PABON RODRIGUEZ et al v. CAJIGAS et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
IN RE:
RAMON 	PABON RODRIGUEZ
ELSA IRIS 	MEDINA LANDIN
CASE NO. 95-02831 ESL
CHAPTER 7
Debtor(s) 	ADVERSARY NO. 05-0246
RAMON PABON RODRIGUEZ, HIS WIFE
ELSA I. MEDINA LANDIN AND THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP CONSTITUED
BY BOTH OF THEM
Plaintiff(s)
JULIO C. CAJIGAS, HIS WIFE NORMA
FELICIANO AND THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP CONSTITUED BY BOTH OF
THEM
FILED & ENTERED ON 3/29/2006
Defendant(s)
OPINION AND ORDER
This 	adversary 	proceeding 	is 	before 	the 	court 	upon 	defendant’s
motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	and 	plaintiff’s 	opposition 	thereto.
Defendant alleges that the issue of the compensation paid to defendant
for his professional services as a surveyor in the bankruptcy case was
adjudicated by this court and may not be relitigated. 	Plaintiffs alleges
That there are issues in controversy regarding the reasonableness of the
fees 	paid to Mr. Julio C. Cajigas Morales. 	For the reasons set forth
below, the motion for summary judgment is granted as the relief requested
is barred on the grounds of res judicata.
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The following facts appear from defendant’s motion and the record of
the bankruptcy case:
1. 	On January 7, 1997, the court entered an order approving the
trustee’s application to employ Mr. Julio Cajigas Morales as a surveyor.
2. 	On June 1, 1999, Ms. Ana D. Cajigas, in representation of Mr.
Julio C. Cajigas, filed a request for payment of administrative expenses
in the amount of $21,599.47.
3. 	On August 2, 1999, the court ordered Mr. Cajigas to give notice
of the application for compensation, and stated that if no opposition was
filed the same would be granted.
4. 	On September 13, 1999, Mr. Cajigas moved the court informing
compliance with this court’s order, and stating that no opposition had
been filed.
5. 	On November 18, 1999, the court entered an order approving the
professional fees in the amount of $21,599.47.
6. 	On March 2, 2002, the debtors and Mr. Cajigas filed a settlement
agreement 	for 	the 	payment 	of 	$19,075.00 	to 	Mr. 	Cajigas 	to 	resolve
controversy on the amounts owed. 	The agreement was approved on August 6,
2002.
7. 	On October 4, 2002, Mr. Cajigas filed a motion requesting the
payment of the $19,075. 	The request was granted on October 12, 2002.
8. 	On November 8, 2002, the debtors moved the court to set aside
the order dated October, 12, 2002. 	The request was denied On December
12, 2002.
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9. 	On 	October 	15, 	2004, 	the 	debtors 	again 	moved 	the 	court
requesting 	a 	declaratory 	judgment 	that 	Mr. 	Cajigas 	has 	been 	overpaid.
The court denied the request on October 21, 2004, on the grounds that the
case 	had 	been 	closed 	on 	August 	15, 	2003, 	and 	that 	a 	request 	for
declaratory judgment must be initiated as an adversary proceeding.
10. 	The instant adversary proceeding was filed on November 4, 2005,
to recover the payment made to Mr. Cajigas.
The doctrine of res judicata bars parties from litigating or re-
litigating 	any 	issue 	or 	claim 	that 	has 	already 	been 	adjudicated 	in 	a
prior case. 	Suarez Cestero v. Pagan Rosa, 198 F.Supp.2d 73, 84 (D.P.R.
2002); Del Carmen Tirado v. Department of Education, 296 F.Supp.2d 127,
130 (D.P.R. 2003). 	Issues surrounding the application of the doctrine of
res judicata arise because of the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by
state and federal courts over similar claims based upon similar facts and
involving 	the 	same 	parties. 	Id. 	“The 	doctrine 	of 	res 	judicata, 	now
called claim preclusion, forecloses litigation of all matters which have
been litigated or might have been litigated in an earlier case. 	The rule
of 	collateral 	estoppel, 	now 	termed 	issue 	preclusion, 	precludes 	re-
litigation of issues actually adjudicated.” 	Id., citing 18 Charles Alan
Wright, 	Arthur 	R. 	Miller 	and 	Edward 	H. 	Cooper, 	Federal 	Practice 	and
Procedure: 	Jurisdiction, 	§ 	4402, 	4404 	(1981). 	The 	doctrines 	of 	res
judicata and collateral estoppel serve important purposes; “they prevent
the waste of judicial and party resources through vexatious and multiple
lawsuits 	and 	encourage 	the 	rendering 	of 	consistent, 	reliable
adjudications.” 	Esteves v. Ortiz Alvarez, 678 F.Supp. 963, 965 (D.P.R.
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1988).
The preclusive effect of a state court judgment depends upon state
law. 	Kane v. Town of Harpswell (In re Kane), 254 F.3d 325, 328 (1st Cir.
2001), citing Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2000); see also,
Suarez 	Cestero 	v. 	Pagan 	Rosa, 	198 	F.Supp.2d 	at 	85 	(“[I]f 	Puerto 	Rico
courts 	would 	give 	preclusive 	effect 	to 	the 	judgment 	of 	a 	state 	court,
then 	this 	Court 	must 	also 	give 	preclusive 	effect 	to 	said 	judgment.”).
Additionally, 	whether 	a 	state 	court 	judgment 	is 	final 	for 	preclusion
purposes 	(claim 	or 	issue) 	is 	a 	question 	of 	state 	law. 	Federación 	de
Maestros 	de 	Puerto 	Rico 	v; 	Junta 	de 	Relaciones 	del 	Trabajo 	de 	Puerto
Rico, 	410 	F.3d 	17, 	22 	fn. 	8 	(1 st 	Cir. 	2005), 	citing 	Roy 	v. 	City 	of
Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517, 1520 (1st Cir. 1983). 	“In Puerto Rico, judgments
can 	be 	given 	preclusive 	effect 	if 	they 	are 	final 	and 	on 	the 	merits.”
Suarez Cestero, 198 F.Supp.2d at 85.
“In Puerto Rico, the broader form of res judicata is applied. 	This
means that issues which could have been litigated and adjudicated in a
previous 	suit, 	as 	well 	as 	those 	actually 	litigated 	and 	adjudicated,
cannot be relitigated in a later suit. 	The broad form does not extend,
however, to collateral estoppel. 	Parties may be collaterally estopped
only from litigating issues actually litigated previously.” 	Esteves, 678
F.Supp. 	at 	965, 	citing 	Mercado 	Riera 	v. 	Mercado 	Riera, 	100 	P.R.R. 	939
(1972) and Schneider v. Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico, 670 F.Supp.
1098, 1104 (D.P.R. 1987). 	Under Puerto Rico law, “[i]n order that the
presumption 	of 	the 	res 	adjudicata 	may 	be 	valid 	in 	another suit, it is
necessary 	that, 	between 	the 	case 	decided 	by 	the 	sentence 	and 	that 	in
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which the same is invoked, there be the most perfect identity between the
things, 	causes, 	and 	persons 	of 	the 	litigants, 	and 	their 	capacity 	as
such.” 	31 P.R. Stat. Ann.
§ 3343 (2002). 	“While the statute refers only to res judicata and “the
most perfect identity between ...causes” the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
has recognized the operation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel where
the 	issues 	and 	parties 	are 	the 	same.” 	Esteves, 	678 	F.Supp. 	at 	965,
citing Pereira v. Hernandez, 83 P.R.R. 156, 161 n. 7 (1961).
The phrase “perfect identity” is not interpreted literally by courts
in Puerto Rico. 	Boateng v. InterAmerican University, Inc., 210 F.3d 56,
61 	(1 st 	Cir. 	2000), 	citing 	Cruz, 	204 	F.3d 	at 	19; 	Futura 	Dev. 	Corp. 	v.
Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 43-45 (1 st Cir. 1985). 	“Thing” refers to the
object 	or 	matter 	over 	which 	the 	action 	is 	exercised. 	Boateng, 	id.,
citing Lausell Marzuach v. Díaz de Yaez, 3 P.R. Offic. Trans. 742, 745
(1975). 	“The test for identity of ‘things’ is whether a decision in the
second 	action 	may 	contradict 	the 	prior 	adjudication.” 	Boateng, 	id.,
citing A & P Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Asociación Caná, 10 P.R. Offic.
Trans. 	987, 	998 	(1981). 	“Cause” 	refers 	to 	the 	principal 	basis, 	main
ground or origin of the action or exceptions raised and decided. 	Id.;
Esteves, 678 F.Supp. at 965, citing Lausell Marzuach. 	“Cause” should not
be confused with the means of proof or the legal grounds of the claims of
the 	parties. 	Id. 	“The 	requirement 	of 	identity 	of 	causes 	does 	not
prevent 	the 	res 	judicata 	doctrine 	from 	being 	applied 	to 	a 	second 	case
simply because the plaintiff alleges a new legal theory in the new case.”
Lugo Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Institute of Culture, 221 F.Supp.2d 229,
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237 (D.P.R. 2002). 	“Identity of persons” may be found, even though there
are 	some 	differences 	in 	the 	parties 	listed 	in 	the 	two actions, if the
parties on each side, in each action, have identical interests. 	Esteves,
678 F.Supp. at 965.
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing, the court finds that there are no relevant
facts in controversy AND that the issue concerning the fees paid to Mr.
Cajigas 	in 	the 	bankruptcy 	case 	was 	adjudicated 	and 	may 	not 	be
relitigated. 	Consequently, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is
hereby granted.
The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing the complaint.
SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 29 day of March, 2006.
ENRIQUE S. LAMOUTTE INCLAN
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
c: 	DEBTOR(S)
JOSE RAUL CANCIO BIGAS
ANTONIO 	FIOL-MATTA
ANA D. CAJIGAS MORALES
SANTIAGO MARI ROCA
UST
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