MARQUIS v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS, (PGW)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SA’MONE MARQUIS, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 2:25-cv-07005-JDW
:
PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS, (PGW), 	:
Defendant. 	:
MEMORANDUM
Sa’mone Marquis asserts claims under the American With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101
et seq. For the following reasons, I will grant Ms. Marquis leave to proceed
in
forma pauperis and dismiss the Amended Complaint without prejudice. I will grant her
leave to file a second amended complaint if she can allege additional facts to cure the
deficiencies that I identify in this Memorandum.
I. 	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
In 2025, PGW hired Ms. Marquis as a call-center representative. She suffers from
chronic asthma, cardiac-related symptoms, and anxiety. She disclosed these conditions
and requested unspecified accommodations. PGW granted temporary accommodations
but terminated Ms. Marquis before she could submit a doctor’s note or “engage in a
permanent interactive process.” (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 7.1) She also experienced “sexual
1 Ms. Marquis filed an amended complaint on December 30, 2025. An amended
complaint supersedes the prior pleading and serves as the governing pleading in a case.
See W. Run Student Hous. Assocs. LLC v. Huntingdon Nat’l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d
Cir. 2013).
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harassment and hostile conduct, including inappropriate comments about appearance,
intrusive behavior, and inconsistent enforcement of policies” (
id. ¶ 8), but she does not
describe these events with any detail; state whether these were the acts of supervisors,
coworkers, or others; describe the “policies;” or state when these events occurred. She
reported safety concerns related to her disabilities and “within days of making these
protected disclosures, [she] was terminated.” (
Id. ¶¶ 9, 10.) PGW claimed that she lied
about the incidents, but she contends this was pretextual.
Ms. Marquis asserts a claim for disability discrimination. She asserts a claim for
failure to accommodate because, even though an accommodation was “temporarily
granted,” PGW “failed to engage in the interactive process by not following up to receive
documentation, discuss alternatives, or implement permanent accommodations” before
she was fired. (
Id. ¶¶ 13, 14.) Ms. Marquis also asserts a retaliation claim. She also claims
she was terminated for unlawful and retaliatory reasons and was subjected to “sexual
harassment, inconsistent policy enforcement, and conduct exacerbating her disabilities.”
(
Id. ¶ 18.)
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plaintiff seeking leave to proceed
in forma pauperis must establish that she is
unable to pay for the costs of her suit.
See Walker v. People Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d
598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989). Where, as here, a court grants a plaintiff leave to proceed
in forma
pauperis, it must determine whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be
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granted.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). That inquiry applies the standard for a motion to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Pursuant to that standard, I must determine whether
the Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations
omitted). That means I must accept the factual allegations in the Complaint as true, draw
inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and determine whether there is a plausible claim.
See
Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021). Conclusory allegations do not
suffice.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When a plaintiff is proceeding
pro se,, I construe her
allegations liberally.
See Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021). However, “
pro se
litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A.	
In Forma Pauperis
Ms. Marquis has completed the Court’s required forms to show, and attested
under penalty of perjury, that she cannot afford to pay the required fees. I will therefore
grant her leave to proceed
in forma pauperis.
B. 	Plausibility Of Claims
The 	ADA 	prohibits 	covered 	entities 	from 	discriminating 	against 	qualified
employees based on their disabilities.
Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., Inc., 961 F.3d 242, 245
(3d Cir. 2020). Ms. Marquis asserts she was terminated on account of a disability, PGW
failed to accommodate her disability, and she suffered retaliation and a hostile work
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environment. Because her allegations in the Amended Complaint are best described as
vague, undeveloped, and lacking in any specifics, she has failed to allege facts to make
her claims plausible and they cannot proceed.
1. 	Termination
To state a claim for employment discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must
allege that she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, she was “otherwise
qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable
accommodations by the employer[;] and she suffered an otherwise adverse employment
decision as a result of discrimination.”
Morgan v. Allison Crane & Rigging LLC, 114 F.4 214,
221 (3d Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted)). An “adverse employment decision” can include
refusing to make reasonable accommodations for employee’s disabilities.
See Gaul v.
Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 579 (3d Cir. 1998).
A person is disabled within the meaning of the ADA if they: (1) have ‘“a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more’ of their ‘major life activities’; (2)
have ‘a record of such an impairment’; or (3) are ‘regarded as having such an impairment.’”
Morgan, 114 F.4 at 221 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). Major life activities include,
inter
alia, breathing and the functions of the brain, and the respiratory and circulatory systems.
§ 12102(2)(A), (B). Ms. Marquis alleges that she has asthma, cardiac issues, and anxiety,
that those conditions limit her major life activities, including breathing and stress
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regulation, and that she communicated all of this to PGW. She has therefore plausibly
alleged that she has a disability withing the meaning of the ADA
However, Ms. Marquis does not allege facts supporting that she was otherwise
qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without accommodations.
She does not describe her job functions or how the nature of her disability, with or without
an accommodation, impacted her qualification to perform those functions. She also has
failed to allege that she was terminated because of disability discrimination. Ms. Marquis
alleges only that PGW terminated her employment “before she could submit a doctor’s
note or engage in a permanent interactive process.” (ECF No. 7, ¶ 7.) This fails to allege
plausibly that she suffered an adverse employment action because of discrimination. I will
therefore dismiss her termination claim.
2. 	Failure to accommodate
Discrimination under the ADA “encompasses not only adverse actions motivated
by prejudice and fear of disabilities, but also includes failing to make reasonable
accommodations for a plaintiff's disabilities.”
Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296,
306 (3d Cir. 1999). To state a claim for a failure to accommodate under the ADA, a plaintiff
must allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that (a) she was disabled
and her employer knew it; (b) she requested an accommodation or assistance; (c) her
employer did not make a good faith effort to assist; and (d) she could have been
reasonably accommodated.
Capps v. Mondelez Global, LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir.
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2017). Ms. Marquis alleges that she was provided otherwise unspecified “temporary
accommodations” but does not identify any accommodation or assistance that she
requested and PGW failed to provide or failed to make a good faith effort to provide. Any
claim based on a failure to accommodate is, therefore, not plausible.
3. 	Hostile work environment
To state a claim for a hostile work environment in the context of the ADA, a plaintiff
must allege that (1) she is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA; (2) she
was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) her employer harassed her because of her
disability or because of a request for an accommodation; (4) the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of plaintiff’s employment and to
cause an abusive working environment; and (5) the defendant employer knew or should
have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt effective remedial action.
See
Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999). But the ADA
does not create a general civility code.
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
788 (1998).
Ms. Marquis asserts in conclusory terms only that she experienced a hostile work
environment and sexual harassment. This type of conclusory allegation is not sufficient to
allege a claim.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Her ambiguous and vague allegations that fail to
describe events of harassment with any detail, identify who was involved, or provide a
temporal context for the events means that her claim fails to comply with Rule 8’s
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requirement of a short plain statement sufficient to provide enough information to put a
defendant on notice to prepare a defense. I will therefore dismiss this claim.
4. 	Retaliation
The ADA retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), states that “[n]o person shall
discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or
practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual made a charge ... under
[the ADA].” This provision is like Title VII’s prohibition of retaliation.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a). Accordingly, courts analyze ADA retaliation claims under the same framework
employed for retaliation claims arising under Title VII.
Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126
F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing cases).
A plaintiff states a plausible retaliation claim based on disability discrimination if
she “pleads sufficient factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of the following elements: (1) she engaged in conduct protected by
Title VII [or here the ADA]; (2) the employer took adverse action against her; and (3) a
causal link exists between her protected conduct and the employer’s adverse action.”
Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016). A general complaint about
unfair treatment does not constitute protected activity; a plaintiff must allege that she
complained specifically about unlawful discrimination.
Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d
694, 702 (3d Cir. 1995). Under the ADA, seeking an accommodation is a “protected
activity.”
Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).
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Ms. Marquis’s vague allegations concerning retaliation are undeveloped and,
accordingly, fail to allege a plausible retaliation claim. First, she does not identify the
“safety concerns” she reported. Second, while she claims she was terminated shortly after
disclosing her medical condition, requesting accommodations, and reporting harassment,
she fails to identify the nature of any accommodation that she requested (or any that
PGW denied in bad faith) or state any non-conclusory facts concerning harassment. Thus,
she fails to assert plausibly that she engaged in protected conduct or that a causal link
exists between protected conduct and her termination.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
I will grant Ms. Marquis leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and dismiss the
Amended Complaint without prejudice. Given her
pro se status, I will give Ms. Marquis
leave to file a second amended complaint if she can allege additional facts to cure the
defects that I have identified in her claims. An appropriate Order follows containing
additional instructions as to amendment. I will deny her motion for referral to mediation
as premature.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joshua D. Wolson
JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J.
January 8, 2026
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