Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Case No. 2:26-cv-06694-JDW
MEMORANDUM
If at first you don’t succeed, try, try again.1 That is the motto guiding the
Government’s legal strategy to justify its mass detention of noncitizens residing in this
country without proper immigration status. At the very least, it seems to have motivated
the treatment of Mehmet Ali Basboga. Officers from U.S. Immigrations And Customs
Enforcement detained Mr. Basboga under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, even though the Third Circuit
had held that ICE lacked the authority to do so. ICE did not offer him any basis for his
detention at the time. Ten days later, recognizing that it lacked the authority to detain Mr.
Basboga under Section 1225(b), the Government pivoted to a new theory: it designated
1 Thomas H. Palmer,
The Teacher’s Manual: Being an Exposition of an Efficient and
Economical System of Education, Suited to the Wants of a Free People (1840). Edward
Hickson later popularized this phrase in his own book,
The Singing Master, published in
1836.
See U.S. Dictionary,
If at First You Don’t Succeed, Try, Try Again: Definition, Meaning,
and Origin (Jan. 13, 2024), https://usdictionary.com/idioms/if-at-first-you-dont-succeed-
try-try-again/.
MEHMET ALI BASBOGA,
Petitioner,
v.
JAMAL L. JAMISON, Warden Of
Philadelphia Federal Detention Center,
et al.,
Respondents.
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his arrest as pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). But to proceed under Section 1226(a), the
Government had to make an individualized determination about Mr. Basboga, and it
never did. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus to remedy that failure, and I will grant it.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	INA Detention Provisions
The Immigration And Nationalities Act allows for detention of noncitizens in
removal proceedings under two provisions: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. I will not spend too
much time on Section 1225, as the thrust of the legal issue in this case pertains to Section
1226(a). To paint the full picture, however, I note that Section 1225, entitled “Inspection
by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for
hearing” provides for the mandatory detention of “applicant[s] for admission.” 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A). The Third Circuit confirmed this summer that “applicant[s] for admission”
refers to noncitizens detained at the border and does not apply to those found already
within the country.
See Buele Morocho v. Warden Philadelphia FDC, No. 26-1150, 2026
WL 2546223, at *5 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026).
8 U.S.C. § 1226, entitled “Apprehension and detention of aliens,” grants the
Attorney General 	discretion 	to 	arrest 	and 	detain 	noncitizens 	currently in 	removal
proceedings (except for those that fall under the statutory exception set forth in Section
1226(c)).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This section further provides that the Government may
“continue to detain the arrested” noncitizen or release him on bond or conditional parole.
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Id. § 1226(a)(1)-(2). Immigration officers make an initial custody determination, after which
the noncitizen may appeal that decision to an immigration judge (“IJ”) to review during a
bond hearing. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1). Either party may appeal an IJ’s decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Id. § 1236.1(d)(3). The noncitizen’s bond remains
subject to revocation under Section 1226(b) if he is released. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b). To secure
his release, a noncitizen must convince the immigration officer charged with his custody
decision, or the IJ at a bond hearing, that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the
community.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), 1003.19(h)(3);
Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397–
98 (2019).
When ICE detains a noncitizen, it uses two forms to create a record. The first is an
I-213 Form, which is the “official record that immigration officials prepare when initially
processing a person suspected of being in the United States without lawful permission.”
Vera Punin v. Garland, 108 F.4th 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2024). The BIA has stated that the I-213
Form is “inherently trustworthy and admissible as evidence” to prove deportability.
In re
Ponce–Hernandez, 22 I & N Dec. 784, 785 (BIA 1999). ICE Agents typically use an I-213
Form to document the reasons for their actions. The second form is an I-286 Form, which
informs a noncitizen of ICE’s decision—
i.e., whether to detain or release him and, if he is
released, any bond or conditions of release—and informs him of his right to request a
custody redetermination hearing before an IJ.
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B. 	Mr. Basboga’s Detention
Mr. Basboga, a native and citizen of Türkiye, entered the United States in February
2023. Agents from Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) apprehended him upon entry
but released him into the United States shortly afterwards and referred him to ICE for
enrollment in the Alternatives to Detention program. At the same time, CBP placed Mr.
Basboga into removal proceedings and issued him a Notice to Appear before the
immigration court. In August 2023, Mr. Basboga file an Application for Asylum and
Withholding of Removal with the immigration court.
On August 31, 2026, Mr. Basboga appeared for a regularly scheduled ICE check-in
at a field office in Pennsylvania, where ICE arrested and detained him. That same day, ICE
agents completed an I-213 form for him, which documented Mr. Basboga’s background,
including his immigration status and history, criminal record, health, and the details
concerning his arrest on that day. 	(ECF No. 5-2 at 1–4.) The I-213 form states that ICE
decided to detain Mr. Basboga “[d]ue to available bed space.” (
Id. at 3.) Though the I-213
form doesn’t say it, ICE detained Mr. Basboga under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Tr. at 38.2)
However, on September 10, 2026, following the Third Circuit’s decision in
Buele Morocho
v. Warden Philadelphia FDC, No. 26-1150, 2026 WL 2546223 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026), ICE
executed and served Mr. Basboga with an I-286, advising him of its decision to detain him
2 Citations to “Tr.” refer to the transcript of the hearing that I conducted on September
29, 2026.
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during the remainder of his removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and offering him
the opportunity to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge.
C. 	Procedural History
On September 5, 2026, just a few days before ICE issued his I-286 form, Mr.
Basboga filed a Petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court while detained at the
Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia. He argues that his detention under Section
1226(a) 	without 	an 	individualized 	custody 	determination 	either 	prior 	to 	or
contemporaneously 	with 	his 	arrest 	violated 	his 	Fifth 	Amendment 	procedural 	and
substantive due process rights and several provisions of the APA related to agency
decision-making. The Government maintains that Mr. Basboga is lawfully detained under
Section 1226(a). It also argues that Mr. Basboga needs to exhaust his administrative
remedies before filing a habeas petition in federal court. 	On September 29, 2026, the
Parties appeared for oral argument in the case to discuss several issues that I identified
as needing further clarity in their briefing. During argument, Mr. Basboga (through
counsel) abandoned his APA claims.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 2241 grants federal district courts the authority to review the legality of
immigration-related detention.
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). The
district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner is “in custody under
or by color of the authority of the United States ... in violation of the Constitution or laws
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or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(1), (c)(3). It is the petitioner’s burden
to show that his detainment violates the Constitution or federal law.
See id. § 2241(c)(3);
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941). In that same vein, courts recognize that it is
the petitioner’s burden to prove facts entitling him to release from custody.
Goins v.
Brierley, 464 F.2d 947, 949, 949 n.4 (3d Cir. 1972) (listing cases).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Mr. Basboga conceded his claims under the APA, and it is unclear to me whether
he means to abandon his substantive due process claim as well. During oral argument,
counsel vacillated between substantive and procedural due process, blurring the lines
between the claims and relying primarily on procedural due process case law and
principles. Because it is unclear to me whether counsel meant to concede this claim in
addition to the APA claims, and because I can resolve this case on procedural due process
grounds, I focus solely on the procedural due process claim.
A. 	Exhaustion
Habeas petitioners ordinarily must exhaust their administrative remedies under
Section 2241.
Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000). However, the statute
itself does not contain an exhaustion requirement, making exhaustion under Section 2241
prudential rather than mandatory.
Id.;
see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992). Courts will excuse exhaustion where: (1) the administrative remedies would be
futile; 	(2) 	the 	agency’s 	actions 	“clearly 	and 	unambiguously 	violate 	statutory 	or
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constitutional rights”; or (3) the administrative procedure at issue “is clearly shown to be
inadequate to prevent irreparable injury.”
Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d
Cir. 1988).
In this case, the Government conceded at oral argument that Mr. Basboga’s could
not exhaust his due process claims before an immigration judge. (Tr. at 17.) On its own,
that concession might be enough for me to excuse exhaustion. But I don’t have to rely
just on the concession because the concession was well-founded, and requiring Mr.
Basboga to exhaust his administrative remedies would be futile. Mr. Basboga challenges
on procedural due process grounds the process through which ICE detained him pursuant
to Section 1226(a). Exhaustion “is not always required when the petitioner advances a due
process claim.”
Khan v. Attorney Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation
modified). “’If the argument, stripped of its due process language, could have been made
before and adjudicated by the BIA, then it must be exhausted as any other claim.”
Okorafor v. Att'y Gen. of United States, 787 F. App’x 808, 810 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing
Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448 (3d Cir. 2005)). A claim is available before the
BIA if it is: (1) “within the jurisdiction of the BIA to consider and implicate[s] agency
expertise,” and (2) within the agency’s capability to grant “the remedy sought by” the
noncitizen.
Bonhometre, 414 F.3d at 447.
The BIA does not have authority to adjudicate constitutional issues like Mr.
Basboga’s due process challenge.
See Qatanani v. Att'y Gen. United States of Am., 144
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F.4th 485, 499–500 (3d Cir. 2025);
Mudric v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 469 F.3d 94, 98 (3d Cir.
2006). Mr. Basboga raises constitutional errors that he claims ICE committed through the
process by which it detained him, not the merits of its custody decision. Thus, Mr.
Basboga’s invocation of due process is not a semantic reframing of an argument that
belongs in immigration court. It is, instead, a constitutional challenge to the initial process
that he received. It is, instead, an argument beyond any IJ’s authority. Requiring Mr.
Basboga to exhaust his due process claims in front of a tribunal that does not have
authority to adjudicate them would be futile.
See Khan, 448 F.3d at 236 n.8;
Qatanani, 144
F.4th at 499–500.
B. 	Procedural Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal Government
from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. amend. V. At the heart of the liberty that the Due Process Clause protects is
freedom from government custody, detention, and other forms of physical restraint.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. That liberty applies to “all persons” within the United States,
including noncitizens, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
permanent.”
Id. at 693 (quoting
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982)).
I am not reviewing the decision to detain Mr. Basboga because, as the Supreme
Court recognizes, “detention during deportation proceedings” is a “constitutionally valid
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aspect of the deportation process.”
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Instead, I
only ask whether the process DHS used to detain Mr. Basboga satisfies the Constitution.
The Government concedes that when ICE arrested Mr. Basboga on August 31,
2026, it did so under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). (Tr. at 38.) However, the Third Circuit’s
Buele
Morocho decision, released three days before Mr. Basboga’s arrest, made clear that
noncitizens in Mr. Basboga’s position could not be detained under that provision of the
INA.
See 2026 WL 2546223, at *7. The Government therefore illegally detained Mr.
Basboga on August 31, 2026. At argument, counsel for the Government suggested that
there was “confusion” in the wake of the Third Circuit’s decision that led to Mr. Basboga’s
detention (Tr. at 10), but that doesn’t matter. DHS was on notice of the ruling as soon as
it came out, and any actions contrary to the Third Circuit’s ruling after that time were
illegal. As a result, I must ask two questions: (1) is it possible for the Government to cure
its initial illegal detention under Section 1225, and (2) did the Government cure its illegal
detention of Mr. Basboga in this case. I first address whether cure is possible.
1. 	Initial detention violation and cure potential
Federal courts recognize the ability to remedy violations of due process rights
through subsequent curative methods in several contexts. For example, a state may cure
a procedural deprivation by later providing a procedural remedy.
See Bonilla v. City of
Allentown, 359 F. Supp.3d 281, 297 (E.D. Pa. 2019),
as amended (Apr. 19, 2019). An inmate
is not deprived of procedural due process where an administrative appeal cures a prior
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disciplinary hearing’s procedural defects.
See Russell v. Scully, 15 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir.
1993),
as modified on denial of reh'g (Jan. 3, 1994). An agency can cure a due process
violation resulting from inaction on a petition by ruling on that petition.
See McCoy v.
United States, 758 F. Supp. 299, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
In the context of habeas petitions, “[t]he Supreme Court “has repeatedly stated
that federal courts may delay the release of a
successful habeas petitioner in order to
provide the State an opportunity to correct the constitutional violation found by the
court.“
Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 159, 168 (3d Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). Moreover,
government agencies, such as ICE, may cure procedural deficiencies by withdrawing prior
action and then following proper procedure.”
Gudino v. Lowe, No. 1:25-CV-00571, 2026
WL 526366, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2026) (citing
Soc'y Hill Towers Owners' Ass'n v. Rendell,
210 F.3d 168, 179 (3d Cir. 2000)). This accords with the principle of the habeas inquiry,
which “is whether Petitioner is
presently in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.”
Zhuno-Livicura v. Jamison, No. 26-CV-07255, 2026 WL 2936515, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2026) (citation modified) (emphasis added). In sum, I will not order
Mr. Basboga’s release based on an “alleged arrest defect” if his custody is now lawful.
See
id. (citing
Cocha Cocha v. Tsoukaris, No. 26-cv-9857, 2026 WL 2806733, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept.
18, 2026));
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952)).
2. 	Curing Mr. Basboga’s detention
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Although the Attorney General’s authority to grant bail is broad,
see Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 540 (1952), it is not limitless. Section 1226(a)’s language affirms the
Attorney General’s broad authority by providing that “[o]n a warrant issued by the
Attorney General,” a noncitizen “may be arrested and detained pending a decision” on
whether he is to be removed from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). However, the
discretionary language outlining that the Attorney General “may” arrest a noncitizen
provides limitation because it implies that there needs to be some level of individualized
determination made.
See id. Indeed, the Supreme Court has interpreted similar “may”
language in other provisions of the INA to require the Attorney General to make “some
level of individualized determination.”
See I.N.S. v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rts., Inc., 502
U.S. 183, 194 (1991) (analyzing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)). That begs two questions: when to make
the determination and what level of individualization is necessary.
The individualized custody determination required under Section 1226(a) need not
occur before detention, but it should nonetheless be prompt.
See Borbot v. Warden
Hudson Cnty. Corr. Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 2018). Detention under Section
1226(a) may eventually become unreasonably prolonged, presenting courts with a
separate due process issue.
	Id. Although Mr. Basboga seems to suggest that the
determination occur before detention (Tr. at 36), I disagree. The statute and implementing
regulations foreclose this argument, as they provide an immigration officer has discretion
to “release” a noncitizen if he proves he is eligible for bond. Simple logic dictates that to
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release a noncitizen, he must first be in custody.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(8);
see also O.F.C. v.
Almodovar, No. 25-CV-9816 (LJL), 2026 WL 74262, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2026).
The regulations also clarify the level of individualized determination required:
“[a]ny officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest
may, in the officer’s discretion,
release” a qualifying noncitizen if the noncitizen “demonstrate[s] ... that such release
would not pose a danger to property or persons” and he is “likely to appear for any future
proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (emphasis added). The regulations therefore provide
for an individualized custody determination following arrest, at which point immigration
officers consider whether to release a noncitizen based on a showing that he is not a
danger to the community or a flight risk.
See id. § 1236.1(c)(8). Several district judges in
this court and elsewhere have reached a similar conclusion.
See, e.g., Dos Reis v. McShane,
No. CV 26-3775, 2026 WL 1746649, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2026);
Hernandez, v. Blanche,
et al., No. CV 26-6195, 2026 WL 2569475, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2026);
Gopie v. Lyons,
No. 25-CV-05229-SJB, 2025 WL 3167130, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2025).
The 	record 	before 	me 	demonstrates 	that 	ICE 	did 	not 	make 	the 	required
individualized determination about Mr. Basboga. The I-213 Form that ICE provided Mr.
Basboga does not include an individualized determination about him; it just notes that a
bed was available for his detention. (Presumably, the agents didn’t do more at the time
because they were invoking section 1225(b), so they didn’t think they needed provide a
reason.) The availability of bed space is not an individualized determination about Mr.
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Basboga under Section 1226(a). That finding contains no connection to whether Mr.
Basboga is a danger to the community or a flight risk, nor does it address any other issue
that might impact ICE’s exercise of its discretion under the statute. Indeed, it fails to
undertake an individual examination of him in any sense. Judge Henry has reached a
similar conclusion with respect to a finding based on available bed space, and I find her
logic persuasive.
See Lopez-Abello, v. Jamison, et al., No. CV 26-6752, 2026 WL 2981935,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2026).
The I-286 Notice of Custody Determination Form also does not qualify as an
individualized determination. That form states only that ICE detained Mr. Basboga
pursuant to Section 1226(a) and offers him the opportunity to request a bond hearing.
(ECF No. 5-1 at 1.) It does not provide an explanation about why ICE chose to detain Mr.
Basboga. But a “statement of reasons must reveal reasoning, and not simply present
conclusions.”
Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 943 (3d Cir. 1988). While one might infer
from the I-286 that someone made an individual determination, it’s really a logical leap,
not a reasonable inference, to make that conclusion. It’s equally possible that someone
checked the detention box reflexively, without thinking about Mr. Basboga’s individual
situation. Due Process, however, demands some individual determination and that ICE be
able to show its work.
Although the Government has offered Mr. Basboga a bond hearing before an IJ,
that is not enough to cure its initial failure. The later bond hearing should offer an
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opportunity to redetermine what ICE has already determined, so the bond hearing does
not cure ICE’s lack of an initial, individualized determination. See
Dos Reis, 2026 WL
1746649, at *3;
Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2025).
Additionally, the regulations confirm that a bond hearing before an immigration judge
occurs “
[a]fter an initial custody determination.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1) (emphasis added).
The determination made concerning bond revocation at a hearing before an immigration
judge is a determination separate from the custody determination that an immigration
officer makes.
See id. And without DHS conducting a proper initial custody determination,
there is nothing that Mr. Basboga can ask an IJ to redetermine. Accordingly, a later bond
hearing before an IJ cannot serve as an adequate remedy for the requirement that DHS
make an individualized custody determination.
See Dos Reis, 2026 WL 1746649, at *3;
Diallo v. Jamison, No. CV 26-4895-KSM, 2026 WL 2547269, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2026).
To hold otherwise would be to offer ICE a roadmap to ignore the statutory requirement
of an initial custody determination by falling back on bond hearings before IJs.
3.	
Matthews v. Eldridge balancing
To determine whether a government action deprived an individual of due process,
courts balance three factors: (a) the private interest affected by official action; (b) the risk
of erroneous deprivation of that interest and the probable value of additional safeguards;
and (c) the Government’s interest, including the burden placed on it to provide the
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additional safeguards.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). All three of the
Mathews factors weigh in Mr. Basboga’s favor.
As to the first factor, the private interest affected here is the most significant liberty
interest that exists—freedom from imprisonment.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529
(2004). In the United States, liberty is the status quo, and detention prior to or without
trial is “the carefully limited exception.”
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
Detention, no matter the purpose, is a significant deprivation of liberty requiring due
process protection.
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983). The first
Mathews
factor weighs in Mr. Basboga’s favor.
As for the second factor, the lack of an individualized custody determination poses
a dangerous risk of erroneously depriving Mr. Basboga of his liberty. I have recognized
that “[t]he lack of any individualized assessment creates a high risk of error.”
Kashranov v.
Jamison, No. 2:25-CV-05555-JDW, 2025 WL 3188399, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025);
see
also Restrepo v. Jamison, 823 F. Supp. 3d 529 (E.D. Pa. 2026). Accordingly, the probable
value of making individualized custody determinations is high. I further note that
conducting an individualized custody determination does not require DHS to implement
additional safeguards to avoid the risk of erroneous deprivation; the INA’s regulations
provide petitioners with the opportunity to obtain their release by showing they are
neither a danger to the community or a flight risk.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). DHS need
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only allow for the opportunity already created by the applicable law. The second
Mathews
factor weighs in Mr. Basboga’s favor as well.
Finally, I acknowledge the Government’s interest in preventing danger to the
community and ensuring that noncitizens appear at future immigration proceedings.
However, the Government must nonetheless follow the law. Making individualized
custody determinations should address its concerns under Section 1226(a).
See Dos Reis,
2026 WL 1746649, at *5;
Hernandez, 2026 WL 2569475, at *5. At the same time, requiring
the Government to conduct individualized custody determinations would impose minimal
burden. The text of the INA and its regulations delineate the proper detention process
under Section 1226(a); it is not a burden on the Government to follow a process that
statute and regulation require.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)–(b); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1),
(d)(3). The third
Mathews factor weighs in favor of Mr. Basboga.
C. 	Remedy
Habeas is “above all, an adaptable remedy,” with its precise application and scope
“depending upon the circumstances.”
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008). At
its core, habeas is a remedy for unlawful detention.
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693
(2008). “The typical remedy” for an unlawful detention is release.
Id. (citing
Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)). The need for release is particularly clear in cases like
this because a later immigration court hearing would not “provide an adequate remedy
for the unconstitutional initial deprivation.”
Dos Reis, 2026 WL 1746649, at *5;
Dzehtisarou
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v. Mullin, No. CV 26-5060, 2026 WL 2211392, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2026). I will therefore
order Mr. Basboga’s immediate release from ICE custody. Should the Government seek to
re-detain 	him 	under 	Section 	1226(a), 	it 	must 	make 	the 	individualized 	custody
determination that the provision requires.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
I will grant Mr. Basboga’s petition on the grounds that he is unlawfully detained
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and order his immediate release. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joshua D. Wolson
JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J.
October 9, 2026
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