Ciccimaro v. Emore et al

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
In re 	: 	Chapter 7
EUGENE CICCIMARO 	:
Debtor 	: 	Bankruptcy No. 03-35430bif
.................................................
MEMORANDUM
.................................................
The former chapter 7 debtor, Mr. Eugene Ciccimaro, filed a motion on June
5, 2006 to reopen his closed chapter 7 case. This terse motion seeks reopening “in order
that [Mr. Ciccimaro] can proceed to litigate an adversary proceeding to enforce the terms
of his discharge against creditors who are violating the discharge injunction . . . .” Mr.
Ciccimaro attached a copy of a complaint that he would file in this court were the case
reopened. The proposed complaint would name Ms. Jacqueline F. Emore, his former
mother-in-law, and Ms. Marta Emore Ciccimaro, his former spouse, as defendants.
A hearing on that motion was scheduled for July 5, 2006. Even though
there was no ruling on the motion to reopen, the court clerk docketed the proposed
complaint as an adversary proceeding on June 5, 2006, Adv. No. 06-0295. A bankruptcy
court has no jurisdiction over a dispute filed after a case is closed until it is reopened,
because the outcome of that dispute can not possibly have an effect upon the
administration of the closed case. See Cook v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 174 B.R. 321, 327
(M.D. Ala. 1994); Walnut Associates v. Saidel, 164 B.R. 487, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1994); In re
Brantley, 1997 WL 74663, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1997) (holding that an adversary
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proceeding filed after a debtor was discharged and the bankruptcy case was closed is
improper); In re Cassidy, 1995 WL 661244, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).
In addition to the court clerk’s premature docketing of Mr. Ciccimaro’s
proposed complaint as an adversary proceeding, the clerk issued a summons to Mr.
Ciccimaro on June 6, 2006. Mr. Ciccimaro’s counsel served the summons and complaint
on the two proposed defendants on June 8, 2006, without waiting for a ruling on the
pending motion to reopen. The proposed defendants, not realizing the jurisdictional
problem or errors by the court clerk, filed answers in opposition to this complaint, and
Ms. Emore’s pleading added a counterclaim.
On July 5, 2006, Mr. Ciccimaro filed a certification requesting that his
motion to reopen be granted by default. However, given my discretion on the issue of
reopening, the court clerk’s errors in docketing the proposed complaint and issuing a
summons, and the nature of the proposed complaint along with the responses thereto, I
declined to rule on the question of reopening without additional information, and so
scheduled another hearing on the matter. At that additional hearing, I obtained from the
parties copies of state court pleadings and orders involving these three individuals that
underlie Mr. Ciccimaro’s request to reopen his closed chapter 7 case.
During that hearing, with all parties participating, counsel for Ms. Emore
stated that her client had been misled by the service of the complaint and summons in
early June 2006, and did not appreciate that she had the right to oppose the motion to
reopen this bankruptcy case. As this confusion was understandable, I set a new deadline
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I also attempted, without success, to resolve the parties’ differences in this court.1
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for opposition to reopening. 	Both Ms. Emore and Ms. Ciccimaro timely filed objections.1
Mr. Ciccimaro then responded to those objections. Thus, presently before me is Mr.
Ciccimaro’s motion to reopen his chapter 7 case and two objections thereto.
I.
Before summarizing the material facts relevant to this contested matter, I
note the following general principles.
Pursuant to section 350(b), “a [closed bankruptcy] case may be reopened in
the court in which such case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor
or for other cause.” Whether to reopen a closed bankruptcy case is committed to the
discretion of the bankruptcy court. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Bernstein, 104 F.3d 547, 551
(3d Cir. 1997); Judd v. Wolfe, 78 F.3d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 1996); Matter of Case, 937 F.2d
1014, 1018 (5th Cir. 1991) (“This discretion depends upon the circumstances of the
individual case and accords with the equitable nature of all bankruptcy court
proceedings.”); Hawkins v. Landmark Finance Co., 727 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1984); Matter
of Becker’s Motor Transportation, Inc., 632 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 916 (1981); Urbanco Inc. v. Urban Systems Streetscape, Inc., 111 B.R. 134
(W.D. Mich. 1990). The burden of demonstrating circumstances sufficient to justify the
reopening is placed upon the moving party. In re Cloninger, 209 B.R. 125, 126 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 1997); In re Nelson, 100 B.R. 905 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989).
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In seeking to reopen his chapter 7 case, Mr. Ciccimaro asserts that
reopening is appropriate because it would benefit him by enforcing his chapter 7
discharge. In general, when a former debtor seeks to reopen a closed bankruptcy case, the
court should consider a variety of non-exclusive factors including: the length of time that
the case has been closed, see Matter of Case, 937 F.2d at 1018; whether a non-bankruptcy
forum, such as state court, has the ability to determine the dispute to be posed by the
debtor were the case reopened, see, e.g. In re Tinsley, 98 B.R. 791 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1989); In re E.A. Adams, Inc., 29 B.R. 227 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); In re Hepburn, 27 B.R.
135 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); whether prior litigation in bankruptcy court implicitly
determined that state court would be the appropriate forum to determine the rights, post-
bankruptcy, of the parties; whether any parties would be prejudiced were the case
reopened or not reopened; the extent of the benefit which the debtor seeks to achieve by
reopening; and whether it is clear at the outset that the debtor would not be entitled to any
relief if the case were reopened. See generally Arleaux v. Arleaux, 210 B.R. 148, 149
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997), aff’d, 149 F.3d 1186 (8th Cir. 1998) (Table); In re Carberry, 186
B.R. 401, 402 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (a bankruptcy “court should not reopen a
bankruptcy case where it appears that to do so would be futile and a waste of judicial
resources”); In re Nelson, 100 B.R. 905, 907 (N.D. Ohio 1989):
Finally, the court will not grant a motion to reopen when no
clear benefit is shown to creditors. . . . Because no benefit
will inure to Debtors' estate or their creditors, Debtors' motion
should be denied.
As noted above, in a number of instances, courts have exercised their
discretion not to reopen a bankruptcy case where there is a non-bankruptcy forum that
may hear the dispute that serves as the basis for the request to reopen. See, e.g., In re
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The scheduled debt to Ms. Emore is not listed as a joint obligation on schedule F;2
nor is it listed on schedule H, which discloses the co-debtors and their obligations.
5
Tinsley, 98 B.R. at 791; In re E.A. Adams, Inc., 29 B.R. at 227; In re Hepburn, 27 B.R. at
135. 	The two objectors so contend in this dispute. They argue that the effect of the
debtor’s previously issued bankruptcy discharge can and should be determined in state
court. 	Mr. Ciccimaro disagrees and asserts that this forum is more appropriate for that
determination.
II.
I apply the aforementioned equitable principles to the following facts,
gleaned from the court docket, documents of record in this court, documents submitted by
the parties in the state court, and the oral admissions made by the parties in open court.
Mr. Ciccimaro filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under chapter 7 on
October 20, 2003. At the time of his bankruptcy filing, he and Ms. Ciccimaro were
parties to a divorce action pending in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas,
docketed at No. 03-00043. In Mr. Ciccimaro’s bankruptcy schedules, he listed his wife as
a co-debtor (but not a creditor) and Ms. Emore as an unsecured creditor. 2
On March 4, 2004, Mr. Ciccimaro received a chapter 7 bankruptcy
discharge; and on March 26, 2004, his chapter 7 case was closed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
350(a). Prior to closing, neither Mr. Ciccimaro nor the objectors filed any complaints
seeking to determine the dischargeability of any claims under section 523(a).
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On October 25, 2004, the Ciccimaros reached an interim agreement on
spousal and child support. The agreement, however, called for state court approval, but
the copy of the agreement as well as a copy of the state court docket entries do not reflect
that such approval was obtained. I also note that the interim agreement contained a
provision in paragraph 8 preserving all claims and defenses of both parties in, inter alia,
any equitable distribution, alimony or other economic issues.
On May 12, 2005, the state court entered a decree in divorce. That order
further provided that a hearing would be scheduled on issues of equitable distribution of
marital property, alimony, and counsel fees. The documents submitted by the parties do
not reflect that any such hearing was held.
In July 2004, Ms. Emore brought suit against Ms. Ciccimaro, who is her
daughter, in state court. This civil action was based upon a loan made by Ms. Emore to
the Ciccimaros prior to Mr. Ciccimaro’s bankruptcy filing. Ms. Emore obtained a
judgment against Ms. Ciccimaro by default in the amount of $71,414.88 on March 16,
2005.
After learning of this judgment, on January 11, 2006 Mr. Ciccimaro filed an
emergency petition in state court seeking to join Ms. Emore as a party in the pending
divorce litigation and seeking to enjoin Ms. Emore from executing on her judgment
against the proceeds of the impending sale of the marital home. He contended that the
judgment amount was excessive and that his due process rights were violated by the entry
of judgment against his estranged wife without notice to him and an opportunity to
defend. On January 17, 2006, the state court issued an order concluding that Mr.
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Ciccimaro’s petition was not an emergency and would be scheduled for a hearing in due
course.
Thereafter, Ms. Emore filed her own petition to intervene in the divorce
litigation. Her petition alleged that she had lent to the Ciccimaros $65,000 to aid them in
the purchase of their family residence, and mortgaged her home to obtain those funds.
When the loan payments ceased, she brought suit against her daughter and obtained a
judgment. She further alleged that intervention was appropriate as her daughter has no
assets that are not marital assets. It appears from the pleadings that if her request to
intervene were granted, Ms. Emore will request of the state court that her judgment
against Ms. Ciccimaro be satisfied prior to the distribution of any funds from the parties’
marital assets.
Upon the filing of Ms. Emore’s petition to intervene, Mr. Ciccimaro
withdrew his emergency petition. Thereafter the state court, learning that Mr. Ciccimaro
had also filed a motion to reopen his bankruptcy case, deferred ruling upon Ms. Emore’s
petition to intervene pending the outcome of Mr. Ciccimaro’s motion to reopen in this
court. Thus, pending presently before state court are issues of intervention, alimony, and
equitable distribution of marital property.
Finally, the parties informed me that the marital residence has been already
been sold and the net proceeds of sale, $111,000, were placed in escrow, presumably
awaiting some court’s directive regarding the proceeds. For purposes of this motion to
reopen, I note that Mr. Ciccimaro valued the Elkins Park marital residence on his
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I take judicial notice, under Fed. R. Evid. 201 (incorporated into bankruptcy3
cases by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9017), of the bankruptcy schedules filed. See generally In re Indian
Palms Associates, Ltd., 61 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1995).
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bankruptcy schedules as worth $200,000, with $195,000 in secured claims against it. 3
The debtor claimed a homestead exemption of only $5,000.
III.
A.
The complaint that Mr. Ciccimaro seeks to prosecute in this forum, were the
bankruptcy case reopened, alleges that Ms. Emore “asserted a right in the Divorce Action
to obtain the collection of her judgment in full from the proceeds of the marital estate
prior to any other distributions in the equitable distribution proceeding.” Proposed
Complaint, ¶ 13. In Mr. Ciccimaro’s view, such recovery would “eviscerate the effect of
the [bankruptcy] discharge of the Debtor’s obligation to” Ms. Emore. Id., ¶ 14.
He further complains that Ms. Ciccimaro has improperly maintained in state
court “that she is entitled to credit in the [equitable] distribution process light [sic] of the
fact that she alone is liable for the parties’ joint obligations.” Proposed Complaint, ¶ 15.
In Mr. Ciccimaro’s opinion, such conduct by his former spouse also attempts to
“eviscerate the effect of the [bankruptcy] discharge” by “requesting that the elimination
of his obligation to pay these [joint] debts be considered in the equitable distribution
aspects of the Divorce action.” Id., ¶ 16.
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In his proposed complaint, Mr. Ciccimaro demands the following relief:
that both Ms. Emore and Ms. Ciccimaro be held in civil contempt for violating the
discharge injunction found in 11 U.S.C. § 524(a); that they both be enjoined from
asserting any discharged claims in the state court equitable distribution litigation; and that
they be liable for plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and court costs. Ms. Emore’s counterclaim
against Mr. Ciccimaro, were this case reopened, also seeks attorney’s fees and costs,
alleging that the complaint against her was not filed in good faith.
At oral argument, counsel for Mr. Ciccimaro opined that this bankruptcy
court should, after reopening the case, direct the state court to distribute equally the realty
proceeds held in escrow, with any satisfaction of Ms. Emore’s judgment paid solely from
Ms. Ciccimaro’s share. His post-hearing memorandum appears to retreat somewhat from
that position. He now contends:
The Debtor begins by observing that he is not in any sense
requesting this court to become involved in the equitable
distribution matter in the CCP [Court of Common Pleas]. As
his proposals at the July 31 2006, hearing indicate, this court
can readily provide adequate relief to him by a simple, short
order that allows the CCP proceedings to go forward, but
precludes the Defendants from making claims in violation of
the discharge injunction. He submits that the court should
and could enter such an order forthwith, thus bringing all of
these matters to a swift conclusion.
Debtor’s Memorandum at 3.
Mr. Ciccimaro also accepts that his bankruptcy discharge did not “preclude
the Wife from seeking equitable distribution . . . .” Id., at 6. In Pennsylvania, a non-
debtor’s interest in an equitable distribution award is viewed as a property interest rather
than a dischargeable debt. See, e.g., In re Ingebrethsen, 1998 WL 351730, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
1998); In re Scholl, 234 B.R. 636 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999). Thus, a post-bankruptcy
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division of marital property is not akin to enforcing a prepetition claim, but represents the
establishment of the debtor’s interest in property. Furthermore, it will generally be
appropriate to permit that property determination to be made in the state court, which has
the greatest expertise, and which may have held some prepetition hearings on the issue.
See Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 1573, 1579 (11th Cir. 1992) (“It is appropriate for
bankruptcy courts to avoid incursions into family law matters out of consideration of
court economy, judicial restraint, and deference to our state court brethren and their
established expertise in such matters.”); In re Polliard, 152 B.R. 51, 55 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1993) (equitable distribution matter should be decided by state court because the court’s
“familiarity with equitable distribution principles far exceeds that of this Court.”); In re
Wilson, 85 B.R. 722, 726 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (court abstained from hearing an
equitable distribution matter).
The objectors for their part concede that Mr. Ciccimaro has received a
bankruptcy discharge, and the discharge must be respected in any subsequent state court
proceeding. Ms. Ciccimaro emphasizes, however, that the state court has not yet rendered
any decision regarding alimony or equitable distribution, and that she should be permitted
to present all information relevant to those decisions, see generally 23 Pa. C.S.A. §
3701(b) (listing 17 factors in determining alimony, including the relative assets and
liabilities of the parties); 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 3502(a) (listing 11 factors in dividing marital
property, including the economic circumstances of each party), which includes her former
husband’s bankruptcy filing and its financial consequences upon her and upon him.
Furthermore, Ms. Ciccimaro observes that this court cannot render any advisory opinions.
See Coffin v. Malvern Federal Savings Bank, 90 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 1996). Therefore, she
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asserts that it is improper for this court to instruct or give guidance to the state court in
adjudicating the pending divorce litigation matters before it.
B.
Mr. Ciccimaro maintains that bankruptcy courts routinely reopen closed
cases to enforce the discharge injunction found in section 524(a). Debtor’s
Memorandum, at 4. This contention is overstated. See generally In re Apex Oil Co.
Inc., 406 F.3d 538, 543 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming the denial of a debtor’s motion to
reopen a closed bankruptcy case as state court was competent to interpret the scope of the
debtor’s chapter 11 discharge). The intersection between bankruptcy law and domestic
relations law is complex, reflecting competing policy considerations. See generally In re
Osting, 337 B.R. 297, 302 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005). On one hand, the bankruptcy
discharge entitles a debtor to a “fresh start.” And the federal supremacy clause obligates
state courts to uphold the effect of the discharge. See, e.g., Hogg v. Hogg, 816 A.2d 314,
319-20 (Pa. Super. 2003). But federal courts, as a matter of comity, generally conclude
that “domestic relations matters . . . should properly be reserved to the state courts.” In re
Harrell, 754 F.2d 902, 907 (11th Cir. 1985); accord Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S.
174 (1988); Roberge v. Buis, 95 F.3d 42 (Table), 1996 WL 482686, at *2 (4th Cir. 1996);
Caswell v. Lang, 757 F.2d 608, 610- 11 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, on some
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The state court has the power, as a court of general jurisdiction, to determine the4
scope of the bankruptcy discharge injunction. See generally In re Watson, 192 B.R. 739, 749-50
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 1996 WL 330895, 116 F.3d 488 (Table) (9th Cir. 1997). Indeed,
the Pennsylvania courts have done so on a number of instances. See, e.g., PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n
v. Balsamo, 430 Pa. Super. 360, 373-76 (1993), appeal denied, 538 Pa. 659 (1994); see also
Buccino v. Buccino, 397 Pa. Super. 241 (1990) (interpreting in considerable detail the non-
dischargeability provisions of section 523(a)(5)).
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dischargeability issues, the state court has concurrent jurisdiction with bankruptcy courts.
See, e.g., Eden v. Robert A. Chapski, Ltd., 405 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2005).
More particularly, the legal issues involved in equitable distribution are
solely matters of state law, with which state court judges have far greater expertise. See,
e.g., Matter of Hursa, 87 B.R. 313 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988); Matter of Baker, 75 B.R. 120,
121 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987); see also In re Perry, 131 B.R. 763, 770 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1991). Thus, it is not surprising that there are reported decisions in which a bankruptcy
court declined to reopen a closed case, where a former debtor sought to enforce the
discharge injunction against a former spouse in domestic relations litigation. See In re
Carter, 156 B.R. 768 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993); In re Danley, 14 B.R. 493 (Bankr. D.N.M.
1981); see also In re Abma, 215 B.R. 148 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). By declining to
reopen, it was left to the state court to enforce the bankruptcy discharge, while also
applying relevant state domestic relations law. See, e.g., In re Danley, 14 B.R. at 495-96.
see generally Pa. R. Civ. P. 1030 (discharge is an affirmative defense which may be
raised in Pennsylvania state court); Birdman v. Medley, 261 Pa. Super. 23 (1978). 4
Conversely, there have been other courts that have reopened a bankruptcy
case and enforced the discharge injunction in domestic relations cases. See, e.g., In re
Fluke, 305 B.R. 635 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004); In re Brabham, 184 B.R. 476 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1995). Those courts that have granted motions to reopen have generally done so to
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preclude a state court from modifying a previously entered equitable distribution decree
based upon a bankruptcy discharge; however, modification of a previously entered
alimony award has been viewed 	by them as permissible. See In re Brabham, 184
B.R. at 487:
In this Court's view, whether the family court seeks to
subsequently modify support, maintenance or alimony as
opposed to a property settlement, is the paramount factor in
the determination of whether such action violates a prior
bankruptcy discharge.
See also In re Henderson, 324 B.R. 302 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2005); Collett v. Collett, 270
Neb. 722 (2005).
Two recent decisions from Pennsylvania’s appellate courts involved the
application of the effect of the federal discharge injunction in domestic relations cases.
First, in Cohen v. Goldberg, 554 Pa. 201 (1998), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
concluded that the trial court was correct in holding that a non-debtor spouse could not
offset her discharged claim against the debtor/husband’s share of the marital property.
Second, in Hogg v. Hogg, 816 A.2d 314 (Pa. Super. 2003), the Pennsylvania Superior
Court ruled that a “state court distributing the marital estate may not reaffirm the debtor
spouse’s obligations set out in the couple’s settlement agreement after those obligations
have been discharged by the bankruptcy court.” Id., at 316.
The Hogg decision involved enforcement of a property settlement
agreement entered into prior to the husband’s bankruptcy filing. The Cohen decision
involved a state court divorce action brought after the debtor’s bankruptcy case was
closed. Both decisions demonstrate the ability of the Pennsylvania court system to
address the scope of the bankruptcy discharge in divorce matters.
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In urging the parties to resolve their differences, I mentioned this issue at the5
hearing.
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C.
If the issue were simply as posed by the parties, I would decline to reopen
this case for a number of reasons: the case has been closed for almost 2½ years; the state
court has not yet ruled upon either alimony or equitable distribution matters; there are
myriad factors that must be analyzed under state law to properly resolve those issues, with
which the state court has the greatest experience; the possibility that there are
dischargeability issues outside of those within the exclusive jurisdiction of this court
under section 523(c); my inability to provide advice to the state court; and the state
court’s demonstrated ability to apply the bankruptcy discharge in domestic relations
matters. In short, the state court is fully competent to afford the parties complete relief
for their disputes, and this court cannot. See In re Apex Oil Co., Inc., 406 F.3d at 543.
However, there is another factor, overlooked by the parties, that tips the
balance toward reopening. 5
“It is well-recognized that a bankruptcy proceeding may be reopened to
administer estate assets and to determine whether additional assets may be available for
creditors of the estate.” In re Zinchiak, 406 F.3d 214, 224 (3d Cir. 2005). Mr. Ciccimaro
stated in his bankruptcy schedules that, after deduction for three outstanding liens against
the marital residence, there was only $5,000 in equity, which equity he claimed as
exempt. Yet, when the property was later sold, after payment of all liens and closing
costs, there are $111,000 in net proceeds remaining.
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I appreciate that the former chapter 7 trustee, Howard Glassman, Esquire,
closed the case without administering the realty, based upon the information found in Mr.
Ciccimaro’s schedules. By virtue of section 554(c), when he closed the case, the trustee
statutorily abandoned the debtor’s interest in the realty back to the debtor. Recent
decisions, however, suggest that a bankruptcy trustee may be able to revoke this
“technical abandonment” in certain limited circumstances. See, e.g., In re Woods, 173
F.3d 770 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Woods v. Kenan, 528 U.S. 878 (1999); see
also In re Zinchiak, 406 F.3d at 224:
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court found that Newcourt's
petition had the potential to generate assets for the benefit of
unsecured creditors of the Debtor's estate. This is notable
considering that previously the Bankruptcy Court had
concluded that there remained no equity in the residential
property for the benefit of the Debtor or unsecured creditors.
However, in the event that it was found that Newcourt had
failed to comply with the requirements of the DJA, and its
claim declared discharged and marked satisfied, additional
equity in the residential property could emerge for the benefit
of unsecured creditors.
At this point, I conclude only that reopening would allow a reappointed
chapter 7 trustee the opportunity to investigate whether to seek a portion of the real estate
sales proceeds, now held in escrow, for the benefit of the allowed unsecured creditors in
this case. Upon review, the trustee may conclude that no valid claim against the proceeds
exists; or I may reach that conclusion in a contested matter. See In re Tadlock, 338 B.R.
436 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2006).
In now reopening the case, I can, upon request of parties in interest, still
permit the state court to adjudicate the outstanding domestic relations issues before it
without interference from this court. Interestingly, to the extent a reappointed trustee
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would view Mr. Ciccimaro’s interest in the realty proceeds as property of the bankruptcy
estate, the bankruptcy trustee may attempt to participate in the state court litigation to
maximize Mr. Ciccimaro’s portion. Indeed, the trustee’s actions in that regard could aid
Ms. Emore, who is an unsecured creditor.
Accordingly, it is the better exercise of discretion to grant Mr. Ciccimaro’s
motion (albeit not necessarily for the reasons he raised) and reopen this closed bankruptcy
case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350(b). See In re Zinchiak. An appropriate order will be
entered.
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
In re 	: 	Chapter 7
EUGENE CICCIMARO 	:
Debtor 	: 	Bankruptcy No. 03-35430
.................................................
ORDER
.................................................
AND NOW, this 7th day of September 2006, for the reasons stated in the
accompanying memorandum, it is hereby ordered that this bankruptcy case is reopened
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350(b). The United States trustee shall reappoint a chapter 7
trustee forthwith to protect the interests of creditors and to insure the efficient
administration of this reopened case. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5010.
It is further ordered that a status hearing shall be held on Adversary No. 06-
0295 on November 6, 2006, in Bankruptcy Courtroom #2 at 9:30 a.m. Until that status
hearing, that adversary proceeding (but not the main bankruptcy case) is placed in
suspense. This will afford the trustee the opportunity to investigate and decide how to
administer this reopened case. 	Also at the status hearing, the trustee, plaintiff and
defendants will be afforded an opportunity to address the appropriate disposition of the
adversary proceeding.
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It is further ordered that, to the extent provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(b), the
bankruptcy stay does not apply to the pending state court litigation involving the debtor.
BRUCE FOX
United States Bankruptcy Judge
copies to:
David A. Scholl, Esq.
Regional Bankruptcy Center of SE PA
Law Office of David A. Scholl
6 St Albans Avenue
Newtown Square, PA 19073
Carole L. Hendrick, Esq.
Attorney at Law
3927 Mill Road
Collegeville, PA 19426
Christina M. Rogomentick, Esq.
Willig, Williams & Davidson
1814 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Howard T. Glassman, Esq.
One Logan Square, 3rd Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Frederic J. Baker, Esq.
Office of the U.S. Trustee
833 Chestnut Street, Suite 500
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Margaret S. Phiambolis, Esq.
1012 Bethlehem Pike, Suite 103
P.O. Box 356
Spring House, PA 19477
Case 06-00295-bif Doc 12 Filed 09/07/06 Entered 09/08/06 15:21:16 Desc Main
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