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Case 3:25-cv-01375-PJC Document15- Filed 10/15/26 Page 1 of 13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FRANK ROBERT BILLIG, : No. 3:25-CV-1375

Plaintiff : (Caraballo, M.J.)

FRANK J. BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social
Security Administration,

Defendant

MEMORANDUM

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Frank Billig seeks judicial review of the final decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security (‘Commissioner’) denying his
applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income (“SSI”) under Title II and Title VXI of the Social Security Act,
respectively. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title 42, United
States Code, Section 405(g), and Title 28, United States Code, Section
636(c).

Billig raises two primary challenges to Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) Edward L. Brady’s determination that Billig was not disabled
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under the Social Security Act. First, Billig contends that the ALJ failed
to explain why he rejected portions of a treating physician's opinion.
Doc. 11, at 1. Second, Billig posits that the ALJ erred in evaluating
medical opinion evidence when determining Billig’s residual functional
capacity. Id. The matter is fully briefed and ripe for decision.

As explained below, ALJ Brady’s residual functional capacity
determination was not supported by substantial evidence because he
failed to explain why, despite finding the relevant medical opinion
persuasive, he declined to incorporate its limitation to one and two-step
tasks. This discrepancy precludes meaningful judicial review because,
absent further explanation from the ALJ, the Court cannot discern
whether the limitation was considered and intentionally rejected, or
inadvertently omitted. Accordingly, the Court vacates the
Commissioner’s decision to deny Billig’s claims for social security
disability and SSI benefits and remands this case for proper

consideration of the one and two-step task limitation.

Case 3:25-cv-01375-PJC Document15- Filed 10/15/26 Page 3 of 13

Il Background!

On October 11, 2022, Frank Billig applied for disability insurance
and SSI benefits, alleging disability as of July 20, 2022, due to bipolar
disorder, ADD, pain in right leg, diabetes, and hypertension. Tr. 95.
The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Billig’s application
on July 13, 2028, id. at 157-66, and again upon reconsideration on
November 20, 2023. Jd. at 169-175. Billig accordingly requested and
received a hearing on May 7, 2024. Id. at 48-70; 182-83; 229-46.

On October 16, 2024, ALJ Brady issued a decision concluding that
Billig was not disabled. Id. at 14-37. Billig appealed to the Social
Security Appeals Council on October 27, 2024. Id. at 264-65. The
Appeals Council denied his request on May 30, 2025. Id. at 1-6. The
instant appeal followed. Doc. 1. The Commissioner provided the record
on September 29, 2025. Doc. 10. The parties then filed their respective

briefs, leaving this matter ripe for decision. Docs. 11, 18-14.

1 As the parties and the Court are well-acquainted with the facts underlying this
appeal, the Court only provides a brief summary of the procedural history, and
addresses the pertinent facts in the discussion below.

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Ill. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Review of the Commissioner’s decision denying a claimant’s
application for social security disability benefits is limited to
determining whether the factual findings of the final decisionmaker are
supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Johnson v. Comm’ of Soe. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (8d Cir. 2008).
Substantial in this context is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence
but may be less than a preponderance.” Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d
1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Put more pointedly, it is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). In an
adequately developed record, this can mean: “something less than the
weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision]
from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar.

Comm n., 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (citations omitted).

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Under this deferential standard, “[f]actual findings which are
supported by substantial evidence must be upheld.” Ficca v. Astrue,
901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). This Court’s role is not to re-weigh the evidence and make
factual determinations, but to simply review the record and ensure that
the ALJ provided “a discussion of the evidence and an explanation of
reasoning for her conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial
review.” Diaz v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (8d Cir. 2009)
(citations and quotations omitted). An ALJ meets that standard by
stating “in her decision which evidence she has rejected and which she
is relying on as the basis for her finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’ of SSA,
181 F.3d 429, 433 (8d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Moreover, when
there is countervailing evidence, an ALJ must “give some reason for
discounting the evidence she rejects.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,
A29 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also Mason v. Shalala,

994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (8d Cir. 1998) (holding that substantial evidence
standard is unmet when the Alu fails to resolve conflicts created by

countervailing evidence).

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B. The ALJ’s Failure to Explain the Exclusion of a One and
Two-Step Task Limitation

Billig posits that, notwithstanding ALJ Brady’s determination
that the opinion of state agency psychologist Dr. Timothy Ostrich was
persuasive, the ALJ failed to account for a limitation to “one and two-
step tasks/instructions” in Billig’s residual functional capacity. Doc. 11
at 13-14; Tr. 141, 153. More expansively, Billig contends that ALJ
Brady’s failure to address the limitation to one and two-step tasks
conflicts with the ALJ’s step five determination, which concluded that
Billig could perform jobs requiring reasoning levels of 2 and 3. Doc. 11
at 14-15. The Commissioner responds that the decision is supported by
substantial evidence because the ALJ was not obligated to adopt every
limitation opined by medical experts. Doc. 13 at 13-14 (citing
Reichenbach v. Comm’ of Soe. Sec., 2024 WL 4336301, at *1 n.1 (W.D.
Pa. 2024) (affirming decision despite the ALJ’s failure to incorporate an
identified one to two-step instruction limitation)).

The ALJ is tasked with assessing a claimant’s residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (S.S.A.
1996). “Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an

individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her

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“impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (8d
Cir. 2000) (quoting Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 359 (8d Cir. 1999)).
A residual functional capacity reflects the most that an individual can
still do, despite his or her limitations, and is used at steps four and five
of the ALJ’s analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1545; SSR 96-8P,
1996 WL 374184, at *2. Although all evidence of record is considered,
the ALJ’s determination must be supported by medical evidence. Doak
v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir. 1986).

| The ALJ need not adopt every limitation expressed by an expert,
as it is well-established that “[t]he ALJ — not treating or examining
physicians or State agency consultants — must make the ultimate
disability and [residual functional capacity] determinations.” Chandler
v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (8d Cir. 2011). Nevertheless,
“while the ALJ may choose which medical opinions are persuasive, for
each limitation opined necessary by a persuasive medical source, the

ALJ is obligated to either: (1) incorporate that limitation in the
claimant’s [residual functional capacity], or (2) explain the basis for
discounting that limitation. Such an obligation ensures that any

omission was intentional and supported by substantial evidence in the

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record.” Lombardo v. Bisignano, 2026 WL 674198, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
2026) (citations and quotations omitted).

With these obligations in mind, several courts within the Middle
District, including the undersigned, have recently held that an ALJ’s
“unexplained failure [] to incorporate a one-to-two-step task limitation
set forth in a medical opinion deemed persuasive constitutes error
which may compel remand.” Id.; see also Simon v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL
828935, at *10 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (“While the ALJ certainly was not
required to include this [one and two-step] limitation, the ALJ was
required to explain the failure to include this limitation, particularly
because the ALJ found this opinion to be generally persuasive and
supported by the record.”); Reichner v. Bisignano, 2026 WL 3034503, at
*1 (M.D. Pa. 2026); Shipman v. Kizakazi, 2023 WL 5599607, at *8 (M.D.
Pa. 2023); Pokorny v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 69883860, at *6 (M.D. Pa. 2023).

At issue here is the medical opinion of state agency psychologist
Timothy Michael Ostrich, Psy.D. On October 27, 2023, Dr. Ostrich
completed a Psychiatric Review Technique and Mental Residual
Functional Capacity Reassessment, in which he identified moderate

mental limitations and opined that Billig “can understand, retain and

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follow simple instructions (i.e., perform/follow one and two-step
tasks/instructions).” Tr. 135-41.

ALJ Brady found Dr. Ostrich’s opinion to be persuasive. Id. at 35.
More specifically, the ALJ concluded that “Dr. Ostrich’s opinion that
[Billig] can understand, retain, and follow simple instructions” was
consistent with other medical opinions and the evidence in the record,
which indicated that Billig “recalled and understood instructions” and
“worked with reflection and deliberation.” Jd. The ALJ relied on this
opinion, among others, in formulating the following residual functional
capacity:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
a limited range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b)
and 416.967(b) except he is capable of standing and/or
walking for four hours in an eight-hour workday. The
claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl,
and climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds. He should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme
cold, humidity, vibrations, and hazards. The claimant can
carry out detailed, but uninvolved, instructions to
perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, involving
only simple work-related decisions, and with occasional
workplace changes. He can tolerate no interaction with public,
and frequent with coworkers and supervisors.

Id. at 26 (emphasis added). ALJ Brady failed to address the one and

two-step task limitation identified by Dr. Ostrich, either by

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incorporating it into Billig’s residual functional capacity or explaining
that omission. Absent such an explanation, the Court is unable to
discern whether the one and two-step task limitation was considered
and intentionally rejected, or inadvertently omitted.2 To this extent,
the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Further,
this error is not harmless and warrants remand for the reasons
discussed below.

The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) describes the
general educational development of each occupation, including the
required reasoning development levels. The DOT explains that, in
occupations with a reasoning level of 1, satisfactory job performance

requires that an employee be able to “[a]pply commonsense

2 The Court also notes that the instant case is distinguishable from Reichenbach v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 4336301 (W.D. Pa. 2024), upon which the
Commissioner relies. In Reichenbach, the Court explained that the ALJ’s decision
was supported by substantial evidence, notwithstanding its failure to adopt the one
to two-step task limitation identified in two medical opinions that were “generally
persuasive,” because the ALJ “adequately explained the basis for his [residual
functional capacity] findings.” Jd. at *1n.1. Here, the Court finds that ALJ Brady
did not adequately explain the basis for his findings. Further, a growing body of
courts within this district supports remand where an ALJ fails to explain the
omission of a one to two-step task limitation despite deeming the relevant medical
opinion persuasive. See, e.g., Rayner v. Bisgnano, 2026 WL 3016232, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
2026); Sarah C. v. Bisignano, 2026 WL 625094 (M.D. Pa. 2026); McCleary v.
Bisignano, 2026 WL 625118 (M.D. Pa. 2026); Delillo v. Bisignano, 2026 WL 592389,
(M.D. Pa. 2026); Warren v. Dudek, 2025 WL 1168276 (M.D. Pa. 2025).

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- understanding to carry out simple one-or two-step instructions.” DOT,
Appendix C, 1991 WL 688702. In occupations with a reasoning level of
2, satisfactory job performance requires that an employee be able to
“Talpply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but
uninvolved written or oral instructions.” DOT, Appendix C, 1991 WL
688702. Courts have interpreted this to mean that, generally, a
limitation to one and two-step tasks is consistent with occupations
requiring a reasoning level of 1, but inconsistent with occupations
requiring reasoning levels of 2 or above. See, e.g., Shipman, 2023 WL
5599607, at *10; Ferrebee v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 905153, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
2022); Lombardo, 2026 WL 674198, at *2. The undersigned agrees with
that rationale.

Here, ALJ Brady determined that Billig “can carry out detailed,
but uninvolved, instructions to perform simple, routine, and repetitive
tasks, involving only simple work-related decisions, and with occasional
workplace changes.” Tr. 26. Based on this finding, the ALJ concluded
that Billig could not return to his past work but could perform other

work in the national economy, namely, reasoning level 2 or 3

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occupations that exceeded the one and two-step task limitation opined
by Dr. Ostrich.’

Because ALJ Brady did not identify at least one occupation
existing in significant numbers that Billig can perform with a reasoning
level of 1, the ALJ’s failure to explain his decision not to incorporate the
one and two-step task limitation is not harmless error. See Michelle M.
uv. Bisignano, 2025 WL 2713737, at *8 (M.D. Pa. 2025). Accordingly, the
Court will remand this case to the Commissioner for further
consideration. While the Court concludes that this error compels a
remand, nothing in this opinion should be deemed as expressing a
judgment on what the ultimate outcome of any reassessment should be.

Instead, that judgment remains entirely within the province of the ALJ.

3 During the hearing, the vocational expert testified that the following jobs were
available to the hypothetical individual ALJ Brady described, which the ALJ relied
upon in determining that other work existing in significant numbers in the national
economy was available to Billig: (1) Router, DOT # 222.587-038 (reasoning level 2);
(2) Small Products Assembler, DOT # 739.687-030 (reasoning level 2); and (3) Mail
clerk, DOT # 209.687-026 (reasoning level 3).

4 Because the Court has determined that remand is required to properly consider
the one and two-step task limitation, the Court declines to address Billig’s
remaining challenges. The Court nevertheless recognizes the thoroughness of the
AlJ’s decision and notes that, to the extent any remaining contention would require
re-weighing the evidence already considered by the ALJ, it would not afford a basis
for disturbing the ALJ’s decision. See Diaz v. Comm ’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504
(8d Cir. 2009).

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IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will VACATE the
decision of the Commissioner and REMAND this case for further

proceedings. A separate order shall follow.

- Date: October 15, 2026 s/ Phillip J. Caraballo
Phillip J. Caraballo
United States Magistrate Judge

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