Silva v. McBurney et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
Gerald J. Silva
v. 	Case No. 21-cv-048-SJM-AKJ
Magistrate John F. McBurney et al.1
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Gerald J. Silva, representing himself, filed a complaint in
this Court while he was incarcerated at the Adult Correctional
Institution in Cranston, Rhode Island (“ACI”). 	Mr. Silva’s
complaint (Doc. No. 1) and complaint addenda (Doc. Nos. 9, 10)
are before the court for preliminary review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(a). 	Also before the Court for a
recommendation as to disposition is the “Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff” (Doc. No. 16).2
1 Plaintiff Gerald J. Silva names the following defendants
in his complaint: United States District Court for the District
of Rhode Island Judge John J. McConnell Jr., Rhode Island
Supreme Court (“RISC”) Associate Justice Luis Matos, RISC
Associate Justice Maureen Keough, RISC Magistrate John F.
McBurney III, former RISC Magistrate Richard Raspallo, former
United States Attorney General William Barr, former United
States Attorney for the District of Rhode Island Aaron L.
Weisman, Rhode Island Attorney General (“RIAG”) Peter Neronho,
former Assistant RIAG Ronald Gendron, and unnamed Assistant
RIAGs.
2 In addition to recommending a disposition on Mr. Silva’s
motion for summary judgment, the undersigned Magistrate Judge
considers the factual assertions therein as complaint addenda
for purposes of preliminary review.
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Preliminary Review Standard
The court may sua sponte dismiss claims asserted in a
prisoner’s complaint if the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, a defendant is immune from the relief sought, the
complaint fails to state a claim, or the action is frivolous or
malicious. 	See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b). 	In
determining whether a pro se complaint states a claim, the court
must construe the complaint liberally. 	See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). 	In conducting preliminary
review, the court takes as true the factual content in the
complaint and inferences reasonably drawn from those facts,
strips away the legal conclusions, and considers whether the
plaintiff has stated a claim that is plausible on its face.
Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 102-03 (1st Cir. 2013)
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Background3
I. 	Federal Criminal Case and Supervised Release Violation
In 2014, a federal jury convicted Mr. Silva of six counts
of receiving child pornography and one count of possessing child
3 The Court’s summary of relevant background facts is drawn
from Mr. Silva’s complaint (Doc. No. 1) and complaint addenda
(Doc. Nos. 9, 10, 16). 	Additionally, the Court takes judicial
notice of Mr. Silva’s federal criminal case, United States v.
Silva, No. 13-cr-043-JJM-PAS (D.R.I.), and Rhode Island state
criminal case, State v. Silva, No. P2-2019-3668A (R.I. Super.
Ct.). 	See Fed. R. Evid. 201.
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pornography.4 	See United States v. Silva, 794 F.3d 173, 177 (1st
Cir. 2015). 	In that case, the Court sentenced Mr. Silva to
serve seventy-two months in prison, followed by fifteen years of
supervised release with conditions. 	See id.
Mr. Silva was released from the incarcerative portion of
his federal sentence on May 3, 2019. 	Mr. Silva then
“deliberately waited until May 7, 2019, which was beyond the
mandated report time-limit to report to any Federal Probation
Office, in order to continue [his] defiant challenge to the
organized crime syndicate in R.I. State and Federal
governments.” 	Compl. (Doc. No. 1, at 10).
As a result of his failure to report to the United States
Probation Office, a warrant issued for Mr. Silva’s arrest, and
United States Marshals arrested him pursuant to that warrant the
following day.5 	See id. at 10-11. 	After conducting a hearing, a
federal Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation
4 Mr. Silva maintains that the federal criminal prosecution
underlying some of the claims asserted here was retaliation for
his efforts to uncover an allegedly corrupt conspiracy operating
inside the Rhode Island legislature and judicial system. 	See
Compl. (Doc. No. 1, at 2-9). 	These allegations provide context
for the claims Mr. Silva has asserted in this case but are not
the subject of any claims asserted in the complaint, and
therefore are not recounted in detail.
5 Mr. Silva asserts that during his arrest, the United
States Marshals seized his money (totaling $110.10) and other
belongings in retaliation for his refusal to answer their
questions. 	Mr. Silva’s claims arising from this arrest and the
resulting seizure of his property are the subject of another
civil suit Mr. Silva filed in this Court, Silva v. Smith, No.
20-cv-012-PB (D.R.I.).
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(“R&R”) recommending, among other things, that the presiding
District Judge impose a four-month sentence, or time-served, for
Mr. Silva’s violation of the terms of his supervised release.
On September 16, 2019, United States District Judge John J.
McConnell conducted a final hearing, accepted the R&R, imposed a
sentence of time served, and, as discussed in more detail below,
remanded Mr. Silva to Rhode Island state authorities pursuant to
a warrant issued by the Rhode Island Superior Court (“RISC”).
See id. at 12; see also Sept. 16, 2019 Supervised Release
Violation Hr’g Tr., United States v. Silva, No. 13-cr-043-JJM-
PAS (D.R.I.) (ECF No. 144, at 24-30).
II. 	Rhode Island State Court Criminal Case
Mr. Silva was charged in the RISC with failing to register
as a sex offender. 	See State v. Silva, No. P2-2019-3668A (R.I.
Super. Ct.). 	While Mr. Silva was still in federal custody for
violating his supervised release conditions, RISC Magistrate
John F. McBurney III issued a notice for a pre-arraignment
hearing for Mr. Silva, which was sent to the home of one of Mr.
Silva’s relatives. 	See Compl. (Doc. No. 1, at 11). 	The
following day, Mr. Silva wrote to Magistrate McBurney,
disavowing any obligation to any Rhode Island state court
because he had not, in his view, “resided” in Rhode Island since
2014, when he was first incarcerated on his federal charges.
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Id. at 11. 	Mr. Silva also asserted that he “had deliberately
refused to establish a residence in any state,” and that he was
(then) “federally incarcerated . . . for violating [his] federal
conditions of probation, including refusing to establish a
residence in R.I.” 	Id. 	Mr. Silva, due to his federal
incarceration, did not appear at the RISC pre-arraignment
conference, and Magistrate McBurney issued a warrant for his
arrest. 	See id.
When Mr. Silva was released from federal custody on
September 16, 2019, federal authorities turned him over to Rhode
Island state authorities, and he was then incarcerated at the
ACI. 	See id. at 12. 	The following day he was arraigned in the
RISC on the state criminal charge alleging he had violated the
state sexual offender registration law.
On October 26, 2019, Mr. Silva wrote a letter to RISC
Associate Justice Luis Matos, the presiding judge in his state
court criminal case, accusing (then) Rhode Island Attorney
General (“RIAG”) Peter Neronha, and his assistants, of
prosecuting Mr. Silva without legal authority.6 	Id. at 13. 	Mr.
Silva also asserted in that letter that the state prosecutors
6 Here, Mr. Silva has stated that was not, at the time he
was charged in state court, a Rhode Island resident, and
therefore, the RIAG had no authority to prosecute him for
violating the Rhode Island sexual offender registration law,
which applies only to Rhode Island residents.
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and Magistrate McBurney were violating his Fifth Amendment
protection against double jeopardy. 	See id. 	Mr. Silva states
that Associate Justice Matos did not respond and refused to hold
an evidentiary hearing on the “false charges” the RIAG was
pursuing against Mr. Silva, in violation of his Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial. 	Id. at 13-14.
Several weeks later, on November 18, 2019, Mr. Silva wrote
to (then) United States Attorney General (“USAG”) William Barr
arguing that the above-described events constituted
constitutional violations and crimes. 	Id. at 14. 	Mr. Silva
contends that USAG Barr “failed in his sworn duties to uphold
the [U.S. Constitution]” because he did not respond. 	Id.
On December 18, 2019, Mr. Silva “notified” former RISC
Magistrate Richard Raspallo7 “about the State’s lack of
jurisdiction.” 	Id. at 15. 	Mr. Silva asserts, without further
explanation, that Magistrate Raspallo “refused to uphold his
sworn duty to protect the Constitutional Laws of the U.S. and to
protect [Mr. Silva.]” 	Id.
Approximately fourteen months later, on February 8, 2021,
Mr. Silva appeared before RISC Associate Justice Maureen Keough
for a hearing in his state criminal case. 	Mr. Silva claims that
Associate Justice Keough refused to discuss: the State’s failure
7 Former RISC Magistrate Raspallo is now an RISC Associate
Justice.
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to arraign or indict him on state charges since his arrest and
incarceration on September 16, 2019, in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial; his Fifth Amendment right to
be protected from double jeopardy because he had already been
adjudicated for failure to register as a sex offender when he
was found to have violated the conditions of his federal
supervised release; that Mr. Silva did not reside in Rhode
Island; and that the RISC had not responded to his motions to
dismiss and to change venue. 	Mr. Silva states Associate Justice
Keough’s refusal to discuss those matters was disrespectful to
Mr. Silva as a self-represented litigant. 	Mr. Silva also
asserts here that Associate Justice Keough “acted on behalf of
the State Assistant Attorney general, thereby performing the
function of a de facto prosecutor.” 	Compl. Addendum (Doc. No.
9, at 2-3). 	Mr. Silva further claims that neither his own
attorney nor the prosecutor fulfilled their respective duties to
protect his constitutional rights in his state criminal case.
Mr. Silva states that on May 25, 2023, he appeared in the
RISC, where the Court “dismissed” the state charges against him
“as being unfounded and without merit.” 	Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J.
(Doc. No. 16, at 1). 	Mr. Silva claims that the dismissal of his
state criminal case “validates” his complaint here. 	Id. at 2.
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III. Prison Conditions
A. 	Medical Care
Mr. Silva asserts that on September 16, 2019, the date he
was released from federal custody, taken into state custody, and
placed at the ACI, the ACI medical staff failed to provide him
with “life sustaining high blood pressure medication resulting
in a serious medical incident occurring during the night of
9/21-22/19.” 	Compl. (Doc. No. 1, at 15). 	Mr. Silva alleges
that the responsible ACI medical staff members violated his
federal constitutional rights, and were negligent, in failing to
provide him with his blood pressure medication. 	Mr. Silva also
complains generally of a “continuing lack of proper medical
treatment” during his incarceration at the ACI.
B. 	Access to the Courts
In his complaint, Mr. Silva alleges that, at the ACI, he
“had absolutely no direct access to the law library or any
access to the copier since at least March 13, 2020,” until at
least January 2021, which, he contends, “clearly violates” his
constitutional right to access the courts. 	Id. (emphasis in
original).8 	Mr. Silva asserts that his “ability to access
8 The court takes judicial notice that March 13, 2020
coincides with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United
States.
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[ACI]’s law library and copy legal documents” was “significantly
hampered” during his incarceration at that facility, in
violation of his federal constitutional right to access the
Courts. 	He also states that he experienced “interference and
damage to [his] ability to effectively access and navigate the
various judicial systems.” 	Compl. Addendum (Doc. No. 10, at 2).
IV. 	Claims Asserted
In his complaint, Mr. Silva alleges that the named
defendants’ actions are civilly and/or criminally prosecutable
under the United States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, the
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil
action for deprivation of rights), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985-86 (civil
action for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights), 18 U.S.C.
§ 241-42 (criminal analogs of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985-86), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a), (criminal Racketeer Influence Corrupt Organizations
Act (“RICO”) statute), and as a “Criminal Action for Conspiracy
against Rights of Citizens.” 	Compl. (Doc. No. 1, at 1, 17). 	As
relief, Mr. Silva asks this court “to take corrective actions to
protect society from any further harm by the defendants, and to
prosecute the defendants to the fullest extent of the laws.”
Id. at 18.
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Discussion
I. 	Claims Based on Criminal Statutes
As an initial matter, Mr. Silva’s complaint seeks to assert
criminal charges against the defendants for purported
“conspiratorial violations” of his constitutional rights.
Compl. (Doc. No. 1, at 1, 18) (citing, for example, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241, 242, and RICO). 	A private citizen, however, may not
initiate a criminal prosecution. 	See United States v. Texas,
599 U.S. 670, 677 (2023 (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“a private citizen lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
another.”). 	And “[o]nly the United States as prosecutor can
bring a complaint under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242 (the criminal
analogue of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).” 	Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2
(1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (noting that
neither § 241 nor § 242 gives rise to a civil action for
damages). 	Since Mr. Silva cannot bring criminal charges, the
District Judge should dismiss all of the claims Mr. Silva
asserts which allege any defendant’s civil liability for
criminal conduct, or which seek to bring criminal charges
against the defendants.
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II. 	Judicial Immunity
It is an 	axiom 	of 	black 	letter 	law 	that 	when 	a
judge 	carries 	out 	traditional adjudicatory 	functions,
he 	or 	she 	has 	absolute 	immunity 	for 	those 	actions.
Judicial 	immunity 	is 	appropriate 	unless 	a 	judge 	is
carrying 	out 	an 	activity 	that 	is not adjudicatory. 	To
determine 	if 	the 	judge 	is 	entitled 	to 	the 	full
protection 	of 	the doctrine’s 	deflector 	shield, 	the
Supreme Court 	has 	assessed 	whether 	the 	judge’s 	act was
one normally performed by a judge, and whether the
parties were dealing with the 	judge 	in 	his 	or 	her
judicial 	capacity. 	Further, absolute judicial
immunity means not just immunity from damages, but
immunity from suit altogether.
Strahan v. McCafferty, No. 23-cv-297-JJM-LDA, 2023 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 145806, at *11-*12, 2023 WL 5929070, at *4 (D.N.H. Aug. 4,
2023) (citations and internal punctuation omitted), appeal
filed, No. 23-1734 (1st Cir. Sept. 7, 2023).
Here, Magistrate McBurney’s, Associate Justice Matos’s,
then-Magistrate Raspallo’s, Associate Justice Keough’s, and
Judge McConnell’s alleged conduct were all judicial acts, as
they were acts normally performed only by judges in proceedings
in which the judges were acting in their judicial capacities.
The District Judge, therefore, should dismiss all the claims Mr.
Silva has asserted against Magistrate McBurney, Associate
Justice Matos, then-Magistrate Raspallo, Associate Judge Keough,
and Judge McConnell, and should dismiss those defendants from
this action.
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III. Prosecutorial Immunity
Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for “exercising
the core prosecutorial functions of ‘initiating a prosecution
and . . . presenting the State’s case.’” 	Penate v. Kaczmarek,
928 F.3d 128, 136 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
U.S. 259, 273 (1993). 	Here, Mr. Silva seeks to assert claims
against RIAG Neronha and his assistants for charging and
prosecuting him for an alleged violation of Rhode Island state
criminal law. 	As criminal charging decisions and the
prosecution of criminal cases are “core prosecutorial
functions,” Penate, 928 F.3d at 136, RIAG Neronha and his
assistants are entitled to absolute immunity. 	Accordingly, the
District Judge should dismiss the claims Mr. Silva has asserted
against them.
IV. 	Defendants Barr, Gendron, and Weisman
Mr. Silva’s complaint does not include any allegations
showing that former USAG Barr, former United States Attorney
Weisman, or former Assistant RIAG Gendron, engaged in any
conduct that violated Mr. Silva’s constitutional or statutory
rights. 	The complaint alleges no factual content pertaining to
former United States Attorney Weisman or former Assistant RIAG
Gendron, and Mr. Silva only alleges, in a conclusory manner,
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that former USAG Barr’s failure to respond to Mr. Silva’s
November 18, 2019 letter violated Mr. Silva’s constitutional
rights. 	Mr. Silva has no general constitutional right, however,
to receive a response to a letter to the USAG concerning his
criminal case. 	Accordingly, the District Judge should dismiss
the claims Mr. Silva has asserted against former USAG Barr,
former United States Attorney Weisman, and former Assistant RIAG
Gendron, for failing to state a claim upon which relief might be
granted.
V. 	Prison Conditions
A. 	Medical Care
Mr. Silva alleges that the ACI medical staff failed to
provide him with constitutionally adequate medical care, in
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. 	Because he was a
pretrial detainee at the time the events underlying these claims
occurred, Mr. Silva’s claims concerning his medical care at the
ACI arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
rather than under the Eighth Amendment, which applies only to
claims asserted by sentenced prisoners. 	See City of Revere v.
Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983).
“‘[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is
categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due
process.’” 	Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396 (2015)
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(emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 	Beyond that, the
government’s duty to protect the health and safety of persons
who are involuntarily detained “‘extend[s] at least as far as
the protection that the Eighth Amendment gives to a convicted
prisoner.’” 	Gomes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 460 F. Supp.
3d 132, 145 (D.N.H. 2020) (quoting Miranda-Rivera v. Toledo-
Dávila, 813 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2016)).
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment if (1)
the alleged deprivation of medical care is objectively
“sufficiently serious”; and 2) the prison official has
a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” that shows
“deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.”
. . . 	The objective component may be established by
allegations regarding an unmet serious medical need
“that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.” 	. . .. 	With respect to the
subjective component of the Eighth Amendment standard,
a defendant is deliberately indifferent if he
subjectively “knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety.” 	To show the
defendant had a culpable state of mind, the plaintiff
“must provide evidence that the defendant had actual
knowledge of impending harm, easily preventable, and
yet failed to take the steps that would have easily
prevented that harm.” 	“Deliberate indifference
entails something more than mere negligence, but is
satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for
the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge
that harm will result.”
Gomes, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 146 (citations omitted).
In Kingsley, the Supreme Court found that a pretrial
detainee’s excessive force claim should be evaluated under an
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objective standard. 	576 U.S. at 397. 	At this stage of this
case, in the absence of any argument from the parties on the
question, this Court declines to express an opinion as to
whether Kingsley has altered the law such that a pretrial
detainee who has been involuntarily detained no longer needs to
show subjective deliberate indifference in order to state a
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for inadequate medical
care, but need only demonstrate that the defendants’ actions
were objectively unreasonable. 	See generally Gomes, 460 F.
Supp. 3d at 147-48 (discussing potential impact of Kingsley on
conditions-of-confinement claims of civil detainees).
At the preliminary review stage, the Court can reasonably
infer, from Mr. Silva’s statement that his blood pressure
medication was “life-sustaining,” that his high blood pressure
constituted a serious issue in need of medical attention.
However, Mr. Silva has not at this time identified anyone at the
ACI who was responsible for denying him adequate medical care
for that condition. 	Further, while Mr. Silva has also claimed
that, in addition to not receiving his blood pressure
medication, he was subjected to a general lack of medical care
at the ACI, he has not stated facts concerning any specific
medical need he had for which he was denied adequate care or
treatment, or any defendant responsible for denying him adequate
medical care and treatment.
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Accordingly, in an Order issued simultaneously with this
R&R, the Court will provide Mr. Silva with the opportunity to
amend his complaint to identify the individual or individuals
who, he alleges, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying
him necessary medication for his high blood pressure. 	Mr. Silva
may also assert, in his amended complaint, other instances in
which he alleges he was denied constitutionally adequate care.
In his amendment, Mr. Silva should identify each person he seeks
to sue with regard to his medical care claim(s), and should
state, with specificity, what each of those individuals did or
failed to do to violate his due process rights. 	Mr. Silva must,
in his amended complaint, assert facts which demonstrate that
each defendant’s actions amounted to more than mere negligence.9
B. 	Access to the Courts
The First Amendment protects a prisoner’s right “to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances,” U.S.
Const. amend. I, and “[t]he right of access to the courts is an
9 In addition to his constitutional claims, Mr. Silva has
asserted generally that the unnamed ACI medical staff members
who denied him adequate medical care are liable to him for
negligence under state law. 	Accordingly, to the extent Mr.
Silva asserts facts in his amended complaint which demonstrate
one or more negligence claims, but which fall short of stating
constitutional claims, the Court will determine, after the
amended complaint is filed, whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over those claims. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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established aspect of this right.” 	Fabiano v Hopkins, 352 F.3d
447, 453 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) (It is well “established . . .
that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the
courts.”). 	In addition, denial of access to the courts for a
self-represented litigant may implicate the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 	See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996).
However, “[t]he right of access to the courts, in the
context of prisoners, is addressed only to a prisoner’s right to
attack his conviction and his right to challenge the conditions
of his confinement.” 	Riva v. Brasseur, No. 15-2554, 2016 WL
9650983, at *1, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23932, at *3 (1st Cir.
Sept. 12, 2016); see also Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. 	Further, a
prisoner must show actual injury, which occurs when an inmate’s
“nonfrivolous legal claim [has] been frustrated or [] impeded.”
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353.
Here, Mr. Silva alleges that he was denied access to the
law library and could not make copies during his pretrial
detention at the ACI, which interfered with his ability to
navigate “various judicial systems.” 	Mr. Silva has not
identified any harm he suffered to any specific court action he
was constitutionally entitled to pursue. 	Nor has he identified
any defendant responsible for denying him access to the library
and copies. 	Accordingly, the Court, in an Order issued this
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date, affords Mr. Silva the opportunity to file an amended
complaint identifying the defendant(s) to this claim and
stating, with specificity, what each defendant did to deny him
access to the courts. 	Further, Mr. Silva must assert facts to
demonstrate that he suffered actual injury in a legal matter he
was entitled to pursue, as a result of the actions of the
defendant(s).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should:
- 	dismiss all of the claims seeking criminal prosecution
or based on the criminal conduct of any defendant;
- 	dismiss all of the claims asserted against the
defendant judges;
- 	dismiss all of the claims asserted against: former
USAG Barr, former United States Attorney Aaron
Weisman, RIAG Neronha, former Assistant RIAG Gendron,
and the unnamed Assistant RIAGs Mr. Silva intended to
sue here;
- 	dismiss all of the currently named defendants, and the
unnamed defendant Assistant RIAGs from this case as
party defendants; and
- 	deny Mr. Silva’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.
16).
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. 	See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. 	Failure to file objections within the specified
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time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. 	See
Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir.
2016).
_______________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
December 28, 2023
cc: 	Gerald J. Silva, pro se
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