SANTUCCI v. BOROUGH OF UPLAND et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CARMEN SANTUCCI,
Plaintiff,
v.
BOROUGH OF UPLAND, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 25-5172
ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of October 2025, upon consideration of the Motions to
Dismiss by Defendants Borough of Upland and Richard Slifer (Dkt. No. 19), Walter
Omlor (Dkt. No. 21) and Andrew Goldberg and Georgia Stone (Dkt. No. 22), it is
ORDERED that the Motions are GRANTED.
1. 	Santucci may amend his Complaint, consistent with the accompanying
Memorandum, on or before Wednesday, November 26, 2025.
2. 	All claims against Stone and Goldberg are DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Stone and Goldberg from the
case.
3. 	The procedural due process claim against Slifer premised on jurisdiction; the
procedural due process claim against Omlor premised on jurisdiction; the
Fourth Amendment claim against Omlor premised on jurisdiction; and the
conspiracy claim against Slifer and Omlor are DISMISSED with prejudice.
4. 	All remaining claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
Case 2:25-cv-05172-GJP Document 30 Filed 10/28/25 Page 1 of 2

It is also ORDERED that Dkt. Nos. 12,1 13 and 142 and 283 are DENIED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gerald J. Pappert
Gerald J. Pappert, J.
1 	Santucci seeks to prevent any municipal-funded lawyer from representing Richard Slifer.
See (Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify Borough Funded Counsel for Richard Slifer at 1–8, Dkt. No. 12). But he
cannot show a constitutional injury for Article III standing purposes. He has not alleged “more than
a de minimis amount of tax revenue has been expended on the challenged practice itself.” Nichols v.
City of Rehoboth Beach, 836 F.3d 275, 281 (3d Cir. 2016). Even if he had standing to pursue this
claim, Santucci fails to adequately explain how the Borough violates state law by funding Slifer’s
counsel. See, e.g., (Borough of Upland & Richard Slifer, Resp. to Mot. to Disqualify Counsel for
Richard Slifer at 1–6, Dkt. No. 16).
2 	Santucci filed motions seeking to prevent any state-funded lawyer from representing Georgia
Stone and Andrew Goldberg. See (Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify State-Funded Counsel for Stone and
Goldberg at 1–7, Dkt. No. 13); (Pl’s Am. Mot. to Disqualify State-Funded Counsel for Stone and
Goldberg at 1–7, Dkt. No. 14). To support the motions, he argues that Pennsylvania law prohibits
the State from funding lawyers to represent Stone and Goldberg because they acted outside the
scope of their offices. (Pl.’s Am. Mot. to Disqualify State-Funded Counsel at 3–4.) According to
Santucci, the “Commonwealth seeks to use” the “tax contributions” of Pennsylvania citizens to
“defend officials accused of systematically violating” his constitutional rights. (Id. at 5–6.) The
question before the Court, Santucci says, is “whether Pennsylvania taxpayers should be compelled to
fund the legal defense of public officials.” (Id. at 2.) The Court can reject this argument on Article
III standing grounds. Santucci does not have standing for at least one reason: He hasn’t suffered an
injury. A state taxpayer concerned that government officials have misspent his tax dollars does not
have a personal stake in the dispute and thus lacks the concrete and particularized injury that
Article III requires. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343 (2006).
3 	Santucci filed a motion to strike Walter Omlor’s reply brief for allegedly violating the Court’s
policies and procedures. See (Pl.’s Mot. to Strike Def.’s Reply Br., Dkt. No. 28). The Court denies the
motion as moot.
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