Singh v. Johnson et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MANDEEP SINGH, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-26-558-SLP
)
JOSHUA JOHNSON, et al., 	)
)
Respondents.1 )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Mandeep Singh, a noncitizen2 and Indian national proceeding with
counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), Doc. 1, challenging under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).
United States District Judge Scott L. Palk referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate
Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Doc. 3. The undersigned set an
expedited briefing schedule, Doc. 7, and the Petition is at issue.3 For the reasons set forth
1 Markwayne Mullin was confirmed as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
on March 23, 2026. He replaces Kristi Noem and is substituted as the proper respondent
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). Todd Blanche was announced as Acting
Attorney General on April 2, 2026. 	He replaces Pamela Bondi and is substituted as the
proper respondent pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
2 Unless quoting, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020)
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
3 On March 23, 2026, the undersigned ordered Respondents to respond to the Petition not
later than March 30, 2026. 	Doc. 7. 	The undersigned also ordered Petitioner to file any
optional reply within three business days. Id. Respondents timely filed a response, Doc.
10, making Petitioner’s reply due not later than April 2, 2026. On April 5, 2026, Petitioner
purported to file an untimely reply brief. Doc. 11. Petitioner did not seek leave to file out
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below, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant the Petition, Doc. 1, in part and
order Respondents to provide Petitioner a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days or otherwise to release him if there is no hearing within that time.
I. 	Background
Petitioner, a citizen of India, entered the United States on May 5, 2018, without
inspection or admission near Calexico, California. Pet. at 19; Doc. 1-1 at 2. On January 22,
2026, ICE detained Petitioner. 	Pet. at 19. 	On the same day, ICE placed Petitioner into
removal proceedings before the Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a through
the issuance of a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) and charged him with being inadmissible
• 	under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United
States without inspection, and
• 	under § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an immigrant who is not in possession
of a valid unexpired visa or other valid entry document.
Pet. at 19; Doc. 1-1 at 5. At some point after his detention, Petitioner filed an application
for asylum, which remains pending. Pet. at 19.
ICE is detaining Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Resp. at 6. The
Petition does not state whether Petitioner has requested or been denied a bond hearing, but
such a request would be futile because all Immigration Judges (“IJs”) are subject to the
binding precedent of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I & N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which
holds that those who entered the country without admission or parole are ineligible for a
bond hearing. See Pet. at 19.
of time or otherwise explain why his reply brief is untimely. 	Nonetheless, Petitioner’s
reply brief would have no impact on the recommended relief.
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When Petitioner filed his Petition, he was detained at Diamondback Correctional
Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. 	Id. at 9. 	He remains detained there. 	See ICE Online
Detainee Locator System, at https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results (last visited Apr. 6,
2026).
II. 	Petitioner’s Claims
Petitioner asserts two counts in his Petition.
• 	Count 	I: 	Violation 	of 	the 	Immigration 	and 	Nationality 	Act
(“INA”). 	Petitioner 	alleges 	his 	continued 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2) is unlawful and violates the INA because that provision
does not apply to those, like him, who previously entered the country
and have been residing in the United States before being apprehended
and placed in removal proceedings. Pet. at 20.
• 	Count II: Violation of Due Process. Petitioner alleges his continued
detention without an individualized bond redetermination hearing
violates his right to due process and that Respondents revoked his
previous release in an arbitrary manner, which violates his right to
procedural due process. Id. at 20-22.
He asks the Court to “issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release
Petitioner or, in the alternative, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) within five days.” Pet. at 22. Petitioner also requests an award of attorney fees
and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).4 Id.
III. 	Standard of Review
To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 	28 U.S.C.
4 To the extent Petitioner may be entitled to EAJA fees and costs as a prevailing party, he
must seek those separately after a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Thus, the
Court need not address this request at this juncture.
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§ 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).
IV. 	Analysis
A. 	Section 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention.
The two sections of the INA at issue are 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. 	Section
1225(a)(1) describes an “applicant for admission” as “an alien present in the United States
who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” Id. § 1225(a)(1) (citation
modified). 	Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229a.” 	If Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” and
“seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A), he is not entitled to a bond hearing. 	On the
other hand, Section 1226(a) more generally authorizes detention of a noncitizen pending
removal proceedings and entitles the noncitizen to a bond hearing. 	See Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (“Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under
§ 1226(a) 	receive 	bond 	hearings 	at 	the 	outset 	of 	detention.”) 	(citing 	8 	C.F.R.
§§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1))).
Petitioner argues he is being held in violation of the INA and § 1225(b)(2) does not
apply to him because he had “previously entered the country and [has] been residing in the
United States.” Pet. at 20. Petitioner contends § 1226(a) “expressly applies to people who,
like [him], are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United States without
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inspection.” 	Pet. at 9. 	According to Petitioner, his detention under § 1225(b)(2) is
“contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency practice” and he is
entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a). Pet. at 9. Respondents contend Petitioner is an
“applicant for admission” and therefore properly detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Resp. at
6. 	Further, Respondents claim (1) § 1225(b)(2)(A) is not limited only to noncitizens
“arriving” in the United States, (2) § 1226(a) is reserved for those who do not fall within
the confines of § 1225(b)(2)(A), (3) any overlap between the two provisions does not
undermine ICE’s interpretation of the two statutes, and (4) “applicants for admission” must
necessarily be “seeking admission.” Resp. at 6-12.
The undersigned has reviewed the statutory text, Congressional intent, legislative
history, and § 1226(a)’s application for the past three decades, as well as numerous recent
cases addressing this exact issue. For the reasons stated below, and adopting this Court’s
reasoning in Lopez v. Corecivic Cimmaron Corr. Facility, No. CIV-25-1175-SLP, 2026
WL 165490, at *3-7 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2026), the undersigned recommends the Court
grant the Petition in part to the extent Petitioner seeks a bond hearing under § 1226(a).
First, the INA limits the scope of the term “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A)
so that section does not apply to noncitizens living in the United States when detained.
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “only applies when a noncitizen ‘applicant for admission’ is actively
‘seeking admission’ into the United States.” 	Valdez v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1250-R, 2025
WL 3709021, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2025). If all “applicants for admission” are also
“seeking admission,” then § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s inclusion of the phrase “seeking admission”
would be redundant and superfluous. 	Lopez, 2026 WL 165490, at *4. 	The undersigned
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best 	understands 	mandatory 	detention 	under 	§ 	1225(b)(2)(A) 	to 	apply 	to 	arriving
noncitizens actively seeking admission at or near the border or port of entry—not those
like Petitioner who have resided in the United States for years and were not arrested when
trying to cross the border.
In addition, the legislative history and recent amendment of § 1226 indicate that
section applies to noncitizens who previously entered without inspection and were residing
in the United States when apprehended. Notably, after passage of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the Department of Justice explained
that “despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been
admitted or paroled . . . will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 	Inspection
and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal
Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (citation
modified). Further, Congress’ recent amendment to § 1226 mandating detention for certain
criminal noncitizens renders Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) superfluous.
Finally, this Court, Chief Judge DeGiusti, Judge Jones, Judge Russell, Judge
Heaton, and myriad district courts have recently applied § 1226(a) to govern detention of
noncitizens like Petitioner.5 See Norboev v. Lyons, No. CIV-26-107-SLP, 2026 WL
5 See, e.g., Lopez, 2026 WL 165490, at *7; Ramirez Rojas v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1236-HE,
2026 WL 94641, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 13, 2026); Valdez, 2025 WL 3709021, at *3; Colin
v. Holt, CIV-25-1189-D, 2025 WL 3645176, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2025); Urbina
Garcia v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1225-J, 2025 WL 3516071, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2025).
Two Judges in the District have applied § 1225(b)(2)(A) to a similarly situated petitioner.
See Gutierrez Sosa v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1257-PRW, 2026 WL 36344, at *3 (W.D. Okla.
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497800, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 23, 2026) (finding § 1226(a) governs a similarly situated
petitioner’s detention and “join[ing] the decision reached by the vast majority of district
courts in this judicial district, in district courts within the Tenth Circuit and across the
country to have addressed the same issues as those raised by Petitioner”). This Court has
found the plain language, legislative history, and past immigration practices all support a
finding that “Petitioner’s detention is not governed by §1225(b)(2).” 	Lopez, 2026 WL
165490, at *7. The undersigned agrees with this Court’s reasoning, the majority of Judges
in this District, and the great weight of authority to conclude Petitioner falls within the
confines of § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2)(A). This conclusion is also in accord with the
Seventh Circuit, which rejected the statutory interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) as urged by
Respondents. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061
(7th Cir. 2025). But see Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 819258, at
*3-6 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026) (agreeing with Respondents’ interpretation); Buenrostro-
Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 501-08 (5th Cir. 2026) (same).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the Court apply § 1226(a) to govern
Petitioner’s current detention. 	The Court should grant the Petition in part and order
Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) before a neutral IJ
within five business days or otherwise release him if he does not have a lawful bond hearing
within that period.
Jan. 6, 2026); Alvarado Montoya, No. CIV-25-01231-JD, 2025 WL 3733302, at *12 (W.D.
Okla. Dec. 26, 2025).
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B. 	The Court should decline to address Petitioner’s due process claim.
Petitioner also argues his continued detention without a bond hearing violates his
rights to due process. Pet. at 20-22. If the Court grants Petitioner’s requested relief for a
bond hearing under § 1226(a), the undersigned recommends the Court decline to decide
the merits of the due process claim based on his continued detention. 	See, e.g., Colin v.
Holt, CIV-25-1189-D, 2025 WL 3645176, at *6 n.3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2025) (declining
to decide the merits of Petitioner’s due process claim when granting a bond hearing
pursuant to § 1226(a)).6
V. 	Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT in
part the Petition for habeas relief by ordering Respondents to provide Petitioner with a
bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five business days or otherwise release
Petitioner if he has not received a lawful bond hearing within that period. 	The undersigned
6 Some Magistrate Judges in this District, including the undersigned, have started
considering whether similarly situated petitioners’ detentions violate due process when
those petitioners raise such a claim and seek a bond hearing specifically requesting the
government bear the burden at such hearing to establish the petitioner’s risk of flight or
danger. Here, the Petition neither requested burden shifting at a bond hearing nor alleged
Petitioner was entitled to burden shifting as someone previously released and re-detained
without due process. 	Petitioner argued in his untimely reply brief that the government
should bear the burden of proof at any future bond hearing, but that argument was too late
and improperly raised for the first time in his reply. See SCO Grp., Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 578
F.3d 1201, 1226 (10th Cir. 2009) (recognizing “general rule” “that a party waives issues
and arguments raised [] for the first time” in a reply brief); Stillwater Designs & Audio Inc.
v. Klein, No. CIV-24-784-SLP, 2025 WL 365651, at *2 n.7 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 31, 2025)
(declining to consider arguments raised for the first time in reply). 	As such, any relief
recommended in this case as the result of a due process violation would be limited to the
same relief recommended for the INA violation.
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further recommends the Court order Respondents to certify compliance by filing a status
report within seven business days of the Court’s order.
The parties are advised of their right to object to this Report and Recommendation.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed not later than April 13, 2026. See id.
§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	If a party wishes to respond to the other party’s
objections, such response must be filed not later than April 16, 2026. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2). 	Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate review of the factual and
legal issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation. 	See Moore v. United States,
950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 6 th day of April, 2026.
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