Emhart Industries, Inc. v. New England Container Company, Inc et al

1:06-cv-00218Rid12 nov 2013

Testo completo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
EMHART INDUSTRIES, INC., 	)
)
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 	)
Defendant, 	)
)
v. 	) 	C.A. No. 06-218 S
)
NEW ENGLAND CONTAINER COMPANY, 	)
INC.; et al., 	)
)
Defendants and Counterclaim )
Plaintiffs. 	)
___________________________________)
)
EMHART INDUSTRIES, INC., 	)
)
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 	)
Defendant, 	)
)
v. 	) 	C.A. No. 11-023 S
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE 	)
AIR FORCE; et al., 	)
)
Defendants, Counterclaim 	)
Plaintiffs, and Third-Party )
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	)
)
BLACK & DECKER, INC.; et al., 	)
)
Third-Party Defendants. 	)
___________________________________)
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, United States District Judge.
Before 	the 	Court 	are 	two 	motions 	for 	protective 	orders
filed 	by 	the 	United 	States, 	which 	is 	currently 	the
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Defendant, 	Counterclaim 	Plaintiff 	and 	Third-Party 	Plaintiff
in 	the 	above 	entitled 	action. 	The 	first 	motion 	seeks 	a
protective 	order 	prohibiting 	the 	deposition 	of 	an
Environmental 	Protection 	Agency 	(“EPA”) 	attorney 	(ECF 	No.
169).1 The 	second 	motion 	seeks 	a 	protective 	order
preventing 	a 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	30(b)(6) 	deposition 	regarding
the 	use 	of 	chemical 	herbicides 	at 	a 	Canadian 	military 	base
in 	the 	1960s 	(ECF 	No. 	176). 	For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth
below, both motions are GRANTED.
I. 	Background
This 	discovery 	flap 	flows 	from 	a 	longstanding 	dispute
brought 	under 	the 	Comprehensive 	Environmental 	Response,
Compensation, 	and 	Liability 	Act 	(CERCLA) 	between 	Emhart
Industries, Inc. (“Emhart”),2 New England Container Company,
Inc. 	(“NECC”), 	the 	United 	States 	(the 	“Government” 	or
“United 	States”) 	and 	a 	slew 	of 	third 	parties.3 The 	current
case 	involves 	liability 	for 	the 	pollution 	and 	environmental
remediation 	of 	the 	Centredale 	Manor 	Restoration 	Project
Superfund 	Site 	(the 	“Site”), 	located 	in 	North 	Providence,
1 Docket numbers reference C.A. No. 11-023 S.
2 References 	to 	Emhart 	also 	refer 	to 	its 	corporate
successor Black & Decker.
3 Discovery 	related 	to 	these 	third 	parties 	has 	been
stayed 	under 	the 	Fifth 	Revised 	Case 	Management 	Order. 	(ECF
No. 211.)
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Rhode 	Island. 	The 	Site 	has 	allegedly 	been 	polluted 	with
various 	hazardous 	substances, 	including 	2, 	3, 	7, 	8-
Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-Dioxin, 	PCBs, 	volatile 	organic
compounds, semi-volatile organic compounds, and metals.
The 	parties 	are 	in 	the 	midst 	of 	discovery, 	which 	of
late 	has 	prompted 	a 	flurry 	of 	disputes 	between 	the
Government 	and 	Emhart. 	On 	July 	12, 	2013, 	Emhart 	served
deposition 	notices 	on 	four 	EPA 	attorneys 	assigned 	to 	the
present 	case, 	one 	attorney 	who 	had 	formerly 	been 	assigned
to 	the 	case, 	and 	one 	paralegal 	assigned 	to 	the 	case. 	Then,
on 	July 	22, 	2013, 	Emhart 	served 	an 	additional 	13 	deposition
notices, 	one 	of 	which 	was 	served 	on 	a 	former 	EPA 	attorney
who 	had 	once 	been 	assigned 	to 	the 	instant 	case, 	but 	who 	is
currently 	employed 	at 	a 	public 	interest 	group 	in 	Oregon.4
Emhart 	explains 	it 	seeks 	to 	depose 	these 	individuals
because 	they 	were 	identified 	by 	the 	Government 	as 	being
“core” 	personnel 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	Site. 	(See 	Emhart’s
Opp’n 	to 	Mot. 	for 	Protective 	Order 	2, 	ECF. 	No. 	184.) 	After
this 	Court 	made 	certain 	rulings 	during 	an 	August 	1, 	2013
4 Emhart’s 	issuance 	of 	deposition 	notices 	to 	the 	12
other EPA employees is not in dispute.
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conference, 	Emhart 	withdrew 	its 	deposition 	notices 	as 	to
four EPA attorneys and one EPA paralegal.5
Emhart 	still 	seeks 	to 	depose 	Eve 	Vaudo, 	an 	EPA
attorney 	who 	has 	worked 	on 	the 	case 	involving 	the 	Site 	from
its 	inception. 	Emhart 	claims 	Vaudo 	“would 	be 	able 	to
provide 	information 	concerning 	her 	discussions 	with
representatives 	of 	Emhart, 	NECC, 	NECC’s 	customers, 	other
[potentially 	responsible 	persons] 	(including 	the
governmental 	[potentially 	responsible 	persons]), 	the 	state
agencies 	that 	previously 	addressed 	the 	Site, 	and 	other
third 	parties.” 	(Id. 	at 	3.) 	Additionally, 	Emhart 	claims
that 	Vaudo 	“will 	be 	able 	to 	provide 	additional 	information
concerning 	the 	EPA’s 	handling 	of 	the 	Site 	during 	the 	EPA
proceedings 	and 	provide 	a 	better 	roadmap 	for 	discovery 	and
potential 	sources 	of 	information, 	which 	might 	allow 	Emhart
to 	further 	whittle 	down 	the 	list 	of 	potential 	EPA
depositions 	in 	this 	matter.” 	(Id.) 	Unclear 	what 	topics
Emhart 	wished 	to 	inquire 	about 	with 	Ms. 	Vaudo, 	this 	Court
requested Emhart provide a list of these topics.
In 	addition 	to 	continuing 	to 	depose 	individual 	fact
witnesses, 	Emhart 	has 	issued 	a 	30(b)(6) 	deposition 	notice
to 	the 	Government. 	In 	pertinent 	part, 	that 	notice 	requests
5 By withdrawing 	these notices, Emhart has rendered the
Government’s 	motion 	for 	a 	protective 	order 	with 	respect 	to
these additional attorneys moot.
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that 	the 	Government 	produce 	a 	witness 	to 	provide
“information 	regarding 	. . 	. 	the 	receipt, 	storage, 	testing,
use, 	release, 	and/or 	disposal 	of 	tactical 	military
herbicides 	in 	New 	Brunswick 	[, 	Canada].” 	This 	request
seeks 	information 	about 	the 	use 	of 	tactical 	military
herbicides 	at 	Base 	Gagetown, 	a 	Canadian 	military 	training
facility 	where 	live-fire 	training 	occurs. 	(Decl. 	Daniel
Procaccini, 	Ex. 	B 	1, 	ECF 	No. 	191.) 	In 	the 	1950s, 	with 	the
onset 	of 	the 	Cold 	War, 	the 	Canadian 	military 	determined 	it
needed 	a 	large 	training 	area 	situated 	on 	the 	Atlantic 	side
of 	Canada 	and 	created 	the 	base 	at 	Gagetown. 	(Id.)
Gagetown 	measures 	110,000 	hectacres.6 (Id.) 	Before
becoming 	a 	military 	base, 	the 	property 	now 	known 	as
Gagetown 	was 	heavily 	forested, 	and 	in 	the 	1950s 	and 	1960s,
the 	Canadian 	military 	faced 	the 	task 	of 	clearing 	the
property to create the training facility. 	(Id.)
In 	the 	mid-1960s, 	at 	the 	invitation 	of 	the 	Canadian
government, 	the 	United 	States 	military 	tested 	tactical
herbicides 	such 	as 	Agent 	Orange 	at 	Base 	Gagetown 	as 	part 	of
that 	process. 	Personnel 	from 	the 	Biological 	Sciences
Laboratory, 	Fort 	Detrick, 	Maryland 	and 	the 	Canadian
Ministry 	of 	Defense 	were 	responsible 	for 	this 	work. 	(Decl.
6 A 	hectacre 	is 	a 	term 	of 	measurement 	equaling 	100
acres.
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Daniel 	Procaccini, 	Ex. 	C 	3, 	ECF 	No. 	196-1.) 	The 	testing
consisted 	of 	chemicals 	being 	sprayed 	from 	an 	Army
helicopter. 	This 	helicopter 	took 	off 	from 	an 	air 	strip
approximately 	2 	to 	4 	air 	miles 	from 	where 	the 	chemicals
were 	applied. 	(Id. 	at 	7.) 	The 	Army 	Aviation 	Detachment 	at
Fort 	Monmouth, 	New 	Jersey 	loaned 	out 	the 	helicopter 	used 	in
the 	testing 	operation. 	(Id. 	at 	9.) 	A 	pilot 	from 	Fort
Rucker, 	Alabama 	flew 	the 	helicopter 	during 	testing. 	(Id.)
No evidence to date ties Base Gagetown to the Site.
II. 	Discussion
A. 	Deposition of EPA Counsel
Rule 	30 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure
permits 	a 	party 	to 	“depose 	any 	person.” 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P.
30(a). 	While 	this 	obviously 	includes 	opposing 	counsel, 	the
practice 	of 	deposing 	opposing 	counsel 	has 	been 	described 	as
“a 	negative 	development 	in 	the 	area 	of 	litigation, 	and 	one
that 	should 	be 	employed 	only 	in 	limited 	circumstances.”
Shelton 	v. 	Am. 	Motors 	Corp., 	805 	F.2d 	1323, 	1327 	(8th 	Cir.
1986).
District 	Courts 	within 	the 	First 	Circuit 	have 	employed
the 	test 	developed 	in 	Bogosian 	v. 	Woloohojian 	Realty 	Corp.,
323 	F.3d 	55 	(1st 	Cir. 	2003), 	to 	address 	the 	depositions 	of
counsel. 	See 	Angela 	Adams 	Licensing, 	LLC 	v. 	Wal-Mart
Stores, 	Inc., 	No. 	2:11-cv-05-GZS, 	2012 	WL 	752356, 	at 	*1 	(D.
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Me. 	March 	7, 	2012); 	Confederate 	Motors, 	Inc. 	v. 	Terny,
Civil 	Action 	No. 	11-10213-JGD, 	2012 	WL 	612506, 	at 	*1 	(D.
Mass. 	Feb. 	24, 	2012); 	In 	re 	Tyco 	Int’l 	Ltd., 	MDL 	No. 	2-md-
1335-PB, 	2007 	WL 	2682763, 	at 	*1 	(D.N.H. 	Sept. 	7, 	2007).
This 	test 	examines 	“whether 	(i) 	the 	subpoena 	was 	issued
primarily 	for 	purposes 	of 	harassment, 	(ii) 	[whether] 	there
are 	other 	viable 	means 	to 	obtain 	the 	same 	evidence, 	and
(iii) 	to 	what 	extent 	the 	information 	sought 	is 	relevant,
nonprivileged, 	and 	crucial 	to 	the 	moving 	party’s 	case.”
Bogosian, 323 F.3d at 66.
At 	a 	hearing 	regarding 	these 	motions, 	the 	Court
requested 	Emhart 	provide 	it 	with 	a 	list 	of 	topics 	it 	would
seek 	to 	inquire 	about 	if 	a 	deposition 	were 	permitted.
After 	careful 	review 	of 	these 	topics, 	the 	Court 	sees 	no
reason 	to 	permit 	Ms. 	Vaudo’s 	deposition, 	given 	her 	status
as 	an 	attorney 	working 	on 	this 	case. 	The 	topics 	of 	inquiry
provided 	by 	Emhart 	have 	been 	covered 	by 	voluminous 	document
discovery 	to 	date, 	have 	been 	the 	subject 	of 	deposition
testimony 	already 	taken 	in 	this 	case, 	or 	could 	be 	provided
more 	easily 	by 	the 	deposition 	testimony 	of 	another 	witness
in 	the 	future.7 Therefore, 	the 	Government’s 	motion 	for 	a
protective order of the deposition of Eve Vaudo is GRANTED.
7 The 	Court 	notes 	that 	the 	Government 	has 	made
representations 	that 	it 	will 	make 	witnesses 	available 	for
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B. 	Motion 	for 	Protective 	Order 	with 	Respect 	to
Tactical Herbicides in New Brunswick, Canada
There 	is 	no 	doubt 	that 	discovery 	is 	broad, 	but 	its
breadth 	is 	not 	limitless. 	The 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil
Procedure 	make 	this 	clear. 	See 	Oppenheimer 	Fund, 	Inc. 	v.
Sanders, 	437 	U.S. 	340, 	351, 	(1978) 	(reasoning 	that
“discovery, 	like 	all 	matters 	of 	procedure, 	has 	ultimate 	and
necessary 	boundaries”) 	(quoting 	Hickman 	v 	Taylor, 	329 	U.S.
495, 	507 	(1947)). 	Under 	the 	federal 	rules, 	“discovery
falls 	into 	two 	broad 	categories: 	matters 	relevant 	to 	a
claim 	or 	defense 	and 	matters 	more 	generally 	relevant 	to 	the
subject 	matter 	of 	the 	action.” 	Trombley 	v. 	Bank 	of 	Am.
Corp., 	636 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	151, 	153 	(D.R.I. 	2009). 	When 	a
party 	seeks 	discovery 	on 	these 	more 	generally 	relevant
matters, 	a 	court 	may 	require 	that 	discovery 	be 	for 	good
cause 	shown. 	Id.; 	see 	also 	Fed 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	26(b)(1) 	(“For
good 	cause, 	the 	court 	may 	order 	discovery 	of 	any 	matter
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.”).
Emhart 	dismisses 	the 	Government’s 	motion 	simply
stating 	that 	relevance 	is 	not 	a 	proper 	objection. 	This
position, 	however, 	ignores 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	26(b)(1), 	which
dictates 	that 	when 	a 	discovery 	request 	is 	unrelated 	to 	a
claim 	or 	defense, 	the 	party 	seeking 	production 	may 	be
additional 	questioning 	and 	the 	Court 	expects 	such 	testimony
will take place as necessary.
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required 	to 	provide 	good 	reason 	for 	its 	request. 	Emhart’s
position 	also 	overlooks 	decisions 	within 	this 	district.
See 	Rhode 	Island 	Hosp. 	v. 	Leavitt, 	C.A. 	No. 	06-260ML, 	2007
WL 	294026, 	at 	*3 	(D.R.I. 	Jan. 	26, 	2007) 	(holding 	discovery
that 	was 	not 	relevant 	to 	a 	claim 	or 	defense 	nor 	reasonably
calculated 	to 	lead 	to 	the 	discovery 	of 	admissible 	evidence
was not permitted).
“[W]hen 	an 	objection 	arises 	as 	to 	the 	relevance 	of
discovery, 	‘the 	court 	would 	become 	involved 	to 	determine
whether 	the 	discovery 	is 	relevant 	to 	the 	claims 	or 	defenses
and, 	if 	not, 	whether 	good 	cause 	exists 	for 	authorizing 	it,
so 	long 	as 	it 	is 	relevant 	to 	the 	subject 	matter 	of 	the
action.’” 	In 	re 	Subpoena 	to 	Witzel, 	531 	F.3d 	113, 	118 	(1st
Cir. 	2008) 	(quoting 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	26, 	Advisory 	Committee
Notes, 	2000 	Amendment). 	Where 	a 	party 	does 	not 	address 	the
good 	cause 	requirement 	and 	good 	cause 	is 	not 	apparent 	on
the 	record, 	discovery 	should 	only 	be 	ordered 	if 	the
discovery is relevant to a party’s claims or defenses. 	Id.
Emhart 	hinges 	its 	argument 	on 	the 	theory 	that 	the
proximity 	of 	Base 	Gagetown 	to 	Otis 	Air 	Base 	and 	Naval 	Air
Station 	Quonset 	Point 	imputes 	some 	relevance 	into 	the
testing 	of 	herbicides 	in 	New 	Brunswick, 	Canada 	nearly 	50
years 	ago. 	Emhart 	then 	reasons, 	“[s]uffice 	it 	to 	say 	that
Emhart 	expects 	to 	show 	that 	tactical 	military 	herbicides
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were 	disposed 	of 	at 	the 	Site 	[and] 	that 	its 	claim 	is 	not
restricted 	to 	the 	4,800 	drums 	delivered 	there 	from 	Otis 	and
Quonset.” 	(Emhart 	Objection 	to 	Gov’t 	Mot. 	for 	Protective
Order 	of 	30(b)(6) 	Deposition 	3, 	ECF 	No. 	189). 	This 	case
involves 	the 	pollution 	of 	a 	Site 	in 	North 	Providence, 	Rhode
Island. 	The 	Government 	accuses 	Emhart 	of 	polluting 	the
Site, 	while 	Emhart 	alleges 	the 	Government 	played 	a 	role 	in
the 	pollution 	of 	it. 	Herbicide 	testing 	in 	Canada 	simply 	is
not implicated by this case.
Emhart 	presents 	speculation 	and 	an 	assurance 	of 	what
it 	will 	do 	in 	the 	future 	in 	an 	attempt 	to 	tie 	Base 	Gagetown
to 	its 	claims 	and 	defenses 	or 	suggest 	that 	it 	is 	relevant
to 	the 	subject 	matter 	generally. 	This 	endeavor 	falls 	flat.
“Requested 	discovery 	is 	not 	relevant 	to 	the 	subject 	matter
involved 	in 	a 	pending 	action 	if 	the 	inquiry 	is 	only 	based
on 	the 	requesting 	party's 	mere 	suspicion 	or 	speculation.”
Sirota 	v. 	Penske 	Truck 	Leasing 	Corp., 	No. 	C05-03296 	SI,
2006 	WL 	708910 	at 	*1 	(N.D. 	Cal. 	Mar. 	17, 	2006) 	(citing
Micro 	Motion, 	Inc. 	v. 	Kane 	Steel 	Co., 	894 	F.2d 	1318, 	1324
(Fed. 	Cir. 	1990)); 	see 	also, 	Ameristar 	Jet 	Charter, 	Inc. 	v.
Signal 	Composites, 	Inc., 	244 	F.3d 	189, 	193 	(1st 	Cir. 	2001)
(holding 	that 	the 	Court 	would 	not 	permit 	the 	requesting
party 	to 	go 	on 	a 	“‘fishing 	expedition,’ 	with 	the 	mere
‘hope’” 	that 	it 	would 	obtain 	information 	it 	was 	seeking).
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To 	date, 	Emhart’s 	requests 	are 	not 	only 	speculative, 	but
are 	belied 	by 	historical 	evidence. 	The 	aircraft
responsible 	for 	the 	spraying 	was 	loaned 	out 	by 	a 	base 	in
New 	Jersey, 	the 	unit 	studying 	the 	impact 	of 	the 	chemicals
hailed 	from 	Maryland, 	and 	the 	location 	where 	the 	chemicals
were 	applied 	was 	in 	Canada. 	Certainly 	if 	discovery 	points
to 	a 	connection 	between 	Base 	Gagetown 	and 	the 	Site, 	Emhart
could 	renew 	its 	push 	for 	discovery 	on 	these 	issues. 	To
date, 	however, 	there 	is 	simply 	no 	connection 	between 	Base
Gagetown and the case at issue.
III. Conclusion
For 	the 	reasons 	stated 	above, 	both 	of 	the 	Government’s
motions for protective order are GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/William E. Smith
William E. Smith
United States District Judge
Date: November 8, 2013
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