SANTUCCI v. BOROUGH OF UPLAND et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CARMEN SANTUCCI,
Plaintiff,
v.
BOROUGH OF UPLAND, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 25-5172
Pappert, J. 	April 14, 2026
MEMORANDUM
Pro se plaintiff Carmen Santucci sued the Borough of Upland and four local
officials—Richard Slifer, Walter Omlor, Georgia Stone and Andrew Goldberg—under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating his constitutional rights. The Court dismissed the
claims against Stone and Goldberg with prejudice but allowed Santucci to amend most
of his other claims. Santucci v. Borough of Upland, No. 25-5172, 2025 WL 3016519, at
*8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2025); (Order, Dkt. No. 30.) Rather than amend, Santucci moved
for reconsideration. The Court denied the motion but extended the date by which
Santucci could amend his complaint. Santucci v. Borough of Upland, No. 25-5172, 2026
WL 27562, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2026); (Order, Dkt. No. 40.) In his amended
complaint, Santucci sues the Borough, Slifer and Omlor alleging largely the same facts
and claims the Court already addressed. The defendants again move to dismiss, and
the Court grants their motions and dismisses the amended complaint with prejudice.
I
The Borough prohibits individuals from parking “motor vehicles” on “unpaved”
land “in connection with a residential . . . establishment.” Upland, Pa. Code ch. 134, § 1
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(1969). A person who violates this ordinance commits a non-traffic summary offense.
See (Am. Compl. Ex. B, Dkt. No. 41); Santucci, 2025 WL 3016519, at *1. Over the past
few years, Richard Slifer—a code enforcement officer—cited Santucci eight times for
violating the ordinance. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) A state court found Santucci guilty in at
least some of these cases and imposed fines and costs. (Id. ¶ 16.) Warrants for
Santucci’s arrest were issued as well. (Id. ¶ 17.) In possession of the warrants, Walter
Omlor, the local constable, engaged in “face-to-face encounters” with Santucci but never
arrested him. (Id. ¶¶ 18–20.) Reading Santucci’s amended complaint by reference to
his original complaint, (id. ¶ 6), Omlor coerced him to pay at least some of the fines and
costs, Santucci, 2025 WL 3016519, at *2.
II
The Court assesses the sufficiency of a pleading before discovery under Federal
Civil Rules 8 and 12. Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint “must contain . . . a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). And Rule 12(b)(6) permits a district court to dismiss a complaint that
fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. 12(b)(6). Taken together,
the two rules require the plaintiff to allege sufficient “facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The first
step in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a plausible claim is to “tak[e] note of
the elements” underlying his claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009);
Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 129–30 (3d Cir. 2010). The second
step is to examine the plaintiff’s complaint and determine whether the factual
allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
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Plausibility requires the plaintiff to plead sufficient facts to allow “the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 678. The reasonableness of an inference depends on common sense and the
strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct. Connelly v. Lane
Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786–87 (3d Cir. 2016); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682. Plaintiffs do
not meet the plausibility burden when the facts alleged are “merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability” or show nothing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In gauging the
plausibility of a claim, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations, construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw
reasonable inferences from them. Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786 n.2. Because Santucci is
proceeding pro se, the Court construes his complaint liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th
182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021).
III
A
Santucci first alleges Slifer deprived him of procedural due process. (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 32–118.) No State may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property” without “due
process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To state a procedural due process claim,
Santucci must allege Slifer “deprive[d]” him of “life, liberty, or property” and he did so
without “due process of law”—without according him the procedural protections the
Constitution requires. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233–34 (3d Cir.
2006).
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Santucci suggests he was deprived of money. He says Slifer cited him eight
times for parking his car on unpaved land, a state judge imposed fines and costs for at
least some of the citations and Omlor coerced him to pay money to the state court. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 16.) Because money is property, Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 572 (1972), and because Santucci paid at least some of the fines and costs, he
was deprived of property, Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir.
2013).
Santucci fails, however, to show a lack of due process. Before a state or local
government may deprive an individual of money, due process requires it to provide
“notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
Notice mailed to a person’s home generally satisfies due process. Mennonite Bd. of
Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983); Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226
(2006). For each citation Slifer filed, the state court summoned Santucci to appear. See
generally (Am. Compl. Exhibits at 1–26, Dkt. No. 41-1).
Santucci responds he did not receive actual notice. But a local government need
not provide actual notice; it “must attempt to provide actual notice.” Dusenbery v.
United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002). Again, the state court issued summonses for
Santucci to appear in court to challenge his citations. And Santucci alleges no facts to
suggest the summonses were insufficient for due process purposes. For example, as the
Court previously explained, he does not allege the Borough or any local official knew
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something went awry with the delivery of the summonses. Santucci, 2025 WL 3016519,
at *4.
Santucci also argues three public dockets prove he didn’t receive notice of three
citations. (Pl.’s Resp. to the Borough and Slifer’s Mot. to Dismiss at 8, Dkt. No. 44.)
According to him, those dockets indicate the state court summonses were either
undelivered or canceled. (Am. Compl. Ex. E); (Id. Ex. I); (Id. Ex. N.) But each of those
dockets show the state court sent multiple summonses for the corresponding citations.
That one summons was undelivered or canceled does not mean the local government
did not comply with due process.
Santucci also fails to allege he took advantage of the process available to him. A
local government does not violate due process “when it has made procedural protection
available and the plaintiff has simply refused to avail himself of” it. Alvin v. Suzuki,
227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Slifer cited Santucci eight times for
parking his car on unpaved land connected to his home, (Am. Compl. ¶ 11), and a state
court issued summonses. (Am. Compl. Exs. at 1–26.) The local constable, Omlor, went
to Santucci’s home and talked with him about the citations. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18–20.)
And Santucci says he sent money to the state court. Santucci, 2025 WL 3016519, at *2.
Santucci never alleges he appeared in state court to contest the citations. He “cannot
skip that process and use the federal courts as a means to get back what he wants.”
Alvin, 227 F.3d at 116.
B
Santucci next claims the Borough’s ordinance is so irrational it violates
substantive due process. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 119–22.) Substantive due process is a
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“component of the [Fourteenth Amendment] that protects individual liberty against
certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (citation
omitted). A land-use regulation may violate substantive due process if it is irrational.
Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 689 (3d Cir. 1990).
The Borough’s ordinance is not irrational. It prohibits individuals from parking
“motor vehicles” on “unpaved” land “in connection with a residential . . . establishment.”
Upland, Pa. Code ch. 134, § 1 (1969). Several plausible reasons exist for this ordinance.
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993); see also Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc.
v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 367 (3d Cir. 2012) (those attacking the rationality of
a law under substantive due process “have the burden to negative every conceivable
basis which might support it”) (citation omitted). Parking a car on unpaved land
connected to a home, for example, may decrease a property’s value by making the home
look cluttered, or such conduct may damage underground infrastructure. No matter
how unjust or unwise Santucci may see the Borough’s ordinance, it easily survives
under rational-basis review.
C
Santucci also alleges Omlor and Slifer violated substantive due process by
engaging in conscience-shocking conduct. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 123–36.)1 Abuse of executive
power may violate substantive due process in rare circumstances. County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). To state a claim for abusive executive
1 	Though Santucci brings his claim against Omlor under a heading that states “Fourth
Amendment,” he argues that Omlor violated the “Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,” which “protects individuals against arbitrary and oppressive government action that
‘shocks the conscience.’” (Am. Compl. ¶ 123.)
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action, Santucci must allege “conscience-shocking” conduct. Id. at 849. The “behavior”
of the governmental officer must be “egregious” and “outrageous.” Id. at 847 n.8.
Santucci fails to meet this standard. He claims Omlor, possessing the warrants
for his arrest, “engaged in multiple face-to-face encounters” with him. (Am. Compl.
¶ 127.) And he argues Slifer is listed as his “arresting officer” on several of the public
docket sheets corresponding to his citations even though Slifer never actually arrested
him. (Id. ¶ 136.) Neither of these allegations show conscience-shocking behavior.
D
Finally, Santucci seeks to hold the Borough liable for violations of his Fourteenth
Amendment right to procedural due process. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32–118, 137–47.) To
prevail, he must show (1) he suffered a constitutional violation and (2) a municipal
policy or custom directly caused the violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436
U.S. 658, 690–92 (1978). But as explained, Santucci fails to state a procedural due
process claim. And even if Santucci could show a procedural due process violation, he
fails to show a municipal custom caused that violation. He says the Borough had a
“custom of obstructing the discovery of evidence.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 137, 139.) But in
support, he alleges only that the Borough denied his three requests for information
pertaining to his citations and Slifer’s employment history. (Id. ¶¶ 139–47.) Three
vague instances of alleged misconduct—all involving Santucci himself—do not show a
practice so widespread and persistent it has the force of law. Hildreth v. Butler, 960
F.3d 420, 428 (7th Cir. 2020).
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IV
A court should “freely give leave” to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2). If a “civil-rights complaint fails to state a claim,” a court “must grant
leave to amend the complaint unless amendment would be futile or inequitable.”
Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 113 (3d Cir. 2018). Santucci
already amended and does not move to amend again. Plus, amendment would be futile.
Santucci alleged the same facts and claims in both his original and amended
complaints, making no effort to cure the deficiencies the Court highlighted in its
previous opinion.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gerald J. Pappert
Gerald J. Pappert, J.
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