).
Therefore, the “‘test under § 455(a) is not whether the judge believes he or she is capable
of impartiality,’” but rather “whether a reasonable person, fully informed of the relevant
facts, would ‘question the judge’s impartiality.’” Id. (quoting Burke v. Regalado, 935
F.3d 960, 1054 (10th Cir. 2019)). “Section 455 establishes ‘an objective standard.’”
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United States v. Wells, 873 F.3d 1241, 1251 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mathis v. Huff &
Puff Trucking, Inc., 787 F.3d 1297, 1310 (10th Cir. 2015)); see also United States v.
Martinez, 92 F.4th 1213, 1257–58 (10th Cir. 2024). The Tenth Circuit reviews for abuse
of discretion the denial of a motion to disqualify a trial judge based on the appearance of
partiality under § 455(a). Barnett, 956 F.3d at 1239 (citing Burke, 935 F.3d at 1052).
Importantly, judges have “‘a strong duty to sit,’ and § 455 must not be so broadly
construed as to make recusal mandated ‘upon the merest unsubstantiated suggestion of
personal bias or prejudice.’” United States v. Mobley, 971 F.3d 1187, 1205 (10th Cir.
2020) (quoting Wells, 873 F.3d at 1251).
Ms. Waddle’s Motion fails to satisfy the standards of §§ 144 and 455. Ms. Waddle
has not submitted an affidavit in support of her Motion as required under § 144. See 28
U.S.C. § 144 (“The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or
prejudice exists . . . and shall be accompanied by a certificate . . . stating that it is made in
good faith.”); see also Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting that
Ҥ 144 requires an affidavit of bias and prejudice, which must be timely, sufficient, made
by a party, and accompanied by a certificate of good faith”); United States v. Burger, 964
F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Under § 144, the affidavits filed in support of recusal
are strictly construed against the affiant and there is a substantial burden on the moving
party to demonstrate that the judge is not impartial.”). That ground standing alone is
sufficient to deny her Motion under § 144.
Additionally, Ms. Waddle’s disagreement with the Court’s prior orders does not
present a sufficient basis for recusal. “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a
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valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Similarly, in
Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 565 (10th Cir. 1997), the plaintiff there—like Ms.
Waddle here—did not allege any extrajudicial source of bias but instead argued that the
district court “ignored facts” purportedly showing a lack of impartiality. Id. The Tenth
Circuit rejected that contention, explaining that the district court had considered the
plaintiff’s arguments but “found them insufficient.” Id. Concluding that the plaintiff’s
assertions were “without merit,” the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district judge had
not abused his discretion in denying the motion to recuse. Id. The Court’s prior rulings
were based on the applicable law and record before it, and not on any personal bias or
prejudice.
Finally, the Court has inherent authority to manage its own docket “so as to
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases,” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370
U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962), and the Court must guard against its docket becoming
unmanageable. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (explaining the Federal Rules “should be
construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”); 11(b); and
12(f). The filing restrictions imposed by this Court apply equally to all the parties in this
case, and they are not a complete bar. A party may seek leave of Court to file if they
deem a filing is necessary, and the restrictions will end once Ms. Waddle files her
amended complaint. See [Doc. No. 25 at 3].
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Motion [Doc. No. 26]. Ms.
Waddle shall file her amended complaint on or by November 18, 2025, in accordance
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with the Court’s October 28, 2025 Order. [Doc. No. 25].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 4th day of November 2025.
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