Aghaei-Moghanloo v. Warden of Diamondback Correctional Facility et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
AMIR AGHAEI-MOGHANLOO,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN OF DIAMONDBACK
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et
al.,
Respondents.
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Case No. CIV-26-1524-J
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Amir Aghaei-Moghanloo, a noncitizen proceeding pro se,1 filed
a petition seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.2
United States District Judge Bernand M. Jones, II referred this matter to the
undersigned 	Magistrate 	Judge 	for 	proceedings 	consistent with 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 4. Respondents filed a response to the petition, Doc.
11, and Petitioner filed a reply, Doc. 14. So the matter is at issue.
1 	This 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	“uses 	the 	term 	‘noncitizen’ 	as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578
n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)). This Court construes “[a] pro se
litigant’s pleadings . . . liberally,” holding them “to a less stringent standard
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
2 	Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated.
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For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the Court
grant the petition and order Respondents to release Petitioner under an
appropriate order of supervision.
I. 	Factual background and Petitioner’s claims.
Petitioner is a citizen of Iran who entered the United States on or around
June 25, 2024. Doc. 11, at 2 & Ex. 1, at 1. The record contains conflicting
accounts of Petitioner’s entry date. Id.; Doc. 11, Ex. 3, at 2 (Deportation Officer
Aaron Nation states in his declaration that Petitioner “entered the United
States at or near Eagle Pass, Texas, on or about November 2, 2024.”). On
November 2, 2024, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a
Notice charging Petitioner as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).
Doc. 11, at 2 & Ex. 2. On November 6, 2024, a Border Patrol Agent found
Petitioner inadmissible as charged and ordered him removed from the United
States. Id. Ex. 2.
On November 13, 2024, DHS referred Petitioner for criminal prosecution
based on his improper entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325. Id. Ex. 3, at 2. On
February 13, 2025, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the improper entry charge, and
the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas sentenced
him to 104 days’ confinement. Id. Ex. 4.
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On February 19, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
took custody of Petitioner. Id. Ex. 3, at 2. For the first time, Petitioner
expressed a fear of removal to Iran. Id. Ex. 3, at 2. On March 3, 2025, Petitioner
participated in a credible fear interview with an asylum officer from the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Id. On March 7, 2025,
the USCIS officer entered a negative credible fear finding, which Petitioner
appealed. Id. On March 21, 2025, an Immigration Judge (IJ) vacated the
negative 	credible 	fear 	finding. 	Id. 	On 	March 	27, 	2025, 	ICE 	cancelled
Petitioner’s prior expedited removal order and issued a Notice to Appear,
maintaining its prior allegation that Petitioner was inadmissible. Id. Ex. 3, at
3.
On August 6, 2025, an IJ ordered Petitioner removed after conducting a
merits hearing. Doc. 11, Ex. 1, at 19-20. On September 2, 2025, Petitioner
appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Id. Ex.
5. On April 10, 2026, the BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, making his
removal order administratively final. Id. Ex. 6; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1 (“An
order of removal . . . shall become final . . . [u]pon dismissal of an appeal by the
Board of Immigration Appeals[.]”). Petitioner did not appeal the BIA’s order.
Since his attempt to enter the United States in 2024, Petitioner has
remained in detention. Doc. 14, at 1. The Government is currently detaining
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him at the Diamondback Correctional Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. Doc. 1,
at 1.3 On June 23, 2026, Petitioner filed his habeas petition in this Court. Id.
II. 	Petitioner’s claims.
Petitioner claims: (1) his continued detention violates Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678 (2001), and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
because his deportation to Iran is not “significantly likely in the reasonabl[y]
foreseeable future”; and (2) his detention violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment because his detention is “unlawful, [has] deprived [him]
of [his] liberty[,] and it has caused [him] significant emotional, physical, and
financial harm.” Doc. 1, at 7.
III. 	Standard of review.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in
custody upon the legality of that custody, and ... the traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
3 	Because Petitioner no longer appears on ICE’s detainee locator website,
the undersigned ordered Respondents to update the Court on Petitioner’s
detention status. Doc. 15. On September 25, 2026, Respondents notified the
Court that Petitioner remains detained at the Diamondback Correctional
Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. Doc. 16.
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States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are
properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d
1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687-88).
IV. 	Petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief.
As of April 10, 2026, Petitioner has a final removal order. See Doc. 11,
Ex. 6; 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a). So his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231,
which provides that “when a [noncitizen] is ordered removed, the Attorney
General shall remove the [noncitizen] from the United States within a period
of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). The ninety-day period is known as the
“removal period” and detention during this period is mandatory. See id.
§ 1231(a)(2)(a) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain
the [noncitizen].”). The “basic purpose” of § 1231 is “assuring the [noncitizen’s]
presence at the moment of removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. But “[a]s the
possibility of removal becomes remote,” this purpose “drops out.” Roble v.
Pontesso, 90 F. App’x 334, 336 (10th Cir. 2004).
After the removal period, ICE has discretion either to further detain or
to release under supervision inadmissible or criminal noncitizens. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(3), (6); see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.1. Further detention, however, may not
be “indefinite.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699.
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In Zadvydas, the Court recognized six months as a “presumptively
reasonable period of detention” following a noncitizen’s removal order to allow
the government to accomplish a noncitizen’s removal. Id. at 699-701. “After
this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there
is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.
at 701.
In 	their 	response 	to 	the 	petition, 	Respondents 	argue 	Petitioner’s
prolonged detention claims are “premature” because Petitioner’s detention has
not exceeded six months. Doc. 11, at 3. The Court should reject this argument
because, as of this date, Respondents have detained Petitioner for more than
six months following his final removal order. See, e.g., Momennia v. Bondi, No.
CIV-25-1067-J, 	2025 	WL 	3011896, 	at 	*9 	(W.D. 	Okla. 	Oct. 	15, 	2025)
(recommending granting the petitioner’s Zadvydas claim when the petition
was filed a few days before the six-month period and by the time the report
and recommendation was issued it had been over six months), adopted, 2025
WL 3006045, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 27, 2025) (“It is undisputed that Petitioner
has been detained over six months.”); see also Lee v. Crawford, No. 25-cv-535,
2026 WL 745263, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 27, 2026) (“Although the Petition may
have been filed before the six-month mark, the Court’s review is not frozen in
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time as of the date of filing. Federal courts routinely consider post-filing
developments in habeas proceedings challenging immigration detention.”),
adopted, 2026 WL 738591 (E.D. Va. Mar. 16, 2026).
Respondents 	alternatively 	argue 	in 	their 	response 	that 	Petitioner’s
continued detention is “reasonable” under § 1231 because his removal is
“imminent.” Doc. 11, at 4-6. The Court should also reject this argument.
Section 1231(a)(6) authorizes “detention only for a period consistent with
the purpose of effectuating removal.” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 384-85
(2005). Petitioner argues in his reply that his removal is not likely “because:
(1) The government does not have diplomatic relations with Iran (2) The
government asserts using a 3 rd country to facilitate removal which they have
failed to gain any traction (3) ICE has made no progress in removing [him] to
a third country for over 3 months[] (4) Further more Iran is in turmoil with the
current war with the United States and Israel and there being no end in sight,
the removal becomes not foreseeable in the future.” Doc. 14, at 1.
The Court should conclude Petitioner has provided the Court with “good
reason 	to 	believe 	that 	there 	is 	no 	significant 	likelihood” 	of 	Respondents
removing him in the reasonably foreseeable future. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
Attempting to establish the reasonableness of Petitioner’s detention,
Respondents submit that Petitioner’s “removal to Iran faces no substantial
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issues” because he has an Iranian passport which is valid through April 24,
2029. Doc. 11, at 4 & Ex. 3, at 3. They also assert that, as of May 18, 2026, the
Government has successfully removed over 131 Iranian nationals to Iran. Id.
Ex. 3, at 3. Plus, “other third countries” are willing to accept Iranian nationals
“when necessary.” Doc. 11, at 5 & Ex. 3, at 3.
Petitioner disputes Respondents’ evidence, stating “[a]ll attempts made
by ICE to retrieve [his] travel documents remain futile.” Doc. 14, at 1. And
there 	is 	no 	“pending 	travel 	document 	request” 	to 	consider 	because 	“the
government 	has 	been 	sitting 	on 	their 	hands 	while 	[he] 	continues 	to 	be
detained.” Id. at 2. Finally, Petitioner asserts that due to the ongoing “war with
Iran,” “the Government has not been able to remove any Iranian Nationals.”
Id.
Although Respondents do not confirm it in this case, in the case of
another Iranian national in this Court, Respondents conceded in a court filing
that “[a]s of May 21, 2026, all removals to Iran are paused.” Sani v. Figueroa,
No. CIV-26-970-JD, 2026 WL 2533037, at *9 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 27, 2026). So,
Respondents have paused removals to Iran for an indefinite period, they have
identified no third country potentially willing to accept Petitioner or provided
evidence of concrete arrangements for his removal to such a country. And, they
have obtained no travel documents for Petitioner during his many months of
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detention. The Court should therefore find that Petitioner has provided good
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future and Respondents have not presented sufficient
evidence to rebut that showing. See, e.g., Sani, 2026 WL 2533037, at *9-10; see
also Momennia, 2025 WL 3011896, at *10 (“[M]ere intent to find a third
country,” absent “specific communications between the United States and an
identified country” is “too speculative to permit indefinite detention.”).
Petitioner’s removal to Iran in the reasonably foreseeable future is not
likely under the circumstances of this case. See, e.g., Bahadorani v. Bondi, No.
25-6177, Doc. 36, at *3 (10th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026) (remanding matter to the
district court to “receive evidence and make findings of fact regarding the
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future given the
recent and current armed conflict between the United States and Iran”). So
§ 1231(a) does not authorize his continued indefinite detention. See, e.g., Clark,
543 U.S. at 385 (“[T]he Secretary may detain aliens only for the period
reasonably 	necessary 	to 	bring 	about 	their 	removal.”). 	Accordingly, 	the
undersigned recommends the Court grant Petitioner’s habeas petition and
order his immediate release subject to an appropriate order of supervision. See,
e.g., Bui v. Bondi, No. 26-91-J, 2026 WL 788947, at *5-6 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 20,
2026) (ordering the petitioner’s immediate release “subject to an appropriate
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Order of Supervision” after finding a due process violation based on the
petitioner’s prolonged detention with no reasonable likelihood of removal to
Vietnam).
V. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
grant Petitioner’s habeas petition and order his immediate release subject to
an 	appropriate 	order 	of 	supervision. 	The 	Court 	should 	further 	order
Respondents to certify compliance by filing a status report within five business
days of the Court’s order.
The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to
this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by October 21,
2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72.4 The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to make timely
4 	Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has
reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition (noting that
rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas corpus
petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings under
Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484 F. App’x
227, 231 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may be
applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that “while the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas proceedings, they
need not be in every instance–particularly where strict application would
undermine the habeas review process.”).
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objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate
review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United
States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation
disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the
captioned matter.
ENTERED this 14th day of October, 2026.
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