White v. Columbia Sportswear Company

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
KAYLENE WHITE, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.
COLUMBIA SPORTSWEAR COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:24-cv-00006-SB
FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION
BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
In early 2022, Plaintiff Kaylene White (“White”), a then-employee of Columbia
Sportswear Company (“Columbia”), requested but did not receive a religious exemption to
Columbia’s mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. After Columbia terminated White for
failing to get vaccinated against COVID-19, White sued Columbia under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e(j), and its Oregon counterpart, OR .
R EV. S TAT. § 659A.030. White alleges that Columbia discriminated against her on the basis of
her religion, in violation of Title VII and Oregon Revised Statutes (“ORS”) § 659A.030, by
failing reasonably to accommodate her request for an exemption to Columbia’s vaccination
requirement.
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Columbia now moves for summary judgment on both of White’s religious discrimination
claims, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56(a). The Court has federal
question jurisdiction over White’s Title VII claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, supplemental
jurisdiction over White’s state law claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and not all parties have
consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons
explained below, the Court recommends that the district judge grant Columbia’s motion for
summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. 	FACTS
“The following facts [are] either undisputed at summary judgment or, if disputed, are
recounted in the light most favorable to [White], the non-moving party.” Rice v. Morehouse, 989
F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Silloway v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 117 F.4th 1070, 1072
(9th Cir. 2024) (giving the nonmovants the “benefit of factual disputes and reasonable inferences
from the evidence” (citing Tuuamalemalo v. Greene, 946 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2019) (per
curiam))).
Columbia is an Oregon corporation that designs and manufactures outdoor apparel and
footwear and maintains its headquarters in Washington County. (Decl. Richelle Luther Supp.
Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Luther Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 29; Def.’s Corporate Disclosure Statement
at 1, ECF No. 7.) White began working for Columbia as an executive assistant in late 2014. (See
Decl. Karen O’Connor Supp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“O’Connor Decl.”) ¶ 2 & Ex. 1 at 15-16,
ECF No. 31, attaching White’s job description; Dep. Kaylene White (“White Dep.”) 89:17-19,
Feb. 1, 2025, ECF No. 31-1 at 1-14, reporting that White started working for Columbia in 2014;
First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 5, 12, ECF No. 23 & Def.’s Answer & Affirmative Defs. ¶¶ 5, 11,
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ECF No. 24, admitting that Columbia terminated White after approximately seven years of
employment).
In her role as an executive assistant, White provided administrative and “special project
support” to, among others, David Lawner (“Lawner”), who served at all relevant times as
Columbia’s Senior Vice President (“SVP”) of Global Retail and White’s direct supervisor.
(White Dep. 39:1-22, 58:9-11, 89:4-23; O’Connor Decl. Ex. 1 at 15-16.) White’s essential job
duties consisted of (1) performing “critical and confidential administrative support” like “phone
call management, calendar management, expense reporting, scheduling meetings, and organizing
office files and materials,” (2) providing support (i.e., “coordinating materials, travel,
presentations, meetings, etc.”) to Columbia’s “general Retail Operations teams and those [who]
interact with the Retail Operations teams on critical projects,” (3) working with Columbia’s
“senior executives to provide support for budgeting, creating presentations, scheduling, and
preparing meeting rooms[,] and working on special projects as requested,” (4) scheduling
appointments, “coordinat[ing] calendars,” and keeping “outlook and contact lists updated and in
sync with smart phone[s] and paper calendar[s],” (5) coordinating “executive travel
arrangements, hotel and car accommodations, and planning of itineraries,” and (6) coordinating
“onsite and offsite meetings (large and small) including attendees, facility equipment needs,
catering, etc.” (See White Dep. 39:23-41:12, 43:14-44:15 & O’Connor Decl. Ex. 1 at 15-16,
attaching and agreeing on White’s “Job Description’s “Essential Functions/Responsibilities”)
(simplified).
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Columbia’s headquarters-based employees worked
“almost exclusively in-person” because many of these employees’ “roles include responsibilities
that must be performed physically at the office” and Columbia considers “face-to-face
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collaboration” and “in-person interaction . . . within and across . . . departments” to be “integral
part[s] of the [c]ompany’s culture” and drivers of “creativity, resourcefulness, and innovation.”
(Luther Decl. ¶ 4; Decl. Rebecca Green Supp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Green Decl.”) ¶¶ 3, 13,
ECF No. 30.) White’s executive assistant role was based out of Columbia’s headquarters. (See
White Dep. 30:5-31:14, 32:2-33:18, 39:1-22, 43:2-44:15, 87:16-88:10, 89:4-19, discussing when
“everybody at headquarters [went] home” because of the pandemic and White’s returns to and
White’s team’s work at “the office” and Columbia’s “Summit Building”; see also Green Decl.
¶ 15, reporting that White’s “former role has been performed onsite, in-person since [White’s]
departure”).
In fact, none of Columbia’s executive assistants worked remotely before the pandemic,
with the exception of infrequent travel to regional meetings. (See White Dep. 42:12-43:13,
87:16-23, estimating that White traveled to such meetings “maybe three or four times” during
her employment). White’s typical pre-pandemic workday consisted of “working through emails,
organizing calendars, correcting conflicts, working with other [executive assistants,]” “trying to
coordinate [her supervisor] being at the corporate office for multiple meetings” and “factoring in
travel time,” ensuring that her supervisor received the information that he needed in advance of
meetings, assisting with the creation and organization of presentations, and “all of the other
things that happen[ed] in the middle . . on [her] floor” like “somebody walk[ing] up and say[ing]
the copier is not working, the copier’s out of toner, I can’t find . . . this [item or] I don’t know
where this [item] is [located], who do I call for this [issue, or] how do I open this program[.]”
(Id. 43:14-44:15.)
Nevertheless, White believed she could have performed her job duties on a full-time,
remote basis, in large part because the executive that she primarily supported (Lawner) only
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visited Portland a “few weeks at a time for various larger meetings” and “[m]ost of [her] team,”
namely, “all of the store managers, [and] all of the regional directors, were always remote
[workers] from the moment [she] began [working for Columbia] in 2014.” (Id. 87:24-88:23; see
also id. 30:5-33:18, recounting that White’s “team” members were “predominately . . . store
manager[s], regional managers, and people [who] were remote work[ers] from corporate” during
the pandemic).
“In March 2020, the United States confronted a threat unlike any in recent times: the
COVID-19 pandemic.” Seaplane Adventures, LLC v. County of Marin, 71 F.4th 724, 726 (9th
Cir. 2023); see also Miller v. City of Scottsdale, 88 F.4th 800, 802 (9th Cir. 2023) (recognizing
the same). In response to the pandemic, Oregon’s then-Governor Kate Brown (the “Governor”)
issued Executive Order (“EO”) 20-03 on March 8, 2020, describing the “circumstances that
existed at that time” in and around Oregon and declaring a state of emergency.1 See Elkhorn
Baptist Church v. Brown, 466 P.3d 30, 35-37 (Or. 2020); see also Off. of the Or. Governor,
Exec. Order No. 20-03, Declaration of Emergency Due to Coronavirus (COVID-19) Outbreak in
Oregon (Mar. 8, 2020), https://www.oregon.gov/gov/eo/eo_20-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP7L-
3C9P].
“As the coronavirus spread across the country, the Governor issued additional [EOs in
March 2020].” Elkhorn Baptist Church, 466 P.3d at 37. The Governor’s additional EOs included
1 The Court takes judicial notice of the outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic and
Governor’s EOs. See D’Augusta v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 117 F.4th 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2024)
(taking judicial notice of the “outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic” as a “historical
event”); Jeffery v. City of New York, 113 F.4th 176, 183 n.7 (2d Cir. 2024) (observing that a
court “may take judicial notice of [EOs]”); cf. FED. R. EVID. 201(c)(1) (noting that a court “may
take judicial notice on its own”); Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, No. 3:20-cv-01035-
SI, 2022 WL 72124, at *4 & n.2 (D. Or. Jan. 7, 2022) (taking judicial notice of an EO on the
court’s own).
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(1) “EO 20-05, which prohibited ‘large social, spiritual, and recreational gatherings of 250
people or more,’” (2) “EO 20-07, which reduced the number of persons permitted at such
gatherings to 25,” and (3) EO 20-12, which was “designated as the ‘Stay Home, Save Lives’
order,” “require[d] ‘social distancing’ at non-essential social and recreational gatherings,” and
“order[ed] the closure of certain businesses and impose[d] social distancing requirements on
others.” Id.
Responding to the Governor’s EOs and its “concerns about employee safety and health,”
Columbia closed its retail stores in mid-March 2020, and “transitioned [its] headquarters-based
employees to primarily remote work.” (Luther Decl. ¶ 6; White Dep. 30:5-15.) Columbia did so
because its Senior Leadership Team (“SLT”) convened and determined that it would be difficult
(if not impossible) to continue “in-person work . . . in close proximity spaces such as [its] office
buildings” and comply with the Governor’s EOs and then-current public health guidance related
to the spread of COVID-19, and thus the “best way” to “protect [its] people was to send them
home and navigate the transition to remote work as best [it] could.” (Luther Decl. ¶ 6; see also
Green Decl. ¶ 4, “[R]emote work was necessary at the time to mitigate the risks associated with
COVID-19.”).
After Columbia closed its retail stores, White spent a few days finalizing her preparations
for Columbia’s annual conference and then traveled to Idaho to be closer to family. (See White
Dep. 30:1-31:19, estimating that White left for Idaho on March 19, 2020, and noting that
Lawner, who was “already en route . . . to the East Coast,” called to ask “why [White was] sitting
in Oregon” and told White to “go be with [her] grandbaby”). White worked remotely from that
point forward and only returned to Oregon on four occasions (i.e., three times to prepare for “big
meetings” from a “home office in [her] Tigard apartment” and once to “move [her] things from
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the Summit Building to the corporate office[,] as [Columbia] instructed” her to do). (See id. 30:5-
15, 31:1-32:14, 33:6-18, 82:12-16; 83:15-84:22, confirming as much and that White filed taxes
in Oregon through 2022 and suggesting that White moved to Idaho at an unspecified time
thereafter).
During the pandemic, Richelle Luther (“Luther”) and Rebecca Green (“Green”) served as
Columbia’s Vice President (“VP”) of Corporate Affairs and Chief Human Resources (“HR”)
Officer and Senior Director of HR. (See Luther Decl. ¶ 2, noting that Luther received a
promotion in “February 2023”; Green Decl. ¶ 2, stating that Green has served in her current “role
since July 2014”). According to Luther and Green, Columbia’s transition to remote work
presented its own “distinct challenges,” including “diminished workplace culture,” reduced
“collaboration, teamwork, and connection,” “social isolation and mental health issues,”
technology-related limitations, an “inability to work with physical product during the product
creation process,” and “morale issues relating to employees who simply needed to be at the
physical worksite to perform their jobs.” (Green Decl. ¶ 4; see also Luther Decl. ¶ 7, describing
similar and “immediately obvious” shortcomings of remote work, which was “not a long-term
solution”).
From White’s perspective, she spent “two years [in Idaho] successfully” performing her
job duties on a “hundred percent” remote basis. (White Dep. 82:12-16, 83:21-84:6, 87:24-88:5.)
White, however, acknowledges that when Columbia’s headquarters transitioned to remote work,
Columbia was “not specifically set up to run in a virtual world,” as opposed to “more face to
face” interactions. (Id. 32:15-17.) As a result, there was a “lot of trial and error” because
employees lacked “knowledge of the virtual platforms that [could] . . . pool [up to 250] people
together.” (Id. 32:17-33:2.) For this reason and others, White “chose to come back to [work from
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her] apartment” when Columbia had “big meetings.” (See id. 31:20-33:18, adding that White
also did so because there was “a lot on the line for a lot of different people” at these “heightened
meetings”).
In August 2021, White experienced “fear and crippling anxiety” because “whispers of a
company policy and [vaccination] mandate/rule were beginning to surface.” (Id. 59:21-60-7;
O’Connor Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. 1 at 18.) Columbia implemented its Vaccine Policy four months later,
in December 2021. (See Green Decl. ¶ 7, noting that Columbia implemented its policy based on
the “federal government’s mandate for large employers” and the SLT kept the policy in place
despite the January 2022 repeal of the federal mandate because the SLT decided that it was the
“best way to protect the [c]ompany’s employees and the broader Portland-area community”;
id. ¶ 8, noting that Columbia wanted to “slow[] the spread of and help[] to eliminate the virus,”
and relied on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) post-repeal guidance
and “employees’ preferences and safety concerns, which were strongly in favor of requiring
vaccinations”).
Columbia’s Vaccine Policy required “[a]ll U.S. Portland headquarters, brand office[,] and
showroom employees [to] be fully vaccinated no later than February 15, 2022.”2 (O’Connor
Decl. Ex. 1 at 23.) Columbia’s Vaccine Policy provided that employees could satisfy this
requirement in one of two ways: (1) obtain the first of the two-dose Moderna or Pfizer vaccines
by January 4 or January 11, 2022, and second dose by February 1, 2022, or (2) obtain the single-
2 Columbia’s retail store and warehouse employees were not subject to its Vaccine Policy
because employees at these locations “interact[ed] regularly throughout the day with members of
the general public and a wide variety of external partners.” (Green Decl. ¶ 9.) Thus, unlike
Columbia’s headquarters offices’ “closed and controlled environment,” Columbia could not
“ensure that both employees and visitors were vaccinated, thereby reducing the risk to
everyone.” (Id.)
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dose Johnson & Johnson vaccine by February 1, 2022. (Id.) Columbia’s Vaccine Policy also
explained that employees who “intend[ed] to request a religious medical accommodation
[needed] to do so no later than December 28[, 2021,] to ensure enough time to go through the
accommodation process and avoid being placed on unpaid leave of absence on February
1[, 2022.]” (Id.)
Further, the Vaccine Policy stated that if employees intended but failed timely to satisfy
the initial February 1 deadline, Columbia would place the employees on unpaid leave beginning
on February 2, 2022, require exhaustion of any paid time off (“PTO”) “while [they were] on
leave” and “before going unpaid,” and terminate their employment for failing to obtain the first
of the two-dose Moderna or Pfizer vaccines or the single-dose Johnson & Johnson vaccine by
February 15, 2022, or failing to obtain their second dose of the Moderna or Pfizer vaccines by
March 15, 2022. (Id.)
Before implementing its Vaccine Policy, Columbia’s “Accommodations Team,” which
included an “Accommodations Specialist” who “reviewed all requests,” worked with outside
counsel on the creation of Columbia’s accommodation request materials and forms and the
processes under which employees submitted accommodation requests and Columbia reviewed
and routed any “difficult or [initially] denied requests” to its Compliance Program Team
Manager for further consideration. (Green Decl. ¶¶ 10-11.) Columbia’s Accommodations Team
also reviewed employees’ job descriptions and essential functions and worked with managers to
assess whether and to what extent they could perform their duties on an in-person, remote, or
hybrid basis. (Id. ¶ 11.)
In the end, Columbia’s Accommodations Team “grouped headquarters-based roles into
three categories: roles that could be performed entirely remotely, roles that could be performed
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partially remotely on a hybrid schedule, and roles that required full-time in-office work.” (Id.)
Columbia’s Accommodations Team determined that a “few jobs” could be performed full-time
on an entirely remote basis (e.g., the HR Program Manager, who can conduct remote meetings
and “designs, manages and administers total rewards and talent programs,” and whose “essential
functions are performed using computer programs and technology”). (Id. ¶ 12; see also Luther
Decl. ¶ 9, representing that “a very small percentage of [Columbia’s] roles permit fully remote
work”).
By contrast, Columbia’s Accommodations Team found that some jobs “required full-time
in-office work.” (Green Decl. ¶ 13.) One example is Columbia’s Facilities Associate, who is
“responsible for management of building operations and [the] work environment, including
maintenance, parking, security, environmental health and safety, and shipping and receiving.”
(Id.) Other examples include “Product Creation” employees, all of whom “work directly with
product on fit, materials, engineering and product development,” and whose essential functions
“require handling of physical product and materials, and working with resources and teams
onsite.” (Id.)
On January 5, 2022, White submitted her “Religious Accommodation Request Form” to
Columbia, along with a screenshot of a “[t]o whom it may concern” email from one of her
pastors, Terry Gurno (“Gurno”). (O’Connor Decl. Ex. 1 at 17-19; see also White Dep. 52:19-21,
noting that White “consulted with [Gurno] about filling out this form, because . . . [she] wanted
to be sure that [she] was reflecting scripture . . . and not saying something that [she] didn’t want
to say . . . [b]ecause [she] didn’t want to violate scripture”; id. 60:2-61:16, identifying a friend as
“another pastor person” with whom White “consulted” with respect to Columbia’s Vaccine
Policy).
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In her accommodation request, White identified and explained the “nature of the conflict”
between her “religious belief, observance, or practice” and Columbia’s mandatory vaccination
requirement:
Within my faith, God tells Christians that we are to use the sacred scriptures
(Romans 15:4) paired with convictions of the Holy Spirit (John 16:8) and our
conscience (1 Corinthians 8 & 10, Romans 14 and others) to make decisions that
are not sinful. Speaking of our conscience in relation to sin, the [B]ible states that
what is sin to one person may not be sin for another. Similarly, regarding the
COVID vaccine, there are many Christians who have taken the vaccine[,] and it is
not sinful per their conscience. However, to other Christians (such as myself), it is
sinful, and that disposition is influenced by my faith and life circumstances[.]
(O’Connor Decl. Ex. 1 at 17) (simplified).
White also cited scripture and her past medical history in addressing whether her
“religious belief or practice reject[ed] all medical care, all vaccines, or [only] the COVID-19
vaccine”:
This for me [is] very personal and has affected me internally with consistent bouts
of terrifying fear and crippling anxiety since August 2021[,] when whispers of a
company policy and mandate/rule were beginning to surface.
I have been harmed by immune therapies in the past and therefore those events
have shaped my conscience. I have personally had two major episodes of severe
reactions to immune therapies[, and in both instances,] I had no idea [that] I
would have severe/life challenging reactions by taking [them]. I have experienced
the debilitat[ing] side effects of a pharmaceutical that nearly resulted in death.
These therapies were prescribed for my benefit but [were] anything but beneficial.
I went through mental, emotional, and bodily harm from those treatments. In
addition to[] anxiety from the financial ramifications of [the] above referenced
treatments[,] I have a legitimate reason to believe any further injections that
manipulate my immune system are a sin. The scriptures are clear [about] how the
conscience of a believer[,] guided by the [H]oly [S]pirit, is individualized [and]
integra[l] to our faith.
The scriptures also show that forcing an individual to do something against their
conscience is a stumbling block to that person and in fact causes them to
transgress their faith with God and commit sin. This is the case regarding the
COVID[-19] mandate and my personal faith in God.
(Id. at 18.)
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After confirming that she had no objection to COVID-19 testing, White expanded on the
conflict between her “religious belief, observance, or practice” and Columbia’s mandatory
vaccination requirement and identified the accommodations that she believed would resolve the
conflict:
The mandate to receive the shot gives me extreme anxiety, fear, and other ill
thoughts based on my life experiences. Comparatively, characteristics of making a
godly decision in line with the fruit of the [H]oly [S]pirit is detailed in Galatians
5:22-23.
Galatians 5:22-23[:] But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience,
kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control; against such things
there is no law.
As anxiety, fear and other emotions are not fruit of the Holy [S]pirit, receiving the
shot is biblically against my faith and conscience as I see it as a sin. To keep
myself from sin, and receive God’s direction in life, I pray and ask God’s
coun[se]l on all major decisions. I have asked God for direction regarding the
current COVID vaccine requirement and the Holy Spirit has moved on my heart
and conscience that I should not accept it and trust in Him. If I were to go against
this moving of the Holy Spirit, I would be sinning and jeopardizing my
relationship with God by violating my conscience.
. . . .
[With respect to specific accommodations,] I would ask to be treated [e]qually
and [i]nclusively[,] and my [d]iversity honored at Columbia Sportswear. I did not
choose the disability of my body/mind. So I ask for support for my work to
maintain my sincerely held beliefs that FEAR is not of my GOD[,] and I will
honor Him . . . minute by minute making decisions that will not harm my faith
and conscience.
(Id. at 18-19) (simplified).
Near the end of her request, White pasted a screenshot of Gurno’s “[t]o whom it may
concern” email. (Id. at 19; see also id. at 21, suggesting that White also attached a copy of
Gurno’s email). Gurno reported that he had known White for “over [twenty] years” because
“[s]he was a member of [his] church,” he asked White to “join [the] staff [and serve] as [the
church’s] children’s pastor” because of her “genuine faith and conviction to live biblical
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principles,” White was the church’s “best team member” and exhibited a “desire to teach
children biblical principles and help them live them out,” and he was available to answer “any
questions” and “hope[d]” Columbia would grant White’s request for a “religious exemption.”
(Id. at 19.)
On January 19, 2022, Columbia’s HR representative called to inform White that
Columbia reviewed but was unable to grant her request for a religious accommodation and
remind White about Columbia’s Vaccine Policy’s terms and impending deadlines. (See White
Dep. 70:1-16, 73:3-20, confirming White’s pre-denial letter conversation with Columbia’s HR
representative).
In a follow-up denial letter dated January 21, 2022, Columbia reiterated that it was
“unable to grant [White’s] request” given the “current challenging pandemic environment” and
explained, among other things, that “regardless of whether the belief [that White] described may
fall within the definition of a religious belief that could otherwise necessitate reasonable
accommodation, the vaccine exemption [that she requested] would impose an undue burden on
[Columbia’s] ability to maintain a safe workplace for all [its] employees and customers.”
(O’Connor Decl. Ex. 1 at 22.) Columbia based its determination in part on White’s “position
entail[ing] work[] in proximity to other employees and visitors in an enclosed indoor space over
extended periods, and on the nature and state of the [then-]current COVID-19 pandemic in
[White’s] region.” (Id.) Columbia also “determined that mitigation measures (including regular
testing) would not sufficiently diminish the safety risk and would impose significant difficulty
and expense.” (Id.)
Columbia concluded by advising White that she would be “required to follow [its]
Vaccine [P]olicy as of February 1, 2022.” (Id.) Columbia also warned that if White failed to
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complete her “vaccination series” by that date, Columbia would place her on unpaid leave and
subject her to the “escalation to termination process[] outlined” in its attached Vaccine Policy.
(Id. at 22-23.)
A week later, on January 28, 2022, White submitted a “Disability/Medical Request for
Accommodation” to Columbia because Lawner, who had only recently received notice that
White was on “a list” of employees who were subject to termination under Columbia’s Vaccine
Policy, advised White and the HR department that White should do so.3 (White Dep. 70:1-73:2.)
White described her “[u]ltimate accommodation request” as an “[i]ndefinite release [from] the
vaccine requirement currently in place and any future [policy] updates . . . requir[ing] booster[s]
or additional injections,” and “[c]ompromised accommodation request” as an “extension of the
deadline for termination and/or [leave of absence] to [March 11, 2022, and] 100% remote work
with full system access to complete [her] job functions.” (O’Connor Decl. Ex. 1 at 24; see also
White Dep. 81:8-20, stating that White was “in charge . . . [of] managing . . . the biggest event
that [her] team underwent” and selected March 11, 2022 because she did not want her “team [to]
3 Although White previously alleged that Columbia discriminated against her on the basis
of disability by denying her medical accommodation request, White’s disability discrimination
claims are no longer at issue in this proceeding. See infra Part II. The Court, however, notes that
White’s medical accommodation request also concerned Columbia’s vaccination requirement
and described White’s requested accommodations in greater detail than her religious
accommodation request. The Court also notes that White acknowledged that her medical request
stemmed largely from her desire to appease Lawner and that her doctor’s staff declined to
“entertain” (or approve) it. (See White Dep. 78:3-80:24, reiterating that White submitted this
form “mostly for [Lawner]” and attached her recent COVID-19 “antigen test” results because her
doctor’s staff informed her that they would not “entertain” her request to “talk to the doctor
about [her] medical history in relation to . . . an exemption from the vaccine mandate,” she “was
not about to Google medical doctors in the [United States] that [would] sign [such] a form,” and
she recognized that “a doctor’s signature . . . was the only thing that was going to make this form
pass”).
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be punished” and this date would have allowed to her to “get [her] team through this major
meeting”).
Columbia terminated White’s employment effective February 1, 2022. (See Def.’s
Answer & Affirmative Defs. ¶ 11, reflecting that Columbia admitted it denied White’s “request
for a religious exception” and terminated White’s “employment . . . effective February 1, 2022”;
cf. FAC ¶ 12, alleging that Columbia terminated White’s employment on “February 2, 2022”).
II. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Following her termination, White filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. White
received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and then sued Columbia in federal court on January
2, 2024. (See Compl. at 1-10, ECF No. 1; Def.’s Answer & Affirmative Defs. ¶ 1, admitting that
the EEOC issued White a right-to-sue letter).
In her original complaint, White asserted religious and disability discrimination claims
against Columbia under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and parallel
state statutes. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-41.) On June 10, 2024, after filing its answer and affirmative
defenses, Columbia moved under Rule 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings. (Def.’s Answer &
Affirmative Defs. at 1-7, ECF No. 6; Def.’s Mot. J. Pleadings at 2, 5, 9, 12, ECF No. 12.)
In an Opinion and Order dated December 11, 2024, the district judge adopted this Court’s
Findings and Recommendation, and therefore granted in part and denied in part Columbia’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissed without prejudice White’s disability
discrimination claims, and declined to dismiss White’s religious discrimination claims. See
White v. Columbia Sportswear Co., No. 24-cv-00006-SB, 2024 WL 5080032, at *1, *3, *12-15
(D. Or. Oct. 28, 2024), findings and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 5077983, at *1 (D. Or.
Dec. 11, 2024).
///
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White did not attempt to cure her disability discrimination claims and instead filed an
amended complaint advancing only her religious discrimination claims. (FAC ¶¶ 17-29; cf. ECF
No. 23-1 at 1-11, attaching a redline version comparing White’s amended and original
complaints). Columbia’s motion for summary judgment followed. (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.
(“Def.’s Mot.”) at 1-33, ECF No. 28.) After the parties completed their briefing, the Court held
oral argument on Columbia’s motion for summary judgment and took the matter under
advisement. (ECF Nos. 36-37; Mot. Summ. J. Hr’g Tr. (“Hr’g Tr.”) 3:1-57:5, June 4, 2025, ECF
No. 38.)
LEGAL STANDARDS
Granting “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute of material
fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1017 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citing Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510
F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2007)); FED. R. C IV. P. 56(a). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-
48 (1986)).
“A material fact is one that is needed to prove (or defend against) a claim, as determined
by the applicable substantive law.” Simmons v. G. Arnett, 47 F.4th 927, 932 (9th Cir. 2022)
(citing Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 93 F.3d 529, 533 (9th Cir.
1996)); see also Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 771 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.
2014) (“A fact is ‘material’ only if it might affect the outcome of the case[.]” (quoting Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248)). “An issue of material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Brown v. Arizona, 82 F.4th 863,
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PAGE 17 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
874 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (quoting Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 956 F.3d 1093, 1104
(9th Cir. 2020)); see also Fresno, 771 F.3d at 1125 (“[A] dispute is ‘genuine’ only if a
reasonable trier of fact could resolve the issue in the non-movant’s favor.” (quoting Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248)).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, courts must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of, the
nonmoving party. See McNeil v. Sherwood Sch. Dist. 88J, 918 F.3d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 2019) (per
curiam) (“The court views ‘evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,’ to
determine ‘whether genuine issues of material fact exist.’” (quoting George v. Edholm, 752 F.3d
1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2014))); Brown, 82 F.4th at 874 (“When determining whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists, [courts] ‘must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party.’” (quoting Howard v. HMK Holdings, LLC, 988 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir.
2021))). In doing so, courts “may not judge credibility, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual
disputes[.]” Clarkson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 59 F.4th 424, 437 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Anderson,
477 U.S. at 255).
DISCUSSION
Columbia moves for summary judgment on White’s remaining religious discrimination
claims under federal and state law. (Def.’s Mot. at 2, 10, 11.) As explained below, the Court
concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment in
Columbia’s favor. The Court therefore recommends that the district judge grant Columbia’s
motion.
///
///
///
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I. 	APPLICABLE LAW
The Court “begin[s] by setting out the legal framework and then discuss[es] its
application in this case.” Petersen v. Snohomish Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 150 F.4th 1211, 1216 (9th
Cir. 2025).
A. 	Parallel Federal and State Law
White asserts religious discrimination claims against Columbia under Title VII and
Oregon’s parallel anti-discrimination statute, OR . R EV. S TAT. § 659A.030. (See FAC ¶¶ 17, 21-
23, 27, alleging that Columbia discriminated against White based on her religion, in violation of
Title VII and ORS § 659A.030). Both Title VII and ORS § 659A.030 “make it unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against an individual based on their religion.” Detwiler v. Mid-
Columbia Med. Ctr., 156 F.4th 886, 893 (9th Cir. 2025) (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; and
then citing OR . R EV. S TAT. § 659A.030(1)(a)). Both of these statutes also require “employers
to . . . accommodate employees’ religious beliefs unless doing so would impose an undue
hardship.” Id. (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); and then citing OR . R EV. S TAT.
§ 659A.030(1)(a)).
Oregon modeled its anti-discrimination statute after Title VII. See Moore v. Portland
Pub. Schs., 537 P.3d 544, 559 (Or. Ct. App. 2023) (“Oregon courts look to federal cases
construing Title VII . . . for guidance in construing ORS [§] 659A.030, because . . . [Oregon’s
statute] was modeled after that act.” (citing H.K. v. Spine Surgery Ctr. of Eugene, LLC, 470 P.3d
403, 406 (Or. Ct. App. 2020))). Accordingly, courts analyze parallel claims of religious
discrimination together under the Title VII framework. See Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433,
1437 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Courts construe Oregon’s statutory counterpart . . . as identical to
Title VII. . . . Accordingly, [the plaintiff’s] state statutory claim succeeds or fails with his Title
VII claim.”); Brown v. Nw. Permanente, P.C., No. 3:22-cv-00986-SI, 2023 WL 6147178, at *3
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PAGE 19 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
(D. Or. Sept. 20, 2023) (“Because [ORS §] 659A.030 is modeled after Title VII, [the] plaintiff’s
state law discrimination claim can be analyzed together with her federal discrimination claim.”)
(simplified).
B. 	Title VII Framework
Title VII make it unlawful “for an employer to . . . discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). “The word ‘religion’ is defined to ‘include all aspects of religious observance
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate [an employee] . . . without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business.’” EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 771-72 (2015) (brackets
omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). Thus, “[a] claim for religious discrimination under Title
VII can be asserted under several different theories, including . . . failure to accommodate.”
Petersen, 150 F.4th at 1216 (quoting Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th
Cir. 2004)).
White’s religious discrimination claims are based on a failure to accommodate theory.
(See FAC ¶¶ 20-21, 26-27.) The Ninth Circuit analyzes such claims under a two-part burden-
shifting framework. See Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 893 (explaining that “[c]laims of failure to
accommodate a religious objection are analyzed under a burden-shifting framework,” and the
Ninth Circuit has held that the “federal framework . . . applies to discrimination claims brought
under [ORS] § 659A.030” (first citing Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of Cal. State Controller, 63 F.4th
1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2023); and then citing Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir.
2011))); Heller, 8 F.3d at 1437-41 (noting that the Ninth Circuit “analyze[s] Title VII religious
discrimination claims under a two-part framework” and turning to the plaintiff’s parallel claims,
which he based on the theory that his employer violated Title VII and Oregon’s “statutory
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PAGE 20 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
counterpart” by failing to accommodate his “religious practice” of attending a “conversion
ceremony”).
First, a plaintiff “must establish a prima facie case[.]” Heller, 8 F.3d at 1438. To establish
a prima facie case of “religious discrimination on the basis of a failure-to-accommodate theory,”
a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) [she] had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which
conflicts with an employment duty; (2) [she] informed [her] employer of the belief and conflict;
and (3) the employer discharged, threatened, or otherwise subjected [her] to an adverse
employment action because of [her] inability to fulfill the job requirement.” Peterson, 358 F.3d
at 606 (citing Heller, 8 F.3d at 1438). “Where an employee seeks an accommodation, she
must . . . show the accommodation request also springs from a bona fide religious belief.”
Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 893 (citing Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 682-83 (9th
Cir. 1998)); see also Tiano, 139 F.3d at 682-83 (stating that “Title VII does not protect secular
preferences” and evidence adduced at a bench trial “suggest[ed] that the [accommodation] was a
personal preference, not part of a bona fide religious belief”) (citations omitted).
Second, if “a plaintiff ‘makes out a prima facie failure-to-accommodate case, the burden
then shifts to the employer to show that it initiated good faith efforts to accommodate reasonably
the employee’s religious [beliefs] or that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee
without undue hardship.” Petersen, 150 F.4th at 1216 (simplified) (quoting Peterson, 358 F.3d at
606). Undue hardship is an affirmative defense, id. at 1217 (citing Bolden-Hardge, 63 F.4th at
1224), and a fact- and context-specific inquiry. See Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 453-54, 468-
73 (2023) (clarifying Title VII’s “context-specific” “undue-hardship standard” and describing the
inquiry as “fact-specific”); Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th Cir. 2006)
(noting that “courts have had to determine [undue hardship] on a case-by-case basis” (citing
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PAGE 21 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Beadle v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589, 592 (11th Cir. 1994), abrogated on
other grounds as recognized in Bazinet v. Beth Isr. Lahey Health, Inc., 113 F.4th 9, 17-18 (1st
Cir. 2024))).
II. 	ANALYSIS
Columbia argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on White’s religious
discrimination claims for two principal reasons. (Def.’s Mot. at 10-11.) First, Columbia argues
that it is entitled to summary judgment because White cannot establish a prima facie case of
religious discrimination. (Id. at 11-19.) Second, Columbia argues that it is entitled to summary
judgment because it could not reasonably accommodate White without undue hardship. (Id. at
19-27.)
A. 	Prima Facie Case
Columbia initially moves for summary judgment on the ground that White cannot
establish the first factor of her prima facie case. (Def.’s Mot. at 11.) In support, Columbia argues
that White “never articulated—whether contemporaneously or in retrospect—a specific conflict
between her faith and receiving a COVID-19 vaccine, instead reasoning that because her
conscience directed her to reject vaccination, her faith required her to do so.” (Id.) Columbia also
argues that to the extent White “identified any specific objections to becoming vaccinated,”
White’s objections fall outside of Title VII’s protections because they are based on purely
“secular concerns about the safety and efficacy of the vaccines,” not bona fide religious beliefs.
(Id.)
It is well established that Title VII does not protect purely secular beliefs. The Ninth
Circuit confirmed as much in its recently published Detwiler opinion. In that case, the majority
explained that to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a] plaintiff seeking a
religious exemption must plead a sufficient nexus between her religion and the specific belief in
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PAGE 22 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
conflict with the work requirement.” Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 895. The majority further explained
that a plaintiff’s “complaint must connect the requested exemption with a truly religious
principle,” and that courts evaluating such complaints “need only determine if a plaintiff has pled
enough facts to show her belief is religious, rather than purely secular.” Id.
Notably, however, the majority in Detwiler also recognized that “[e]valuating the first
factor of the prima facie case is a delicate inquiry,” “[o]verlap between secular and religious
bases for a belief poses a particular problem,” and “[t]he challenge lies in distinguishing purely
secular concerns from preferences that overlap with a bona fide religious belief.” Id. at 894-95.
Even in the current summary judgment posture, the Court must engage in a similarly challenging
and delicate inquiry to resolve Columbia’s assertion that White failed to carry her prima facie
burden.
Consider, for example, the situation that the Ninth Circuit confronted in Tiano. The
evidence adduced at the Tiano bench trial revealed “only a bona fide religious belief” that the
plaintiff “needed to go” on a religious pilgrimage “at some time” but the plaintiff failed to prove
that a “temporal mandate” (i.e., she needed to go on the pilgrimage during a nine-day period in
October) was “part of [her] bona fide religious belief.” 139 F.3d at 682. Given its conclusion that
the temporal mandate was purely a secular preference to which Title VII’s protections did not
apply, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of religious
discrimination and, therefore, reversed the district court’s finding of “Title VII liability.” Id. at
681-83.
In so holding, the Ninth Circuit deemed insufficient the plaintiff’s “[un]corroborat[ed]”
and “lone unilateral statement” that she “felt [she] was called to go” at the relevant time “from
deep in [her] heart.” Id. at 682. The Ninth Circuit emphasized, among other things, that the
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PAGE 23 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
plaintiff “did not testify that the visions of the Virgin Mary were expected to be more intense
during that period” or “suggest that the Catholic Church advocated her attendance at that
particular pilgrimage,” and the “record [was] replete with evidence that contradict[ed] [the
plaintiff’s] claim that the temporal mandate was part of her bona fide religious belief.” Id. at 682-
83; cf. id. at 683-84 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (declining to disturb the district court’s “credibility
finding” and decision to “believe[]” the plaintiff’s testimony that she “felt . . . from deep in [her]
heart that [she] was called . . . [and] had to be [on the pilgrimage] at th[e] time” in question, and
adding that “[n]othing in the record suggest[ed] that [the plaintiff’s] belief that she had to make
her pilgrimage ‘at that time’ was in any way insincere” and “October was known to be a
particularly important month for [such] pilgrimages,” in part because of the previous “linking
[of] numerous sightings to October 1917, when the Virgin Mary made an appearance in Fatima,
Portugal”) (simplified).
Consider also the hypothetical example that the Detwiler majority offered in support of
its decision:
Take, for example, a claimant who believes her body is a temple. She then
interprets that belief as a requirement to exercise daily and finds evidence
suggesting that such exercise is most effective when done in the morning. While
the generic principle and the claimant’s chosen implementation are both
understandable, they are not equivalent. She may prefer to exercise in the
mornings, but she is not entitled to an exemption from attendance at early
meetings. Nothing in her religion conflicts with morning work requirements.
Instead, such a plaintiff relies on personal and practical preferences rather than a
religious mandate. Even though her belief in her body as a temple is religious, the
rationale for her specific exemption request is not.
The same is true here. To allow [the plaintiff’s] claim to go forward would
open the door to unlimited religious discrimination claims. Such a deluge would
certainly generate negative consequences. Employers incur costs in the
administration of religious accommodation requests and the early stages of
litigation. Courts would face greater numbers of these claims, allocating further
judicial resources to complaints with no merit whatsoever. [The plaintiff] offers
no limiting principle within her proposed standard. Therefore, courts in this
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circuit must hold assertions of religious belief to the routine plausibility standard
and examine whether there is any nexus between religion and a plaintiff’s
viewpoint.
Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 899.
Now consider the facts here. White provided the following explanation to Columbia on
the “nature of the conflict” between her “religious belief[s]” and Columbia’s vaccination
requirement:
Within my faith, God tells Christians that we are to use the sacred scriptures
(Romans 15:4) paired with convictions of the Holy Spirit (John 16:8) and our
conscience (1 Corinthians 8 & 10, Romans 14 and others) to make decisions that
are not sinful. Speaking of our conscience in relation to sin, the [B]ible states that
what is sin to one person may not be sin for another. Similarly, regarding the
COVID vaccine, there are many Christians who have taken the vaccine[,] and it is
not sinful per their conscience. However, to other Christians (such as myself), it is
sinful, and that disposition is influenced by my faith and life circumstances[.]
(O’Connor Decl. Ex. 1 at 17) (simplified).
White also cited scripture and her past medical history in addressing whether her
“religious belief[s] . . . reject[ed] all medical care, all vaccines, or [only] the COVID-19
vaccine”:
This for me [is] very personal and has affected me internally with consistent bouts
of terrifying fear and crippling anxiety since August 2021[,] when whispers of a
company policy and mandate/rule were beginning to surface.
I have been harmed by immune therapies in the past and therefore those events
have shaped my conscience. I have personally had two major episodes of severe
reactions to immune therapies[, and in both instances,] I had no idea [that] I
would have severe/life challenging reactions by taking [them]. I have experienced
the debilitat[ing] side effects of a pharmaceutical that nearly resulted in death.
These therapies were prescribed for my benefit but [were] anything but beneficial.
I went through mental, emotional, and bodily harm from those treatments. In
addition to[] anxiety from the financial ramifications of [the] above referenced
treatments[,] I have a legitimate reason to believe any further injections that
manipulate my immune system are a sin.
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The scriptures are clear [about] how the conscience of a believer[,] guided by the
[H]oly [S]pirit, is individualized [and] integrated to our faith. The scriptures also
show that forcing an individual to do something against their conscience is a
stumbling block to that person and in fact causes them to transgress their faith
with God and commit sin. This is the case regarding the COVID[-19] mandate
and my personal faith in God.
(Id. at 18.)
Furthermore, after confirming that she did not object to COVID-19 testing, White
expanded on the manner in which her “religious belief[s]” conflicted with Columbia’s
vaccination requirement and identified the accommodations that she believed would resolve the
conflict:
The mandate to receive the shot gives me extreme anxiety, fear, and other ill
thoughts based on my life experiences. Comparatively, characteristics of making a
godly decision in line with the fruit of the [H]oly [S]pirit is detailed in Galatians
5:22-23.
Galatians 5:22-23[:] But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience,
kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control; against such things
there is no law.
As anxiety, fear and other emotions are not fruit of the Holy [S]pirit, receiving the
shot is biblically against my faith and conscience as I see it as a sin. To keep
myself from sin, and receive God’s direction in life, I pray and ask God’s
coun[se]l on all major decisions. I have asked God for direction regarding the
current COVID vaccine requirement and the Holy Spirit has moved on my heart
and conscience that I should not accept it and trust in Him. If I were to go against
this moving of the Holy Spirit, I would be sinning and jeopardizing my
relationship with God by violating my conscience.
. . . .
[With respect to specific accommodations,] I would ask to be treated [e]qually
and [i]nclusively[,] and my [d]iversity honored at Columbia Sportswear. I did not
choose the disability of my body/mind. So I ask for support for my work to
maintain my sincerely held beliefs that FEAR is not of my GOD[,] and I will
honor Him . . . minute by minute making decisions that will not harm my faith
and conscience.
(Id. at 18-19) (simplified).
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White also testified at her deposition about her religious accommodation request, the
explanation that she provided Columbia for seeking an accommodation and believing the
Vaccine Policy conflicted with her beliefs, and her medical and vaccination history. (White Dep.
45:7-48:2, 52:5-55:23, 60:2-61:16, 84:23-85:25.) White testified that during the COVID-19
pandemic and vaccine rollout, there was a “movement upon [her] spirit” in which her
“conscience,” which she defined as the “secular term” for “Holy Spirit,” caused her to
“question[], based on [her] . . . faith, . . . human walk, . . . humanness, . . . frailty, [and] medical
stuff, [how] all of these things . . . factor[ed] into the choices that [she] was going to be making
going forward.” (Id. 53:1-12.) White explained that “very often there are points in your life
where scripture is somewhat silent, but that is why we have the counselor, the Holy Spirit, within
us.” (Id. 54:25-55:2.)
White further explained that she “pray[s] over everything,” including whether to get the
flu and other recommended vaccines and in August 2021, when “whispers of a company policy
and mandate/rule were beginning to surface” and she suffered from “terrifying fear and crippling
anxiety,” she visited and consulted with a friend and “pastor person.” (Id. 45:7-48:2, 52:5-55:23,
60:2-61:16.) Recounting that she was “so distraught and overwhelmed” and often “tear[ful]” and
“sat with her [pastor person friend] for four days” and “prayed about this . . . decision that was
coming down” at work, White testified that she viewed the COVID-19 vaccine rollout as an
“experiment” because “[n]obody kn[ew]” or could “produce what’s a hundred percent in this
vaccine that [they] would like [her] to put in [her] body,” and “all [she] want[ed] to know” was
“what is was going inside [her] body” where it would “permanently [remain] . . . once injected,”
unlike “safety goggles and a hard hat that [she could] take off at the end of the day.” (Id. 60:2-
61:16.)
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White also focused on her “opinion” that the “entirety of COVID-19” and “vaccine
[rollout] was . . . very fear-based” and the “state of . . . fear” and uncertainty resulted in people
being unable to “walk” and “go to the grocery store,” and how she “immediately prays”
whenever someone “tr[ies] to have [her] do something” or “mak[e] [her] afraid so [they] can get
[her] to do something,” because “living in fear is the opposite of living in faith.” (Id. 47:11-21,
84:23-84:25.) White acknowledged that although she has declined vaccines for similar reasons,
she received a pneumonia vaccine shot a few years before the pandemic and she not only prayed
about and received flu vaccines, but she also did so at “Columbia Sportswear[.]” (Id. 45:7-48:2,
52:5-14.)
The foregoing evidence is illustrative of why “courts have struggled to draw a line
between the religious and the secular.” Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 894 (citing Callahan v. Woods,
658 F.2d 679, 687 (9th Cir. 1981)). White invokes scripture and prayer in attaching religious
significance to her objections to Columbia’s Vaccine Policy. (See O’Connor Decl. Ex. 1 at 17-
19; White Dep. 45:7-48:2, 52:5-55:23, 60:2-61:16, 84:23-85:25.) At the same time, however,
White suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic and vaccine rollout were instances in which
“scripture is somewhat silent” and necessitated reliance on her “conscience,” which she defined
as the “secular term” for “Holy Spirit.” (White Dep. 53:1-12, 54:25-55:2.) White also suggests
that unlike when she prayed and received seasonal flu vaccines at “Columbia Sportswear,” her
opposition to the COVID-19 vaccine stems from her personal and medical preferences (i.e.,
fundamentally secular considerations like her past medical history and “frailty” and views that
the vaccine rollout was a “fear-based” “experiment” and that she lacked sufficient information
regarding the vaccines’ contents). (See id. 45:7-48:2, 52:5-55:23, 60:2-61:16, 84:23-85:25.)
///
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White cites these secular considerations as the source of her fear, anxiety, and related
emotions, which in turn triggered her belief that “anxiety, fear and other emotions are not fruit of
the Holy [S]pirit” and thus that the COVID-19 vaccine is “biblically against [her] faith and
conscience” and “a sin.” (O’Connor Decl. Ex. 1 at 17-19; White Dep. 45:7-48:2, 52:5-55:23,
60:2-61:16, 84:23-85:25.) In doing so, White confirms that her objections to the COVID-19
vaccine derive not from an overarching or truly religious principle, but from a subjective
evaluation of secular considerations. White’s subjective, case-by-case evaluation of vaccines are
not entitled to Title VII’s religious protections.4 See Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 895, 899-900
(recognizing that to prevail on a Title VII religious discrimination claim, a plaintiff must
“connect the requested exemption with a truly religious principle”); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215-17 (1972) (reflecting that in First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
gave “no weight to . . . secular considerations” and explained that “purely secular
considerations” do not merit constitutional protections for religion and a “subjective evaluation
and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority . . . [does] not rest on a
religious basis”).
Given this undisputed factual record, the Court agrees with Columbia that although
White “may have met her minimal initial burden to survive dismissal” at the pleading stage, the
summary judgment record demonstrates that White fails to establish a prima facie case of
religious discrimination. (See Def.’s Mot. at 15 n.9.) The Court therefore recommends that the
4 To find otherwise would allow White to refuse any employment duty that caused her
anxiety or fear on the ground that it violated her conscience and, therefore, her religion. Cf.
Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 899 (“To allow [the plaintiff’s] claim to go forward would open the door
to unlimited religious discrimination claims.”).
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district judge grant Columbia’s motion for summary judgment on White’s religious
discrimination claims.
B. 	Undue Hardship
In the event the district judge disagrees with the Court’s analysis with respect to White’s
prima facie case, the Court also addresses Columbia’s affirmative defense of undue hardship.
The Supreme Court recently “clarified how lower courts should conduct the undue
hardship analysis.” Petersen, 150 F.4th at 1217 (citing Groff, 600 U.S. at 468-69). The Supreme
Court had previously “suggested that an employer need not demonstrate ‘more than a de minimis
cost’ to show ‘undue hardship[,]’ . . . [but in Groff,] the [Supreme] Court observed that [its
previous] ‘reference to de minimis was fleeting’ and, when divorced from the context of [the
underlying case], unfortunate.” Id. (simplified) (first quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977); and then quoting Groff, 600 U.S. at 465). The Supreme Court
“clarified that ‘showing more than a de minimis cost does not suffice to establish undue hardship
under Title VII[,’ and] . . . held that ‘undue hardship is shown when a burden is substantial in the
overall context of an employer’s business.’” Id. (simplified) (quoting Groff, 600 U.S. at 468).
The Supreme Court explained that a “hardship” in this context is “more severe than a
mere burden”:
[A] hardship is more severe than a mere burden. So even if Title VII said only
that an employer need not be made to suffer a “hardship,” an employer could not
escape liability simply by showing that an accommodation would impose some
sort of additional costs. Those costs would have to rise to the level of hardship,
and adding the modifier “undue” means that the requisite burden, privation, or
adversity must rise to an “excessive” or “unjustifiable” level. . . . [W]e are pointed
toward something closer to . . . “substantial additional costs” or “substantial
expenditures.”
Groff, 600 U.S. at 469 (simplified).
///
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The Supreme Court also provided guidance on the manner in which courts must apply
this test:
The [Supreme] Court counseled [lower courts] to “apply the test in a
manner that takes into account all relevant factors in the case at hand, including
the particular accommodations at issue and their practical impact in light of the
nature, size and operating cost of [an] employer,” to see if “the burden of granting
an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the
conduct of its particular business.” [Groff, 600 U.S. at 470-71 (simplified).] In the
end, “‘undue hardship’ in Title VII means what it says,” id. at 471, and proof of
hardship to the employer is not sufficient—the hardship must be undue, see id. at
471-72. By way of example, the [Supreme] Court offered that “forcing other
employees to work overtime would not constitute an undue hardship,” id. at 473,
without considering other options such as “temporary costs, voluntary shift
swapping, occasional shift swapping, or administrative costs,” id. at 471 (citing
EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)).
Petersen, 150 F.4th at 1217 (simplified).
Until recently, the Ninth Circuit had “not had an occasion to grapple with how exactly [it]
should ‘take[] into account all relevant factors.’” Id. (quoting Groff, 600 U.S. at 470). In
Petersen, the Ninth Circuit explained that “[i]t is sufficient for [it] to state at this point that Groff
raised the bar that defendants must clear to show undue hardship but left [it] to consider a range
of factors that [it] might deem relevant.” Id. at 1218. Keeping “Groff in mind,” the Ninth Circuit
considered whether the defendant fire department “would have faced an undue hardship by
accommodating [the plaintiff firefighters’] request for vaccine exemption.” Id. (citing Groff, 600
U.S. at 468). In evaluating the defendant’s undue hardship defense, the Ninth Circuit grouped the
“different kind of costs” that the defendant “identified” and claimed it “would have faced” into
“three categories: (1) health and safety costs, (2) operational burdens, and (3) financial burdens.”
Id.
Like in Petersen, Columbia cites various costs in support of its argument that granting
White’s religious accommodation request would have imposed an undue hardship. (See Def.’s
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Mot. at 19-27.) For the most part, the Court can group Columbia’s claimed costs into the same
“three categories” that the Ninth Circuit evaluated in Petersen: (1) health and safety costs,
(2) operational burdens, and (3) financial burdens. (See Def.’s Mot. at 19-27, relying on the
detriments to White’s co-workers’ health and safety, White’s ‘significant in-person
responsibilities” and necessary “face-to-face contact with colleagues, external partners, and
community members,” and Columbia’s need to incur certain “expense[s]” and “reassign essential
functions of [White’s executive assistant] position”).
1. 	Health and Safety Costs
The Court first addresses Columbia’s alleged health and safety costs. “Groff tells [courts]
that [they] may look to EEOC guidance to help determine if these health and safety costs would
have imposed an undue hardship on [an employer].” Petersen, 150 F.4th at 1220 (citing Groff,
600 U.S. at 471). In terms of guidance, “[t]he EEOC has said that when considering undue
hardship in the context of COVID, employers should consider if the employee ‘works in a
solitary or group work setting,’ ‘has close contact with other employees or members of the
public,’ and ‘works outdoors or indoors.’” Id. (citing What You Should Know About COVID-19
and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws, EEOC (published Mar. 1, 2022),
https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-
and-other-eeo-laws [https://perma.cc/CQ9C-JPNY]). Each of the foregoing factors weigh in
favor of finding undue hardship here. See id. (reaching the same conclusion because the plaintiffs
“work[ed] in group settings, interfacing constantly with coworkers and the public, both inside
and outdoors”).
The record reflects that “important aspects” of White’s “position require[d] in-person
engagement.” (See O’Connor Decl. Ex. 1 at 24 & Ex. 2 at 1, noting that Columbia issued a letter
on January 31, 2022, denying White’s medical accommodation request and rejecting White’s
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“[u]ltimate” and “[c]ompromised accommodation request[s],” in part because Columbia
“believe[d] that certain important aspects of [White’s] position require[d] in-person
engagement”). To be sure, White agreed that her “Job Description” accurately described her
executive assistant role’s essential functions. (See White Dep. 39:23-41:12, 43:14-44:15;
O’Connor Decl. Ex. 1 at 15-16.) White’s essential functions included, but were not limited to,
performing “critical and confidential administrative support” like “organizing office files and
materials,” “preparing meeting rooms,” “coordinat[ing] onsite and offsite meetings (large and
small) including attendees, facility equipment needs, catering, etc.,” and providing support (i.e.,
“coordinating materials, travel, presentations, meetings, etc.”) to Columbia’s “general Retail
Operations teams and those [who] interact with the Retail Operations teams on critical projects.”
(O’Connor Decl. Ex. 1 at 15.)
Relatedly, White testified that her typical pre-pandemic workday consisted of, among
other things, “all of the [random] things that happen[ed] in the middle [of the workday] . . on
[her] floor,” such as co-workers “walk[ing] up and say[ing] the copier is not working, the
copier’s out of toner, I can’t find . . . this [item or] I don’t know where this [item] is [located],
who do I call for this [issue, or] how do I open this program[.]” (White Dep. 43:14-44:15.) White
also acknowledged that when its headquarters transitioned to remote work, Columbia was “not
specifically set up to run in a virtual world,” as opposed to “more face to face” interactions.
(Id. 32:15-17.) As a result, there was a “lot of trial and error” because employees had “very little
knowledge of the virtual platforms that [could] . . . pool [up to 250] people together.” (Id. 32:17-
33:2.)
Given this undisputed evidence, it is clear that White’s essential duties required indoor
work in group settings and close contact with co-workers, facilities, caterers, invitees,
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Columbia’s Retail Operations teams, and individuals who interacted with the Retail Operations
teams on “critical projects.”
White also fails to produce any evidence undermining Columbia’s assessment that
allowing her to work onsite while unvaccinated posed a health and safety risk to her fellow
employees, who had expressed their “preferences and safety concerns, which were strongly in
favor of requiring vaccinations.” (See Green Decl. ¶¶ 4-9, stating as much and citing Columbia’s
efforts to “mitigate the risks associated with COVID-19,” such as wearing masks, “social
distancing,” frequent handwashing, disinfecting workspaces, and implementing a “testing
protocol” and Columbia’s SLT’s determination that “vaccination was the best way to protect the
[c]ompany’s employees and the broader Portland-area community in which [it] operate[s]”;
Luther Decl. ¶¶ 6-8, describing Columbia’s reliance on health authorities’ advisories and
requirements regarding “masking requirements, physical distancing, [and] building capacity
limitations,” and work with state officials to secure and host vaccination clinics as part of its
“commitment to the safety and health of its employees” and help slow the spread of COVID-
19).5
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the health and safety costs upon which
Columbia relies weigh in favor of finding undue hardship. See Hall v. Sheppard Pratt Health
Sys., Inc., 155 F.4th 747, 754 (4th Cir. 2025) (“Courts have found that, even post-Groff, such a
safety risk to fellow employees is independently a cognizable undue hardship.” (first citing
Bordeaux v. Lions Gate Ent., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1136 (C.D. Cal. 2023), aff’d, No. 23-
4340, 2025 WL 655065 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2025); and then citing Petersen, 150 F.4th at 1220)).
5 Notably, White also acknowledged that in 2021, the months preceding her vaccine
exemption request, “hospitals around the county were overwhelmed with COVID patients.”
(White Dep. 57:4-12.)
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2. 	Operational Burdens
The operational burdens upon which Columbia relies similarly weigh in favor of finding
undue hardship.
The undisputed record reveals that before the COVID-19 pandemic, Columbia’s
headquarters-based employees worked “almost exclusively in-person” because many of these
employees’ “roles include responsibilities that must be performed physically at the office” and
Columbia considers “face-to-face collaboration” and “in-person interaction . . . within and
across . . . departments” to be “integral part[s] of the [c]ompany’s culture” and drivers of
“creativity, resourcefulness, and innovation.” (Luther Decl. ¶ 4; Green Decl. ¶¶ 3, 13.) The
record also reveals that none of Columbia’s executive assistants worked remotely before the
pandemic, with the exception of infrequent travel to regional meetings. (See White Dep. 42:12-
43:13, 87:16-23, estimating that White traveled to such meetings “maybe three or four times”
during her seven years of employment).
Columbia presents unrebutted evidence supporting that it operates in the same manner
post-pandemic, in part because of the “immediately obvious” shortcomings of remote work,
which was “not a long-term solution.” (See Green Decl. ¶¶ 4-6, 14-15, representing that White’s
“former role has been performed onsite, in-person since [her] departure,” approximately “eighty-
seven percent of Columbia’s corporate employees in Oregon are [currently] office-based, and
[work] in the office a minimum of three days per week, and usually more,” “[o]nly thirteen
percent of [Columbia’s] Oregon-based corporate employees are remote,” and Columbia’s
temporary transition to remote work presented “distinct challenges,” such as “diminished
workplace culture,” reduced “collaboration, teamwork, and connection,” “social isolation and
mental health issues,” technology-related limitations, an “inability to work with physical product
during the product creation process,” and “morale issues relating to employees who simply
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needed to be at the physical worksite to perform their jobs”; Luther Decl. ¶¶ 6-8, describing
similar and “immediately obvious” shortcomings of remote work, which was “not a long-term
solution”).
On this record, the Court concludes that Columbia’s operational burdens weigh in favor
of finding undue hardship. Columbia’s operational burdens include the risk that it would have
incurred by allowing unvaccinated employees like White to return to indoor work in group
settings and close contact with others. (See O’Connor Decl. Ex. 1 at 22, denying White’s
religious accommodation request in a follow-up letter dated January 21, 2022, explaining that
granting White’s request would “impose an undue burden on [Columbia’s] ability to maintain a
safe workplace for all [Columbia’s] employees and customers,” because White’s “position
entails working in proximity to other employees and visitors in an enclosed indoor space over
extended periods, and [because of] the nature and state of the [then-]current COVID-19
pandemic in [the] region”). The Ninth Circuit made a similar observation in Petersen. See 150
F.4th at 1220 (“There is an additional operational cost to [the] [p]laintiffs’ requested
accommodation. As we discussed in the prior section, allowing unvaccinated firefighters to
work—even if they were masked, tested regularly, and maintained social distancing—put other
firefighters at risk.”).
Columbia’s operational burdens also included the “immediately obvious” shortcomings
of, and prolonged overreliance on, remote work. The record reflects that Columbia’s operations
depend largely on the work and support of executives who oversee the design and manufacture
of outdoor apparel and footwear and employees who create them and must “work directly with
product on fit, materials, engineering and product development,” handle “physical product and
materials, and work[] with resources and teams onsite.” (Green Decl. ¶¶ 4, 13; Luther Decl. ¶¶ 3,
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7); cf. Petersen, 150 F.4th at 1220 (addressing a different context involving firefights and noting
that the circumstances and number of exemptions “would have hamstrung [the defendant’s]
operations”).
Additionally, even if it allowed executive assistants like White to work remotely on a
hybrid basis, Columbia’s operational burdens would still include the outright or ad hoc
reassignment of essential functions, such as “organizing office files and materials,” “preparing
meeting rooms,” “coordinat[ing] onsite and offsite meetings (large and small) including
attendees, facility equipment needs, catering, etc.,” and providing support (i.e., “coordinating
materials, travel, presentations, meetings, etc.”) to Columbia’s “general Retail Operations teams
and those that interact with the Retail Operations teams on critical projects.” (O’Connor Decl.
Ex. 1 at 15.)
In sum, the Court concludes that Columbia’s operational burden weighs in favor of
finding undue hardship.
3. 	Financial Burdens
Finally, Columbia denied White’s religious accommodation request based in part on the
“significant difficulty and expense” associated with “mitigation measures” like “regular testing,”
which Columbia determined were insufficient to “diminish the safety risks.” (See O’Connor
Decl. Ex. 1 at 22, stating that Columbia “determined that mitigation measures (including regular
testing) would not sufficiently diminish the safety risk and would impose significant difficulty
and expense”).
In evaluating the affirmative defense of undue hardship, courts generally “consider only
actual hardships, not hypothetical ones[.]” Petersen, 150 F.4th at 1221 (quoting EEOC v.
Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1988)). In Groff, the Supreme Court
“mentioned that temporary labor costs alone do not constitute an undue hardship[.]” Id. (citing
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Groff, 600 U.S. at 473). But pre-Groff decisions “regularly considered economic costs when
conducting the undue hardship analysis,” and post-Groff decisions “have continued to consider
economic costs when conducting the undue hardship analysis.” Id. (ellipses omitted) (quoting
Lavelle-Hayden v. Legacy Health, 744 F. Supp. 3d 1135, 1151 (D. Or. 2024)). Further, “[a]n
undue hardship may include an evaluation of the risk of hardship, not just an accounting of
damages actually suffered.” Id. at 1221-22. Such a risk, “however, must be realistic and not
‘merely conceivable or hypothetical.’” Id. at 1222 (quoting Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d
at 615).
Before it denied White’s accommodation request, many of Columbia’s employees needed
to make occasional office visits to perform in-person work and Columbia responded by
“implement[ing] a testing protocol” “as soon as testing was readily available” and requiring that
these employees “wear masks, follow social distancing rules, frequently wash their hands[,] and
disinfect their workspaces[.]” (Green Decl. ¶ 5.) Given Columbia’s recent history of testing and
other mitigation measures, Columbia was justified in considering the burden of incurring
additional costs to accommodate unvaccinated employees like White. See Petersen, 150 F.4th at
1221-22 (stating that the Ninth Circuit does “not understand ‘undue hardship’ to mean ‘realized
hardships,” as opposed to “realistic and not ‘merely conceivable or hypothetical’” hardships
(quoting Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d at 615)).
For these reasons, Columbia’s financial burdens weigh in favor of finding undue
hardship. See id. at 1222 (finding that a “risk of additional liability” weighed in favor of such a
defense).
4. 	Recommendation
Columbia has identified “several substantial costs of accommodating [White’s] requested
vaccine exemption[.]” See id. (same). Taken together, these costs “amount[] to a showing that
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[Columbia] could not reasonably have accommodated [White] without undue hardship in
[February 2022].” Id. (first citing Groff, 600 U.S. at 469; and then citing Peterson, 358 F.3d at
606). Accordingly, the Court recommends that the district judge grant Columbia’s motion on the
ground that accommodating White would have caused Columbia undue hardship.6
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court recommends that the district judge GRANT Columbia’s
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 28).
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Court will refer its Findings and Recommendation to a district judge. Objections, if
any, are due within fourteen (14) days. If no objections are filed, the Findings and
Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due
within fourteen (14) days. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the
Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.
DATED this 20th day of November, 2025.
HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN
United States Magistrate Judge
6 At oral argument, the Court took under advisement White’s counsel’s request to file a
surreply and declaration from White in support of White’s opposition to Columbia’s motion for
summary judgment. (Hr’g Tr. 45:14-46:7.) The Court denies White’s counsel’s request because
he received an opportunity to respond in writing and at oral argument when Columbia’s motion
was fully briefed, and he repeatedly claimed that White’s testimony was alone sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact on White’s remaining claims. (Id. 10:23-11:5, 25:24-26:4,
46:1-5.)
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