WILLIAMS v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-00095
District Judge Stephanie L. Haines
Magistrate Judge Kezia O. L. Taylor
ECF No. 26
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss be granted. Specifically, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s RLUIPA and Due Process
claims 	be dismissed 	with 	prejudice because 	amendment 	would 	be 	futile. 	It 	is 	further
recommended that Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Houser and
his Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement claim be dismissed without prejudice to
Plaintiff filing a Second Amended Complaint, limited to his conditions of confinement claim
related to his time in the DEMO unit and his retaliation claim against Defendant Houser for
allegedly sending him to the DEMO unit because of Plaintiff’s previous legal action. Finally, it
is recommended that Defendants Schaffer, Heide, Torres, Maust, Ickes, Stutzman, and Caro be
dismissed for lack of personal involvement and terminated from the docket.
II. 	REPORT
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff Norman Williams, Jr., (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner who is currently in the
custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, confined at SCI-Greene. 	The events
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giving rise to his lawsuit occurred while he was housed at SCI-Somerset. 	See ECF No. 21,
generally. 	Plaintiff initiated this pro se prisoner civil rights action on April 4, 2024, with the
filing of a Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County. ECF No. 1. On May
2, 2024, Defendants1 removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, and after being granted an extension of time, moved to dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint. ECF Nos. 1-3, 8. On September 20, 2024, Plaintiff sought leave to file an
amended complaint. ECF No. 14. This Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion and directed him to file
his amended pleading by November 8, 2024. 	ECF No. 15. 	On November 13, 2024, Plaintiff
filed another Motion for Extension of Time, which this Court granted, directing him to submit
the amended pleading by January 7, 2025, but cautioning Plaintiff that this would be the last
extension afforded to him. 	ECF Nos. 16, 17. 	Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this deadline
resulted in this Court’s issuance of a show cause order on January 15, 2025. 	ECF No. 20. 	On
the same day Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint was docketed and Defendants’ pending Motion to
Dismiss was rendered moot. ECF Nos. 21, 22.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings Section 1983 claims under the First, Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as a claim under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.,
against Defendants in their individual capacities. 	ECF No. 21 at 1, ¶¶ 3-17. 	Plaintiff seeks
injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory relief, including punitive damages. Id at 7-8.
After being granted an extension of time to submit their responsive pleading, Defendants
filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 3, 2025. ECF Nos. 24-26. Plaintiff filed a Response to the
pending motion along a Brief in support thereof. ECF Nos. 29, 30. Defendants’ Motion is ripe
1 	All of the following individuals are DOC employees and will be collectively referred to as
“Defendants” throughout this Report and Recommendation: Barnacle, Torres, Tice, Caro, Tiller,
Schaffer, Pasquale, Sweitzer, Streczywilk, Stutzman, Heide, Maust, Ickes, and Houser.
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for review.
B. Factual Background
At all relevant times, Plaintiff was housed at SCI-Somerset and “was allegedly classified
as a General Population inmate with a security clearance of 3Y, which is the lowest classification
for an inmate serving a life without parole sentence.” ECF No. 21 ¶ 32. On December 14, 2021,
unidentified corrections officers ordered Plaintiff to pack his things and report to Receiving and
Discharge (“R&D”) to be moved to another facility. 	Id. ¶ 19. 	To prevent Plaintiff from
disclosing his impending transfer, Plaintiff’s telephone PIN number had been deactivated two
days earlier. 	Id. ¶ 20. 	Once in R&D, 15 corrections officers, wearing CERT2 uniforms,
“physically took custody of the Plaintiff and placed him in a holding cell.” 	Id. ¶ 21. 	At some
point thereafter, while wearing restraints, Plaintiff was escorted “to I-B Unit at SCI-Somerset, to
an area now known as the DEMO Program (DEMO)[,]” id. ¶ 22, where he was strip searched,
issued a new uniform, and placed in a new cell. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff was advised that for the next
two days he would be on restricted movement, while inmates from other prisons were being
processed into the DEMO program. 	Id. 	“The DOC defined the DEMO unit as an area of the
facility where general population inmates could be monitored for drug activities.” Id. ¶ 49.
Plaintiff was then led to Defendant Pasquale’s office, where he, along with Defendants
Tice, Streczywilk, and Sweitzer were present. 	Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff was “compelled to sign a cell
agreement form” along with an employment request form to be able to work while in the DEMO
unit, and threatened with being locked in for 23 hours-per-day if he refused to sign either, or if he
refused a job. 	Id. 	Plaintiff was placed on Administrative Custody (“AC”) status “without the
benefit of any due process.” 	Id. 	The DEMO unit team advised Plaintiff that he was a general
population inmate on a general population unit. 	Id. ¶ 25. 	Plaintiff was told by all Defendants
2 “Corrections Emergency Response Team.”
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that in order to graduate from the DEMO program, he would need to maintain employment. Id. ¶
35. Plaintiff asked for a list of requirements for completing the program, but he never received
it. Id. Seven months into the DEMO program, Plaintiff was “[v]aguely informed of graduation
criteria by the name defendants,” including that he could “[n]ot be in the game,” but he still did
not have an enumerated list of requirements. Id. ¶¶ 36, 37.
Defendants Tice, Pasquale, Streczywilk, and Sweitzer told Plaintiff that if he broke any
DEMO rules, he would be punished, kept at SCI-Somerset, and required to spend additional time
in the DEMO unit. 	Id. ¶ 27. 	That same day, Defendant Tice told Plaintiff that inmates who
created problems or assaulted staff would be placed on the Restricted Release List (“RRL”) for
at least five years. 	Id. ¶ 28. 	Despite his classification, which permitted contact visits, id. ¶ 33,
Plaintiff avers that he was discriminated against by all Defendants and that from December 14,
2021 until August 8, 2023, he was subjected to the following restrictions:
[T]he Plaintiff was barred from receiving contact visits, utilizing
most publications available in the general and law libraries, barred
from confidential communications with religious advisors, barred
from congregational religious and recreational activities, barred
from attending vocational and educational classes and barred from
the use of recreational equipment that was all made available to
general population inmates.
Id. ¶ 29.3 	Plaintiff also asserts that he “was barred from confidential discussion of his mental
and physical health” and nonmedical corrections officers were privy to his health conditions and
made comments about them. 	Id. ¶ 30. 	Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Tice,
Houser, Caro, Barnacle, Tiller, Pasquale, Streczywilk, and Torres deliberately deprived him of
contact and non-contact visits without due process. Id. ¶ 34.
3 Plaintiff specifically avers that he was prevented from attending “Ju’Mah and Taleem services
which are required by the 5 pillars of his faith (Islam) in violation of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act.” Id. ¶ 43.
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At some point in December 2021, Plaintiff requested DOC policies that were not
provided to him because Defendant Stutzman and Pasquale “failed to obtain the documents.” Id.
¶ 31. Plaintiff submitted grievance 977144 “concerning their complicity in denying the Plaintiff
and similarly situated inmates from obtaining these documents.” 	Id. 	Also, at some point in
2021, contact visits within the DOC were re-introduced following the lessening of restrictions
developed in response to COVID. 	Id. ¶ 40. 	However, per Defendant Tiller’s memorandum,
Plaintiff, along with other DEMO participants, was still prohibited from participating in contact
visits, without exceptions, limiting their ability to interact with those outside of prison to virtual
visits, only. Id. ¶ 40. Even though Defendants Maust and Ickes were aware of these restrictions,
they did nothing to change the practices, in violation of Plaintiff’s equal protection rights. Id. ¶¶
40, 42.
According to Plaintiff, he was told “by two B.I.I. Agents that his placement in the DEMO
unit resulted form his prior legal actions taken against Defendant Houser, in a clear retaliatory
act for utilizing a Constitutionally protected activity.” Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiff claims that the policies
and protocols governing this unit are secret, and as such, he was unable to appeal his placement
in the DEMO unit. 	Id. ¶¶ 50, 51. 	Progress through the phases of the program are at the sole
discretion of the named Defendants, and can “depend on an individuals behavior, drug activity,
and information received by staff or other inmates at 90 day review intervals.” Id. ¶ 53. Since
“[p]hase changes can be based on almost anything . . .there is no appeal of a setback or denial of
phase change . . ..” Id. ¶ 54.
Plaintiff avers that he twice failed the DEMO program, “which equated to 180 plus days
of sanctions, for failing to “meaningfully participate” in his first 90 day review, and/or suspected
drug trafficking.” Id. ¶ 38. Plaintiff alleges that he was not issued any misconducts – formal or
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informal – for any infractions he may have committed to warrant the failures. Id. After Plaintiff
questioned the 90-day review outcomes, “[t]he Plaintiff was met with open hostility by
Defendant’s (sic) Tice, Caro, Pasquale, Streczywilk, Sweitzer, Tiller and Houser . . ..” Id. ¶ 39.
Plaintiff claims that the 90-day review was a way to “extort information and gain intelligence by
threatening to fail participants, such as the Plaintiff, for the quarter if they failed to provide
information.” Id. ¶ 39. He alleges that “he was compelled to self-incriminate at all of his 90 day
reviews when questioned about his telephone calls and emails.” Id. ¶ 41. 	This, Plaintiff avers,
was in violation of his due process rights. Id. Plaintiff asserts that “the unit was discontinued as
it was held to be punitive in nature,” despite Defendants’ description to the contrary. Id. ¶ 58.
C. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. 	See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). 	In
deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual
allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. 	See U.S.
Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). Because Plaintiff is proceeding
pro se, the allegations in the complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 	Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). 	The “court[]
generally consider[s] only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint,
matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim” when considering a
motion to dismiss. 	Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.1997)).
In making its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the
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plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual
allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). 	See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Furthermore, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570
(rejecting the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78
(1957)).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. 	A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 	Id. (citing
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). 	Moreover, a court need not accept inferences
drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as explained in the complaint. 	See
California Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept
legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. 	See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v.
City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept
as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Put
another way, in assessing a motion to dismiss, while the Court must view the factual allegations
contained in the pleading at issue as true, the Court is “not compelled to accept unwarranted
inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.”
Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). Expounding on the Twombly and Iqbal
line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
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First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”
Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 	Lastly, “where there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement for relief.” 	Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir.
2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). 	This
determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, the Court recognizes that in a civil rights action, when dismissing a case for
failure to state a claim, a court must give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend a deficient
complaint, regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so, unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile. 	See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d
247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
D. Discussion
a. 	Lack of Personal Involvement
For liability to be imposed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[a] defendant in a civil rights action
must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on
the operation of respondeat superior.” 	Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.
1988) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 n.3 (1981) (other citation omitted)); see also
C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (“To impose liability on the
individual defendants, Plaintiffs must show that each one individually participated in the alleged
constitutional violation or approved of it.”) (citing C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201–02 (3d Cir.
2000) (en banc)). 	A plaintiff must allege this personal involvement through allegations of
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participation, personal direction, or actual knowledge and acquiescence. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
These allegations “must be made with appropriate particularity.” Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead
that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.”); Santiago at 130 (“Particularly after Iqbal, the connection between
the supervisor’s directions and the constitutional deprivation must be sufficient to ‘demonstrate a
“plausible nexus” or “affirmative link” between the [directions] and the specific deprivation of
constitutional rights at issue.’”) (quoting Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Here, 	Defendants submit that Plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite personal
involvement of the following individuals: Schaffer, Heide, Torres, Maust, Ickes, Stutzman, Caro,
and Houser. 	Initially, Plaintiff repeatedly refers to his “original and Amended Complaint,” see
ECF No. 30 at 1, 2, 3. 	However, when granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaint, this Court provided:
Plaintiff is on notice that his amended complaint will fully replace
his original complaint, so it must include both the content he wants
to keep from the original complaint and any new content that he
wants to add. For this reason, the amended complaint must include
all claims that Plaintiff wants to bring against the defendant(s), and
any claim not included in the amended complaint will be deemed
waived.
ECF No. 15. As such, only allegations asserted in the operative pleading will be considered.
Defendants correctly submit that neither Schaffer nor Heide is included in any allegations
in the Amended Complaint. 	ECF No. 27 at 7. 	As such, these Defendants should be dismissed
from this case and terminated from the docket. 	Dismissal is also warranted for Defendants
Torres, Maust, Ickes, and Caro as their involvement pertained to Plaintiff not being able to have
contact and non-contact visits. 	Having recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s equal protection
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claim related to visitations, infra, dismissal of these Defendants is also proper. 	To the extent
Plaintiff attempts to allege Defendant Caro’s personal involvement by describing his “open
hostility” related to Plaintiff’s 90-day reviews, see ECF No. 21 ¶ 39, he has failed because there
is no constitutional claim that is being asserted relative to Defendant Caro’s “open hostility.”
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is asserted against Defendant Houser, who is alleged to have
placed Plaintiff in the DEMO unit because of his prior legal actions. See ECF No. 30 at 3-4. As
such, at this stage of the proceedings, it cannot be said that Defendant Houser did not have the
requisite personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants Schaffer, Heide, Torres,
Maust, Ickes, Stutzman, and Caro be dismissed due to lack of personal involvement. However, it
is recommended that Defendant Houser remain in the case because Plaintiff has plausibly alleged
that Defendant Houser’s decision to place Plaintiff in the DEMO unit was a retaliatory act.
b. 	RLUIPA Claim
RLUIPA provides that “no government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that the burden ... is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering
that ... interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). As Chief District Judge Hornak recently explained:
RLUIPA did not abrogate sovereign immunity with respect to
money 	damages; 	money 	damages 	are unrecoverable 	where 	a
plaintiff sues a state entity or a state official in their official
capacity under RLUIPA. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 293
(2011). 	Similarly, 	RLUIPA 	does 	not 	impose 	a 	condition 	of
individual liability that renders individual defendants vulnerable to
claims for money damages in their individual capacities. Sharp v.
Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2012). “[I]n other words, a
RLUIPA plaintiff may seek only injunctive or declaratory relief.”
Parkell v. Senato, 704 F. App’x 122, 125 (3d Cir. 2017).
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Molina v. Little, No. 1:23-CV-00257, 2024 WL 3548453, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 26, 2024).
Initially, as Defendants correctly point out, Plaintiff is suing them in their individual
capacities. ECF No. 21 ¶¶ 4-17. To the extent he is suing Defendants for money damages, this,
alone, is enough to dismiss Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim because RLUIPA recovery is limited to
official capacity claims for declaratory or injunctive relief. 	See Sharp, 669 F.3d at 155.
Furthermore, in addition to alleging that the DEMO unit has been “discontinued,” ECF No. 21 ¶
58, Plaintiff is no longer housed at SCI-Somerset, see ECF No. 18, such that the declaratory and
injunctive relief sought is moot. See Mollett v. Leith, 2011 WL 5407359, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Nov.
8, 2011), aff’d sub nom., Mollett v. Leith, 511 F. App’x 172 (3d Cir. 2013) (“an inmate-plaintiff’s
transfer to another prison, or his release, moots a request for declaratory or injunctive relief.”).
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim be dismissed
with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.
c. 	Eighth Amendment Claim
“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons ... which house
persons convicted of serious crimes, cannot be free of discomfort.” 	Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337 at 349 (1991). “To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they
are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id. at 347.
Nevertheless, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment imposes
constitutional limitations on a prisoner’s conditions of confinement. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337;
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Wilson V. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim related to the conditions of confinement, an
inmate 	must 	meet 	two 	requirements: 	(1) 	the 	deprivation 	alleged 	must 	be, 	objectively,
“sufficiently serious,” and (2) the “prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of
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mind.” 	Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). 	The objective component is narrowly defined: only “extreme deprivations” are
sufficient to make out an Eighth Amendment claim. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
The first element is satisfied when an inmate is deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities.” 	Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991). 	These needs include “food,
clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety.” Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703,
709 (3d Cir. 1997). “[A] totality of the circumstances test must be applied to determine whether
the conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Tillery v. Owens, 907
F.2d 418, 427 (3d Cir. 1990). The second element is satisfied when an inmate shows that prison
officials acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety or conditions of
confinement that violated the inmate’s constitutional rights. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03. “This
subjective component is also narrowly construed.” Henry v. Overmyer, 2013 WL 3177746, at *2
(W.D. Pa. June 24, 2013). 	A prison official’s conduct violates the Eighth Amendment “only if
he knows that the inmate[ ] face[s] a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by
failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” 	Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847)
(alterations in original).
Through Chief Magistrate Judge Lanzillo, this Court previously explained:
“[B]y virtue of their convictions, inmates must expect significant
restrictions, inherent in prison life, on rights and privileges free
citizens take for granted.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39-40
(2002). Furthermore, “prisoners have no inherent constitutional
right 	to 	placement 	in 	any 	particular 	prison, 	to 	any 	security
classification, or to any particular housing assignment.” Myers v.
Folerezell, 2023 WL 8478013, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2023)
(citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); Montayne v. Haymes, 427
U.S. 236, 243 (1976); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9
(1976)). See also, Podhorn v. Grondolsky, 350 Fed. Appx. 618,
620 	(3d 	Cir. 	2009) 	(reiterating 	that 	“prisoners 	have 	no
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constitutional right to be assigned to a particular institution, facility
or rehabilitative program”).
Rochester v. Klinefelter, No. 3:23-CV-284-RAL, 2024 WL 5146520, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 17,
2024).
Here, Plaintiff brings a conditions of confinement claim related to his time in the DEMO
unit, during which he was not permitted to have contact visits or participate in group
programming, including educational and vocational programming, had limited out of cell time,
and was not afforded opportunities to have confidential discussions about his mental and
physical health. ECF No. 21 ¶ 29; ECF No. 30 at 4-5. Initially, if Plaintiff’s claim arises out of
his placement in the DEMO program, the claim fails because Plaintiff does not have a
constitutional right to any particular prison, housing unit, or security classification. 	See
Rochester, 2024 WL 5146520, at *4. 	Next, Plaintiff has not pled that during his time in the
DEMO program – from December 2021 until August 2023, ECF No. 21 ¶ 29 – he was ever
denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. There are
no allegations suggesting that Plaintiff was denied basic necessities such as food or water or that
he was housed in a cell that had persistent unsanitary or unsafe conditions. While he does aver
that he was denied access to confidential discussions about his medical and mental wellbeing;
there are no allegations from which it can be inferred that he was actually denied access to
medical care. ECF No. 21 ¶ 30. Put another way, the allegations in his Amended Complaint are
not objectively “sufficiently serious” to implicate the Eighth Amendment. 	See Farmer, 511 at
834.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead the objective component of a
conditions of confinement claim, such that the undersigned need not address whether any
Defendant acted with deliberate indifference. 	It is therefore respectfully recommended that
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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim
be granted, and that the Eighth Amendment claim be dismissed. 	This dismissal should be
without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a Second Amended Complaint and alleging facts, to the
extent such facts exist, related to any deprivations of life’s necessities that he suffered during his
time in the DEMO unit.
d. 	Fourteenth Amendment Claims
i. 	Equal Protection Claim
The Equal Protection Clause “is not a command that all persons be treated alike but,
rather, ‘a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’” 	Artway v. Att’y
Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1267 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 439, (1985)). 	Accordingly, to state a cognizable equal protection claim, a plaintiff
“must allege that he is a member of a protected class, similarly situated to members of an
unprotected class, and treated differently from the unprotected class.” Pollack v. City of Phila.,
No. 06-04089, 2007 WL 576264, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007) (citations omitted). In addition,
a plaintiff must allege that this differential treatment was intentional. 	See, e.g., McClesky v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (“[A plaintiff] who alleges an equal protection violation has the
burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination.”).
Plaintiff does not allege his equal protection claim based on race, religion, or national
origin, and prisoners are not a protected class of individuals. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d
307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that neither prisoners nor indigents are suspect classes). Thus,
it appears that Plaintiff is proceeding on a class of one theory. 	According to the class of one
theory, “a plaintiff states a claim for violation of the Equal Protection clause when he ‘alleges
that he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is
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no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” 	Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,
239 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). “To state an
equal-protection violation, [Plaintiff] must allege that ‘he has been arbitrarily treated differently
from similarly situated inmates’ in all relevant respects.” 	Hammond v. Zaken, No. 2:23-1151,
2024 WL 3593487, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 31, 2024) (quoting McKeithan v. Kerestes, No. 11-
1441, 2014 WL 3734569, at *10 (M.D. Pa. July 28, 2014)).
In his Response to Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff explains that while in the DEMO unit,
“he was treated differently than those inmates similarly situated in general population housing
units in violation of the equal protection clause.” ECF No. 30 at 7. However, while “DEMO is
designed as a General Population cell block,” ECF No. 1-1 at 84, it is limited to inmates involved
with institutional drug trafficking, requiring certain restrictions, such as no contact and non-
contact visits. ECF No. 1-1 at 68, 96.4 Plaintiff concedes that “contact visits on the DEMO unit
were banned for all inmates,” necessarily negating any discrimination Plaintiff believes was
directed to him. ECF No. 30 at 7.
Accordingly, since Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that “he has been
arbitrarily treated differently from similarly situated inmates,” his equal protection claim should
be 	dismissed. 	See 	Hammond, 	2024 	WL 	3593487, 	at 	*2. 	It 	is 	therefore 	respectfully
recommended that Plaintiff’s equal protection claim be dismissed with prejudice because
amendment would be futile.
4 While there are no exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, there are references to
the exhibits that were attached to his original Complaint. See ECF No. 21 ¶¶ 37-40, 42-45. As
they are on the docket, and a matter of public record, they can be considered when deciding a
motion to dismiss. See Lum, 361 F.3d at 222.
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ii. 	Due Process Claim
“In analyzing a procedural due process claim, the first step is to determine whether the
nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the “liberty or property” language of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556
(1972).” 	Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000). 	The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a
substantial adverse impact on a prisoner. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); see also
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 531 (3d Cir. 2003) (A plaintiff’s “procedural due process rights
are triggered by deprivation of a legally cognizable liberty interest.”). 	A protected liberty
interest arises only where a restraint “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dept’ of Corr., 848 F.3d
549, 558-59 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997))
(emphasis in original); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 	Only if the Court
determines that a protected property or liberty interest has been implicated, does the question of
what process is due to protect it arise. Shoats, 213 F.3d at 143 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
Here, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged nor plausibly suggested that his transfer to the
DEMO unit presented atypical or significant hardship such that his placement implicates any
liberty interest.5 	As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held,
“confinement in administrative or punitive segregation will rarely be sufficient, without more, to
5 Being denied contact and non-contact visits does not implicate a liberty interest because access
to contact visits is not a recognized liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Henry v.
Dep’t of Corr., 131 F. App’x 847, 849 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Wishnefsky v. Salameh, No. 15-
148, 2016 WL 11480717, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2016), report and recommendation adopted,
2016 WL 7324080 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2016). 	Moreover, Plaintiff does not dispute that he had
access to virtual visits as well as the use of phones. ECF No. 21 ¶¶ 38, 40
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establish the kind of ‘atypical’ deprivation of prison life necessary to implicate a liberty interest.”
Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). Since no
liberty interest was implicated, no process was due.
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff’s due process claim be
dismissed. This dismissal should be with prejudice because amendment would be futile.
e. 	First Amendment Retaliation Claim
A liberal reading of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, together with his opposition brief,
suggests that he may also be pursuing a First Amendment retaliation claim, even though it is not
independently identified. See ECF No. 21 ¶ 44; ECF No. 30 at 3.
Under the First Amendment, “[r]etaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights is itself a violation of rights secured by the Constitution.” 	White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d
103, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1990). 	In order to set forth a cognizable claim for First Amendment
retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) he engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2)
he suffered, at the hands of a state actor, adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary
firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the protected activity was a substantial
or motivating factor in the state actor’s decision to take adverse action.” 	Fantone, 780 F.3d at
191 (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)). Further, to establish the critical
element of causation, a plaintiff usually must allege “either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal
proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of
antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link.” Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d
259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503-04 (3d Cir.
1997)).
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Plaintiff was told by unidentified officers “that his placement in the DEMO unit resulted
from his prior legal actions taken against Defendant Houser, in a clear retaliatory act for utilizing
a Constitutionally protected activity.” ECF No. 21 ¶ 44; ECF No. 30 at 4. Plaintiff provides no
details about the nature of the “prior legal actions” or when they were filed. 	Assuming,
arguendo, that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity, the retaliation claim still fails because
there are not facts related to Defendant Houser’s involvement in Plaintiff’s placement in the
DEMO program. 	Going a step further, and assuming, arguendo, that this Defendant was
responsible for Plaintiff’s placement in the DEMO unit, the Amended Complaint is devoid of
any facts demonstrating a causal connection between Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected
activity and this Defendant’s adverse action. 	As such, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against
Defendant House should be dismissed, albeit without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a Second
Amended Complaint wherein he provides facts, to the extent such facts exist, to support each
element of the retaliation claim.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss be granted. 	Plaintiff’s RLUIPA and Due Process claims should be dismissed with
prejudice because amendment would be futile. 	It is further recommended that Plaintiff’s First
Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Houser and his Eighth Amendment Conditions
of Confinement claim be dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a Second Amended
Complaint, limited to his conditions of confinement claim related to his time in the DEMO unit
and his retaliation claim against Defendant Houser for allegedly sending him to the DEMO unit
because of Plaintiff’s previous legal action. Finally, it is recommended that Defendants Schaffer,
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Heide, Torres, Maust, Ickes, Stutzman, and Caro be dismissed for lack of personal involvement
and terminated from the docket.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and
Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date
of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing
the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond
thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.
Dated: October 28, 2025.
/s/ Kezia O. L. Taylor ________
KEZIA O. L. TAYLOR
United States Magistrate Judge
NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR.
GD2737
SCI GREENE
169 PROGRESS DRIVE
WAYNESBURG, PA 15370
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